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  1. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2008). Insects and the Problem of Simple Minds: Are Bees Natural Zombies? Journal of Philosophy 105 (8): 389-415.
    This paper explores the idea that many “simple minded” invertebrates are “natural zombies” in that they utilize their senses in intelligent ways, but without phenomenal awareness. The discussion considers how “first-order” representationalist theories of consciousness meet the explanatory challenge posed by blindsight. It would be an advantage of first-order representationalism, over higher-order versions, if it does not rule out consciousness in most non-human animals. However, it is argued that a first-order representationalism which adequately accounts for blindsight also implies that most (...)
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  2. Robert L. Arrington (1979). Criteria and Entailment. Ratio 21 (June):62-72.
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  3. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1962). Criteria, Analogy, and Knowledge of Other Minds. Journal of Philosophy 59 (September):533-546.
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  4. William Cornwell, Making Sense of the Other: Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Conference Proceedings).
    Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to an empirical-verifiability criterion of mental or linguistic meaning. The acceptance of this criterion confronted them with the same problem: how to understand the Other as a subject with his own experience, if the existence and nature of the Other's experiences cannot be verified. Husserl tackled this problem in the Cartesian Meditations, but he could not reconcile the verifiability criterion with understanding the Other's feelings and sensations. Carnap's solution was to embrace behaviorism and eliminate (...)
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  5. Maximilian de Gaynesford (2002). Blue Book Ways of Telling: Criteria, Openness and Other Minds. Philosophical Investigations 25 (4):319–330.
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  6. J. C. Garvey (1979). Wittgenstein and Other Minds. Philosophical Studies 26:72-95.
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  7. W. D. Glasgow & G. W. Pilkington (1970). Other Minds on Evidential Necessity. Mind 79 (315):431-35.
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  8. Harrison B. Hall (1976). Criteria, Perception and Other Minds. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (June):257-274.
    The paper uses thompson clark's theory of the relation of perceptual parts and wholes to illuminate certain aspects of our knowledge of other minds. The thesis is that the traditional problem can be usefully broken down into two parts--One of which calls for a better understanding of the logic of perceptual concepts; the other, For a closer look at what happens when we try to take the epistemological skeptic seriously.
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  9. Stevan Harnad (1991). Other Bodies, Other Minds: A Machine Incarnation of an Old Philosophical Problem. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54.
    Explaining the mind by building machines with minds runs into the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is (...)
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  10. William Hasker (1971). Theories, Analogies, and Criteria. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):242-256.
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  11. Alec Hyslop (1973). Criteria and Other Minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (August):105-14.
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  12. Norman Malcolm (1958). Knowledge of Other Minds. Journal of Philosophy 55 (September):35-52.
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  13. M. McGinn (1998). The Real Problem of Others: Cavell, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein on Scepticism About Other Minds. European Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):45-58.
  14. Anne H. Narveson (1966). Evidential Necessity and Other Minds. Mind 75 (January):114-121.
  15. Paul E. Robinson (1991). McDowell Against Criterial Knowledge. Ratio 4 (1):59-75.
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  16. Richard Rorty (1973). Criteria and Necessity. Noûs 7 (November):313-327.
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  17. John T. Saunders (1973). Persons, Criteria, and Skepticism. Metaphilosophy 4 (April):95-123.
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  18. Charles Sayward (2004). Malcolm on Criteria. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):349-358.
    Consider the general proposition that normally when people pain-behave they are in pain. Where a traditional philosopher like Mill tries to give an empirical proof of this proposition (the argument from analogy), Malcolm tries to give a transcendental proof. Malcolm’s argument is transcendental in that he tries to show that the very conditions under which we can have a concept provide for the application of the concept and the knowledge that the concept is truly as well as properly applied. The (...)
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  19. J. Temkin (1990). Wittgenstein on Criteria and Other Minds. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):561-93.
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  20. Edoardo Zamuner (2004). “Treating the Sceptic with Genuine Expression of Feeling. Wittgenstein’s Later Remarks on the Psychology of Other Minds”. In A. Roser & R. Raatzsch (eds.), Jahrbuch der Deutschen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft. Peter Lang Verlag.
    This paper is concerned with the issue of authenticity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. In the manuscripts published as Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie – Das Innere und das Äußere, the German term Echtheit is mostly translated as ‘genuineness’. In these manuscripts, Wittgenstein frequently uses the term as referring to a feature of the expression of feeling and emotion: -/- […] I want to say that there is an original genuine expression of pain; that the expression of pain (...)
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  21. Edoardo Zamuner (2004). “Wittgenstein on the Fallacy of the Argument From Pretence”. In Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society.
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  22. Edoardo Zamuner (ed.) (2004). Wittgenstein on the Fallacy of the Argument From Pretence. Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society.
    This paper is concerned with the answer Wittgenstein gives to a specific version of the sceptical problem of other minds. The sceptic claims that the expressions of feelings and emotions can always be pretended. Wittgenstein contrasts this idea with two arguments. The first argument shows that other-ascriptions of psychological states are justified by experience of the satisfaction of criteria. The second argument shows that if one accepts the conclusion of the first argument, then one is compelled to accept the idea (...)
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