Making a decision is a way of forming an intention, at least other things equal. In making a decision we seem to be active – decisions seem to be mental actions. One question philosophers have asked about decisions is whether and in what sense decisions really are actions. Other questions include: (i) what makes a decision rational? (ii) do decisions provide reasons to act as you have decided? (iii) are decisions reducible to other kinds of mental states or events (e.g. desire-formation). Since decisions lead to intentions, many discussions of intentions are also relevant to discussions of decisions, and vice-versa.
|Key works||For discussion of whether decisions are actions, see Mele 2000 and Pink 1996. For discussion of the rationality of decisions and of whether decisions give us reasons to act, see Pink 1996, Smith 1991, and Cullity 2008.|
- Deliberation (106)
- Desire and Motivation (69)
- Desire and Reason (136)
- Instrumental Reasoning (130)
- Practical and Theoretical Reasoning (92)
- Rational Requirements (103)
- Pratical Reason, Misc (121)
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