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  1. J. McKenzie Alexander (2012). Decision Theory Meets the Witch of Agnesi. Journal of Philosophy 109 (12):712-727.
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  2. Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2005). Value and Unacceptable Risk. Economics and Philosophy 21 (2):177-197.
    Consider a transitive value ordering of outcomes and lotteries on outcomes, which satisfies substitutivity of equivalents and obeys “continuity for easy cases,” i.e., allows compensating risks of small losses by chances of small improvements. Temkin (2001) has argued that such an ordering must also – rather counter-intuitively – allow chances of small improvements to compensate risks of huge losses. In this paper, we show that Temkin's argument is flawed but that a better proof is possible. However, it is more difficult (...)
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  3. Marcus Arvan (forthcoming). How to Rationally Approach Life's Transformative Experiences. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    In a widely discussed forthcoming article, “What you can’t expect when you’re expecting”, as well as in a forthcoming book, L.A. Paul uses the notion of transformative experience to challenge culturally and philosophically traditional views about how to rationally make major life-decisions, most specifically the decision of whether to have children. The present paper argues that if the problem Paul presents has no direct solution—if there is no way to defend the philosophically and culturally dominant approach to rational decision-making for (...)
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  4. Robert Audi (1986). Action Theory as a Resource for Decision Theory. Theory and Decision 20 (3):207-221.
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  5. S. K. Berninghaus, S. J. Brams, P. H. Edelman, J. Esteban, I. Fischer, P. C. Fishburn, G. Gigliotti, W. Güth, R. D. Luce & P. Modesti (2003). Theory and Decision. Theory and Decision 55 (392).
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  6. Magnus Boman (1999). Norms in Artificial Decision Making. Artificial Intelligence and Law 7 (1):17-35.
    A method for forcing norms onto individual agents in a multi-agent system is presented. The agents under study are supersoft agents: autonomous artificial agents programmed to represent and evaluate vague and imprecise information. Agents are further assumed to act in accordance with advice obtained from a normative decision module, with which they can communicate. Norms act as global constraints on the evaluations performed in the decision module and hence no action that violates a norm will be suggested to any agent. (...)
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  7. James Cargile (1984). Rational Decision and Causality by Ellery Eells. Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):163-168.
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  8. Michael Clark & Nicholas Shackel (2003). Decision Theory, Symmetry and Causal Structure: Reply to Meacham and Weisberg. Mind 112 (448):691-701.
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  9. Franz Dietrich, How to Reach Legitimate Decisions When the Procedure is Controversial.
    Imagine a group that faces a decision problem but does not agree on which decision procedure is appropriate. In that case, can a decision be reached that respects the procedural concerns of the group? There is a sense in which legitimate decisions are possible even if people disagree on which procedure to use. I propose to decide in favour of an option which maximizes the number of persons whose judged-right procedure happens to entail this decision given the profile. This decision (...)
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  10. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2013). A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice. Noûs 47 (1):104-134.
    There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philosophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational choices, the other rarely engages with the formal models of decision problems used by social scientists. To bridge this gap, we propose a new, reason-based theory of rational choice. At its core is an account of preference formation, according to which an agent’s preferences are determined by his or her motivating reasons, together with a (...)
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  11. Daniel Dohrn (forthcoming). Egan and Agents: How Evidential Decision Theory Can Deal with Egan’s Dilemma. Synthese:1-26.
    Andy Egan has presented a dilemma for decision theory. As is well known, Newcomb cases appear to undermine the case for evidential decision theory . However, Egan has come up with a new scenario which poses difficulties for causal decision theory. I offer a simple solution to this dilemma in terms of a modified EDT. I propose an epistemological test: take some feature which is relevant to your evaluation of the scenarios under consideration, evidentially correlated with the actions under consideration (...)
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  12. P. Dowe (1998). A Problem for Causal Decision Theory: Causality and Identity. Communication and Cognition. Monographies 31 (4):325-338.
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  13. R. Allen Gardner & John B. Forsythe (1961). Supplementary Report: Two-Choice Decision Behavior with Many Alternative Events. Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (6):631.
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  14. Hilary Greaves (2013). Epistemic Decision Theory. Mind 122 (488):915-952.
    I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in a consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focused on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent’s choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction leads to a proliferation of puzzle cases and theories to deal with them, including epistemic analogues of evidential and causal decision theory, and (...)
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  15. York Hagmayer & Björn Meder (2008). Causal Learning Through Repeated Decision Making. In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. 179--184.
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  16. Alan Hájek & Harris Nover (2006). Perplexing Expectations. Mind 115 (459):703 - 720.
    This paper revisits the Pasadena game (Nover and Háyek 2004), a St Petersburg-like game whose expectation is undefined. We discuss serveral respects in which the Pasadena game is even more troublesome for decision theory than the St Petersburg game. Colyvan (2006) argues that the decision problem of whether or not to play the Pasadena game is ‘ill-posed’. He goes on to advocate a ‘pluralism’ regarding decision rules, which embraces dominance reasoning as well as maximizing expected utility. We rebut Colyvan’s argument, (...)
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  17. Richard Jeffrey (1993). Causality in the Logic of Decision. Philosophical Topics 21 (1):139-151.
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  18. James Joyce (1995). Decision Theory. Philosophical Books 36 (4):225-237.
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  19. James M. Joyce (2007). Are Newcomb Problems Really Decisions? Synthese 156 (3):537 - 562.
    Richard Jeffrey long held that decision theory should be formulated without recourse to explicitly causal notions. Newcomb problems stand out as putative counterexamples to this ‘evidential’ decision theory. Jeffrey initially sought to defuse Newcomb problems via recourse to the doctrine of ratificationism, but later came to see this as problematic. We will see that Jeffrey’s worries about ratificationism were not compelling, but that valid ratificationist arguments implicitly presuppose causal decision theory. In later work, Jeffrey argued that Newcomb problems are not (...)
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  20. James Joyce & Ellery Eells (2000). Reviews-The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):893-900.
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  21. Joseph B. Kadane, Teddy Seidenfeld & Mark J. Schervish, A Rubinesque Theory of Decision.
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  22. Patrick Maher (1987). Causality in the Logic of Decision. Theory and Decision 22 (2):155-172.
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  23. Gary Malinas (1993). Reflective Coherence and Newcomb Problems: A Simple Solution. Theory and Decision 35 (2):151-166.
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  24. Laurence T. Maloney (2002). Statistical Decision Theory and Biological Vision. In Dieter Heyer & Rainer Mausfeld (eds.), Perception and the Physical World. Wiley. 145--189.
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  25. Kenneth L. Manders (1979). The Theory of All Substructures of a Structure: Characterisation and Decision Problems. Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (4):583-598.
    An infinitary characterisation of the first-order sentences true in all substructures of a structure M is used to obtain partial reduction of the decision problem for such sentences to that for Th(M). For the relational structure $\langle\mathbf{R}, \leq, +\rangle$ this gives a decision procedure for the ∃ x∀ y-part of the theory of all substructures, yet we show that the ∃ x 1x 2 ∀ y-part, and the entire theory, is Π 1 1 -complete. The theory of all ordered subsemigroups (...)
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  26. Howard Margolis (2000). Simple Heuristics That Make Us Dumb. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):758-758.
    The simple heuristics that may indeed usually make us smart–or at least smart enough–in contexts of individual choice will sometimes make us dumb, especially in contexts of social choice. Here each individual choice (or vote) has little impact on the overall choice, although the overall choice is compounded out of the individual choices. I use an example (risk aversion) to illustrate the point.
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  27. Björn Meder & York Hagmayer (2009). Causal Induction Enables Adaptive Decision Making. In N. A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn (eds.), Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
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  28. A. Morton (1999). Mark Kaplan, Decision Theory as Philosophy. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50:505-507.
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  29. Sahlin Nils-Eric, Vareman Niklas, Galavotti Maria Carla & Scazzieri Roberto (2008). Three Types of Decision Theory. In Maria-Carla Galavotti (ed.), Reasoning, Rationality and Probability. Csli Publications.
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  30. Alastair Norcross (1998). Great Harms From Small Benefits Grow: How Death Can Be Outweighed by Headaches. Analysis 58 (2):152–158.
    Suppose that a very large number of people, say one billion, will suffer a moderately severe headache for the next twenty-four hours. For these billion people, the next twenty-four hours will be fairly unpleasant, though by no means unbearable. However, there will be no side-effects from these headaches; no drop in productivity in the work-place, no lapses in concentration leading to accidents, no unkind words spoken to loved ones that will later fester. Nonetheless, it is clearly desirable that these billion (...)
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  31. J. M. P. (1966). The Logic of Decision. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 19 (4):813-814.
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  32. Philip Pettit (1989). Decision Theory, Political Theory and the Hats Hypothesis. In Fred D'Agostino & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Freedom and Rationality. Reidel. 23--34.
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  33. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2000). Value and Choice Some Common Themes in Decision Theory and Moral Philosophy. Lund Universitetstrycheriet.
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  34. Steven L. Reynolds, Ryan Takenaga & Luminosity Argument (2002). James M. Joyce/Levi on Causal Decision Theory and the Possibility of Predicting One's Own Actions 69–102. Philosophical Studies 110 (295).
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  35. Reed Richter (1986). Further Comments on Decision Instability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (3):345 – 349.
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  36. Nils-Eric Sahlin & Niklas Vareman (2008). Three Types of Decision Theory. In Maria-Carla Galavotti (ed.), Reasoning, Rationality and Probability. Csli Publications. 37--59.
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  37. J. H. Sobel (1999). Kaplan, M.-Decision Theory as Philosophy. Philosophical Books 40:62-64.
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  38. Patrick Suppes (1967). Decision Theory. In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York, Macmillan. 2--310.
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  39. Patrick Suppes (1961). The Philosophical Relevance of Decision Theory. Journal of Philosophy 58 (21):605-614.
  40. Mc-T. Tai (2003). Who Makes the Decision? Synthesis Philosophica 18 (1/2):355-364.
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  41. Nassim N. Taleb & Avital Pilpel (2007). Epistemology and Risk Management. Risk and Regulation 13:6--7.
  42. Paul Weirich (1996). Mark Kaplan, Decision Theory as Philosophy Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 16 (3):179-180.
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  43. Paul Weirich (1985). Decision Instability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):465 – 472.
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Causal Decision Theory
  1. A. Ahmed (2013). Causal Decision Theory: A Counterexample. Philosophical Review 122 (2):289-306.
    The essay presents a novel counterexample to Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Its interest is that it generates a case in which CDT violates the very principles that motivated it in the first place. The essay argues that the objection applies to all extant formulations of CDT and that the only way out for that theory is a modification of it that entails incompatibilism. The essay invites the reader to find this consequence of CDT a reason to reject it.
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  2. Arif Ahmed (2015). Infallibility in the Newcomb Problem. Erkenntnis 80 (2):261-273.
    It is intuitively attractive to think that it makes a difference in Newcomb’s problem whether or not the predictor is infallible, in the sense of being certainly actually correct. This paper argues that that view is irrational and manifests a well-documented cognitive illusion.
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  3. Arif Ahmed (2014). Causal Decision Theory and the Fixity of the Past. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (4):665-685.
    Causal decision theory (CDT) cares only about the effects of a contemplated act, not its causes. The article constructs a case in which CDT consequently recommends a bet that the agent is certain to lose, rather than a bet that she is certain to win. CDT is plainly giving wrong advice in this case. It therefore stands refuted. 1 The Argument2 The Argument in More Detail2.1 The betting mechanism2.2 Soft determinism2.3 The content of P 2.4 The argument again3 The Descriptive (...)
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  4. Arif Ahmed (2014). Dicing with Death. Analysis 74 (4):587-592.
    You should rather play hide-and-seek against someone who cannot predict where you hide than against someone who can, as the article illustrates in connection with a high-stakes example. Causal Decision Theory denies this. So Causal Decision Theory is false.
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  5. Arif Ahmed (2014). Evidence, Decision and Causality. Cambridge University Press.
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  6. Arif Ahmed (2012). Push the Button. Philosophy of Science 79 (3):386-395.
    Opponents of Causal Decision Theory (CDT) sometimes claim (i) that it gives the wrong advice in Egan-style cases, where the CDT-endorsed act brings news that it causes a bad outcome; (ii) that CDT gives the right advice in Newcomb cases, where it is known in advance that the CDT-act causes you to be richer than the alternative. This paper argues that (i) and (ii) cannot both be true if rational preference over acts is transitive.
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  7. Arif Ahmed (2010). Causation and Decision. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):111-131.
    Sophisticated ‘tickle’-style defences of Evidential Decision Theory take your motivational state to screen off your act from any state that is causally independent of it, thus ensuring that EDT and CDT converge. That leads to unacceptable instability in cases in which the correct action is obvious. We need a more liberal conception of what the agent controls. It follows that an ordinary deliberator should sometimes consider the past and not only the future to be subject to her present choice.
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