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  1. David J. Alexander (2013). The Problem of Respecting Higher-Order Doubt. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (18).
    This paper argues that higher-order doubt generates an epistemic dilemma. One has a higher-order doubt with regards to P insofar as one justifiably withholds belief as to what attitude towards P is justified. That is, one justifiably withholds belief as to whether one is justified in believing, disbelieving, or withholding belief in P. Using the resources provided by Richard Feldman’s recent discussion of how to respect one’s evidence, I argue that if one has a higher-order doubt with regards to P, (...)
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  2. David Annis (1973). Knowledge and Defeasibility. Philosophical Studies 24 (3):199 - 203.
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  3. Robert Audi (1983). Foundationalism, Epistemic Dependence, and Defeasibility. Synthese 55 (1):119 - 139.
    This paper is an examination of modest foundationalism in relation to some important criteria of epistemic dependence. The paper distinguishes between causal and epistemic dependence and indicates how each might be related to reasons. Four kinds of reasons are also distinguished: reasons to believe, reasons one has for believing, reasons for which one believes, and reasons why one believes. In the light of all these distinctions, epistemic dependence is contrasted with defeasibility, and it is argued that modest foundationalism is not (...)
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  4. Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Developmental Process Reliabilism: On Justification, Defeat, and Evidence. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 73 (1):1 - 17.
    Here I present and defend an etiological theory of objective, doxastic justification, and related theories of defeat and evidence. The theory is intended to solve a problem for reliabilist epistemologies— the problem of identifying relevant environments for assessing a process's reliability. It is also intended to go some way to accommodating, neutralizing, or explaining away many internalist-friendly elements in our epistemic thinking.
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  5. James K. Beilby (ed.) (2002). Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Cornell University Press.
    In this, the first book to address the ongoing debate, Plantinga presents his influential thesis and responds to critiques by distinguished philosophers from a ...
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  6. John W. Bender (1992). Unreckoned Misleading Truths and Lehrer's Theory of Undefeated Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 17:465-481.
    According to Keith Lehrer’s coherence theory, knowledge is true acceptance whose justification is undefeated by a falsehood. It has recently become clear that Lehrer’s handling of important Gettier-inspired problems depends upon his position that only falsehoods accepted by the subject can act as defeaters of knowledge. I argue against this and present an example in which an unreckoned truth---one neither believed nor believed to be false by the subject---defeats knowledge. I trace the negative implications of this matter for the coherence (...)
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  7. Michael Bergmann (2006). Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford University Press.
    Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...)
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  8. Michael Bergmann (2005). Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.
    Internalists tend to impose on justification higher-level requirements, according to which a belief is justified only if the subject has a higher-level belief (i.e., a belief about the epistemic credentials of a belief). I offer an error theory that explains the appeal of this requirement: analytically, a belief is not justified if we have a defeater for it, but contingently, it is often the case that to avoid having defeaters, our beliefs must satisfy a higher-level requirement. I respond to the (...)
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  9. Michael Bergmann (2000). Deontology and Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):87-102.
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  10. Michael Bergmann (1997). Internalism, Externalism and the No-Defeater Condition. Synthese 110 (3):399-417.
    Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of internal here? And of which conditions of (...)
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  11. David Boonin (2002). Animal, Vegetable, or Woman?: A Feminist Critique of Ethical Vegetarianism. Environmental Ethics 24 (4):429-432.
  12. Leonard G. Boonin (1966). Concerning the Defeasibility of Legal Rules. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (3):371-378.
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  13. Jake Chandler (2013). Defeat Reconsidered. Analysis 73 (1):49-51.
    It appears to have gone unnoticed in the literature that Pollock's widely endorsed analysis of evidential defeat entails a remarkably strong symmetry principle, according to which, for any three propositions D, E and H, if both E and D provide a reason to believe H, then D is a defeater for E's support for H if and only if, in turn, E is a defeater for D's support for H. After illustrating the counterintuitiveness of this constraint, a simple, more suitable, (...)
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  14. Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
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  15. Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
    In an influential book, Gilbert Harman writes, "In explaining the observations that support a physical theory, scientists typically appeal to mathematical principles. On the other hand, one never seems to need to appeal in this way to moral principles [1977, 9 – 10]." What is the epistemological relevance of this contrast, if genuine? In this article, I argue that ethicists and philosophers of mathematics have misunderstood it. They have confused what I will call the justificatory challenge for realism about an (...)
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  16. Allen Coates (2012). Rational Epistemic Akrasia. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.
    Epistemic akrasia arises when one holds a belief even though one judges it to be irrational or unjustified. While there is some debate about whether epistemic akrasia is possible, this paper will assume for the sake of argument that it is in order to consider whether it can be rational. The paper will show that it can. More precisely, cases can arise in which both the belief one judges to be irrational and one’s judgment of it are epistemically rational in (...)
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  17. Fred Dretske & Palle Yourgrau (1983). Lost Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 80 (6):356-367.
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  18. Andy Egan & Adam Elga (2005). I Can't Believe I'm Stupid. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):77–93.
    It is bad news to find out that one's cognitive or perceptual faculties are defective. Furthermore, it’s not always transparent how one ought to revise one's beliefs in light of such news. Two sorts of news should be distinguished. On the one hand, there is news that a faculty is unreliable -- that it doesn't track the truth particularly well. On the other hand, there is news that a faculty is anti-reliable -- that it tends to go positively wrong. These (...)
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  19. Adam Elga (2005). On Overrating Oneself. . . And Knowing It. Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):115 - 124.
    When it comes to evaluating our own abilities and prospects, most (non-depressed) people are subject to a distorting bias. We think that we are better – friendlier, more well-liked, better leaders, and better drivers – than we really are. Once we learn about this bias, we should ratchet down our self-evaluations to correct for it. But we don’t. That leaves us with an uncomfortable tension in our beliefs: we knowingly allow our beliefs to differ from the ones that we think (...)
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  20. Carl Ginet (1975). Knowledge, Perception, and Memory. D. Reidel Pub. Co..
    INTRODUCTION . What is it to know that something is the case? What am I saying when I say, 'I know that the temperature outside is below freezing' or 'I ...
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  21. Thomas Grundmann (2013). Doubts About Philosophy? The Alleged Challenge From Disagreement. In Tim Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action. Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. Routledge. 72-98.
    In philosophy, as in many other disciplines and domains, stable disagreement among peers is a widespread and well-known phenomenon. Our intuitions about paradigm cases, e.g. Christensen's Restaurant Case, suggest that in such controversies suspension of judgment is rationally required. This would prima facie suggest a robust suspension of judgment in philosophy. But we are still lacking a deeper theoretical explanation of why and under what conditions suspension is rationally mandatory. In the first part of this paper I will focus on (...)
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  22. Thomas Grundmann (2011). Defeasibility Theory. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routleddge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. 156-166.
    This is a survey article about epistemic defeaters: what is defeated, how defeaters work, different kinds of defeaters, indefeasibility and how defeaters fit into epistemic internalism and externalism.
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  23. Thomas Grundmann (2009). Reliabilism and the Problem of Defeaters. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):65-76.
    It is widely assumed that justification is defeasible, e.g. that under certain conditions counterevidence removes prior justification of beliefs. In this paper I will first (sect. 1) explain why this feature of justification poses a prima facie problem for reliabilism. I then will try out different reliabilist strategies to deal with the problem. Among them I will discuss conservative strategies (sect. 2), eliminativist stragies (sect. 3) and revisionist strategies (sect. 4). In the final section I will present an improved revisionist (...)
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  24. Thomas Grundmann (2009). Introspective Self-Knowledge and Reasoning: An Externalist Guide. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 71 (1):89 - 105.
    According to the received view, externalist grounds or reasons need not be introspectively accessible. Roughly speaking, from an externalist point of view, a belief will be epistemically justified, iff it is based upon facts that make its truth objectively highly likely. This condition can be satisfied, even if the epistemic agent does not have actual or potential awareness of the justifying facts. No inner perspective on the belief-forming mechanism and its truth-ratio is needed for a belief to be justified. In (...)
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  25. Allan Hazlett (2006). How to Defeat Belief in the External World. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):198–212.
    I defend the view that there is a privileged class of propositions – that there is an external world, among other such 'hinge propositions'– that possess a special epistemic status: justified belief in these propositions is not defeated unless one has sufficient reason to believe their negation. Two arguments are given for this conclusion. Finally, three proposals are offered as morals of the preceding story: first, our justification for hinge propositions must be understood as defeatable, second, antiskeptics must explain our (...)
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  26. Michael Huemer (2001). The Problem of Defeasible Justification. Erkenntnis 54 (3):375-397.
    The problem of induction and the problem of Cartesian/brain-in-the-vat skepticism have much in common. Both are instances of a general problem of defeasible justification . I use the term "defeasible justification" to refer to a relation between a piece of evidence.
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  27. Richard Hull, Almeder's Unknowable Defeater Defeated.
    Robert Almeder has argued1 that three “fourth conditions” for nondefectiveness of knowledge justification claims, proposed in the recent literature,2 are essentially similar, require modification in order to eliminate the possibility of an unknowable defeater, and, so modified, render attainment of non-basic factual knowledge impossible. Although I believe there are objections to be raised against his exposition and reduction of the three proposed fourth conditions, I wish only to raise some doubts about the supposed necessity of the modifications and then to (...)
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  28. Mikael Janvid (2013). The Challenges of Traveling Without Itinerary: The Overrding Case. Grazer Philosophische Studien 87:59-73.
    As an important step towards a comprehensive model of challenges and defeat- ers, it is here argued that securing a previously held epistemic status for a belief in the face of an overriding challenge does not require us to reach a higher epistemic standard than the one the belief originally reached. In the course of the investigation, criteria for when the epistemic status of beliefs are challenged and defeated are suggested. At the end of the paper, these results are then (...)
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  29. Mikael Janvid (2012). Towards a Default and Challenge Model of A Priori Warrant. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:135-154.
    This paper outlines a default and challenge account of a priori warrant by unfolding the three stages of the epistemic dialectic in which such warrant comes to the fore. Among the virtues of this account is that it does not rely on controversial assumptions regarding non-experiential sources of warrant, like intellectual intuition, but instead relies on features of our epistemic practice, more precisely, its default and challenge structure. What distinguishes beliefs to which you are warranted a priori is not that (...)
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  30. Mikael Janvid (2010). Empirical Indefeasibility and Nonfactuality. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):183-197.
    Hartry Field has recently presented an original and interesting approach to the a priori. Its main theses are, first, that certain rules are empirically indefeasible and, second, that the reasonableness of these rules are not based on any factual property. After an introduction, Field’s approach is presented in section II. Section III examines his claims concerning empirical indefeasibility. It will be argued that his general argument for empirical indefeasibility fails along with the particular examples of rules he gives. Alternative ways (...)
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  31. Mikael Janvid (2008). The Experiential Defeasibility and Overdetermination of A Priori Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:271-278.
    In a recent and interesting paper “Experientially Defeasible A Priori Justification,” Joshua Thurow argues that many a priori justified beliefs are defeasible by experience. The argument takes the form of an objection against Albert Casullo’s recent book, A Priori Justification, where Casullo, according to Thurow, denies that if a justified belief is non-experientially defeasible, then that belief is also experientially defeasible. This paper critically examines Thurow’s two arguments in the first two sections I–II. In the last section, III, an alternative (...)
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  32. Mikael Janvid (2008). Defeaters and Rising Standards of Justification. Acta Analytica 23 (1):45-54.
    The purpose of this paper is to refute the widespread view that challenging a knowledge-claim always raises the original standards of justification–a view often associated with contextualism. To that purpose the distinction between undermining and overriding defeaters will be used. Three kinds of challenges will be considered that differ in their degree of specification. In all three kinds of challenges, the rising standards of justification model fails to capture the dialectic of justification in the case of undermining defeaters. At the (...)
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  33. Daniel M. Johnson (2011). Proper Function and Defeating Experiences. Synthese 182 (3):433-447.
    Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that what he terms “doxastic” theories of epistemic justification fail to account for certain epistemic features having to do with evidence. I’m going to give an argument roughly along these lines, but I’m going to focus specifically on proper function theories of justification or warrant. In particular, I’ll focus on Michael Bergmann’s recent proper function account of justification, though the argument applies also to Alvin Plantinga’s proper function account of warrant. The epistemic features I’m concerned about (...)
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  34. Peter D. Klein (1979). Misleading "Misleading Defeaters&Quot;. Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
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  35. Peter D. Klein (1976). Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility. Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.
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  36. Peter D. Klein (1971). A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
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  37. Matthew Kotzen (2013). Multiple Studies and Evidential Defeat. Noûs 47 (1):154-180.
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  38. Jonathan Kvanvig (2007). Two Approaches to Epistemic Defeat. In Deane-Peter Baker (ed.), Alvin Plantinga. Cambridge University Press. 107-124.
    There are two different kinds of theories of the concept of epistemic defeat. One theory begins with propositional relationships, only by implication describing what happens in the context of a noetic system. Such a theory places inforrmation about defeat up front, not informing us of how the defeat relationships play out in the context of actual belief, at least not initially. The other theory takes a back door to the concept of defeat, assuming a context of (...)
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  39. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2013). The Dogmatism Puzzle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (3):1-16.
    According to the Dogmatism Puzzle, knowledge breeds dogmatism: if a subject knows a proposition h, then she is justified in disregarding any future evidence against h, for she knows that such evidence is misleading. The standard, widely accepted, solution to the puzzle appeals to the defeasibility of knowledge. I argue that the defeat solution leaves intact a residual dogmatist puzzle. Solving this puzzle requires proponents of defeat to deny a plausible principle that the original puzzle relies on called Entitlement, a (...)
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  40. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010). Unreasonable Knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.
    It is common orthodoxy among internalists and externalists alike that knowledge is lost or defeated in situations involving misleading evidence of a suitable kind. But making sense of defeat has seemed to present a particular challenge for those who reject an internalist justification condition on knowledge. My main aim here is to argue that externalists ought to take seriously a view on which knowledge can be retained even in the face of strong seemingly defeating evidence. As an instructive example, I (...)
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  41. Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio (2014). Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
  42. Steven R. Levy (1978). Misleading Defeaters. Journal of Philosophy 75 (12):739-742.
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  43. Matthew McGrath (2013). Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):533-562.
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  44. Giacomo Melis (2014). Understanding Undermining Defeat. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):433-442.
    Taking the inspiration from some points made by Scott Sturgeon and Albert Casullo, I articulate a view according to which an important difference between undermining and overriding defeaters is that the former require the subject to engage in some higher-order epistemic thinking, while the latter don’t. With the help of some examples, I argue that underminers push the cognizer to reflect on the way she formed a belief by challenging the epistemic worthiness of either the source of justification or the (...)
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  45. Ram Neta (2009). D Efeating the Dogma of Defeasibility. In Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 161--82.
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  46. Alison Pease & Andrew Aberdein (2011). Five Theories of Reasoning: Interconnections and Applications to Mathematics. Logic and Logical Philosophy 20 (1-2):7-57.
    The last century has seen many disciplines place a greater priority on understanding how people reason in a particular domain, and several illuminating theories of informal logic and argumentation have been developed. Perhaps owing to their diverse backgrounds, there are several connections and overlapping ideas between the theories, which appear to have been overlooked. We focus on Peirce’s development of abductive reasoning [39], Toulmin’s argumentation layout [52], Lakatos’s theory of reasoning in mathematics [23], Pollock’s notions of counterexample [44], and argumentation (...)
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  47. Alvin Plantinga (2003). Probability and Defeaters. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):291–298.
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  48. Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford University Press.
    In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment.
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  49. Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford University Press.
    Plantinga examines the nature of epistemic warrant; whatever it is that when added to true belief yields knowledge. This volume surveys current contributions to the debate and paves the way for his owm positive proposal in Warrant and Proper Function.
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  50. Review author[S.]: Alvin Plantinga (1995). Reliabilism, Analyses and Defeaters. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):427-464.
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