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  1. E. M. Adams (1960). The Theoretical and the Practical. Review of Metaphysics 13 (4):642 - 662.
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  2. Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.) (2010). New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
  3. Maria Alvarez (2010). Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press.
    Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions and motives, and of how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. In Kinds of Reasons, Maria Alvarez offers a fresh and incisive treatment of these issues, focusing in particular on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. Her account builds on some important recent work in the (...)
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  4. Kent Bach (1980). Actions Are Not Events. Mind 89 (353):114-120.
  5. Jussi Backman, The End of Action: An Arendtian Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Praxis. Hannah Arendt: Practice, Thought and Judgement.
    The article re-examines the Aristotelian backdrop of Arendt’s notion of action. On the one hand, Backman takes up Arendt’s critique of the hierarchy of human activities in Aristotle, according to which Aristotle subordinates action (praxis) to production (poiesis) and contemplation (theoria). Backman argues that this is not the case since Aristotle conceives theoria as the most perfect form of praxis. On the other hand, Backman stresses that Arendt’s notion of action is in fact very different from Aristotle’s praxis, to the (...)
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  6. Renée Bilodeau (2000). La philosohie de l'action. In Pascal Engel (ed.), Précis de philosophie analytique. P.U.F. 189-212.
    Introduction à quelques problèmes de philosophie de l'action: la nature de l'action, l'individuation de l'action, la théorie causale, les raisons et les causes, les chaînes causales déviantes, la notion d'intention, la "simple view", les raisonnements pratiques.
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  7. Myles Brand (1970). Causes of Actions. Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):932-947.
  8. Justin Capes (2012). Action, Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.
    Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful.
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  9. Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette (2015). Recensement: Hyman - Action, Knowledge and Will. [REVIEW] Philosophiques 42 (2):435-440.
    Ce compte-rendu résume les quatre dimensions de la philosophie de l’ action défendue dans Action, Knowledge and Will : physique, éthique, psychologique et intellectuel. Cela dit, les deux contributions principales du livre recensé relèvent de liens entre les différentes dimensions de l’ action. Il s’agit d’une distinction et d’une connexion. Premièrement, Hyman croit qu’il faut distinguer la dimension éthique et la dimension physique de l’ action. Plus précisément, il pense que le concept de volonté et le concept de volontaire doivent (...)
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  10. Arthur B. Cody (1971). Is 'Human Action' A Category? Inquiry 14 (1-4):386-419.
    It seems to have been taken for granted that we all know what a human action is. However in attempting to draw from what philosophers have said about actions the necessary clues as to their distinguishing features, one finds little to discourage the idea that there is no way of distinguishing one category of occurrences, human actions, from the complex of different sorts of things which happen. From this I am tempted to conclude that there is no category of human (...)
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  11. Jonathan Dancy (2008). On How to Act : Disjunctively. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press 262--282.
  12. Donald Davidson (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.
  13. Lawrence H. Davis (1979). Theory of Action. Prentice Hall.
  14. R. E. Dowling (1969). ROWN, D. G.: Action. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47:404.
  15. K. Fine & Nicholas Rescher (1970). The Logic of Decision and Action. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (80):287.
    The four main essays in this volume investigate new sectors of the theory of decision, preference, act-characteristics, and action analysis. Herbert A. Simon applies tools developed in the theory of decision-making to the logic of action, and thereby develops a novel concept of heuristic power. Adapting ideas from utility and decision theory, Nicholas Rescher proposes a logic of preference by which conflicting theories proposed by G. H. von Wright, R. M. Chisholm, and others can be systematized. Donald Davidson discusses difficulties (...)
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  16. Anton Ford (2011). Action and Generality. In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press
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  17. Kim Frost (forthcoming). Antinomy of Basic Action. In Roman Altshuler Michael J. Sigrist (ed.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. Routledge
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  18. Alvin I. Goldman (1978). Chisholm's Theory of Action. Philosophia 7 (3-4):583-596.
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  19. Alvin I. Goldman (1971). The Individuation of Action. Journal of Philosophy 68 (21):761-774.
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  20. Alvin Ira Goldman (1965). Action. Dissertation, Princeton University
  21. Ghita Holmström-Hintikka (1991). Action, Purpose and Will: A Formal Theory. Distributed by Akateeminen Kirjakauppa.
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  22. Ghita Holmström-Hintikka & Raimo Tuomela (1997). Contemporary Action Theory.
  23. Jennifer Hornsby (1980). Actions. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    This book presents an events-based view of human action somewhat different from that of what is known as "standard story". A thesis about trying-to-do-something is distinguished from various volitionist theses. It is argued then that given a correct conception of action's antecedents, actions will be identified not with bodily movements but with causes of such movements.
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  24. Patricia Mary Lourdes Illingworth (1985). Consequences and Privileged Act Descriptions. Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
    In the dissertation I provide an account of action descriptions which emphasizes their role as explanations of consequences. By showing that consequences are ascribed to an action under a description, and only when that description can explain the consequence, I undermine the view that consequences are brute events. Roughly, I reason as follows. If consequences were brute events, then their ascription to an action wouldn't hinge on how we understand the action. We could, for instance, say in ordinary circumstances "John (...)
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  25. Carolyn Dicey Jennings & Bence Nanay (2016). Action Without Attention. Analysis 76 (1):29-36.
    Wayne Wu argues that attention is necessary for action: since action requires a solution to the ‘Many–Many Problem’, and since only attention can solve the Many–Many Problem, attention is necessary for action. We question the first of these two steps and argue that it is based on an oversimplified distinction between actions and reflexes. We argue for a more complex typology of behaviours where one important category is action that does not require a solution to the Many–Many Problem, and so (...)
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  26. A. J. P. Kenny (1963). Action, Emotion And Will. Ny: Humanities Press.
    ACTION, EMOTION AND WILL "This a clear and persuasive book which contains as many sharp points as a thorn bush and an array of arguments that as neat and ...
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  27. Carl Erik Kühl (2008). Kinesis and Energeia—and What Follows. Outline of a Typology of Human Actions. Axiomathes 18 (3):303-338.
    This paper presents a typology of human actions, based on Aristotle’s kinesis–energeia dichotomy and on a formal elaboration (with some refinement) of the Vendler–Kenny classificatory schemes for action types (or action verbs). The types introduced are defined throughout by inferential criteria, in terms of what here are referred to as “modal-temporal expressions” (‘MT-terms’). Examples of familiar categories analysed in this way are production and maintenance, but the procedure is meant to offer a basis for defining various other commonsense categories. Among (...)
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  28. Ernest Lepore & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) (1985). Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. B. Blackwell.
  29. Yair Levy (forthcoming). Action Unified. Philosophical Quarterly:pqv056.
    Mental acts are conspicuously absent from philosophical debates over the nature of action. A typical protagonist of a typical scenario is far more likely to raise her arm or open the window than she is to perform a calculation in her head or talk to herself silently. One possible explanation for this omission is that the standard ‘causalist’ account of action, on which acts are analyzed in terms of mental states causing bodily movements, faces difficulties in accommodating some paradigmatic cases (...)
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  30. Yair Levy (2013). Intentional Action First. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.
    The paper motivates a novel research programme in the philosophy of action parallel to the ‘Knowledge First’ programme in epistemology. It is argued that much of the grounds for abandoning the quest for a reductive analysis of knowledge in favour of the Knowledge First alternative is mirrored in the case of intentional action, inviting the hypothesis that intentional action is also, like knowledge, metaphysically basic. The paper goes on to demonstrate the sort of explanatory contribution that intentional action can make (...)
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  31. A. I. Melden (1956). Action. Philosophical Review 65 (4):523-541.
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  32. Alfred R. Mele (ed.) (1997). The Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press.
    The latest offering in the highly successful Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, The Philosophy of Action features contributions from twelve leading figures in the field, including: Robert Audi, Michael Bratman, Donald Davidson, Wayne Davis, Harry Frankfurt, Carl Ginet, Gilbert Harman, Jennifer Hornsby, Jaegwon Kim, Hugh McCann, Paul Moser, and Brian O'Shaughnessy. Alfred Mele provides an introductory essay on the topics chosen and the questions they deal with. Topics addressed include intention, reasons for action, and the nature and explanation of internal (...)
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  33. Christian Miller (2008). Introduction to Agency Symposium. Ethics 118 (3):385-387.
    The three essays which make up this symposium engage with some of the most important issues in the theory of action and agency today. Among the topics which are considered at length are the possibility of practical knowledge, the relationship between knowledge how versus knowledge that, the constitution of intentions, the importance of knowledge without observation, the difference between genuine actions versus mere bodily movements, the role of making sense in action and valuing, the nature of valuing and of values, (...)
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  34. Carlos Moya (1990). The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction. Polity Press.
  35. Matthew B. O'Brien (2013). Elizabeth Anscombe and the New Natural Lawyers on Intentional Action. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly (1):47-56.
  36. Robert Pasnau (1995). Review of Audi, "Action, Intention, and Reason". [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 49 (2):398-400.
  37. Leon Pearl (1977). Action Theory. International Studies in Philosophy 9:111-112.
  38. Jean-luc Petit (1989). La Sémantique de L'Action. A.N.R.T. Université de Lille Iii.
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  39. Karl Pfeifer (1992). Carl Ginet, On Action. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 12:196-199.
  40. Joëlle Proust (2013). Mental Acts as Natural Kinds. In Till Vierkant, Julian Kieverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford University Press 262-282.
    This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot have pre-specified goal contents. For example, one cannot prespecify the content of a judgment or of a deliberation. Second, mental acts seem to depend crucially on receptive attitudes. Third, it does not seem that intentions play any role in mental actions. Given these three constraints, mental and bodily actions appear (...)
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  41. Rebekah L. H. Rice (forthcoming). Reasons and Divine Action: A Dilemma. In Kevin Timpe Dan Speak (ed.), Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns. Oxford University Press
    Many theistic philosophers conceive of God’s activity in agent-causal terms. That is, they view divine action as an instance of (perhaps the paradigm case of) substance causation. At the same time, many theists endorse the claim that God acts for reasons, and not merely wantonly. It is the aim of this paper to show that a commitment to both theses gives rise to a dilemma. I present the dilemma and then spend the bulk of the paper defending its premises. I (...)
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  42. David-Hillel Ruben (2016). A Conditional Theory of Trying. Philosophical Studies 173 (1):271-287.
    What I shall do in this paper is to propose an analysis of ‘Agent P tries to A’ in terms of a subjunctive conditional, that avoids some of the problems that beset most alternative accounts of trying, which I call ‘referential views’. They are so-named because on these alternative accounts, ‘P tries to A’ entails that there is a trying to A by P, and therefore the expression ‘P’s trying to A’ can occur in the subject of a sentence and (...)
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  43. David-Hillel Ruben (1991). Review of Natural Agency. [REVIEW] Mind (2):287-290.
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  44. Bede Rundle (1997). Mind in Action. Oxford University Press.
    Mind in Action challenges the dominant view in contemporary philosophy that human action is driven by thoughts and desires much as a machine is made to function by the operation of physical causes. Bede Rundle rejects the materialist view of mind and the causal theory of action; his alternative approach elucidates such key concepts as thought, belief, desire, intention, and freedom to give a fresh view of human behavior.
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  45. Constantine Sandis (2006). When Did the Killing Occur? Daimon: Revista de Filosofia 37:179-186.
  46. Constantine Sandis & Timothy O'Connor (eds.) (2010). A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell.
  47. Markus E. Schlosser, Agency. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and 'agency' denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard theory of action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. From this, we obtain a standard conception and a standard theory of agency. There are (...)
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  48. Matthew Silverstein (2010). The Standards of Practical Reasoning. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):631-638.
    A critical study of Kieran Setiya's *Reasons without Rationalism*.
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  49. Gordon Park Stevenson (2004). Revamping Action Theory. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):427 - 451.
    Philosophical interest in intentional action has flourished in recent decades. Typically, action theorists propose necessary and sufficient conditions for a movement's being an action, conditions derived from a conceptual analysis of folk psychological action ascriptions. However, several key doctrinal and methodological features of contemporary action theory are troubling, in particular (i) the insistence that folk psychological kinds like beliefs and desires have neurophysiological correlates, (ii) the assumption that the concept of action is "classical" in structure (making it amenable to definition (...)
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  50. Helen Steward (2014). Causing Things and Doing Things. In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility.
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