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  1. J. McKenzie Alexander (2011). Expectations and Choiceworthiness. Mind 120 (479):803-817.
    The Pasadena game is an example of a decision problem which lacks an expected value, as traditionally conceived. Easwaran (2008) has shown that, if we distinguish between two different kinds of expectations, which he calls ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, the Pasadena game lacks a strong expectation but has a weak expectation. Furthermore, he argues that we should use the weak expectation as providing a measure of the value of an individual play of the Pasadena game. By considering a modified version of (...)
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  2. Gerard Allwein, Yingrui Yang & William L. Harrison (2011). Qualitative Decision Theory Via Channel Theory. Logic and Logical Philosophy 20 (1-2):81-110.
    We recast parts of decision theory in terms of channel theory concentrating on qualitative issues. Channel theory allows one to move between model theoretic and language theoretic notions as is necessary for an adequate covering. Doing so clarifies decision theory and presents the opportunity to investigate alternative formulations. As an example, we take some of Savage’s notions of decision theory and recast them within channel theory. In place of probabilities, we use a particular logic of preference. We introduce a logic (...)
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  3. Horacio Arló-Costa (2005). Models of Preference Reversals and Personal Rules: Do They Require Maximizing a Utility Function with a Specific Structure? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):650-651.
    One of the reasons for adopting hyperbolic discounting is to explain preference reversals. Another is that this value structure suggests an elegant theory of the will. I examine the capacity of the theory to solve Newcomb's problem. In addition, I compare Ainslie's account with other procedural theories of choice that seem at least equally capable of accommodating reversals of preference.
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  4. Paul Bernays (1957). Review: W. Ackermann, Solvable Cases of the Decision Problem. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (1):68-72.
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  5. Max Black (1978). The « Prisoner's Dilemma » and the Limits of Rationality. International Studies in Philosophy 10:7-22.
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  6. Nick Bostrom (2001). The Meta-Newcomb Problem. Analysis 61 (4):309–310.
    There are two boxes in front of you and you are asked to choose between taking only box B or taking both box A and box B. Box A contains $ 1,000. Box B will contain either nothing or $ 1,000,000. What B will contain is (or will be) determined by Predictor, who has an excellent track record of predicting your choices. There are two possibilities. Either Predictor has already made his move by predicting your choice and putting a million (...)
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  7. Ann Boyd (2013). Treatment Option or Pharmacological Wager? Journal of Clinical Research and Bioethics 4 (4).
  8. Darren Bradley (2007). Bayesianism And Self-Locating Beliefs. Dissertation, Stanford University
    How should we update our beliefs when we learn new evidence? Bayesian confirmation theory provides a widely accepted and well understood answer – we should conditionalize. But this theory has a problem with self-locating beliefs, beliefs that tell you where you are in the world, as opposed to what the world is like. To see the problem, consider your current belief that it is January. You might be absolutely, 100%, sure that it is January. But you will soon believe it (...)
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  9. Allen H. Brady (1998). Review: Pascal Michel, Busy Beaver Competition and Collatz-Like Problems. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 63 (1):331-332.
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  10. Michael Bratman (1998). Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention. In Jules L. Coleman, Christopher W. Morris & Gregory S. Kavka (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Cambridge University Press. 59--83.
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  11. John W. Carroll (1993). The Indefinitely Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: Reply to Becker and Cudd. Theory and Decision 34 (1):63-72.
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  12. A. B. Carter (2002). Is the Wager Back On? A Response to Douglas Groothuis. Philosophia Christi 4 (2):493-500.
  13. Ann T. Delehanty (2004). Morality and Method in Pascal's. Philosophy and Literature 28 (1).
    : This essay argues that Pascal's work both questions the accuracy of perspective in an infinite universe, and describes a model for moral truth that escapes the limitations of perspective. This model, rooted in Christianity, requires a total reorientation of approach towards moral truth. By asserting the limits of rational method, making use of recent scientific developments, and constructing a new model for moral truth, Pascal's work sought to update the role of Christianity to be not only consonant with the (...)
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  14. Ellery Eells (1984). Newcomb's Many Solutions. Theory and Decision 16 (1):59-105.
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  15. Xiaocong Fan & John Yen (2012). Intentions and Potential Intentions Revisited. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (3):203-230.
    The importance of potential intentions has been demonstrated both in the construction of agent systems and in the formalisation of teamwork behaviour. However, there still lacks an adequate semantics for the notion of potential intentions as introduced by Grosz and Kraus in their SharedPlans framework. In this paper, we give a formal semantics to intentions and potential intentions, drawing upon both the representationalist approach and the accessibility-based approach. The model captures the dynamic relationship among intentions and potential intentions by providing (...)
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  16. José Luis Ferreira (2010). Monty Hall Drives a Wedge Between Judy Benjamin and the Sleeping Beauty: A Reply to Bovens. Analysis 70 (3):473 - 481.
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  17. John Martin Fischer (2001). Newcomb’s Problem: A Reply to Carlson. Analysis 61 (271):229–236.
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  18. James Franklin (2001). The Science of Conjecture: Probability Before Pascal: Contents. Johns Hopkins University Press.
    The Dark Ages The Gregorian Revolution The Glossators Invent "Half-Proof" Presumptions in Canon Law Innocent III Grades of Evidence, and Torture The Post-Glossators Bartolus and Baldus: The Completed Theory The Inquisition Maimonides on Testimony Law in the East Ch. 3 Renaissance Law..
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  19. On Genuine & Territorial Demarcation (2013). Loki's Wager and Laudan's Error. In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press. 79.
  20. Laurence Goldstein & Peter Cave (2008). A Unified Pyrrhonian Resolution of the Toxin Problem, the Surprise Examination, and Newcomb's Puzzle. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):365 - 376.
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  21. Samuel Gorovitz (1979). The St. Petersburg Puzzle. In Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.), Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel. 259--270.
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  22. Alan Hájek & Harris Nover (2006). Perplexing Expectations. Mind 115 (459):703 - 720.
    This paper revisits the Pasadena game (Nover and Háyek 2004), a St Petersburg-like game whose expectation is undefined. We discuss serveral respects in which the Pasadena game is even more troublesome for decision theory than the St Petersburg game. Colyvan (2006) argues that the decision problem of whether or not to play the Pasadena game is ‘ill-posed’. He goes on to advocate a ‘pluralism’ regarding decision rules, which embraces dominance reasoning as well as maximizing expected utility. We rebut Colyvan’s argument, (...)
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  23. Riley Hughes (1946). The Journals of Charles King Newcomb. Thought 21 (3):541-543.
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  24. N. Jacobi (1993). Newcomb's Paradox: A Realist Resolution. Theory and Decision 35 (1):1-17.
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  25. Jeff Jordan (1996). Pragmatic Arguments and Belief. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (4):409 - 420.
  26. Jeff Jordan (1991). Duff and the Wager. Analysis 51 (3):174 - 176.
  27. R. Jurecka (2000). Pascal's Argument of Stake. Filosoficky Casopis 48 (4):541-556.
  28. Leigh B. Kelley (1988). Reflections on Deliberative Coherence. Synthese 76 (1):83 - 121.
    This paper treats two problem cases in decision theory, the Newcomb problem and Reed Richter''s Button III. Although I argue that, contrary to Richter, the latter case does not constitute a genuine counterexample to a standard general proposition of (causal) decision theory, I agree with and undertake to amplify his solution to the decision problem in Button III. I then apply the conclusions and distinctions in the foregoing treatment of Button III to the Newcomb problem and argue that a familiar (...)
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  29. Victor Alexandrovich Khoryev (2012). Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz's St. Petersburg Text. Dialogue and Universalism 21 (3):55-64.
    Khoryev regards Petersburg, a collection of essays by Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, published in 1976, as a windup of the writer’s complex ties with Russian culture and literature, which he was widely known to have loved and known in depth. It is a book where, through the legendary city on the river Neva, Iwaszkiewicz takes a look at a number of essential issues of Russian history and its ties with the history of Poland and the Polish people. Iwaszkiewicz avoids unequivocal judgments, noticing (...)
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  30. Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton (2005). Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):384-395.
    One's inaccuracy for a proposition is defined as the squared difference between the truth value (1 or 0) of the proposition and the credence (or subjective probability, or degree of belief) assigned to the proposition. One should have the epistemic goal of minimizing the expected inaccuracies of one's credences. We show that the method of minimizing expected inaccuracy can be used to solve certain probability problems involving information loss and self-locating beliefs (where a self-locating belief of a temporal part of (...)
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  31. Srecko Kovac (2012). Logical Opposition and Collective Decisions. In Jean-Yves Béziau & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition. Springer. 341--356.
    The square of opposition (as part of a lattice) is used as a natural way to represent different and opposite ways of who makes decisions, and in what way, in/for a group or a society. Majority logic is characterized by multiple logical squares (one for each possible majority), with the “discursive dilemma” as a consequence. Three-valued logics of majority decisions with discursive dilemma undecided, of veto, consensus, and sequential voting are analyzed from the semantic point of view. For instance, the (...)
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  32. Bruce Langtry (2004). The Classical and Maximin Versions of the Two-Envelope Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2:30-43.
    The Two-Envelope Paradox is classically presented as a problem in decision theory that turns on the use of probabilities in calculating expected utilities. I formulate a Maximin Version of the paradox, one that is decision-theoretic but omits considerations of probability. I investigate the source of the error in this new argument, and apply the insights thereby gained to the analysis of the classical version.
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  33. Isaac Levi (1978). Newcomb's Many Problems. In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Theory and Decision. D. Reidel. 369--383.
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  34. Isaac Levi (1975). Newcomb's Many Problems. Theory and Decision 6 (2):161-175.
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  35. John Lyons (1984). Tragic Closure and the Cornelian Wager. Analecta Husserliana 18:409.
  36. Neil Manson (1999). The Precautionary Principle, the Catastrophe Argument, and Pascal's Wager. Ends and Means 4 (1).
  37. John Mccarthy (1995). Pascal on Certainty and Utility. Interpretation 22 (2):247-269.
  38. Philippe Mongin (2000). Does Optimization Imply Rationality? Synthese 124 (1-2):73 - 111.
    The relations between rationality and optimization have been widely discussed in the wake of Herbert Simon's work, with the common conclusion that the rationality concept does not imply the optimization principle. The paper is partly concerned with adding evidence for this view, but its main, more challenging objective is to question the converse implication from optimization to rationality, which is accepted even by bounded rationality theorists. We discuss three topics in succession: (1) rationally defensible cyclical choices, (2) the revealed preference (...)
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  39. W. Moore (1946). Pascal and the Nature of Belief. Hibbert Journal 44:353-357.
  40. Paul Nemser (2009). From Taurus and Europa in St. Petersburg. Arion 16 (3):113-142.
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  41. Alastair Norcross (1998). Great Harms From Small Benefits Grow: How Death Can Be Outweighed by Headaches. Analysis 58 (2):152–158.
    Suppose that a very large number of people, say one billion, will suffer a moderately severe headache for the next twenty-four hours. For these billion people, the next twenty-four hours will be fairly unpleasant, though by no means unbearable. However, there will be no side-effects from these headaches; no drop in productivity in the work-place, no lapses in concentration leading to accidents, no unkind words spoken to loved ones that will later fester. Nonetheless, it is clearly desirable that these billion (...)
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  42. Robert Nozick (1969). Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel. 114--146.
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  43. Andrzej Papuziński (2000). Sprawozdanie z Międzynarodowej Konferencji Naukowej \"Ekologia a humanizm\" (Petersburg, 20-21.06.2000 r.). Humanistyka I Przyrodoznawstwo 6:264-265.
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  44. John L. Pollock (2010). A Resource-Bounded Agent Addresses the Newcomb Problem. Synthese 176 (1):57 - 82.
    In the Newcomb problem, the standard arguments for taking either one box or both boxes adduce what seem to be relevant considerations, but they are not complete arguments, and attempts to complete the arguments rely upon incorrect principles of rational decision making. It is argued that by considering how the predictor is making his prediction, we can generate a more complete argument, and this in turn supports a form of causal decision theory.
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  45. Ruth Poproski (2010). The Rationalizability of Two-Step Choices. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):713 - 743.
    This paper presents a formal characterization of a two stage decision rule. This characterization involves three conditions which, together, are satisfied by any choice function that can be represented as a two-tier choice function. And any choice function satisfying these three conditions can be represented as a two-tier choice function. The first condition identifies particular features of two-tier choice functions when they violate Property α. The other two conditions are essentially existence claims, required to ensure that the two tiers of (...)
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  46. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2003). Remarks on the Absentminded Driver. Studia Logica 73 (2):241 - 256.
    Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) present and analyse the sequential decision problem of an “absentminded driver”. The driver's absentmindedness (imperfect recall) leads him to time-inconsistent strategy evaluations. His original evaluation gets replaced by a new one under impact of the information that the circumstances have changed, notwithstanding the fact that this change in circumstances has been expected by him all along. The time inconsistency in strategy evaluation suggests that such an agent might have reason to renege on his adopted strategy. As (...)
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  47. David Runciman (2010). The Paradox of Immediacy. [REVIEW] Political Theory 38 (1):148 - 155.
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  48. Maurice W. Sasieni (1984). Newcomb's Paradox. Theory and Decision 16 (3):217-223.
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  49. P. Shaw (1996). The Tortoise and the Prisoners' Dilemma. Mind 105 (419):475-483.
    Simon Blackburn has claimed that on a theory of revealed preference it is tautological that any eligible player - one whose preferences are consistent - plays hawk, chooses a strategy of non-cooperation with the other prisoner. This claim is examined and rejected. A prisoner in the appropriate sense is defined not by preferences over actions (playing hawk or playing dove) but by preferences over the four possible outcomes which result from the players' actions jointly (both playing hawk, both playing dove, (...)
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  50. Brian Skyrms (1985). Review: R. C. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision; Richard C. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision; Richard C. Jeffrey, Preference Among Preferences. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (1):247-248.
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