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  1. Larry Alexander (2014). Hart and Punishment for Negligence. In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility.
  2. Mark Alicke & David Rose (2010). Culpable Control or Moral Concepts? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (04):330-331.
    Knobe argues in his target article that asymmetries in intentionality judgments can be explained by the view that concepts such as intentionality are suffused with moral considerations. We believe that the “culpable control” model of blame can account both for Knobe's side effect findings and for findings that do not involve side effects.
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  3. Robert Allen, Free Agency and Self-Esteem: What Gaslighting Cases Show.
    An historical approach to free agency states that an agent acts freely iff she would reflectively accept the process by which her motive was formed. Its adherents eschew the notion that the content of an agent's motive determines whether or not she acts freely, believing instead that any belief, desire, cause, etc., no matter how self-destructive or bizarre it seems, may be an impetus to free action just as long as its genesis would be positively appraised upon reflection. Such a (...)
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  4. Robert N. Audi (1974). Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (January):1-14.
    This paper sets out and defends an account of free action and explores the relation between free action and moral responsibility. Free action is analyzed as a certain kind of uncompelled action. The notion of compulsion is explicated in detail, And several forms of compulsion are distinguished and compared. It is argued that contrary to what is usually supposed, A person may be morally responsible for doing something even if he did not do it freely. On the basis of the (...)
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  5. Dennis J. Baker (2007). The Moral Limits of Criminalizing Remote Harms. New Criminal Law Review 10 (3):370-391.
    I draw on accessorial liability jurisprudence in an attempt to outline the moral limits of criminalizing people for merely influencing the criminal choices of others. A person's conduct is a remote harm when it is harmless but for the fact that it encourages another independent party to commit a harmful criminal act (a primary harm). For example, the broken windows thesis holds that minor incivilities (such as passive begging) are a precursor to more serious crime. Passive begging allegedly sends a (...)
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  6. Chris Beckett (2009). The Ethics of Control. Ethics and Social Welfare 3 (3):229-233.
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  7. James Bell (2007). Absolve You to Yourself: Emerson's Conception of Rational Agency. Inquiry 50 (3):234 – 252.
    Ralph Waldo Emerson famously warned his readers against the dangers of conformity and consistency. In this paper, I argue that this warning informs his engagement with and opposition to a Kantian view of rational agency. The interpretation I provide of some of Emerson's central essays outlines a unique conception of agency, a conception which gives substance to Emerson's exhortations of self-trust. While Kantian in spirit, Emerson's view challenges the requirement that autonomy requires acting from a conception of the law. The (...)
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  8. Christopher Bennett, Edgar Maraguat, J. M. Pérez Bermejo, Antony Duff, J. L. Martí, Sergi Rosell & Constantine Sandis (2012). Symposium. The Apology Ritual. Teorema 31 (2).
    Symposium on Christopher Bennet's The Apology Ritual. A Philosophical Theory of Punishment [Cambridge University Press, 2008].
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  9. Gunnar Björnsson (2011). Joint Responsibility Without Individual Control: Applying the Explanation Hypothesis. In Jeroen van den Hoven, Ibo van de Poel & Nicole Vincent (eds.), Moral Responsibility: beyond free will and determinism. Springer.
    This paper introduces a new family of cases where agents are jointly morally responsible for outcomes over which they have no individual control, a family that resists standard ways of understanding outcome responsibility. First, the agents in these cases do not individually facilitate the outcomes and would not seem individually responsible for them if the other agents were replaced by non-agential causes. This undermines attempts to understand joint responsibility as overlapping individual responsibility; the responsibility in question is essentially joint. Second, (...)
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  10. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2013). A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.
    Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they are mistaken—theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept has proved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitions; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibility judgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are influenced by a number of (...)
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  11. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2009). [2009] Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 35th Annual Meeting (Bloomington, IN; June 12-14).
    Recent work in experimental philosophy shows that folk intuitions about moral responsibility are sensitive to a surprising variety of factors. Whether people take agents to be responsible for their actions in deterministic scenarios depends on whether the deterministic laws are couched in neurological or psychological terms (Nahmias et. al. 2007), on whether actions are described abstractly or concretely, and on how serious moral transgression they seem to represent (Nichols & Knobe 2007). Finally, people are more inclined to hold an agent (...)
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  12. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2009). Judgments of Moral Responsibility – a Unified Account. In [2009] Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 35th Annual Meeting (Bloomington, IN; June 12-14). 326-354.
    Recent work in experimental philosophy shows that folk intuitions about moral responsibility are sensitive to a surprising variety of factors. Whether people take agents to be responsible for their actions in deterministic scenarios depends on whether the deterministic laws are couched in neurological or psychological terms (Nahmias et. al. 2007), on whether actions are described abstractly or concretely, and on how serious moral transgression they seem to represent (Nichols & Knobe 2007). Finally, people are more inclined to hold an agent (...)
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  13. Paul Bloom, Causal Deviance and the Attribution of Moral Responsibility.
    Are current theories of moral responsibility missing a factor in the attribution of blame and praise? Four studies demonstrated that even when cause, intention, and outcome (factors generally assumed to be sufficient for the ascription of moral responsibility) are all present, blame and praise are discounted when the factors are not linked together in the usual manner (i.e., cases of ‘‘causal deviance’’). Experiment 4 further demonstrates that this effect of causal deviance is driven by intuitive gut feelings of right and (...)
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  14. John Hilary Bogart (1985). Law, Morality and the Criminalization of Negligence. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago
    There are two sorts of general categorical arguments against criminalizing negligence available on the basis of standard Anglo-American theories of the criminal law. One general line is founded on an assumed relation of subordination of the criminal law to morality. This is termed the external argument. In Chapters Two and Three it is argued that external arguments fail because no appropriate subordination thesis can be established for the relation between law and morality. The other source for a categorical argument against (...)
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  15. Karin Boxer (2014). Hart's Senses of 'Responsibility'. In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility.
  16. James B. Brady (1996). Conscious Negligence. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):325 - 335.
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  17. Talbot Brewer (2000). The Bounds of Choice: Unchosen Virtues, Unchosen Commitments. Garland Pub..
    Presents a sustained and original challenge to the orthodox understanding of the relationship between morality and voluntary choice. The two main theses of the book are that we can be morally responsible for aspects of our character that we have not chosen or otherwise authored, and that we can enter into interpersonal commitments to which we have not voluntarily consented.
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  18. Vivienne Brown (2006). Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):265-288.
    Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those that bring (...)
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  19. Donald W. Bruckner (2007). Rational Responsibility for Preferences and Moral Responsibility for Character Traits. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:191-209.
    A theory of rationality evaluates actions and actors as rational or irrational. Assessing preferences themselves as rational or irrational is contrary to the orthodox view of rational choice. The orthodox view takes preferences as given, holding them beyond reproach, and assesses actions as rational or irrational depending on whether the actions tend to serve as effective means to the satisfaction of the given preferences. Against this view, this paper argues that preferences themselvesare indeed proper objects of rational evaluation. This evaluation (...)
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  20. Edith Brugmans & Bert Hamminga (2000). Naar Aanleiding Van Responsibility and Control. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 62 (1):125 - 138.
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  21. C. Daryl Cameron, Joshua Knobe & B. Keith Payne (2010). Do Theories of Implicit Race Bias Change Moral Judgments? Social Justice Research 23:272-289.
    Recent work in social psychology suggests that people harbor “implicit race biases,” biases which can be unconscious or uncontrollable. Because awareness and control have traditionally been deemed necessary for the ascription of moral responsibility, implicit biases present a unique challenge: do we pardon discrimination based on implicit biases because of its unintentional nature, or do we punish discrimination regardless of how it comes about? The present experiments investigated the impact such theories have upon moral judgments about racial discrimination. The results (...)
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  22. Joseph Keim Campbell (2008). New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):193 - 201.
    This is the introduction to a volume of new essays in the metaphysics of moral responsibility by John Martin Fischer, Carl Ginet, Ishtiyaque Haji, Alfred R. Mele, Derk Pereboom, Paul Russell, and Peter van Inwagen. I provide some background for the essays, cover the main debates in the metaphysics of moral responsibility, and emphasize some of the authors' contributions to this area of philosophy.
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  23. Justin Caouette & David Boutland (2013). Perception of Addiction and Its Effects on One's Moral Responsibility. AJOB Neuroscience 4 (3):43-44.
  24. Justin Capes (2012). Action, Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.
    Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful.
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  25. Justin A. Capes (2010). The W-Defense. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):61-77.
    There has been a great deal of critical discussion of Harry Frankfurt’s argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), almost all of which has focused on whether the Frankfurt-style examples, which are designed to be counterexamples to PAP, can be given a coherent formulation. Recently, however, David Widerker has argued that even if Frankfurt-style examples can be given a coherent formulation, there is reason to believe that an agent in those examples could never be morally blameworthy for what she (...)
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  26. David Carr (2010). On the Moral Value of Physical Activity: Body and Soul in Plato's Account of Virtue. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 4 (1):3 – 15.
    It is arguable that some of the most profound and perennial issues and problems of philosophy concerning the nature of human agency, the role of reason and knowledge in such agency and the moral status and place of responsibility in human action and conduct receive their sharpest definition in Plato's specific discussion in the Republic of the human value of physical activities. From this viewpoint alone, Plato's exploration of this issue might be considered a locus classicus in the philosophy of (...)
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  27. Will Cartwright (2006). Responsibility: A Puzzle, Two Theories, and Bad Background. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):167-176.
    This essay seeks to illuminate both the theory and practice of holding people responsible. It investi- gates two leading accounts of responsibility, examining some of their implications and certain difficulties that they face. It tests the two accounts by applying them to an illustrative example, which demonstrates how the questions that are decisive in judging an agent’s responsibility are notably different on the two accounts. Although both views are variously illuminating, they each face difficulties and arguably depend on, or foster, (...)
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  28. Will Cartwright (2006). Reasons and Selves: Two Accounts of Responsibility in Theory and Practice. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):143-155.
    This paper advances further three of the matters dealt with in “Reasons and Selves: Two Accounts of Responsibility in Theory and Practice” (Cartwright 2006). It discusses the two theories of responsibility at the center of “Reasons and Selves” in the light of remarks made by the two commentators. It takes the sort of person who provided the practical example in “Reasons and Selves,” namely the delinquent with a disastrous background, and assembles a variety of possible ways of thinking about the (...)
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  29. Gregg Caruso (forthcoming). If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, Then People Are Less Responsible Than We Think. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
  30. Gregg Caruso (forthcoming). Précis of Neil Levy’s Consciousness and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
  31. Wan Har Chong (2006). Personal Agency Beliefs in Self-Regulation: The Exercise of Personal Responsibility, Choice and Control in Learning. Marshall Cavendish Academic.
  32. Randolph Clarke (2011). Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):594-624.
    It is widely held that one can be responsible for doing something that one was unable to avoid doing. This paper focuses primarily on the question of whether one can be responsible for not doing something that one was unable to do. The paper begins with an examination of the account of responsibility for omissions offered by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, arguing that in many cases it yields mistaken verdicts. An alternative account is sketched that jibes with and (...)
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  33. D. Justin Coates & Philip Swenson (2013). Reasons-Responsiveness and Degrees of Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):629-645.
    Ordinarily, we take moral responsibility to come in degrees. Despite this commonplace, theories of moral responsibility have focused on the minimum threshold conditions under which agents are morally responsible. But this cannot account for our practices of holding agents to be more or less responsible. In this paper we remedy this omission. More specifically, we extend an account of reasons-responsiveness due to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza according to which an agent is morally responsible only if she is appropriately (...)
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  34. E. J. Coffman (2011). How (Not) to Attack the Luck Argument. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.
    The Luck Argument is among the most influential objections to the main brand of libertarianism about metaphysical freedom and moral responsibility. In his work, Alfred Mele [2006. Free will and luck . Oxford: Oxford University Press] develops - and then attempts to defeat - the literature's most promising version of the Luck Argument. After explaining Mele's version of the Luck Argument, I present two objections to his novel reply to the argument. I argue for the following two claims: (1) Mele's (...)
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  35. EJ Coffman, Luck and Standard Libertarianism.
    ‘Standard Libertarianism’ (‘SL’) says that you act freely on a given occasion only if the past and laws of nature do not entail your acting as you do then. The so-called “Luck Argument” is one of the premier objections to SL. I here provide a reply to the Luck Argument that’s superior to ones prominent in the literature. §1 presents a common version of the Luck Argument, and highlights a challenge its proponents face. §2 identifies two desiderata of a reply (...)
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  36. Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2007). Finking Frankfurt. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):363--74.
    Michael Smith has resisted Harry Frankfurt's claim that moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise. He does this by claiming that, in Frankfurt cases, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present, but is a disposition that has been `finked' or masked by other factors. We suggest that, while Smith's account appears to work for some classic Frankfurt cases, it does not work for all. In particular, Smith cannot explain cases, such as the Willing Addict, where (...)
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  37. David Copp (1997). Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility. Noûs 31 (4):441-456.
    According to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for an action only if he could have done otherwise. PAP underlies a familiar argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility with determinism. I argue that Harry Frankfurt's famous argument against PAP is unsuccessful if PAP is interpreted as a principle about blameworthiness. My argument turns on the maxim that "ought implies can" as well as a "finely-nuanced" view of the object of blame. To reject PAP on (...)
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  38. J. Angelo Corlett (1990). Fingarette on the Disease Concept of Alcoholism. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 11 (3).
    Herbert Fingarette [1] argues that alcoholism is not a disease and that the alleged alcoholic under certain circumstances has the power to control his or her drinking disorders. I shall analyze Fingarette's argument and show that his position rests on some logical and conceptual confusions.In analyzing Fingarette's argument for the self-control theory of drinking disorders I conclude that it is problematic for the following reasons: (1) his argument assumes that the identification of a single cause of alcoholism is a necessary (...)
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  39. Florian Cova (2014). Frankfurt-Style Cases User Manual: Why Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases Do Not Necessitate Tech Support. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):505-521.
    ‘Frankfurt-style cases’ (FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy (J Philos 105:223–239, 2008) has recently argued that FSCs fail because we are not entitled to suppose that the agent is morally responsible, given that the mere presence of a counterfactual intervener is enough to make an agent lose responsibility-grounding abilities. Here, I distinguish two (...)
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  40. Keith Culver (1999). Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Review of Metaphysics 53 (2):444-446.
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  41. Fiery Cushman (2008). Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection (...)
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  42. Oisín Deery (2007). Extending Compatibilism: Control, Responsibility, and Blame. Res Publica 13 (3):209-230.
    In this paper, I argue that 'moral responsibility' refers to two concepts, not to one. In the first place, we are not ultimately morally responsible or, therefore, unqualifiedly blameworthy, due to the fact that we lack ultimate forms of control. But, second, it is legitimate to consider us to be morally responsible in another sense, and therefore qualifiedly blameworthy, once we have certain forms of control. Consequently, I argue that our normal practice of blaming is unjust, since it requires that (...)
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  43. A. E. Denham & Franklin Worrell (2013). Identity, Agency & Tragedy. In Zina Giannopoulos (ed.), The Philosophy of Film: David Lynch. Routledge.
  44. Ezio Di Nucci & Filippo Santoni de Sio (forthcoming). Who’s Afraid of Robots? Fear of Automation and the Ideal of Direct Control. In Fiorella Battaglia & Natalie Weidenfeld (eds.), Roboethics in Film. Pisa University Press.
    We argue that lack of direct and conscious control is not, in principle, a reason to be afraid of machines in general and robots in particular: in order to articulate the ethical and political risks of increasing automation one must, therefore, tackle the difficult task of precisely delineating the theoretical and practical limits of sustainable delegation to robots.
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  45. Susan Dimock (2012). Intoxication and the Act/Control/Agency Requirement. Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):341-362.
    Doug Husak has argued, persuasively I think, that there is no literal ‘act requirement’ in Anglo-American law. I begin by reviewing Husak’s reasons for rejecting the act requirement, and provide additional reasons to think he is right to do so. But Husak’s alternative, the ‘control condition’, I argue, is inadequate. The control requirement is falsified by the widespread practice of holding extremely intoxicated offenders liable for criminal conduct they engage in even if they lack control over their conduct at the (...)
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  46. David Dolinko (1991). Book Review:Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability. R. A. Duff. [REVIEW] Ethics 102 (1):172-.
  47. Fred Dretske (1992). The Metaphysics of Freedom. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):1-13.
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  48. Luc Faucher (2012). Tirer la responsabilité au clair : le cas des attitudes implicites et le révisionnisme. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 7 (1):179-212.
    Dans cet article, je considère l’influence possible des recherches récentes sur les attitudes en psychologie sociale, principalement dans le paradigme des théories des processus duaux [dual process theories], sur notre compréhension de la responsabilité. La thèse que je soutiens est que certaines révisions à notre façon de comprendre la responsabilité et nos pratiques d’attribution de la responsabilité pourraient être justifiées par ces travaux. Avant de présenter les révisions que j’introduis, je décris les grandes lignes du paradigme que j’utiliserai, soit celui (...)
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  49. John Martin Fischer (2012). Semicompatibilism and Its Rivals. Journal of Ethics 16 (2):117-143.
    In this paper I give an overview of my “framework for moral responsibility,” and I offer some reasons that commend it. I contrast my approach with indeterministic models of moral responsibility and also other compatibilist strategies, including those of Harry Frankfurt and Gary Watson.
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  50. John Martin Fischer (2012). Deep Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. OUP USA.
    In this collection of essays -- a follow up to My Way and Our Stories -- John Martin Fischer defends the contention that moral responsibility is associated with "deep control". Fischer defines deep control as the middle ground between two untenable extreme positions: "superficial control" and "total control". -/- Our freedom consists of the power to add to the given past, holding fixed the laws of nature, and therefore, Fischer contends, we must be able to interpret our actions as extensions (...)
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