About this topic
Summary

Deductive reasoning is (very roughly) the kind of reasoning in which the premises logically entail the conclusion, at least assuming that no mistake has been made in the reasoning. The premises of a deductive argument may be propositions that the thinker believes or propositions that the thinker temporarily assumes to be true in order to explore their consequences. Deductive reasoning contrasts with inductive (or ampliative ) reasoning, the kind of reasoning in which the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion.

One important question concerning deductive reasoning is whether we do, in fact, engage in anything that could reasonably be called “deductive reasoning”. Some philosophers and psychologists have denied that there is any such thing, though the consensus in both psychology and philosophy seems to be that there is a distinctive kind of deductive reasoning. Within cognitive science, an important question concerns the nature of deductive reasoning – does it depend on applying rules to mental representations that resemble the sentences of natural language or does it involve reasoning with diagrammic models? Within philosophy, there are important questions concerning the epistemology of deductive reasoning. Which deductive rules are thinkers justified in employing? What makes it the case that certain rules of inference preserve justification (or knowledge) rather than others?

Key works See Harman 1986 for the claim that logic does not provide a theory of good reasoning (and that there is no such thing as deductive inference). See Field 2009 for a reply. A classic paper on deduction is Carroll 1895, which raises the question of how deductive inferences rationally compel belief in their conclusion.  Dummett 1974 discusses the issue of what it is to justify deduction raised in the context of deciding between classical and intuitionist logic). Also see Haack 1976 on the difficulty of justifying deduction in a non-circular way. There are many different account of the justification of deductive rules of inference. They are often presented as part of a more general theory of a priori knowledge and justification. For instance, Bealer 2000 presents a theory based on intuition. BonJour 1998 presents a theory based on rational insight. Boghossian 2003 and Peacocke 1993 present theories based on the nature of concepts. Horwich 2008 argues that it is a primitive fact which rules of inference are justified.
Introductions For a brief introductory article, see Schechter 2013
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
86 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 86
  1. Leo Abraham (1936). A Note on the Fruitfulness of Deduction. Philosophy of Science 3 (2):152-155.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.) (2008). Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press.
    This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Holger Andreas (2013). Deductive Reasoning in the Structuralist Approach. Studia Logica 101 (5):1093-1113.
    The distinction between the syntactic and the semantic approach to scientific theories emerged in formal philosophy of science. The semantic approach is commonly considered more advanced and more successful than the syntactic one, but the transition from the one approach to the other was not brought about without any loss. In essence, it is the formal analysis of atomic propositions and the analysis of deductive reasoning that dropped out of consideration in at least some of the elaborated versions of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Bruno G. Bara & Monica Bucciarelli (2000). Deduction and Induction: Reasoning Through Mental Models. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 1 (1):95-107.
    In this paper we deal with two types of reasoning: induction, and deduction First, we present a unified computational model of deductive reasoning through models, where deduction occurs in five phases: Construction, Integration, Conclusion, Falsification, and Response. Second, we make an attempt, to analyze induction through the same phases. Our aim is an explorative evaluation of the mental processes possibly shared by deductive and inductive reasoning.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Pierre Barrouillet & Henry Markovits (2002). Is the Self-Organizing Consciousness Framework Compatible with Human Deductive Reasoning? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):330-331.
    As stressed by Perruchet & Vinter, the SOC model echoes Johnson-Laird's mental model theory. Indeed, the latter rejects rule-based processing and assumes that reasoning is achieved through the manipulation of conscious representations. However, the mental model theory as well as its modified versions resorts to the abstraction of complex schemas and some form of implicit logic that seems incompatible with the SOC approach.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Diderik Batens (2006). Narrowing Down Suspicion in Inconsistent Premise Sets. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):185-209.
    Inconsistency-adaptive logics isolate the inconsistencies that are derivable from a premise set, and restrict the rules of Classical Logic only where inconsistencies are involved. From many inconsistent premise sets, disjunctions of contradictions are derivable no disjunct of which is itself derivable. Given such a disjunction, it is often justified to introduce new premises that state, with a certain degree of confidence, that some of the disjuncts are false. This is an important first step on the road to consistency: it narrows (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Michael P. Berman & Brian A. Lightbody (2010). The Metaphoric Fallacy to a Deductive Inference. Informal Logic 30 (2):185-193.
    Our article identifies and describes the metaphoric fallacy to a deductive inference (MFDI) that is an example of incorrect reasoning along the lines of the false analogy fallacy. The MFDI proceeds from informal semantical (metaphorical) claims to a supposedly formally deductive and necessary inference. We charge that such an inference is invalid. We provide three examples of the MFDI to demonstrate the structure of this invalid form of reasoning. Our goal is to contribute to the set of known informal fallacies.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (14 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. S. V. Bhave (1997). Situations in Which Disjunctive Syllogism Can Lead From True Premises to a False Conclusion. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (3):398-405.
    Disjunctive Syllogism, that is, the inference from 'not-A or B' and 'A', to 'B' can lead from true premises to a false conclusion if each of the sentences 'A' and 'not-A' is a statement of a partial truth such that affirming one of them amounts to denying the other, without each being the contradictory of the other. Such sentences inevitably occur whenever a situation which for its proper precise description needs the use of expressions such as 'most probably true' and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Paul Boghossian (2003). Blind Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.
    The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of ‘blind but blameless’ reasoning. Finally, the paper explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants can help explain how such reasoning is possible.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Selmer Bringsjord (1998). Is Gödelian Model-Based Deductive Reasoning Computational? Philosophica 61.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Alonzo Church (1948). Review: George Boole, The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, Being an Essay Towards a Calculus of Deductive Reasoning. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 (4):216-216.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. L. Jonathan Cohen (1981). Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
    The object of this paper is to show why recent research in the psychology of deductive and probabilistic reasoning does not have.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Moritz Cordes & Friedrich Reinmuth, A Speech Act Calculus. A Pragmatised Natural Deduction Calculus and its Meta-Theory.
    Building on the work of Peter Hinst and Geo Siegwart, we develop a pragmatised natural deduction calculus, i.e. a natural deduction calculus that incorporates illocutionary operators at the formal level, and prove its adequacy. In contrast to other linear calculi of natural deduction, derivations in this calculus are sequences of object-language sentences which do not require graphical or other means of commentary in order to keep track of assumptions or to indicate subproofs. (Translation of our German paper "Ein Redehandlungskalkül. Ein (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Moritz Cordes & Friedrich Reinmuth, Ein Redehandlungskalkül. Ein Pragmatisierter Kalkül des Natürlichen Schließens Nebst Metatheorie.
    Building on the work of Peter Hinst and Geo Siegwart, we develop a pragmatised natural deduction calculus, i.e., a natural deduction calculus that incorporates illocutionary operators at the formal level, and prove its adequacy. In contrast to other linear calculi of natural deduction, derivations in this calculus are sequences of object-language sentences which do not require graphical or other means of commentary in order to keep track of assumptions or to indicate subproofs.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Marcello D'Agostino & Luciano Floridi (2009). The Enduring Scandal of Deduction. Synthese 167 (2):271 - 315.
    Deductive inference is usually regarded as being “tautological” or “analytical”: the information conveyed by the conclusion is contained in the information conveyed by the premises. This idea, however, clashes with the undecidability of first-order logic and with the (likely) intractability of Boolean logic. In this article, we address the problem both from the semantic and the proof-theoretical point of view. We propose a hierarchy of propositional logics that are all tractable (i.e. decidable in polynomial time), although by means of growing (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Marcello D'Agostino & Luciano Floridi (2009). The Enduring Scandal of Deduction: Is Propositional Logic Really Uninformative? Synthese 167 (2):271 - 315.
    Deductive inference is usually regarded as being "tautological" or "analytical": the information conveyed by the conclusion is contained in the information conveyed by the premises. This idea, however, clashes with the undecidability of first-order logic and with the (likely) intractability of Boolean logic. In this article, we address the problem both from the semantic and the proof-theoretical point of view. We propose a hierarchy of propositional logics that are all tractable (i.e. decidable in polynomial time), although by means of growing (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Louis S. Dickstein (1980). Inference Errors in Deductive Reasoning. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 16 (6):414-416.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Sinan Dogramaci (2013). Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning. Noûs 47 (3):n/a-n/a.
    In section 1, I develop epistemic communism, my view of the function of epistemically evaluative terms such as ‘rational’. The function is to support the coordination of our belief-forming rules, which in turn supports the reliable acquisition of beliefs through testimony. This view is motivated by the existence of valid inferences that we hesitate to call rational. I defend the view against the worry that it fails to account for a function of evaluations within first-personal deliberation. In the rest of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Sinan Dogramaci (2013). Intuitions for Inferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.
    In this paper, I explore a question about deductive reasoning: why am I in a position to immediately infer some deductive consequences of what I know, but not others? I show why the question cannot be answered in the most natural ways of answering it, in particular in Descartes’s way of answering it. I then go on to introduce a new approach to answering the question, an approach inspired by Hume’s view of inductive reasoning.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Michael A. E. Dummett (1974). The Justification of Deduction. In Michael Dummett (ed.), Truth and Other Enigmas. Oxford.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Pascal Engel (2006). Logic, Reasoning and the Logical Constants. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):219-235.
    What is the relationship between logic and reasoning? How do logical norms guide inferential performance? This paper agrees with Gilbert Harman and most of the psychologists that logic is not directly relevant to reasoning. It argues, however, that the mental model theory of logical reasoning allows us to harmonise the basic principles of deductive reasoning and inferential perfomances, and that there is a strong connexion between our inferential norms and actual reasoning, along the lines of Peacocke’s conception of inferential role.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Edward M. Engelmann (2007). Aristotle's Syllogystic, Modern Deductive Logic, and Scientific Demonstration. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (4):535-552.
    This article investigates the nature of Aristotelian syllogistics and shows that the categorical syllogism is fundamentally about showing the connection, in the premises of the syllogism, between the major and minor terms as stated in the conclusion. It discusses how this is important for the use of the syllogism in scientific demonstration. The article then examines modern deductive logic with an eye to they way in which it contrasts with Aristotelian syllogistics. It shows howmodern logic is about making necessary connections (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Jsbt Evans (2005). Deductive Reasoning. In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge Univ Pr.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Simon Evnine, The Universality of Logic.
    I argue for the thesis (UL) that there are certain logical abilities that any rational creature must have. Opposition to UL comes from naturalized epistemologists who hold that it is a purely empirical question which logical abilities a rational creature has. I provide arguments that any creatures meeting certain conditions - plausible necessary conditions on rationality - must have certain specific logical concepts and be able to use them in certain specific ways. For example, I argue that any creature able (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Hartry Field (2009). What is the Normative Role of Logic? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):251-268.
    The paper tries to spell out a connection between deductive logic and rationality, against Harman's arguments that there is no such connection, and also against the thought that any such connection would preclude rational change in logic. One might not need to connect logic to rationality if one could view logic as the science of what preserves truth by a certain kind of necessity (or by necessity plus logical form); but the paper points out a serious obstacle to any such (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Samuel Fillenbaum (1993). Deductive Reasoning: What Are Taken to Be the Premises and How Are They Interpreted? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):348.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Dan Flory (forthcoming). Hitchcock and Deductive Reasoning: Moving Step by Step in Vertigo. Film and Philosophy.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Danny Frederick (2011). Deduction and Novelty. The Reasoner 5 (4):56-57.
    It is often claimed that the conclusion of a deductively valid argument is contained in its premises. Popper refuted this claim when he showed that an empirical theory can be expected always to have logical consequences that transcend the current understanding of the theory. This implies that no formalisation of an empirical theory will enable the derivation of all its logical consequences. I call this result ‘Popper-incompleteness.’ This result appears to be consistent with the view of deductive reasoning as a (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Joseph S. Fulda (1995). Reasoning with Imperatives Using Classical Logic. Sorites 3:7-11.
    As the journal is effectively defunct, I am uploading a full-text copy, but only of my abstract and article, and some journal front matter. -/- Note that the pagination in the PDF version differs from the official pagination because A4 and 8.5" x 11" differ. -/- Traditionally, imperatives have been handled with deontic logics, not the logic of propositions which bear truth values. Yet, an imperative is issued by the speaker to cause (stay) actions which change the state of affairs, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Mikkel Gerken (2013). Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental. Palgrave Macmillan (Innovations in Philosophy).
    Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental integrates the epistemology of reasoning and philosophy of mind. The book contains introductions to basic concepts in the epistemology of inference and to important aspects of the philosophy of mind. By examining the fundamental competencies involved in reasoning, Gerken argues that reasoning's epistemic force depends on the external environment in ways that are both surprising and epistemologically important. -/- For example, Gerken argues that purportedly deductive reasoning that exhibits the fallacy of equivocation may nevertheless transmit (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Mikkel Gerken (2011). Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):381-400.
    In this paper, I challenge a widely presupposed principle in the epistemology of inference. The principle, (Validity Requirement), is this: S’s (purportedly deductive) reasoning, R, from warranted premise-beliefs provides (conditional) warrant for S’s belief in its conclusion only if R is valid. I argue against (Validity Requirement) from two prominent assumptions in the philosophy of mind: that the cognitive competencies that constitute reasoning are fallible, and that the attitudes operative in reasoning are anti-individualistically individuated. Indeed, my discussion will amount to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Mikkel Gerken (2009). Conceptual Equivocation and Epistemic Relevance. Dialectica 63 (2):117-132.
    Much debate has surrounded "switching" scenarios in which a subject's reasoning is said to exhibit the fallacy of equivocation ( Burge 1988 ; Boghossian 1992, 1994 ). Peter Ludlow has argued that such scenarios are "epistemically prevalent" and, therefore, epistemically relevant alternatives ( Ludlow 1995a ). Since a distinctive feature of the cases in question is that the subject blamelessly engages in conceptual equivocation, we may label them 'equivocational switching cases'. Ludlow's influential argument occurs in a discussion about compatibilism with (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Bart Geurts (2003). Reasoning with Quantifiers. Cognition 86 (3):223--251.
    In the semantics of natural language, quantification may have received more attention than any other subject, and one of the main topics in psychological studies on deductive reasoning is syllogistic inference, which is just a restricted form of reasoning with quantifiers. But thus far the semantical and psychological enterprises have remained disconnected. This paper aims to show how our understanding of syllogistic reasoning may benefit from semantical research on quantification. I present a very simple logic that pivots on the monotonicity (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Nina Gierasimczuk, Han L. J. Van der Maas & Maartje E. J. Raijmakers (2013). An Analytic Tableaux Model for Deductive Mastermind Empirically Tested with a Massively Used Online Learning System. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 22 (3):297-314.
    The paper is concerned with the psychological relevance of a logical model for deductive reasoning. We propose a new way to analyze logical reasoning in a deductive version of the Mastermind game implemented within a popular Dutch online educational learning system (Math Garden). Our main goal is to derive predictions about the difficulty of Deductive Mastermind tasks. By means of a logical analysis we derive the number of steps needed for solving these tasks (a proxy for working memory load). Our (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. V. Goel (2004). Differential Involvement of Left Prefrontal Cortexin Inductive and Deductive Reasoning. Cognition 93 (3):B109-B121.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Vinod Goel (2007). Anatomy of Deductive Reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (10):435-441.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Vinod Goel (2005). Cognitive Neuroscience of Deductive Reasoning. In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge Univ Pr. 475--492.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Susan Haack (1976). The Justification of Deduction. Mind 85 (337):112-119.
    It is often taken for granted by writers who propose--and, for that matter, by writers who oppose--'justifications' of inductions, that deduction either does not need, or can readily be provided with, justification. The purpose of this paper is to argue that, contrary to this common opinion, problems analogous to those which, notoriously, arise in the attempt to justify induction, also arise in the attempt to justify deduction.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Tanabe Hajime & Timothy Burns (2013). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Deductive Reasoning. Comparative and Continental Philosophy 5 (2):124-149.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Graeme S. Halford & Glenda Andrews (2004). The Development of Deductive Reasoning: How Important is Complexity? Thinking and Reasoning 10 (2):123 – 145.
    Current conceptions of the nature of human reasoning make it no longer tenable to assess children's inference by reference to the norms of logical inference. Alternatively, the complexity of the mental models employed in children's inferences can be analysed. This approach is applied to transitive inference, class inclusion, categorical induction, theory of mind, oddity, categorical syllogisms, analogy, and reasoning deficits. It is argued that a coherent account of children's reasoning emerges in that there is correspondence between tasks at the same (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. J. D. Halpern (1986). Review: J. A. Robinson, Logic: Form and Function. The Mechanization of Deductive Reasoning. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (1):227-229.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Gilbert Harman (1986). Change in View. MIT Press.
    Change in View offers an entirely original approach to the philosophical study of reasoning by identifying principles of reasoning with principles for revising one's beliefs and intentions and not with principles of logic. This crucial observation leads to a number of important and interesting consequences that impinge on psychology and artificial intelligence as well as on various branches of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics and action theory. Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. A Bradford Book.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Allen Hazen (1987). Natural Deduction and Hilbert's Ɛ-Operator. Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (4):411 - 421.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Hector Hernandez Ortiz & Joseph S. Fulda (2012). Strengthening the Antecedent, Concessive Conditionals, Conditional Rhetorical Questions, and the Theory of Conditional Elements. Journal of Pragmatics 44 (3):328-331.
    Extends the theory of conditional elements in three ways. The critical way, primarily due to the senior author, is the solution to the fallacy of the strengthened antecedent within classical logic.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Ulf Hlobil (2014). Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on Inference. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):419-429.
    I argue that the accounts of inference recently presented (in this journal) by Paul Boghossian, John Broome, and Crispin Wright are unsatisfactory. I proceed in two steps: First, in Sects. 1 and 2, I argue that we should not accept what Boghossian calls the “Taking Condition on inference” as a condition of adequacy for accounts of inference. I present a different condition of adequacy and argue that it is superior to the one offered by Boghossian. More precisely, I point out (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. John H. Holland, Keith J. Holyoak, Richard E. Nisbett & Paul R. Thagard (1993). Deductive Reasoning. In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Mit Press.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Mutsumi Imai, Lennart Schalk, Henrik Saalbach & Hiroyuki Okada (2010). Influence of Grammatical Gender on Deductive Reasoning About Sex-Specific Properties of Animals. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Mark Jago (2012). The Content of Deduction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):317-334.
    For deductive reasoning to be justified, it must be guaranteed to preserve truth from premises to conclusion; and for it to be useful to us, it must be capable of informing us of something. How can we capture this notion of information content, whilst respecting the fact that the content of the premises, if true, already secures the truth of the conclusion? This is the problem I address here. I begin by considering and rejecting several accounts of informational content. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1995). Mental Models, Deductive Reasoning, and the Brain. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. Mit Press. 999--1008.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. H. P. K. (1968). Logic, a Modern Introduction to Deductive Reasoning. Review of Metaphysics 21 (4):756-757.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 86