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- Mark Alicke & David Rose (2010). Culpable Control or Moral Concepts? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (04):330-331.
- Robert N. Audi (1974). Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (January):1-14.
- James Bell (2007). Absolve You to Yourself: Emerson's Conception of Rational Agency. Inquiry 50 (3):234 – 252.
- Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). Joint Responsibility Without Individual Control: Applying the Explanation Hypothesis. In Jeroen van den Hoven, Ibo van de Poel & Nicole Vincent (eds.), Compatibilist Responsibility: beyond free will and determinism. Springer.
- Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2009). Judgments of Moral Responsibility – a Unified Account. In [2009] Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 35th Annual Meeting (Bloomington, IN; June 12-14).
- Paul Bloom, Causal Deviance and the Attribution of Moral Responsibility.
- Talbot Brewer (2000). The Bounds of Choice: Unchosen Virtues, Unchosen Commitments. Garland Pub..
- Vivienne Brown (2006). Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):265-288.
- Donald W. Bruckner (2007). Rational Responsibility for Preferences and Moral Responsibility for Character Traits. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:191-209.
- Joseph Keim Campbell (2008). New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):193 - 201.
- Justin Capes (2012). Action, Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.
- Justin A. Capes (2010). The W-Defense. Philosophical Studies 150:61-77.
- E. J. Coffman (2011). How (Not) to Attack the Luck Argument. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.
- Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2007). Finking Frankfurt. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):363--74.
- David Copp (1997). Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility. Noûs 31 (4):441-456.
- Fiery Cushman, Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment.
- Oisín Deery (2007). Extending Compatibilism: Control, Responsibility, and Blame. Res Publica 13 (3).
- Fred Dretske (1992). The Metaphysics of Freedom. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):1-13.
- John Martin Fischer (2010). Precis of My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):229-241.
- John Martin Fischer (2010). The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories. Philosophical Review 119 (3):315-336.
- John Martin Fischer (2006). My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
- John Martin Fischer (2004). Free Will and Moral Responsibility. In D. Copps (ed.), Handbook on Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.
- John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Morally Responsible People Without Freedom. In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
- John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1993). Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Cornell University Press.
- Harry G. Frankfurt (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829-39.
- Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
- Carl Ginet (2006). Working with Fischer and Ravizza's Account of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 10 (3):229-253.
- Carl Ginet (2000). The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility. Noûs 34 (s14):267 - 277.
- W. Glannon (1999). Responsibility and Control: Fischer's and Ravizza's Theory of Moral Responsibility. Law and Philosophy 18 (2):187-213.
- Walter Glannon (1995). Responsibility and the Principle of Possible Action. Journal of Philosophy 92 (5):261-274.
- Richard M. Glatz (2008). The (Near) Necessity of Alternate Possibilities for Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):257 - 272.
- Patricia S. Greenspan (1978). Behavior Control and Freedom of Action. Philosophical Review 87 (April):225-40.
- Ishtiyaque Haji (2008). Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):239 - 261.
- Ishtiyaque Haji (2006). The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and a Defeated Dilemma. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):179 – 201.
- Ishtiyaque Haji (2003). Alternative Possibilities, Luck, and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 7 (3):253-275.
- Ishtiyaque Haji (1996). Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Induced Pro-Attitudes. Dialogue 35 (04):703-.
- Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2004). Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Manipulation Reconsidered. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (4):439 – 464.
- Pamela Hieronymi (2011). Making a Difference. Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):81-94.
- Pamela Hieronymi (2008). Responsibility for Believing. Synthese 161 (3):357-373.
- Ted Honderich, Harry Frankfurt: Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.
- Terence Horgan (1979). 'Could', Possible Worlds, and Moral Responsibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):345-358.
- David P. Hunt (2005). Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):126–145.
- David P. Hunt (2000). Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action. Philosophical Studies 97 (2):195-227.
- Peter Inwagen (1997). Fischer on Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):373-381.
- Jonathan A. Jacobs (2001). Choosing Character: Responsibility for Virtue and Vice. Cornell University Press.
- Neal Judisch (2007). Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism and the Consequences of Belief. Journal of Ethics 11 (4):357 - 375.
- Neal Judisch (2005). Responsibility, Manipulation and Ownership: Reflections on the Fischer/Ravizza Program. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):115-130.
- Arnold S. Kaufman (1962). Moral Responsibility and the Use of `Could Have'. Philosophical Quarterly 12 (47):120-128.
- Matt King, Getting Traction Without Tracing.
- Matt King, Manipulating Responsibility.
- Matt King (2011). Traction Without Tracing: A (Partial) Solution for Control-Based Accounts of Moral Responsibility. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):n/a-n/a.
- Matt King (2009). The Problem with Negligence. Social Theory and Practice 35 (4):577-595.
- Friderik Klampfer (2004). Moral Responsibility for Unprevented Harm. Acta Analytica 19 (33):119-161.
- Kristjan Kristjansson (1992). Social Freedom and the Test of Moral Responsibility. Ethics 103 (1):104-116.
- Neil Levy (2008). Introducing Neuroethics. Neuroethics 1 (1).
- Neil Levy (2008). Restoring Control: Comments on George Sher. Philosophia 36 (2):213-221.
- Neil Levy & Michael McKenna (2009). Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
- Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2003). Identification and Responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):349-376.
- Paul Litton (2007). The Insignificance of Choice and Wallace's Normative Approach to Responsibility. Law and Philosophy 26 (1):67-93.
- Andreas Maier (2008). Weeding in the Garden of Forking Paths - yet Another Look at Alternate Possibilities. Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):228-235.
- A. McIntyre (2000). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Review 109 (2):267-270.
- Michael McKenna (2008). Putting the Lie on the Control Condition for Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):29 - 37.
- Alfred R. Mele (2009). Moral Responsibility and History Revisited. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5).
- Alfred R. Mele (2009). Moral Responsibility and Agents' Histories. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161 - 181.
- Alfred R. Mele (2008). Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):263 - 286.
- Alfred R. Mele (2006). Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 10 (3):283-294.
- Hugo Meynell (2008). Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Edited by David Widerker and Michael McKenna. Heythrop Journal 49 (3):518–520.
- James Montmarquet (1993). Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Carlos J. Moya (2007). Moral Responsibility Without Alternative Possibilities? Journal of Philosophy 104 (9):475-486.
- Dana K. Nelkin (2008). Responsibility and Rational Abilities: Defending an Asymmetrical View. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):497-515.
- Thomas Nys (2009). Autonomy Under Threat: A Revised Frankfurtian Account. Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):3 – 17.
- Justin Oakley & Dean Cocking (1994). Consequentialism, Moral Responsibility, and the Intention/ Foresight Distinction. Utilitas 6 (02):201-.
- Marina A. L. Oshana (2002). The Misguided Marriage of Responsibility and Autonomy. Journal of Ethics 6 (3):261-280.
- Gordon Pettit (2005). Moral Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:303-319.
- Joseph Raz, Responsibility & the Negligence Standard.
- Joseph Raz, Responsibility and The Negligence Standard.
- Joseph Raz, Agency and Luck.
- Brian Ribeiro (2011). Epistemic Akrasia. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1:18-25.
- Paul Russell (2002). Responsibility and Control. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32:587-606.
- Carolina Sartorio (2004). How to Be Responsible for Something Without Causing It. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):315–336.
- George Sher (2008). Who's in Charge Here?: Reply to Neil Levy. Philosophia 36 (2):223-226.
- Katrina L. Sifferd (forthcoming). Translating Scientific Evidence Into the Language of the ‘Folk’: Executive Function as Capacity-Responsibility. In Nicole A. Vincent (ed.), Legal Responsibility and Neuroscience. OUP.
- Angela M. Smith (2010). Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness. Social Theory and Practice 36 (3):515-524.
- Angela M. Smith (2008). Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.
- Angela M. Smith (2005). Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life. Ethics 115 (2):236-271.
- Christian Stein (1997). Walker on the Voluntariness of Judgment. Inquiry 40 (2):175 – 186.
- Zofia Stemplowska (2008). Holding People Responsible for What They Do Not Control. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (4):355-377.
- Helen Steward (2009). Fairness, Agency and the Flicker of Freedom. Noûs 43 (1):64 - 93.
- Eleonore Stump (1999). Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: The Flicker of Freedom. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):299-324.
- Eleonore Stump & John Martin Fischer (2000). Transfer Principles and Moral Responsibility. Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):47-56.
- Andy Taylor (2010). Moral Responsibility and Subverting Causes. Dissertation, University of Reading
- James Stacey Taylor (2005). Willing Addicts, Unwilling Addicts, and Acting of One's Own Free Will. Philosophia 33 (1-4):237-262.
- James Stacey Taylor (2001). John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (1):125-130.
- Tim O'Keefe (2002). The Reductionist and Compatibilist Argument of Epicurus' "On Nature", Book 25. Phronesis 47 (2):153 - 186.
- Patrick Todd & Neal A. Tognazzini (2008). A Problem for Guidance Control. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):685-692.
- Peter Vallentyne (2008). Brute Luck and Responsibility. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):57-80.
- Peter van Inwagen (1999). Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):343-351.
- Peter van Inwagen (1997). Fischer on Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):373–381.
- Manuel Vargas (2005). The Trouble with Tracing. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269–291.
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