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  1. John Harvey Ahrens (1978). The Concept of Harm and the Libertarian State. Dissertation, The University of Iowa
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  2. Larry Alexander (2014). Hart and Punishment for Negligence. In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility.
  3. Matthew L. Baum (2013). The Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA) Genetic Predisposition to Impulsive Violence: Is It Relevant to Criminal Trials? Neuroethics 6 (2):287-306.
    In Italy, a judge reduced the sentence of a defendant by 1 year in response to evidence for a genetic predisposition to violence. The best characterized of these genetic differences, those in the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), were cited as especially relevant. Several months previously in the USA, MAOA data contributed to a jury reducing charges from 1st degree murder (a capital offence) to voluntary manslaughter. Is there a rational basis for this type of use of MAOA evidence in criminal (...)
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  4. Franz Bäuml (1980). Varieties and Consequences of Medieval Literacy and IlliteracyArticle Author Querybäuml Fh [Google Scholar]: “Es Ist Eine Zeit Angebrochen, … in der Die Führenden Schichten der Gesellschaft Keine Bildung Besitzen, Auch Keine Bücher, Ja Nicht Einmal Eine Sprache, in der Sich Eine Ihnen Angemessene Bildung Hätte Ausdrücken Können. Es Gab Eine Gelehrte Sprache, Und Es Gab Unschreibbare Umgangssprachen; Eine Bildungssprache Gab Es Nicht.” The Situation Thus Described by Erich Auerbach Was to Prevail Throughout the Middle Ages. At All Levels of Society, the Majority of the Population of Europe Between the Fourth and the Fifteenth Centuries Was, in Some Sense, Illiterate. Yet Medieval Civilization Was a Literate Civilization; the Knowledge Indispensable to the Functioning of Medieval Society Was Transmitted in Writing: The Bible and its Exegesis, Statutory Laws, and Documents of All Kinds. The Need for Writing That Served a Wide Variety of Purposes is Evident in the Development of the Ars Di. [REVIEW] Speculum 55 (2):237-265.
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  5. Michael D. Bayles (1976). Harm to the Unconceived. Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (3):292-304.
  6. T. M. Benditt (1976). Benefit and Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (1):116-120.
    In this paper I will first bring out some linguistic difficulties which suggest that the notions of benefit and harm are not as straightforwardly univocal as one might have thought, and then go on to make some distinctions within these notions which will bring to light their complexities, and help to clarify the relation between the good and the beneficial. The notion of the good and of the bene- ficial that are being used here are tied to human happiness. There (...)
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  7. Thom Brooks, Moral Sentiments and the Justification of Punishment.
  8. D. G. Brown (1978). Mill on Harm to Others' Interests. Political Studies 26 (3):395-399.
  9. Edmund Byrne (1980). After “Mental Illness” What? A Philosophical Endorsement of Statutory Reform. Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:122-131.
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  10. R. Newton Crane (1910). Marriage Laws and Statutory Experiments in Eugenics in the United States. The Eugenics Review 2 (1):61.
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  11. Kai Draper (2009). Defense. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):69 - 88.
    This paper is an exploration of the nature of what is perhaps the most widely recognized justification for inflicting harm on human beings: the appeal to defense (self-defense and other-defense). I develop and defend a rights-based account of the appeal to defense that takes into account whether and to what degree both the aggressor and his potential victim are morally responsible for the relevant threat. However, unlike most extant rights-based accounts, mine is not a forfeiture account. That is, I do (...)
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  12. Mabel A. Elliott (1931). Conflicting Penal Theory in Statutory Law. By E. H. Sutherland. [REVIEW] Ethics 42:337.
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  13. Joanna Mary Firth & Jonathan Quong (2012). Necessity, Moral Liability, and Defensive Harm. Law and Philosophy 31 (6):673-701.
    A person who is liable to defensive harm has forfeited his rights against the imposition of the harm, and so is not wronged if that harm is imposed. A number of philosophers, most notably Jeff McMahan, argue for an instrumental account of liability, whereby a person is liable to defensive harm when he is either morally or culpably responsible for an unjust threat of harm to others, and when the imposition of defensive harm is necessary to avert the threatened unjust (...)
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  14. Donelson R. Forsyth, Eddie Albritton & Barry R. Schlenker (1977). The Effects of Social Context and Size of Injury on Perceptions of a Harm-Doer and Victim. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 9 (1):37-39.
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  15. Konrad Fuchs (1981). Pauperism and Population. Statutory Marriage Restrictions in the South German States During the Nineteenth Century. Philosophy and History 14 (1):96-97.
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  16. Ramchandra Gandhi (1973). Injury, Harm, Damage, Pain, Etc. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (2):266-269.
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  17. Allan Gibbard (1973). Doing No More Harm Than Good. Philosophical Studies 24 (3):158 - 173.
    Given all the consequences of an act and the value of each of them, how can we find their value on the whole? In Utilitarianisms: Simple and General, Inquiry 13, 394–449, J. Howard Sobel offers two alternative suggestions. Here one of Sobel's suggestions is attacked and the other given new support. Where the number of consequences is finite, it is argued, their value is the sum of their basic intrinsic values: the basic intrinsic value of a state of affairs is (...)
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  18. David P. Gontar (1978). Permitting Harm. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):15-22.
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  19. Craig R. Goodrum (1976). Notes on the Harm Principle. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3):239.
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  20. John D. Harman (1981). Harm, Consent and Distress. Journal of Value Inquiry 15 (4):293-309.
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  21. Stephen E. Henderson & Kelly Sorensen (2013). Search, Seizure, and Immunity: Second-Order Normative Authority and Rights. Criminal Justice Ethics 32 (2):108-125.
    A paradigmatic aspect of a paradigmatic kind of right is that the rights holder is the only one who can alienate it. When individuals waive rights, the normative source of that waiving is normally taken to be the individual herself. This moral feature?immunity?is usually in the background of discussions about rights. We bring it into the foreground here, with specific attention to a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Kentucky v. King (2011), concerning search and seizure rights. An entailment of the (...)
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  22. Stuart Henry & Dena Plemmons (2012). Neuroscience, Neuropolitics and Neuroethics: The Complex Case of Crime, Deception and fMRI. Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (3):573-591.
    Scientific developments take place in a socio-political context but scientists often ignore the ways their innovations will be both interpreted by the media and used by policy makers. In the rush to neuroscientific discovery important questions are overlooked, such as the ways: (1) the brain, environment and behavior are related; (2) biological changes are mediated by social organization; (3) institutional bias in the application of technical procedures ignores race, class and gender dimensions of society; (4) knowledge is used to the (...)
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  23. William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd (2014). Ethics and the Brains of Psychopaths: The Significance of Psychopathy for Our Ethical and Legal Theories. In Charles Wolfe (ed.), Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy. Springer 149-170.
    The emerging neuroscience of psychopathy will have several important implications for our attempts to construct an ethical society. In this article we begin by describing the list of criteria by which psychopaths are diagnosed. We then review four competing neuropsychological theories of psychopathic cognition. The first of these models, Newman’s attentional model, locates the problem in a special type of attentional narrowing that psychopaths have shown in experiments. The second and third, Blair’s amygdala model and Kiehl’s paralimbic model represent the (...)
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  24. William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd (2011). The Legal Self: Executive Processes and Legal Theory. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):151-176.
    When laws or legal principles mention mental states such as intentions to form a contract, knowledge of risk, or purposely causing a death, what parts of the brain are they speaking about? We argue here that these principles are tacitly directed at our prefrontal executive processes. Our current best theories of consciousness portray it as a workspace in which executive processes operate, but what is important to the law is what is done with the workspace content rather than the content (...)
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  25. Andrew Ingram (2012). Parsing the Reasonable Person: The Case of Self-Defense. American Journal of Criminal Law 39 (3):101-120.
    Mistakes are a fact of life, and the criminal law is sadly no exception to the rule. Wrongful convictions are rightfully abhorred, and false acquittals can likewise inspire outrage. In these cases, we implicitly draw a distinction between a court’s finding and a defendant’s actual guilt or innocence. These are intuitive concepts, but as this paper aims to show, contemporary use of the reasonable person standard in the law of self-defense muddles them. -/- Ordinarily, we can distinguish between a person's (...)
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  26. Andrew Jeffrey (1979). Polemarchus and Socrates on Justice and Harm. Phronesis 24 (1):54 - 69.
  27. Andrew Jeffrey (1979). Polemarchus and Socrates on Justice and Harm. Phronesis 24 (1):54-69.
  28. John Kleinig (1978). Crime and the Concept of Harm. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):27 - 36.
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  29. D. R. Knowles (1978). A Reformulation of the Harm Principle. Political Theory 6 (2):233-246.
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  30. Dudley R. Knowles (1978). A Reformulation of the Harm Principle. Political Theory 6 (2):233-246.
  31. Adam Kolber (2014). Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution? Indiana Law Journal 89:807-845.
    The central debate in the field of neurolaw has focused on two claims. Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen argue that we do not have free will and that advances in neuroscience will eventually lead us to stop blaming people for their actions. Stephen Morse, by contrast, argues that we have free will and that the kind of advances Greene and Cohen envision will not and should not affect the law. I argue that neither side has persuasively made the case for (...)
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  32. C. Lambros (1975). Notes toward an axiomatization of recklessness. Logique Et Analyse 18 (69):133.
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  33. Ken Levy (2016). Trying to Make Sense of Criminal Attempts. [REVIEW] Jurisprudence 7 (3):656-64.
    Issues include attempts generally; the problem of outcome luck; the impossibility defense; physical movement and intent; and reckless attempts, attempted rape, and attempted theft. In the final section, I offer a hypothetical that challenges Prof. Donnelly-Lazarov's theory.
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  34. Ken Levy (2014). It's Not Too Difficult: A Plea to Resurrect the Impossibility Defense. New Mexico Law Revview 45:225-274.
    Suppose you are at the gym trying to see some naked beauties by peeping through a hole in the wall. A policeman happens by, he asks you what you are doing, and you honestly tell him. He then arrests you for voyeurism. Are you guilty? We don’t know yet because there is one more fact to be considered: while you honestly thought that a locker room was on the other side of the wall, it was actually a squash court. Are (...)
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  35. Ken Levy (2011). Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment And to Preventive Detention. San Diego Law Review 48:1299-1395.
    I argue for two propositions. First, contrary to the common wisdom, we may justly punish individuals who are not morally responsible for their crimes. Psychopaths – individuals who lack the capacity to feel sympathy – help to prove this point. Scholars are increasingly arguing that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their behavior because they suffer from a neurological disorder that makes it impossible for them to understand, and therefore be motivated by, moral reasons. These same scholars then infer from (...)
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  36. David Lyons (1979). Liberty and Harm to Others. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5:1.
    J s mill's principle of liberty is often thought to say that the only good reason for interfering with a person's conduct is that it is harmful to others. An alternative interpretation is defended: that the only good reason for interfering is to prevent harm to others. Harm-Prevention is the aim, But the latter principle allows that conduct affected not be harmful; interference must be calculated to prevent harm to others, Perhaps indirectly. This accords with mill's official statement of his (...)
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  37. Eric Mack (1980). Bad Samaritanism and the Causation of Harm. Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (3):230-259.
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  38. Matthew Matravers & Arina Cocoru (2014). Revisiting the Hart/Wootton Debate on Responsibility. In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility.
  39. Steve Matthews (2004). Failed Agency and the Insanity Defence. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27:413-424.
    In this article I argue that insanity defences such as M’Nagten should be abolished in favour of a defence of failed agency. It is not insanity per se, or any other empirical condition, which constitutes the moral reason for exculpation. Rather, we should first recognize the conditions for being a responsible moral agent. These include some capacity to direct and control one’s behavior, a non-delusional component, and the capacity to recognize that one’s behavior is expressive of what they have reason (...)
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  40. R. Neville (1972). Justice and the Future of Statutory Law. American Journal of Jurisprudence 17 (1):92-110.
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  41. Mark Philpott (1996). Not Guilty By Reason of Genetic Determinism. In Henry Tam (ed.), Punishment, Excuses and Moral Development. Avebury 95-112.
    In February 1994, Stephen Mobley was convicted of the murder of John Collins. Mobley's lawyers attempted to introduce genetic evidence in an attempt to have Mobley's sentence reduced from death to life imprisonment. I examine the prospects for appeal to genetic determinism as a criminal defense. Guided by existing standards for insanity defenses, I argue that a genetic defense might be allowable in exceptional cases but will not be generally available as some have worried.
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  42. C. G. Pulman (2014). 'Introduction'. In Hart on Responsibility. Palgrave Macmillan
  43. Jonathan Quong (2012). Liability to Defensive Harm. Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (1):45-77.
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  44. John A. Robertson (1978). In Vitro Conception and Harm to the Unborn. Hastings Center Report 8 (5):13-14.
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  45. Eleanor Kallman Roemer (1981). Harm and the Ideal of the Educated Person: Response to Jane Roland Martin. Educational Theory 31 (2):115-124.
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  46. Kathleen Romanow (2003). Criminal Law: Physician Convicted for Recklessly Prescribing OxyContin. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 31 (1):154-155.
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  47. H. J. Rose (1958). Harm Vos: Θ μις. Pp. 83. Assen, Netherlands: van Gorcum, 1956. Paper. The Classical Review 8 (01):79-.
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  48. Re'em Segev (2014). Moral Rightness and the Significance of Law: Why, How and When Mistake of Law Matters. University of Toronto Law Journal, Forthcoming 64:36-63.
    The question of whether a mistake of law should negate or mitigate criminal liability is commonly considered to be pertinent to the culpability of the agent, often examined in light of the (epistemic) reasonableness of the mistake. I argue that this view disregards an important aspect of this question, namely whether a mistake of law affects the rightness of the action, particularly in light of the moral significance of the mistake. I argue that several plausible premises, regarding moral rightness under (...)
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  49. Re'em Segev (2008). Online Exclusive: Response To Whitley Kaufman: The Distributive Justice Theory Of Self-Defense. Ethics & International Affairs 22.
    Segev argues for a theory of distributive justice and considers its implications. This theory includes a principle of responsibility that was endorsed by others within an account of defensive force. Kaufman criticizes this account, which he refers to as the "distributive justice theory of self- defense ". In this paper, Segev responds to this criticism.
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  50. Re'em Segev (2008). The Distributive Justice Theory of Self-Defense: A Response to Whitley Kaufman. Ethics and International Affairs 22 (1).
    In several papers, I have argued for a theory of distributive justice and considered its implications. This theory includes a principle of responsibility that was endorsed by others within an account of defensive force (self-defense and defense of others). Whitley Kaufman criticizes this account which he refers to as the "distributive justice theory of self-defense" (DJ theory). In this paper, I respond to this criticism. I argue that Kaufman presents the theory inaccurately, that his standard of evaluation of the theory (...)
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