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  1. Jonathan Bennett (1974). Counterfactuals And Possible Worlds. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (December):381-402.
  2. Sara Bernstein (forthcoming). Omission Impossible. Philosophical Studies.
    This paper gives a framework for understanding causal counterpossibles, statements in which a counterfactual imbued with causal content has an antecedent that appeals to a metaphysically impossible world. Such statements are generated by omissive causal claims that appeal to metaphysically impossible events. I give an account of impossible omissions, and argue for two claims: (i) impossible omissions are causally relevant to the actual world, and (ii) the analysis of causal counterpossibles provides further evidence for the nonvacuity of counterpossibles more generally.
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  3. Francesco Berto (2013). Impossible Worlds. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013).
    It is a venerable slogan due to David Hume, and inherited by the empiricist tradition, that the impossible cannot be believed, or even conceived. In Positivismus und Realismus, Moritz Schlick claimed that, while the merely practically impossible is still conceivable, the logically impossible, such as an explicit inconsistency, is simply unthinkable. -/- An opposite philosophical tradition, however, maintains that inconsistencies and logical impossibilities are thinkable, and sometimes believable, too. In the Science of Logic, Hegel already complained against “one of the (...)
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  4. Jens Christian Bjerring (2013). On Counterpossibles. Philosophical Studies (2):1-27.
    The traditional Lewis–Stalnaker semantics treats all counterfactuals with an impossible antecedent as trivially or vacuously true. Many have regarded this as a serious defect of the semantics. For intuitively, it seems, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents—counterpossibles—can be non-trivially true and non-trivially false. Whereas the counterpossible "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then the mathematical community at the time would have been surprised" seems true, "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then sick children in the mountains of Afghanistan at the time would (...)
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  5. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (forthcoming). A Counterfactual Account of Essence. The Reasoner.
    Kit Fine (1994. “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1-16) argues that the standard modal account of essence as de re modality is ‘fundamentally misguided’ (p. 3). We agree with his critique and suggest an alternative counterfactual analysis of essence. As a corollary, our counterfactual account lends support to non-vacuism the thesis that counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are not always vacuously true.
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  6. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (forthcoming). Why Counterpossibles Are Non-Trivial. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), Synthese volume.
    I. Non-Trivial Counterpossibles On Lewis’ account, a subjunctive of the form ‘if it were the case that p, it would be the case that q’ (represented as ‘p → q’) is to be given the following rough meta-linguistic truth-conditions1.
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  7. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2013). Remarks on Counterpossibles. Synthese 190 (4):639-660.
    Since the publication of David Lewis’ Counterfactuals, the standard line on subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents (or counterpossibles) has been that they are vacuously true. That is, a conditional of the form ‘If p were the case, q would be the case’ is trivially true whenever the antecedent, p, is impossible. The primary justification is that Lewis’ semantics best approximates the English subjunctive conditional, and that a vacuous treatment of counterpossibles is a consequence of that very elegant theory. Another justification (...)
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  8. Richard Davis (2006). God and Counterpossibles. Religious Studies 42 (4):371 - 391.
    In this paper I critically examine Brian Leftow's attempt to construct a theistic semantics for counterpossibles, one that can be used to make sense of the fact that propositions, which exist necessarily, nevertheless depend on God as their cause. I argue that the impressive theoretical framework erected by Leftow cannot guarantee an asymmetrical dependence of propositions on God, and ultimately leads to a semantic collapse in which every counterpossible comes out false. I end by defending an alternative account of God (...)
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  9. Khaled El-Rouayheb (2009). Impossible Antecedents and Their Consequences: Some Thirteenth-Century Arabic Discussions. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (3):209-225.
    The principle that a necessarily false proposition implies any proposition, and that a necessarily true proposition is implied by any proposition, was apparently first propounded in twelfth century Latin logic, and came to be widely, though not universally, accepted in the fourteenth century. These principles seem never to have been accepted, or even seriously entertained, by Arabic logicians. In the present study, I explore some thirteenth century Arabic discussions of conditionals with impossible antecedents. The Persian-born scholar Afdal al-Dīn al-Kh najī (...)
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  10. Vincent Hendricks (ed.) (forthcoming). Synthese Volume.
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  11. Vincent Hendricks (ed.) (forthcoming). Synesthe Volume.
  12. Andrea Iacona, Counterfactuals as Strict Conditionals.
    This paper defends the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Its purpose is to show that there is a coherent view according to which counterfactuals are strict conditionals whose antecedent is stated elliptically. Section 1 introduces the view. Section 2 outlines a response to the main argument against the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Section 3 compares the view with a proposal due to Aqvist, which may be regarded as its direct predecessor. Sections 4 and 5 explain how the (...)
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  13. Jesper Kallestrup (2009). Conceivability, Rigidity and Counterpossibles. Synthese 171 (3):377 - 386.
    Wright (In Gendler and Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and possibility, 2002) rejects some dominant responses to Kripke’s modal argument against the mind-body identity theory, and instead he proposes a new response that draws on a certain understanding of counterpossibles. This paper offers some defensive remarks on behalf of Lewis’ objection to that argument, and it argues that Wright’s proposal fails to fully accommodate the conceivability intuitions, and that it is dialectically ineffective.
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  14. Seahwa Kim & Cei Maslen (2006). Counterfactuals as Short Stories. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):81 - 117.
  15. Barak Krakauer (2012). Counterpossibles. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts
    Counterpossibles are counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents. The problem of counterpossibles is easiest to state within the "nearest possible world" framework for counterfactuals: on this approach, a counterfactual is true (roughly) when the consequent is true in the "nearest" possible world where the antecedent is true. Since counterpossibles have necessarily false antecedents, there is no possible world where the antecedent is true. On the approach favored by Lewis, Stalnaker, Williamson, and others, counterpossibles are all trivially true. I introduce several arguments (...)
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  16. Brian Leftow (2006). Impossible Worlds. Religious Studies 42 (4):393-402.
    Richard Brian Davis offers several criticisms of a semantics I once proposed for subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents. I reply to these.
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  17. Edwin D. Mares & André Fuhrmann (1995). A Relevant Theory of Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (6):645 - 665.
    In this paper we set out a semantics for relevant (counterfactual) conditionals. We combine the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevant logic with a semantics for conditionals based on selection functions. The resulting models characterize a family of conditional logics free from fallacies of relevance, in particular counternecessities and conditionals with necessary consequents receive a non-trivial treatment.
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  18. Karl R. Popper (1959). On Subjunctive Conditionals with Impossible Antecedents. Mind 68 (272):518-520.
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  19. Joe Salerno & Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Williamson on Counterpossibles. The Reasoner.
    Lewis/Stalnaker semantics has it that all counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are vacuously true. Non-vacuism, by contrast, says the truth-values of counterpossibles are affected by the truth-values of the consequents. Some counterpossibles are true, some false. Williamson objects to non-vacuism. He asks us to consider someone who answered ‘11’ to ‘What is 5 + 7?’ but who mistakenly believes that he answered ‘13’. For the non-vacuist, (1) is false, (2) true: (1) If 5 + 7 were 13, x (...)
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  20. Edward Wierenga (1998). Theism and Counterpossibles. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):87-103.
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  21. Wayne Wobcke (2000). An Information-Based Theory of Conditionals. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (2):95-141.
    We present an approach to combining three areas of research which we claim are all based on information theory: knowledge representation in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science using prototypes, plans, or schemata; formal semantics in natural language, especially the semantics of the `if-then' conditional construct; and the logic of subjunctive conditionals first developed using a possible worlds semantics by Stalnaker and Lewis. The basic premise of the paper is that both schema-based inference and the semantics of conditionals are based on (...)
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