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  1. Anton Benz & Robert van Rooij (2007). Optimal Assertions, and What They Implicate. A Uniform Game Theoretic Approach. Topoi 26 (1):63-78.
    To determine what the speaker in a cooperative dialog meant with his assertion, on top of what he explicitly said, it is crucial that we assume that the assertion he gave was optimal. In determining optimal assertions we assume that dialogs are embedded in decision problems (van Rooij 2003) and use backwards induction for calculating them (Benz 2006). In this paper, we show that in terms of our framework we can account for several types of implicatures in a uniform way, (...)
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  2. Cristina Bicchieri & Gian Aldo Antonelli (1995). Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like rationality at a node and knowledge at a node. We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own theory of the game. The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in general the (...)
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  3. Jonathan Birch (2014). Propositional Content in Signalling Systems. Philosophical Studies 171 (3):493-512.
    Skyrms, building on the work of Dretske, has recently developed a novel information-theoretic account of propositional content in simple signalling systems. Information-theoretic accounts of content traditionally struggle to accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation, and I show that Skyrms’s account is no exception. I proceed to argue, however, that a modified version of Skyrms’s account can overcome this problem. On my proposed account, the propositional content of a signal is determined not by the information that it actually carries, but by the (...)
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  4. Giacomo Bonanno (1999). How to Make Sense of the Com M on P Ri or Assumption Under Incomplete Information. International Journal of Game Theory 28 (3):409-434.
    The Common Prior Assumption (CPA) is central to the economics of information and the foundations of game theory. Recent contributions (Dekel and Gul, 1997, Gul, 1996, Lipman, 1995) have questioned its meaningfulness in situations of incomplete information where there is no ex ante stage and the primitives of the model are the individuals’ belief hierarchies. We address this conceptual issue by providing characterizations of two local versions of the CPA which are in terms of the primitives and, therefore, do not (...)
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  5. Tyler Burge (1975). On Knowledge and Convention. Philosophical Review 84 (2):249-255.
    It is argued that david lewis' account of convention in "convention" required too much self-Consciousness of parties participating in a convention. In particular, It need not be known that there are equally good alternatives to the convention. This point affects other features of the definition, And suggests that the account is too much guided by the "rational assembly" picture of human conventions. (edited).
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  6. Robin Clark & Prashant Parikh (2007). Game Theory and Discourse Anaphora. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 16 (3):265-282.
    We develop an analysis of discourse anaphora—the relationship between a pronoun and an antecedent earlier in the discourse—using games of partial information. The analysis is extended to include information from a variety of different sources, including lexical semantics, contrastive stress, grammatical relations, and decision theoretic aspects of the context.
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  7. Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden (2003). Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis' Game Theory. Economics and Philosophy 19 (2):175-210.
    David Lewis is widely credited with the first formulation of common knowledge and the first rigorous analysis of convention. However, common knowledge and convention entered mainstream game theory only when they were formulated, later and independently, by other theorists. As a result, some of the most distinctive and valuable features of Lewis' game theory have been overlooked. We re-examine this theory by reconstructing key parts in a more formal way, extending it, and showing how it differs from more recent game (...)
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  8. Rick Dale, Riccardo Fusaroli, Nicholas Duran & Daniel Richardson (2013). The Self Organization of Human Interaction. Psychology of Learning and Motivation 59.
    We describe a “centipede’s dilemma” that faces the sciences of human interaction. Research on human interaction has been involved in extensive theoretical debate, although the vast majority of research tends to focus on a small set of human behaviors, cognitive processes, and interactive contexts. The problem is that naturalistic human interaction must integrate all of these factors simultaneously, and grander theoretical mitigation cannot come only from focused experimental or computational agendas. We look to dynamical systems theory as a framework for (...)
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  9. Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Common Knowledge of Rationality in Extensive Games. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (3):261-280.
    We develop a logical system that captures two different interpretations of what extensive games model, and we apply this to a long-standing debate in game theory between those who defend the claim that common knowledge of rationality leads to backward induction or subgame perfect (Nash) equilibria and those who reject this claim. We show that a defense of the claim à la Aumann (1995) rests on a conception of extensive game playing as a one-shot event in combination with a principle (...)
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  10. P. Dekker (2000). Bi-Directional Optimality Theory: An Application of Game Theory. Journal of Semantics 17 (3):217-242.
    Optimality Theory catches on in linguistics, first in phonology, then in syntax, and recently also at the semantics/pragmatics interface. In this paper we point to some parallels between principles employed in optimality theoretic interpretation, and notions from the wellestablished field of Game Theory. Optimality theoretic interpretation can be defined as what we call an ‘interpretation game’, and optimality itself can be viewed as a solution concept for a game. More in particular, optimality can be characterized in terms of the game-theoretical (...)
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  11. David L. Dickinson (2000). Ultimatum Decision-Making: A Test of Reciprocal Kindness. Theory and Decision 48 (2):151-177.
    While fairness is often mentioned as a determinant of ultimatum bargaining behavior, few data sets are available that can test theories that incorporate fairness considerations. This paper tests the reciprocal kindness theory in Rabin (1993 Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics, The American Economic Review 83: 1281-1302) as an application to the one-period ultimatum bargaining game. We report on data from 100 ultimatum games that vary the financial stakes of the game from 1 to 15. Responder behavior is strongly (...)
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  12. Nicola Dimitri (2003). Coordination in an Email Game Without ``Almost Common Knowledge''. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (1):1-11.
    The paper presents a variation of the EMAIL Game, originally proposed byRubinstein (American Economic Review, 1989), in which coordination ofthe more rewarding-risky joint course of actions is shown to obtain, evenwhen the relevant game is, at most, ``mutual knowledge.'' In the exampleproposed, a mediator is introduced in such a way that two individualsare symmetrically informed, rather than asymmetrically as in Rubinstein,about the game chosen by nature. As long as the message failure probabilityis sufficiently low, with the upper bound being a (...)
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  13. Bruce Edmonds, A Brief Survey of Some Results on Mechanisms and Emergent Outcomes.
    The mechanisms/abilities of agents compared to the emergent outcomes in three different scenarios from my past work is summarised: the El Farol Game; an Artificial Stock Market; and the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Within each of these, the presence or absence of some different agent abilities was examined, the results being summarised here – some turning out to be necessary, some not. The ability in terms of the recognition of other agents, either by characteristics or by name is a recurring theme. (...)
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  14. Riccardo Fusaroli, Bahador Bahrami, Karsten Olsen, Andreas Roepstorff, Geraint Rees, Chris Frith & Kristian Tylén (2012). Coming to Terms: Quantifying the Benefits of Linguistic Coordination. Psychological Science 23 (8):931-939.
    Sharing a public language facilitates particularly efficient forms of joint perception and action by giving interlocutors refined tools for directing attention and aligning conceptual models and action. We hypothesized that interlocutors who flexibly align their linguistic practices and converge on a shared language will improve their cooperative performance on joint tasks. To test this prediction, we employed a novel experimental design, in which pairs of participants cooperated linguistically to solve a perceptual task. We found that dyad members generally showed a (...)
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  15. Margaret Gilbert (1996). Rationality and Coordination Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. Philosophical Review 105 (1):105-108.
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  16. Margaret Gilbert (1981). Game Theory Andconvention. Synthese 46 (1):41 - 93.
    A feature of David Lewis's account of conventions in his book "Convention" which has received admiring notices from philosophers is his use of the mathematical theory of games. In this paper I point out a number of serious flaws in Lewis's use of game theory. Lewis's basic claim is that conventions cover 'coordination problems'. I show that game-Theoretical analysis tends to establish that coordination problems in Lewis's sense need not underlie conventions.
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  17. Richard E. Grandy (1977). Review. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):129-139.
  18. Patrick Grim (2000). Evolution of Communication in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds. World Futures 56 (2):179-197.
    We extend previous work on cooperation to some related questions regarding the evolution of simple forms of communication. The evolution of cooperation within the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has been shown to follow different patterns, with significantly different outcomes, depending on whether the features of the model are classically perfect or stochastically imperfect (Axelrod 1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1985; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak and Sigmund, 1990, 1992; Sigmund 1993). Our results here show that the same holds for communication. Within a simple (...)
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  19. Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte (2013). Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence. Public Reason 5 (1):3-13.
  20. David Lewis (1976). Convention: Reply to Jamieson. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):113-120.
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  21. David Lewis (1972). Utilitarianism and Truthfulness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):17 – 19.
    D. H. Hodgson has argued that among highly knowledgeable and rational act-Utilitarians there is no non-Circular reason to be truthful or to expect truthfulness from others; wherefore these utilitarians forfeit the benefits of communication. I reply that hodgson goes wrong by tacitly assuming that his utilitarians have no premises to reason from except those that hodgson lays down in specifying the example under consideration.
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  22. Emiliano Lorini (2010). A Dynamic Logic of Agency II: Deterministic Dla {\Mathcal{Dla}} , Coalition Logic, and Game Theory. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):327-351.
    We continue the work initiated in Herzig and Lorini (J Logic Lang Inform, in press) whose aim is to provide a minimalistic logical framework combining the expressiveness of dynamic logic in which actions are first-class citizens in the object language, with the expressiveness of logics of agency such as STIT and logics of group capabilities such as CL and ATL. We present a logic called ( Deterministic Dynamic logic of Agency ) which supports reasoning about actions and joint actions of (...)
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  23. Teresa Marques & Manuel García-Carpintero (2014). Disagreement About Taste: Commonality Presuppositions and Coordination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):701-723.
    The paper confronts the disagreement argument for relativism about matters of taste, defending a specific form of contextualism. It is first considered whether the disagreement data might manifest an inviariantist attitude speakers pre-reflectively have. Semantic and ontological enlightenment should then make the impressions of disagreement vanish, or at least leave them as lingering ineffectual Müller-Lyer-like illusions; but it is granted to relativists that this does not fully happen. López de Sa’s appeal to presuppositions of commonality and Sundell’s appeal to metalinguistic (...)
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  24. Joe Mintoff (2004). Is an Agreement an Exchange of Intentions? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):44–67.
    Margaret Gilbert has argued that an agreement is not exchange of promises, since no such exchange plays all the roles she claims are distinctive of agreements. After briefly discussing the notion of intention and the principles governing intentions, I argue that a certain type of exchange of intentions — in which one person forms a conditional intention to act if the other does, and the other forms an unconditional intention to act on the presumption that the first will do what (...)
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  25. Richard Moore (2013). Imitation and Conventional Communication. Biology and Philosophy 28 (3):481-500.
    To the extent that language is conventional, non-verbal individuals, including human infants, must participate in conventions in order to learn to use even simple utterances of words. This raises the question of which varieties of learning could make this possible. In this paper I defend Tomasello’s (The cultural origins of human cognition. Harvard UP, Cambridge, 1999, Origins of human communication. MIT, Cambridge, 2008) claim that knowledge of linguistic conventions could be learned through imitation. This is possible because Lewisian accounts of (...)
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  26. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin (1997). Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-Ordination: Recent Lessons From Game Theory. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (2):171-90.
    The importance of the notion of common knowledge in sustaining cooperative outcomes in strategic situations is well appreciated. However, the systematic analysis of the extent to which small departures from common knowledge affect equilibrium in games has only recently been attempted.We review the main themes in this literature, in particular, the notion of common p-belief. We outline both the analytical issues raised, and the potential applicability of such ideas to game theory, computer science and the philosophy of language.
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  27. Cedric Paternotte (2010). Review of Brian Skyrms, Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (11).
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  28. Cedric Paternotte & Jonathan Grose (2013). Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):551-587.
    Recent years have witnessed an increased number of game-theoretic approaches to social norms, which apparently share some common vocabulary and methods. We describe three major approaches of this kind (due to Binmore, Bicchieri and Gintis), before comparing them systematically on five crucial themes: generality of the solution, preference transformation, punishment, epistemic conditions and type of explanation. This allows us to show that these theories are, by and large, less compatible than they seem. We then argue that those three theories struggle (...)
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  29. Robert Van Rooy (2004). Utility, Informativity and Protocols. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):389 - 419.
    Recently, natural language pragmatics started to make use of decision-, game-, and information theoretical tools to determine the usefulness of questions and assertions in a quantitative way. In the first part of this paper several of these notions are related with each other. It is shown that under particular natural assumptions the utility of questions and answers reduces to their informativity, and that the ordering relation induced by utility sometimes even reduces to the logical relation of entailment. The second part (...)
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  30. Don Ross (2008). Classical Game Theory, Socialization and the Rationalization of Conventions. Topoi 27 (1-2):57-72.
    The paper begins by providing a game-theoretic reconstruction of Gilbert’s (1989) philosophical critique of Lewis (1969) on the role of salience in selecting conventions. Gilbert’s insight is reformulated thus: Nash equilibrium is insufficiently powerful as a solution concept to rationalize conventions for unboundedly rational agents if conventions are solutions to the kinds of games Lewis supposes. Both refinements to NE and appeals to bounded rationality can plug this gap, but lack generality. As Binmore (this issue) argues, evolutive game theory readily (...)
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  31. Abraham Sesshu Roth (2014). Team Reasoning and Shared Intention. In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Springer. 279-295.
  32. Daniel Rothschild (2013). Game Theory and Scalar Implicatures. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):438-478.
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  33. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2012). Identification in Games: Changing Places. Erkenntnis 77 (2):197-206.
    This paper offers a novel ‘changing places’ account of identification in games, where the consequences of role swapping are crucial. First, it illustrates how such an account is consistent with the view, in classical game theory, that only outcomes (and not pathways) are significant. Second, it argues that this account is superior to the ‘pooled resources’ alternative when it comes to dealing with some situations in which many players identify. Third, it shows how such a ‘changing places’ account can be (...)
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  34. Rory Smead (2008). The Evolution of Cooperation in the Centipede Game with Finite Populations. Philosophy of Science 75 (2):157-177.
    The partial cooperation displayed by subjects in the Centipede Game deviates radically from the predictions of traditional game theory. Even standard, infinite population, evolutionary settings have failed to provide an explanation for this behavior. However, recent work in finite population evolutionary models has shown that such settings can produce radically different results from the standard models. This paper examines the evolution of partial cooperation in finite populations. The results reveal a new possible explanation that is not open to the standard (...)
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  35. Kai Spiekermann (2007). Translucency, Assortation, and Information Pooling: How Groups Solve Social Dilemmas. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (3):285-306.
    In one-shot public goods dilemmas, defection is the strictly dominant strategy. However, agents with cooperative strategies can do well if (1) agents are `translucent' (that is, if agents can fallibly recognize the strategy other agents play ex ante ) and (2) an institutional structure allows `assortation' such that cooperative agents can increase the likelihood of playing with their own kind. The model developed in this article shows that even weak levels of translucency suffice if cooperators are able to pool their (...)
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  36. Robert Sugden (2003). The Logic of Team Reasoning. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):165 – 181.
    Abstract Orthodox decision theory presupposes that agency is invested in individuals. An opposing literature allows team agency to be invested in teams whose members use distinctive modes of team reasoning. This paper offers a new conceptual framework, inspired by David Lewis's analysis of common reasons for belief, within which team reasoning can be represented. It shows how individuals can independently endorse a principle of team reasoning which prescribes acting as a team member conditional on assurance that others have endorsed the (...)
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  37. Raimo Tuomela (2009). Collective Intentions and Game Theory. Journal of Philosophy 106 (5):292-300.
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  38. Jan van Eijck, Collective Rational Action: Is It Possible?
    Individual rational action consists of (i) knowing what you want, (ii) taking proper steps to approach what you want as closely as possible, within the confines of the law. This one can learn, although some people are more skilled in it than others. Modern democracies are set up in such a way that they leave as much room as possible for individual rational action. Education for citizenship is sometimes taken to be: getting young citizens acquainted with the legal possibilities for (...)
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  39. Robert van Rooy (2004). Utility, Informativity and Protocols. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):389-419.
    Recently, natural language pragmatics started to make use of decision-, game-, and information theoretical tools to determine the usefulness of questions and assertions in a quantitative way. In the first part of this paper several of these notions are related with each other. It is shown that under particular natural assumptions the utility of questions and answers reduces to their informativity, and that the ordering relation induced by utility sometimes even reduces to the logical relation of entailment. The second part (...)
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  40. Peter Vanderschraaf (1995). Convention as Correlated Equilibrium. Erkenntnis 42 (1):65 - 87.
    Aconvention is a state in which agents coordinate their activity, not as the result of an explicit agreement, but because their expectations are aligned so that each individual believes that all will act so as to achieve coordination for mutual benefit. Since agents are said to follow a convention if they coordinate without explicit agreement, the notion raises fundamental questions: (1) Why do certain conventions remain stable over time?, and (2) How does a convention emerge in the first place? In (...)
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