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  1. Ken Akiba (2004). Conceptions of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):525 – 527.
    Book Information Conceptions of Truth. Conceptions of Truth Wolfgang Künne , Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2003 , xiii + 493 , £50.00 ( cloth ) By Wolfgang Künne. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. xiii + 493. £50.00 (cloth:).
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  2. William P. Alston (1996). A Realist Conception of Truth. Cornell University Press.
    William P. Alston formulates and defends a realist conception of truth, which he calls alethic realism (from "aletheia", Greek for "truth").
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  3. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2012). Sellars and Pretense on "Truth & 'Correspondence'" (with a Detour Through Meaning Attribution). Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (21):33-63.
    In this paper, we show how an internal tension in Wilfrid Sellars’s understanding of truth, as well as an external tension in his account of meaning attribution, can be resolved while adhering to a Sellarsian spirit, by appealing to the particular fictionalist accounts of truth-talk and proposition-talk (including meaning-attribution) that we have developed elsewhere.
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  4. Richard Kenneth Atkins (2010). Pragmatic Scruples and the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Dialogue 49 (3):365-380.
    ABSTRACT: Cheryl Misak has offered a pragmatic argument against a position she calls Scientific transcendentalists hold that truth is something different from what would be believed at the end of inquiry; more specifically, they adhere to a correspondence theory of truth. Misak thinks scientific transcendentalists thereby undermine the connection between truth and inquiry, for (a) pragmatically speaking, it adds nothing to truth and inquiry to ask whether what would be the results of sufficiently rigorous inquiry are really true and (b) (...)
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  5. J. L. Austin (1961). Unfair to Facts. In J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock (eds.), Philosophical Papers. Clarendon Press.
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  6. J. L. Austin (1950). Truth. Aristotelian Society Supp 24 (1):111--29.
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  7. Robert Barnard & Joseph Ulatowski (2013). Truth, Correspondence, and Gender. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):621-638.
    Philosophical theorizing about truth manifests a desire to conform to the ordinary or folk notion of truth. This practice often involves attempts to accommodate some form of correspondence. We discuss this accommodation project in light of two empirical projects intended to describe the content of the ordinary conception of truth. One, due to Arne Naess, claims that the ordinary conception of truth is not correspondence. Our more recent study is consistent with Naess’ result. Our findings suggest that contextual factors and (...)
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  8. C. A. Baylis (1948). Facts, Propositions, Exemplification and Truth. Mind 57 (228):459-479.
  9. Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (2005). Introduction. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon.
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  10. Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.) (2005). Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon.
    This volume will be the starting point for future discussion and research.
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  11. Simon Blackburn (2005). Truth: A Guide. Oxford University Press.
    The author of the highly popular book Think, which Time magazine hailed as "the one book every smart person should read to understand, and even enjoy, the key questions of philosophy," Simon Blackburn is that rara avis--an eminent thinker who is able to explain philosophy to the general reader. Now Blackburn offers a tour de force exploration of what he calls "the most exciting and engaging issue in the whole of philosophy"--the age-old war over truth. The front lines of this (...)
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  12. Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.) (1999). Truth. Oxford University Press.
    This volume is designed to set out some of the central issues in the theory of truth. It draws together, for the first time, the debates between philosophers who favor 'robust' or 'substantive' theories of truth, and those other, 'deflationist' or minimalists, who deny that such theories can be given. The editors provide a substantial introduction, in which they look at how the debates relate to further issues, such as the Liar paradox and formal truth theories.
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  13. Joseph K. Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.) (2002). Meaning and Truth - Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press.
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  14. John Corcoran (forthcoming). Tarski’s Convention T: Condition Beta. SOUTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LOGIC 1 (1).
    Tarski’s Convention T—presenting his notion of adequate definition of truth (sic)—contains two conditions: alpha and beta. Alpha requires that all instances of a certain T Schema be provable. Beta requires in effect the provability of ‘every truth is a sentence’. Beta formally recognizes the fact, repeatedly emphasized by Tarski, that sentences (devoid of free variable occurrences)—as opposed to pre-sentences (having free occurrences of variables)—exhaust the range of significance of is true. In Tarski’s preferred usage, it is part of the meaning (...)
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  15. Chris Daly (2005). So Where's the Explanation? In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon. 85.
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  16. M. David (2001). Truth as Identity and Truth as Corespondence. In Michael P. Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. Mit Press.
  17. Marian David (2009). Truth-Making and Correspondence. In E. J. Lowe (ed.), Truth and Truth-Making. Acumen Press.
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  18. Marian David, The Correspondence Theory of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact -- a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20 th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). During the (...)
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  19. Marian David (2006). Kuenne on Conceptions of Truth. [REVIEW] Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):179-191.
    The review focuses on Kuenne's account of truthmaking and on his minimalist approach to truth.
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  20. Marian David (2005). Armstrong on Truthmaking. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon. 141.
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  21. Marian David (2005). Review of Gerald Vision, Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and its Critics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
    The review focuses on Visions' general approach to correspondence theories.
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  22. Marian David (2004). Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):42 – 47.
    Contra Lewis, it is argued that the correspondence theory is a genuine rival theory of truth: it goes beyond the redundancy theory; it competes with other theories of truth; it is aptly summarized by the slogan 'truth is correspondence to fact'; and it really is a theory of truth.
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  23. Marian David (2004). Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):42 – 47.
    Contra Lewis, it is argued that the correspondence theory is a genuine rival theory of truth: it goes beyond the redundancy theory; it competes with other theories of truth; it is aptly summarized by the slogan 'truth is correspondence to fact'; and it really is a theory of truth.
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  24. Marian David (2004). Theories of Truth. In I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen & J. Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer. 331--414.
  25. Marian David (2004). Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):42 – 47.
    Contra Lewis, it is argued that the correspondence theory is a genuine rival theory of truth: it goes beyond the redundancy theory; it competes with other theories of truth; it is aptly summarized by the slogan 'truth is correspondence to fact'; and it really is a theory of truth.
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  26. Marian David (2002). Truth and Identity. In J. K. Campbell & M. O'Rourke (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations Into Philosophical Semantics.
    According to a classical correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true iff it corresponds to a fact. The approach has its competitors. One of them, the identity theory of truth, pushes for a surprising simplification. It says that true propositions do not correspond to facts, they are facts. Some find this view too bizarre to be taken seriously. Some are attracted to it because they worry that the correspondence theory opens a gap between our thoughts and reality--a gap that, (...)
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  27. Marian David (1997). Review of F. Schmitt: Truth, A Primer. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 106 (3):441-443.
  28. Marian David (1994). Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth. Oxford University Press.
    Marian David defends the correspondence theory of truth against the disquotational theory of truth, its current major rival. The correspondence theory asserts that truth is a philosophically rich and profound notion in need of serious explanation. Disquotationalists offer a radically deflationary account inspired by Tarski and propagated by Quine and others. They reject the correspondence theory, insist truth is anemic, and advance an "anti-theory" of truth that is essentially a collection of platitudes: "Snow is white" is true if and only (...)
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  29. Donald Davidson (1969). True to the Facts. Journal of Philosophy 66 (21):748-764.
  30. M. Devitt (1990). Realism and Truth, 2nd Edition. Princeton University Press.
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  31. Michael Devitt (1991). Realism and Truth. B. Blackwell.
  32. Igor Douven & Frank Hindriks (2005). Deflating the Correspondence Intuition. Dialectica 59 (3):315–329.
  33. Douglas Edwards (2013). Naturalness, Representation and the Metaphysics of Truth. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):384-401.
    : This paper explores how consideration of the notions of naturalness and eligibility, which have played an increasingly significant role in contemporary metaphysics, might impact on the study of truth. In particular, it aims to demonstrate how taking such notions seriously may be of benefit to ‘representational’ theories of truth by showing how the naturalness of truth on a representational account provides a response to the ‘Scope Problem’ presented by Lynch (2009).
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  34. B. D. Ellis (1990). Truth and Objectivity. Basil Blackwell.
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  35. G. Englebretsen (2006). Bare Facts and Truth: An Essay on the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Ashgate Publishing Company.
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  36. Hartry Field (1974). Quine and the Correspondence Theory. Philosophical Review 83 (2):200-228.
    A correspondence theory of truth explains truth in terms of various correspondence relations (e.G., Reference) between words and the extralinguistic world. What are the consequences of quine's doctrine of indeterminacy for correspondence theories? in "ontological relativity" quine implicitly claims that correspondence theories are impossible; that is what the doctrine of 'relative reference' amounts to. But quine's doctrine of relative reference is incoherent. Those who think the indeterminacy thesis valid should not try to relativize reference, They should abandon the relation and (...)
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  37. G. Forbes (1986). Truth, Correspondence and Redundancy. In G. Macdonald & C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and Morality: Essays on A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth & Logic. Basil Blackwell.
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  38. R. Fumerton (2002). Realism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Rowman & Littlefield.
    This book is a defense of realism about truth.
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  39. Michael Glanzberg, Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.
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  40. Hans Johann Glock (2006). Truth in the Tractatus. Synthese 148 (2):345 - 368.
    My paper takes issue both with the standard view that the Tractatus contains a correspondence theory and with recent suggestions that it features a deflationary or semantic theory. Standard correspondence interpretations are mistaken, because they treat the isomorphism between a sentence and what it depicts as a sufficient condition of truth rather than of sense. The semantic/deflationary interpretation ignores passages that suggest some kind of correspondence theory. The official theory of truth in the Tractatus is an obtainment theory – a (...)
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  41. Patrick Greenough (2008). Indeterminate Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):213-241.
    In §2-4, I survey three extant ways of making sense of indeterminate truth and find each of them wanting. All the later sections of the paper are concerned with showing that the most promising way of making sense of indeterminate truth is via either a theory of truthmaker gaps or via a theory of truthmaking gaps. The first intimations of a truthmaker–truthmaking gap theory of indeterminacy are to be found in Quine (1981). In §5, we see how Quine proposes to (...)
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  42. Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.) (2006). Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? The essays in this book debate these two questions, which are among the oldest of philosophical issues and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant, to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy, and original answers to debates of great interest both within philosophy and in the culture at large.
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  43. Dorothy Grover (2004). The Correspondence Theory of Truth. International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):438-440.
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  44. D. W. Hamlyn (1962). The Correspondence Theory of Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 12 (48):193-205.
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  45. Christopher S. Hill (2006). Précis of Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):174–181.
    Thought and World has three main concerns.1 First, it presents and defends a deflationary theory of propositional truth—that is, a deflationary theory of the concept of truth that figures in claims like the proposition that snow is white is true. I have long admired the deflationary theory of truth that Paul Horwich developed in the eighties, but I have also had substantial misgivings about that theory.2 In writing TW I was concerned to formulate an alternative view that enjoys the virtues (...)
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  46. H. Hochberg (1978). Thought, Fact and Reference: The Origins and Ontology of Logical Atomism. University of Minnesota Press.
    The Analysis of Perception i Moore's most systematic attempt to handle the problems of in- tentionality occurs in connection with his analysis of perception in Some Main Problems of Philosophy . He begins the book with the following ...
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  47. Herbert Hochberg (2003). Review of Andrew Newman, The Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (1).
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  48. Frank Hofmann, The Correspondence Theory of Truth.
    Ever since the works of Alfred Tarski and Frank Ramsey, two views on truth have seemed very attractive to many people. On the one hand, the correspondence theory of truth seemed to be quite promising, mostly, perhaps, for its ability to accomodate a realistic attitude towards truth. On the other hand, a minimalist conception seemed appropriate since it made things so simple and unmysterious. So even though there are many more theories of truth around - the identity theory, the prosentential (...)
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  49. Jennifer Hornsby (2005). Truth Without Truthmaking Entities. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon. 33.
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  50. Rognvaldur Ingthorsson (2006). Truthmakers Without Truth. Metaphysica 7 (2):53–71.
    It is often taken for granted that truth is mind-independent, i.e. that, necessarily, if the world is objectively speaking in a certain way, then it is true that it is that way, independently of anyone thinking that it is that way. I argue that proponents of correspondence-truth, in particular immanent realists, should not take the mind-independence of truth for granted. The assumption that the mind-independent features of the world, i.e. ‘facts’, determine the truth of propositions, does not entail that truth (...)
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