Cryonics

Cryonics is the preservation of legally dead human bodies at the temperature of liquid nitrogen in the hope that future technologies will be able to revive them. In philosophical debates surrounding this practice, arguments often focus on prudential implications of cryopreservation, or moral arguments on a societal level. In this paper, we claim that this debate is incomplete, since it does not take into account a significant relational concern about cryonics. Specifically, we argue that attention should be paid to the (...) potential implications of cryopreservation for the mourning processes of surviving loved ones. Cryopreservation increases the likelihood of disruption of the practical and mental tasks involved in a successful mourning process, which can negatively impact survivors of the cryopreserved patient. To illustrate my argument, we will draw on a case study from the 2019 documentaryHope Frozen. We aim to introduce this concern, in order to gain a more complete view on the potential implications of cryopreservation. (shrink)

Cryonics is the practice of cryopreserving the bodies or brains of legally dead individuals with the hope that these individuals will be reanimated in the future. A standard argument for cryonics says that cryonics is prudentially justified despite uncertainty about its success because at worst it will leave you no worse off than you otherwise would have been had you not chosen cryonics, and at best it will leave you much better off than you otherwise would have been. Thus, it (...) is a good, no-risk bet; in game-theoretic terms, cryonics is a weakly dominant strategy relative to refraining from utilizing cryonics. I object to this argument for two reasons. First, I argue that there is a practically relevant chance that cryonics will put you into an inescapable and very bad situation. Hence, cryonics is neither a no-risk bet nor a weakly dominant strategy. Second, I argue that the experience of being reanimated and living in the distant future would likely be transformative, and this likelihood undermines your justification for thinking that reanimation would be beneficial to you. I conclude that the standard argument does not show that cryonics is prudentially justified. (shrink)

By utilizing words, photographs, and motion pictures, this multimodal and multisited project traces a rhizomatic genealogy of Russian Cosmism—a nineteenth century political theology promoting a universal human program for overcoming death, resurrecting ancestors, and traveling through the cosmos—throughout post-Soviet techno-utopian projects and imaginaries. I illustrate how Cosmist techno-utopian, futurist, and other-than-human discourse exist as Weberian “elective affinities” within diverse ecologies of the imagination, transmitting a variety of philosophies and political programs throughout trans-temporal, yet philosophically bounded, communities. With a particular focus (...) on the United States and Ukraine, and taking an apophatic analytical position, I dissect how different groups of philosophers, technologists, and publics interact(ed) with Cosmism, as well as how seemingly disparate communities (re)shape and deterritorialize Cosmist political theology in an attempt to legitimize their constructed political imaginaries. (shrink)

In 1989, Thomas Donaldson requested the California courts to allow physicians to hasten his death. Donaldson had been diagnosed with brain cancer, and he desired to die in order to cryonically preserve his brain, so as to stop its further deterioration. This case elicits an important question: is this a case of euthanasia? In this article, we examine the traditional criteria of death, and contrast it with the information-theoretic criterion. If this criterion is accepted, we posit that Donaldson’s case would (...) have been cryocide, but not euthanasia. We then examine if cryocide is an ethically feasible alternative to euthanasia. To do so, we rely on the ethical doctrine of double effect. (shrink)

This article explores theoretical conditions necessary for “quantum immortality” (QI) as well as its possible practical implications. It is demonstrated that the QI is a particular case of “multiverse immortality” (MI) which is based on two main assumptions: the very large size of the Universe (not necessary because of quantum effects), and the copy-friendly theory of personal identity. It is shown that a popular objection about the lowering of the world-share (measure) of an observer in the case of QI doesn’t (...) work, as the world-share decline could be compensated by the merging timelines for the simpler minds, and also some types of personal preferences are not dependent on such changes. Despite large uncertainty about MI’s validity, it still has appreciable practical consequences in some important outcomes like suicide and aging. The article demonstrates that MI could be used to significantly increase the expected subjective probability of success of risky life extension technologies, like cryonics, but makes euthanasia impractical, because of the risks of eternal suffering. Euthanasia should be replaced with cryothanasia, i.e. cryopreservation after voluntary death. Another possible application of MI is as a last chance to survive a global catastrophe. MI could be considered a plan D of reaching immortality, where plan A consists of the survival until the creation of the beneficial AI via fighting aging, plan B is cryonics, and plan C is digital immortality. (shrink)

Mormonism mandates Transhumanism based on four premises that reflect the Mormon authoritative tradition. First, God commands us to use ordained means to participate in God's work. Second, science and technology are among the means ordained of God. Third, God's work is to help each other attain Godhood. And fourth, an essential attribute of Godhood is a glorified immortal body. Thus, God commands us to use science and technology to help each other attain a glorified immortal body, which qualifies as Transhumanism. (...) This mandate is consistent with Mormon accounts of the Tower of Babel, as well as with Mormon positions that impinge on assessment of technologies commonly advocated by Transhumanists, such as cryonics and mind uploading. (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on the most efficacious AI applications for life extension and anti-aging at three expected stages of AI development: narrow AI, AGI and superintelligence. First, we overview the existing research and commercial work performed by a select number of startups and academic projects. We find that at the current stage of “narrow” AI, the most promising areas for life extension are geroprotector-combination discovery, detection of aging biomarkers, and personalized anti-aging therapy. These advances could help currently living (...) people reach longevity escape velocity and survive until more advanced AI appears. When AI comes close to human level, the main contribution to life extension will come from AI integration with humans through brain-computer interfaces, integrated AI assistants capable of autonomously diagnosing and treating health issues, and cyber systems embedded into human bodies. Lastly, we speculate about the more remote future, when AI reaches the level of superintelligence and such life-extension methods as uploading human minds and creating nanotechnological bodies may become possible, thus lowering the probability of human death close to zero. We suggest that medical AI based superintelligence could be safer than, say, military AI, as it may help humans to evolve into part of the future superintelligence via brain augmentation, uploading, and a network of self-improving humans. Medical AI’s value system is focused on human benefit. (shrink)

It might seem counterintuitive to think transhumanists, who are typically characterized by extreme techno-optimism and hope for radical life-extension, would be interested in assisted dying. Because the technological enhancements they long for will probably not be available during their natural lifetimes, many transhumanists at least entertain the idea of having themselves cryonically preserved to buy some additional time for real-world technology to catch up to their dreams. However, since an ideal preservation would take place before serious cellular deterioration sets in, (...) controlling the time and manner of death would be very attractive for transhumanist cryonicists. This chapter identifies some circumstances under which they might be justified in seeking assistance in dying (even though they would describe it as something more akin to hibernating). After providing a fundamental overview of both transhumanism and cryonics, and then making my case for what some scholars have called “cryothanasia” (i.e. assisted dying for the purpose of improved preservation quality), I proceed to consider some scenarios meant to test the limits of this justification. While things are admittedly murkier when considering the possibility of cryothanasia outside the context of imminent medical collapse, I can see no insurmountable criticisms of cryothanasia as a last resort in cases of (currently) terminal and irreparable neurodegeneration or other forms of progressive brain damage. (shrink)

This dissertation discusses several ethical and moral issues which arise from the cryonics movement. Within each section, the question is posed: how does that problem impact on how we should think about cryonics? Is cryonics morally permissible and/or morally obligatory? Issues include a consideration of economic resource allocation, bodily ownership and identity.

Cryoethics is a new theme within bioethics (see bioethics) concerned with the ethics of cryonic storage. Cryonics, which is also erroneously referred to as “cryogenic” technology, offers people the option of having their bodies or brain-stems preserved at very low temperatures after death in order to be revived at some point in the future when technology is sufficiently advanced to enable reanimation, and possibly immortality. The main issues in cryoethics center around whether it is ethical to use this technology, and (...) whether it is prudent to do so. While there are several prudential and ethical arguments against cryonic storage, there is only one argument in favor, but it is quite powerful: the possibility of cheating death for a few years, or even forever if technology advances enough in the time before revival (Shaw 2009). (shrink)

Youniverse is about you and the way things really are--how to improve your chances of a much longer and more satisfying life.

Cryonic suspension is a relatively new technology that offers those who can afford it the chance to be 'frozen' for future revival when they reach the ends of their lives. This paper will examine the ethical status of this technology and whether its use can be justified. Among the arguments against using this technology are: it is 'against nature', and would change the very concept of death; no friends or family of the 'freezee' will be left alive when he is (...) revived; the considerable expense involved for the freezee and the future society that will revive him; the environmental cost of maintaining suspension; those who wish to use cryonics might not live life to the full because they would economize in order to afford suspension; and cryonics could lead to premature euthanasia in order to maximize chances of success. Furthermore, science might not advance enough to ever permit revival, and reanimation might not take place due to socio-political or catastrophic reasons. Arguments advanced by proponents of cryonics include: the potential benefit to society; the ability to cheat death for at least a few more years; the prospect of immortality if revival is successful; and all the associated benefits that delaying or avoiding dying would bring. It emerges that it might be imprudent not to use the technology, given the relatively minor expense involved and the potential payoff. An adapted and more persuasive version of Pascal's Wager is presented and offered as a conclusive argument in favour of utilizing cryonic suspension. (shrink)

This paper considers the issue of cryopreservation and the definition of death from an Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective. A central conceptual focus throughout this discussion is the purportedly irreversible nature of death and the criteria by which a human body is considered to be informed by a rational soul. It concludes that a cryopreserved corpse fails to have “life potentially in it” sufficient to satisfy Aristotle’s definition of ensoulment. Therefore, if the possibility that such a corpse may be successfully preserved and resuscitated (...) comes to fruition, one would have to conclude that the person’s rational soul, which had separated from its body at death, has literally reanimated its resuscitated body. Obviously, this conclusion has theological implications that go beyond the scope of this discussion if we regard bodily resuscitation in this manner as a form of technologically induced resurrection. Another apparent implication of the paper’s argument is that, in a limited sense, death loses its irreversible nature. (shrink)