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  1. Natalie Abrams (1981). Book Review:On Defining Death. Douglas N. Walton. [REVIEW] Ethics 92 (1):148-.
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  2. Gerard A. J. M. Jagers op Akkerhuis (2010). Towards a Hierarchical Definition of Life, the Organism, and Death. Foundations of Science 15 (3):245-262.
    Despite hundreds of definitions, no consensus exists on a definition of life or on the closely related and problematic definitions of the organism and death. These problems retard practical and theoretical development in, for example, exobiology, artificial life, biology and evolution. This paper suggests improving this situation by basing definitions on a theory of a generalized particle hierarchy. This theory uses the common denominator of the “operator” for a unified ranking of both particles and organisms, from elementary particles to animals (...)
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  3. J. M. Appel (2005). Defining Death: When Physicians and Families Differ. Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (11):641-642.
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  4. Kurt Bayertz (1992). Techno-Thanatology: Moral Consequences of Introducing Brain Criteria for Death. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (4):407-417.
    This paper is based on the hypothesis that the effort to establish new criteria for diagnosing human death, which has been taking place over the past twenty years or more, can be viewed as a paradigm case for the impact of scientific and technological progress on morality. This impact takes the form of three tendencies within the change in morality, which may be characterized as ‘denaturalization’, ‘functionalization’ and ‘homogenization’. The paper concludes with the view that these tendencies do not indicate (...)
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  5. Ben Bradley (2009). Well-Being and Death. Oxford University Press.
  6. Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.) (2013). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. OUP USA.
    This Handbook consists of 21 new essays on the nature and value of death, the relevance of the metaphysics of time and personal identity for questions about death, the desirability of immortality, and the wrongness of killing.
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  7. Alister Browne (1987). Defining Death. Journal of Applied Philosophy 4 (2):155-164.
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  8. E. C. Brugger (2013). D. Alan Shewmon and the PCBE's White Paper on Brain Death: Are Brain-Dead Patients Dead? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 38 (2):205-218.
    The December 2008 White Paper (WP) on “Brain Death” published by the President’s Council on Bioethics (PCBE) reaffirmed its support for the traditional neurological criteria for human death. It spends considerable time explaining and critiquing what it takes to be the most challenging recent argument opposing the neurological criteria formulated by D. Alan Shewmon, a leading critic of the “whole brain death” standard. The purpose of this essay is to evaluate and critique the PCBE’s argument. The essay begins with a (...)
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  9. Mike Collins (2010). Reevaluating the Dead Donor Rule. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (2):1-26.
    The dead donor rule justifies current practice in organ procurement for transplantation and states that organ donors must be dead prior to donation. The majority of organ donors are diagnosed as having suffered brain death and hence are declared dead by neurological criteria. However, a significant amount of unrest in both the philosophical and the medical literature has surfaced since this practice began forty years ago. I argue that, first, declaring death by neurological criteria is both unreliable and unjustified but (...)
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  10. Mike Collins (2009). Consent for Organ Retrieval Cannot Be Presumed. HEC Forum 21 (1):71-106.
  11. Niall Connolly (2011). How the Dead Live. Philosophia 39 (1):83-103.
    This paper maintains (following Yougrau 1987; 2000 and Hinchliff 1996) that the dead and other former existents count as examples of non-existent objects. If the dead number among the things there are, a further question arises: what is it to be dead—how should the state of being dead be characterised? It is argued that this state should be characterised negatively: the dead are not persons, philosophers etc. They lack any of the (intrinsic) qualities they had while they lived. The only (...)
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  12. Megan Crowley-Matoka & Robert M. Arnold (2004). The Dead Donor Rule: How Much Does the Public Care ... And How Much Should. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14 (3):319-332.
    : In this brief commentary, we reflect on the recent study by Siminoff, Burant, and Youngner of public attitudes toward "brain death" and organ donation, focusing on the implications of their findings for the rules governing from whom organs can be obtained. Although the data suggest that many seem to view "brain death" as "as good as dead" rather than "dead" (calling the dead donor rule into question), we find that the study most clearly demonstrates that understanding an individual's definition (...)
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  13. Françoise Dastur (2012). How Are We to Confront Death?: An Introduction to Philosophy. Fordham University Press.
    Overcoming death -- Neutralizing death -- Accepting death.
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  14. Leonardo D. de Castro & Peter A. Sy (1998). Critical Care in the Philippines: The "Robin Hood Principle" Vs. Kagandahang Loob. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 23 (6):563 – 580.
    Practical medical decisions are closely integrated with ethical and religious beliefs in the Philippines. This is shown in a survey of Filipino physicians' attitudes towards severely compromised neonates. This is also the reason why the ethical analysis of critical care practices must be situated within the context of local culture. Kagandahang loob and kusang loob are indigenous Filipino ethical concepts that provide a framework for the analysis of several critical care practices. The practice of taking-from-the-rich-to-give-to-the-poor in public hospitals is not (...)
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  15. John Donnelly (ed.) (1994). Language, Metaphysics, and Death. Fordham University Press.
    This standard work in thanatology is updated with ten essays new to the second edition, and features a new introduction by Donnelly. The collection addresses certain basic issues inherent in a philosophy of death.
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  16. Gerald Dworkin (2007). Pt. IV. The End of Life. The Definition of Death / Stuart Youngner ; The Aging Society and the Expansion of Senility: Biotechnological and Treatment Goals / Stephen Post ; Death is a Punch in the Jaw: Life-Extension and its Discontents / Felicia Nimue Ackerman ; Precedent Autonomy, Advance Directives, and End-of-Life Care / John K. Davis ; Physician-Assisted Death: The State of the Debate. [REVIEW] In Bonnie Steinbock (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. Oxford University Press.
  17. H. M. Evans (2005). Reply To: Defining Death: When Physicians and Families Differ. Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (11):642-644.
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  18. James W. Evra (1984). Death. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 5 (2).
    There is a classic problem which confronts any attempt to assign death a value. On the assumption that death is personal annihilation, death deprives evil of a requisite subject, for no misfortune can befall something which does not exist. Recent efforts to provide a reasonable basis for counting death as a bad thing have centered on an analysis of the loss of life's goods which it brings. So long as the analysis assumes that death is a simple state, loss can (...)
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  19. Fred Feldman, “Death”.
    Reflection on death gives rise to a variety of philosophical questions. One of the deepest of these is a question about the nature of death. Typically, philosophers interpret this question as a call for an analysis, or definition, of the concept of death. Plato proposed to define death as the separation of soul from body. This definition is not acceptable to materialists, who think that there are no souls. It is also unacceptable to anyone who thinks that plants and lower (...)
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  20. Fred Feldman (2000). The Termination Thesis. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):98–115.
    The Termination Thesis (or “TT”) is the view that people go out of existence when they die. Lots of philosophers seem to believe it. Epicurus, for example, apparently makes use of TT in his efforts to show that it is irrational to fear death. He says, “as long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist.”1 Lucretius says pretty much the same thing, but in many more words and more poetically: “Death (...)
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  21. Fred Feldman (1992). The Enigma of Death. Philosophia 21 (3-4):163-181.
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  22. Antony Flew (1964). Body, Mind, and Death. New York, Macmillan.
  23. Norman Fost (2004). Reconsidering the Dead Donor Rule: Is It Important That Organ Donors Be Dead? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14 (3):249-260.
    : The "dead donor rule" is increasingly under attack for several reasons. First, there has long been disagreement about whether there is a correct or coherent definition of "death." Second, it has long been clear that the concept and ascertainment of "brain death" is medically flawed. Third, the requirement stands in the way of improving organ supply by prohibiting organ removal from patients who have little to lose—e.g., infants with anencephaly—and from patients who ardently want to donate while still alive—e.g., (...)
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  24. Cody Gilmore (2013). When Do Things Die? In Ben Bradley, Jens Johansson & Fred Feldman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. Oxford University Press.
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  25. Cody Gilmore (2007). Defining 'Dead' in Terms of 'Lives' and 'Dies'. Philosophia 35 (2):219-231.
    What is it for a thing to be dead? Fred Feldman holds, correctly in my view, that a definition of ‘dead’ should leave open both (1) the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being alive, and (2) the possibility of things that go directly from being alive to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. But if this is right, then surely such a definition should also leave open the possibility of things that (...)
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  26. David B. Hershenov (2006). The Death of a Person. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (2):107 – 120.
    Drawing upon Lynne Baker's idea of the person derivatively possessing the properties of a constituting organism, I argue that even if persons aren't identical to living organisms, they can each literally die a biological death. Thus we can accept that we're not essentially organisms and can still die without having to admit that there are two concepts and criteria of death as Jeff McMahan and Robert Veatch do. Furthermore, we can accept James Bernat's definition of "death" without having to insist, (...)
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  27. Stephen Holland (2010). On the Ordinary Concept of Death. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (2):109-122.
    What is death? The question is of wide-ranging practical importance because we need to be able to distinguish the living from the dead in order to treat both appropriately; specifically, the permissibility of retrieving vital organs for transplantation depends upon the potential donor's ontological status. There is a well-established and influential biological definition of death as irreversible breakdown in the functioning of the organism as a whole, but it continues to elicit disquiet and rejoinders. The central claims of this paper (...)
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  28. Peter Hucklenbroich (1981). On Defining Death. An Analytic Study of the Concept of Death in Philosophy and Medical Ethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2 (3):361-365.
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  29. A. Ya Ivanyushkin (1989). Trends in the Development of Medical Ethics in the Ussr. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14 (3):301-314.
    The study of professional ethics has a long tradition in the Soviet Union; medical ethics is a code of conduct as well as an academic discipline. The paper discusses the ethical issues in intensive care, the definition of death, abortion, euthanasia, and the moral aspects of medical mistakes. Keywords: abortion, euthanasia, intensive care, medical mistakes, medical deontology, professional ethics, Marxism, socialism, USSR, bioethics CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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  30. Royce P. Jones (1985). The Logical Status of Brain Death Criteria. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10 (4):387-396.
    This article is an attempt to clarify a confusion in the brain death literature between logical sufficiency/necessity and natural sufficiency/necessity. We focus on arguments that draw conclusions regarding empirical matters of fact from conceptual or ontological definitions. Specifically, we critically analyze arguments by Tom Tomlinson and Michael B. Green and Daniel Wikler. which, respectively, confuse logical and natural sufficiency and logical and natural necessity. Our own conclusion is that it is especially important in discussing the brain death issue to observe (...)
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  31. Susan Frances Jones & Anthony S. Kessel (2001). The 'Redefinition of Death' Debate: Western Concepts and Western Bioethics. Science and Engineering Ethics 7 (1):63-75.
    Biomedicine is a global enterprise constructed upon the belief in the universality of scientific truths. However, despite huge scientific advances over recent decades it has not been able to formulate a specific and universal definition of death: In fact, in its attempt to redefine death, the concept of death appears to have become immersed in ever increasing vagueness and ambiguity. Even more worrisome is that bioethics, in the form of principlism, is also endeavouring to become a global enterprise by claiming (...)
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  32. Eike-Henner W. Kluge (1981). On Defining Death: An Analytic Study of the Concept of Death in Philosophy and Medical Ethics. By Douglas N. Walton. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1979. Pp. Xii, 189. $15.95. [REVIEW] Dialogue 20 (03):616-620.
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  33. Rodrigo Laera (2013). The Preoccupation with Death. Problemata: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 4 (1):110-133.
    Against the epicurean position, the rationality about the preoccupation with death is discussed by the present paper. For this purpose two elemental thesis are proposed. The first one supports that it is rational to worry about death before dying because we conceive the idea of a discourse in which the impossibility of interfere in the world to satisfy our pending goals is lamented. The second thesis is that death afflicts any prejudice only to whom wonders about it, because this question (...)
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  34. John P. Lizza (2005). Potentiality, Irreversibility, and Death. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 30 (1):45 – 64.
    There has been growing concern about whether individuals who satisfy neurological criteria for death or who become non-heart-beating organ donors are really dead. This concern has focused on the issue of the potential for recovery that these individuals may still have and whether their conditions are irreversible. In this article I examine the concepts of potentiality and irreversibility that have been invoked in the discussions of the definition of death and non-heart-beating organ donation. I initially focus on the recent challenge (...)
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  35. John P. Lizza (1999). Defining Death for Persons and Human Organisms. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 20 (5):439-453.
    This paper discusses how alternative concepts of personhood affect the definition of death. I argue that parties in the debate over the definition of death have employed different concepts of personhood, and thus have been talking past each other by proposing definitions of death for different kinds of things. In particular, I show how critics of the consciousness-related, neurological formation of death have relied on concepts of personhood that would be rejected by proponents of that formulation. These critics rest on (...)
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  36. Steven Luper, Death. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    First, what constitutes a person's death? It is clear enough that people die when their lives end, but less clear what constitutes the ending of a person's life.
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  37. J. E. Malpas & Robert C. Solomon (eds.) (1998). Death and Philosophy. Routledge.
    Death and Philosophy presents a wide ranging and fascinating variety of different philosophical, aesthetic and literary perspectives on death. Death raises key questions such as whether life has meaning of life in the face of death, what the meaning of "life after death" might be and whether death is part of a narrative that can be retold in different ways, and considers the various types of death, such as brain death, that challenge mind-body dualism. The essays also include explorations of (...)
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  38. Mike Nair-Collins (2010). Death, Brain Death, and the Limits of Science: Why the Whole-Brain Concept of Death Is a Flawed Public Policy. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 38 (3):667-683.
    Legally defining “death” in terms of brain death unacceptably obscures a value judgment that not all reasonable people would accept. This is disingenuous, and it results in serious moral flaws in the medical practices surrounding organ donation. Public policy that relies on the whole-brain concept of death is therefore morally flawed and in need of revision.
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  39. Clifton Perry (1979). Determining and Defining Death. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 4 (3):219-225.
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  40. Julia Reeve (1989). Brain Life and Brain Death – the Anencephalic as an Explanatory Example. A Contribution to Transplantation. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14 (1):5-23.
    The current debate regarding the suitability of anencephalics as organ donors is due primarily to misunderstandings. The anatomical and neurophysiological literature shows that the anencephalic lacks a cerebrum because of the failure of neuralplate fusion. However, even the incomplete function of an atrophic brain stem is currently accepted at law in most if not all countries as sufficient for brain life: which is to say, cessation of breathing is currently required in order to make the diagnosis of brain death. Because (...)
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  41. David Shaw (2013). Cryoethics. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopaedia of Ethics. Blackwell.
    Cryoethics is a new theme within bioethics (see bioethics) concerned with the ethics of cryonic storage. Cryonics, which is also erroneously referred to as “cryogenic” technology, offers people the option of having their bodies or brain-stems preserved at very low temperatures after death in order to be revived at some point in the future when technology is sufficiently advanced to enable reanimation, and possibly immortality. The main issues in cryoethics center around whether it is ethical to use this technology, and (...)
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  42. David Shaw (2009). Cryoethics: Seeking Life After Death. Bioethics 23 (9):515-521.
    Cryonic suspension is a relatively new technology that offers those who can afford it the chance to be 'frozen' for future revival when they reach the ends of their lives. This paper will examine the ethical status of this technology and whether its use can be justified. Among the arguments against using this technology are: it is 'against nature', and would change the very concept of death; no friends or family of the 'freezee' will be left alive when he is (...)
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  43. D. A. Shewmon (2010). Constructing the Death Elephant: A Synthetic Paradigm Shift for the Definition, Criteria, and Tests for Death. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (3):256-298.
    In debates about criteria for human death, several camps have emerged, the main two focusing on either loss of the "organism as a whole" (the mainstream view) or loss of consciousness or "personhood." Controversies also rage over the proper definition of "irreversible" in criteria for death. The situation is reminiscent of the proverbial blind men palpating an elephant; each describes the creature according to the part he can touch. Similarly, each camp grasps some aspect of the complex reality of death. (...)
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  44. D. Alan Shewmon (2001). The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights Into the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating Brain Death with Death. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 26 (5):457 – 478.
    The mainstream rationale for equating brain death (BD) with death is that the brain confers integrative unity upon the body, transforming it from a mere collection of organs and tissues to an organism as a whole. In support of this conclusion, the impressive list of the brains myriad integrative functions is often cited. Upon closer examination, and after operational definition of terms, however, one discovers that most integrative functions of the brain are actually not somatically integrating, and, conversely, most integrative (...)
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  45. David Shoemaker (2010). The Insignificance of Personal Identity for Bioethics. Bioethics 24 (9):481-489.
    It has long been thought that certain key bioethical views depend heavily on work in personal identity theory, regarding questions of either our essence or the conditions of our numerical identity across time. In this paper I argue to the contrary, that personal identity is actually not significant at all in this arena. Specifically, I explore three topics where considerations of identity are thought to be essential – abortion, definition of death, and advance directives – and I show in each (...)
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  46. Theodore Sider (2012). The Evil of Death: What Can Metaphysics Contribute? In Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Death.
    For most us, learning which quantum theory correctly describes human bodies will not affect our attitudes towards our loved ones. On the other hand, a child’s discovery of the nature of meat (or an adult’s discovery of the nature of soylent green) can have a great effect. In still other cases, it is hard to say how one would, or should, react to new information about the underlying nature of what we value—think of how mixed our reactions are to evidence (...)
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  47. Laura A. Siminoff, Christopher Burant & Stuart J. Youngner (2004). Death and Organ Procurement: Public Beliefs and Attitudes. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14 (3):217-234.
    : Although "brain death" and the dead donor rule—i.e., patients must not be killed by organ retrieval—have been clinically and legally accepted in the U.S. as prerequisites to organ removal, there is little data about public attitudes and beliefs concerning these matters. To examine the public attitudes and beliefs about the determination of death and its relationship to organ transplantation, 1351 Ohio residents ≥18 years were randomly selected and surveyed using random digit dialing (RDD) sample frames. The RDD telephone survey (...)
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  48. Robert Sparrow (2006). Right of the Living Dead? Consent to Experimental Surgery in the Event of Cortical Death. Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (10):601-605.
    Ravelingien et al have suggested that early human xenotransplantation trials should be carried out on patients who are in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) and who have previously granted their consent to the use of their bodies in such research in the event of their cortical death. Unfortunately, their philosophical defence of this suggestion is unsatisfactory in its current formulation, as it equivocates on the key question of the status of patients who are in a PVS. The solution proposed by (...)
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  49. Albert Garth Thomas (2012). Continuing the Definition of Death Debate: The Report of the President's Council on Bioethics on Controversies in the Determination of Death. Bioethics 26 (2):101-107.
    The President's Council on Bioethics has recently released a report supportive of the continued use of brain death as a criterion for human death. The Council's conclusions were based on a conception of life that stressed external work as the fundamental marker of organismic life. With respect to human life, it is spontaneous respiration in particular that indicates an ability to interact with the external environment, and so indicates the presence of life. Conversely, irreversible apnoea marks an inability to carry (...)
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  50. David C. Thomasma (1984). The Comatose Patient, the Ontology of Death, and the Decision to Stop Treatment. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 5 (2).
    In this paper I address three problems posed by modern medical technology regarding comatose dying patients. The first is that physicians sometimes hide behind the tests for whole-brain death rather than make the necessary human decision. The second is that the tests themselves betray a metaphysical judgment about death that may be ontologically faulty. The third is that discretion used by physicians and patients and/or family in deciding to cease treatment when the whole-brain death criteria may not be met are (...)
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