This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
22 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Matthew L. Baum (2013). The Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA) Genetic Predisposition to Impulsive Violence: Is It Relevant to Criminal Trials? Neuroethics 6 (2):287-306.
    In Italy, a judge reduced the sentence of a defendant by 1 year in response to evidence for a genetic predisposition to violence. The best characterized of these genetic differences, those in the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), were cited as especially relevant. Several months previously in the USA, MAOA data contributed to a jury reducing charges from 1st degree murder (a capital offence) to voluntary manslaughter. Is there a rational basis for this type of use of MAOA evidence in criminal (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Kai Draper (2009). Defense. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):69 - 88.
    This paper is an exploration of the nature of what is perhaps the most widely recognized justification for inflicting harm on human beings: the appeal to defense (self-defense and other-defense). I develop and defend a rights-based account of the appeal to defense that takes into account whether and to what degree both the aggressor and his potential victim are morally responsible for the relevant threat. However, unlike most extant rights-based accounts, mine is not a forfeiture account. That is, I do (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd (2014). Ethics and the Brains of Psychopaths: The Significance of Psychopathy for Our Ethical and Legal Theories. In Charles Wolfe (ed.), Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy. Springer. 149-170.
    The emerging neuroscience of psychopathy will have several important implications for our attempts to construct an ethical society. In this article we begin by describing the list of criteria by which psychopaths are diagnosed. We then review four competing neuropsychological theories of psychopathic cognition. The first of these models, Newman’s attentional model, locates the problem in a special type of attentional narrowing that psychopaths have shown in experiments. The second and third, Blair’s amygdala model and Kiehl’s paralimbic model represent the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd (2011). The Legal Self: Executive Processes and Legal Theory. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):151-176.
    When laws or legal principles mention mental states such as intentions to form a contract, knowledge of risk, or purposely causing a death, what parts of the brain are they speaking about? We argue here that these principles are tacitly directed at our prefrontal executive processes. Our current best theories of consciousness portray it as a workspace in which executive processes operate, but what is important to the law is what is done with the workspace content rather than the content (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Steve Matthews (2004). Failed Agency and the Insanity Defence. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27:413-424.
    In this article I argue that insanity defences such as M’Nagten should be abolished in favour of a defence of failed agency. It is not insanity per se, or any other empirical condition, which constitutes the moral reason for exculpation. Rather, we should first recognize the conditions for being a responsible moral agent. These include some capacity to direct and control one’s behavior, a non-delusional component, and the capacity to recognize that one’s behavior is expressive of what they have reason (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Mark Philpott (1996). &Quot;not Guilty By Reason of Genetic Determinism&Quot;. In Henry Tam (ed.), Punishment, Excuses and Moral Development. Avebury. 95-112.
    In February 1994, Stephen Mobley was convicted of the murder of John Collins. Mobley's lawyers attempted to introduce genetic evidence in an attempt to have Mobley's sentence reduced from death to life imprisonment. I examine the prospects for appeal to genetic determinism as a criminal defense. Guided by existing standards for insanity defenses, I argue that a genetic defense might be allowable in exceptional cases but will not be generally available as some have worried.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Kathleen Romanow (2003). Criminal Law: Physician Convicted for Recklessly Prescribing OxyContin. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 31 (1):154-155.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Re'em Segev (forthcoming). Moral Rightness and the Significance of Law: Why, How and When Mistake of Law Matters. University of Toronto Law Journal, Forthcoming.
    The question of whether a mistake of law should negate or mitigate criminal liability is commonly considered to be pertinent to the culpability of the agent, often examined in light of the (epistemic) reasonableness of the mistake. I argue that this view disregards an important aspect of this question, namely whether a mistake of law affects the rightness of the action, particularly in light of the moral significance of the mistake. I argue that several plausible premises, regarding moral rightness under (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Re'em Segev (2009). Sub-Optimal Justification and Justificatory Defenses. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):57-76.
    Justificatory defenses apply to actions that are generally wrong and illegal—mainly since they harm people—when they are (exceptionally) justified—usually since they prevent (more serious) harm to others. A strict conception of justification limits justificatory defenses to actions that reflect all pertinent principles in the optimal manner. A more relaxed conception of justification applies (also) to actions that do not reflect all pertinent principles optimally due to (unjustified) mistake but are not too far from this optimum. In the paper, I consider (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Re'em Segev (2008). The Distributive Justice Theory of Self-Defense: A Response to Whitley Kaufman. Ethics and International Affairs 22 (1).
    In several papers, I have argued for a theory of distributive justice and considered its implications. This theory includes a principle of responsibility that was endorsed by others within an account of defensive force (self-defense and defense of others). Whitley Kaufman criticizes this account which he refers to as the "distributive justice theory of self-defense" (DJ theory). In this paper, I respond to this criticism. I argue that Kaufman presents the theory inaccurately, that his standard of evaluation of the theory (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Re'em Segev (2006). Justification, Rationality and Mistake: Mistake of Law is No Excuse? It Might Be a Justificaton! [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 25 (1):31-79.
    According to a famous maxim, ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse. This maxim is supposed to represent both the standard and the proper rule of law. In fact, this maxim should be qualified in both respects: ignorance and mistake of law sometimes are, and (perhaps even more often) should be, excused. But this dual qualification only reinforces the fundamental and ubiquitous assumption which underlies the discussions of the subject, namely, that the only ground of exculpation relevant to ignorance (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Katrina L. Sifferd (2006). In Defense of the Use of Commonsense Psychology in the Criminal Law. Law and Philosophy 25 (6):571 - 612.
    The criminal law depends upon 'commonsense' or 'folk' psychology, a seemingly innate theory used by all normal human beings as a means to understand and predict other humans' behavior. This paper discusses two major types of arguments that commonsense psychology is not a true theory of human behavior, and thus should be eliminated and replaced. The paper argues that eliminitivist projects fail to provide evidence that commonsense psychology is a false theory, and argues that there is no need to seek (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Katrina Sifferd & William Hirstein (2012). On the Criminal Culpability of Successful and Unsucessful Psychopaths. Neuroethics 6 (1):129-140.
    The psychological literature now differentiates between two types of psychopath:successful (with little or no criminal record) and unsuccessful (with a criminal record). Recent research indicates that earlier findings of reduced autonomic activity, reduced prefrontal grey matter, and compromised executive activity may only be true of unsuccessful psychopaths. In contrast, successful psychopaths actually show autonomic and executive function that exceeds that of normals, while having no difference in prefrontal volume from normals. We argue that many successful psychopaths are legally responsible for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy (2011). Insanity Defense. In John Deigh & David Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press. 299--334.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Uwe Steinhoff (2014). Just Cause and 'Right Intention'. Journal of Military Ethics 13 (1):32-48.
    I argue that the criterion of just cause is not independent of proportionality and other valid jus ad bellum criteria. One cannot know whether there is a just cause without knowing whether the other (valid) criteria (apart from ‘right intention’) are satisfied. The advantage of this account is that it is applicable to all wars, even to wars where nobody will be killed or where the enemy has not committed a rights violation but can be justifiably warred against anyway. This (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. François Tanguay-Renaud (2012). Individual Emergencies and the Rule of Criminal Law. In François Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos (eds.), Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law. Hart Publishing.
  17. François Tanguay-Renaud (2010). Understanding Criminal Law Through the Lens of Reason. Res Publica 16 (1):89-98.
    This is a review essay of Gardner, John. 2007, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 288 pp.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Irving Thalberg (1971). Hart on Strict Liability and Excusing Conditions. Ethics 81 (2):150-160.
  19. Mark Tunick (2011). Entrapment and Retributive Theory. In Mark White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. Oxford University Press.
    I address the question, ‘Should a retributivist support an entrapment defense and if so, under what circumstances?’, by considering the culpability of entrapped defendants. An entrapment defense is invoked by defendants who claim they violated the law because they were enticed to crime by the police and would not otherwise have committed the crime. There are different rationales for the defense: people who are normally law abiding, and who are not predisposed to commit crimes, do not commit crimes merely when (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Lucinda Vandervort (2001). Mistake of Law and Obstruction of Justice: A 'Bad Excuse' ... Even for a Lawyer! University of New Brunswick Law Journal 50: 171-186.
    In Regina v. Murray, (2000, Ont S.Ct.J.) the learned trial judge, Justice Gravely, errs in his interpretation and application of the law of mens rea in the offense of willfully attempting to obstruct justice under section 139(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada. In view of his findings of fact and law, including the determination that the accused knowingly and intentionally committed the actus reus of the offense and the absence of any suggestion that he lacked awareness of any relevant (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Lucinda Vandervort (1987-1988). Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea. Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 2 (2):233-309.
    In this ground-breaking article submitted for publication in mid-1986, Lucinda Vandervort creates a radically new and comprehensive theory of sexual consent as the unequivocal affirmative communication of voluntary agreement. She argues that consent is a social act of communication with normative effects. To consent is to waive a personal legal right to bodily integrity and relieve another person of a correlative legal duty. If the criminal law is to protect the individual’s right of sexual self-determination and physical autonomy, rather than (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Nicole A. Vincent (2011). Legal Responsibility Adjudication and the Normative Authority of the Mind Sciences. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):315-331.
    In the field of ?neurolaw?, reformists claim that recent scientific discoveries from the mind sciences have serious ramifications for how legal responsibility should be adjudicated, but conservatives deny that this is so. In contrast, I criticise both of these polar opposite positions by arguing that although scientific findings can have often-weighty normative significance, they lack the normative authority with which reformists often imbue them. After explaining why conservatives and reformists are both wrong, I then offer my own moderate suggestions about (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation