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  1. Hartley B. Alexander (1905). Quantity, Quality, and the Function of Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (17):459-464.
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  2. Dmitriy Ankin & Lev Lamberov (2007). Comments on the E. Gettier's Paper. Analytica 1:127-135.
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  3. A. J. Anwar (1997). Chisho'm's Solution of the Gettier Problem: An Inconsistency. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 24 (3):307-314.
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  4. Bruce Aune (1985). The Analysis of Knowing. Review of Metaphysics 38 (4):905-907.
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  5. David F. Austin (1993). Philosophical Analysis: A Defense By Example. Noûs 27 (2):249-258.
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  6. Guy Axtell (2003). Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 34 (3):331--352.
    Luck threatens in similar ways our conceptions of both moral and epistemic evaluation. This essay examines the problem of luck as a metaphilosophical problem spanning the division between subfields in philosophy. I first explore the analogies between ethical and epistemic luck by comparing influential attempts to expunge luck from our conceptions of agency in these two subfields. I then focus upon Duncan Pritchard's challenge to the motivations underlying virtue epistemology, based specifically on its handling of the problem of epistemic luck. (...)
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  7. Murat Baç (2005). The Myth Of Nonepistemic Truth As A Necessary Condition Of Knowledge. Philosophical Writings 30 (3).
    This paper aims to show that the putatively non-epistemic nature of propositional truth presents an interesting problem for those who reasonably believe that truth is normatively distinct from warrant or evidence and that such truth is an irreducible condition on propositional knowledge. After arguing that McDowell’s direct realist approach is rather inadequate to deal with the issue I am raising here, I introduce the notion of ‘epistemic gradient’ to show that even if one may plausibly maintain that a significant portion (...)
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  8. John A. Barker & Fred Adams (2012). Conclusive Reasons, Knowledge, and Action. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):35-52.
  9. Lawrence C. Becker (1982). Knowledge as Doubly Anchored True Belief. Philosophy Research Archives 8:223-241.
    Some ambiguities in the verb ‘to know’ are analyzed, and it is argued that “undefeatably justified true belief” is the meaning of most philosophical interest with respect to specifying truth conditions for ‘S knows that p’. Two general conditions for an adequate definition of ‘S knows that p’ are discussed. Then a proposal for a quasi-causal theory of knowledge is introduced and defended.
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  10. Alexander Bird (2007). Justified Judging. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81-110.
    Traditional approaches to epistemology have sought, unsuccessfully, to define knowledge in terms of justification. I follow Timothy Williamson in arguing that this is misconceived and that we should take knowledge as our fundamental epistemological notion. We can then characterise justification as a certain sort of approximation to knowledge. A judgement is justified if and only if the reason (if there is one) for a failure to know is to be found outside the subject's mental states; that is, justified judging is (...)
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  11. Michael A. Bishop (2005). Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. Oxford University Press.
    Bishop and Trout here present a unique and provocative new approach to epistemology (the theory of human knowledge and reasoning). Their approach aims to liberate epistemology from the scholastic debates of standard analytic epistemology, and treat it as a branch of the philosophy of science. The approach is novel in its use of cost-benefit analysis to guide people facing real reasoning problems and in its framework for resolving normative disputes in psychology. Based on empirical data, Bishop and Trout show how (...)
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  12. Frode Bjordal (1993). A Theory of Knowledge. Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    In this dissertation I present a new solution to the renowned Gettier problem. My solution, which in a sense represents a defense of a rather traditional epistemological approach, is based upon a distinction between primary and secondary beliefs. I argue that primary beliefs are known if justified and true, whereas secondary beliefs are known if they are believed on the basis of a known primary belief. Much emphasis is put upon defending this approach against potential objections, but I also draw (...)
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  13. Tim Black & Peter Murphy (2007). In Defense of Sensitivity. Synthese 154 (1):53 - 71.
    The sensitivity condition on knowledge says that one knows that P only if one would not believe that P if P were false. Difficulties for this condition are now well documented. Keith DeRose has recently suggested a revised sensitivity condition that is designed to avoid some of these difficulties. We argue, however, that there are decisive objections to DeRose’s revised condition. Yet rather than simply abandoning his proposed condition, we uncover a rationale for its adoption, a rationale which suggests a (...)
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  14. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009). Knowledge and Presuppositions. Mind 118 (470):241 - 294.
    The paper explicates a new way to model the context-sensitivity of 'knows', namely a way that suggests a close connection between the content of 'knows' in a context C and what is pragmatically presupposed in C. After explicating my new approach in the first half of the paper and arguing that it is explanatorily superior to standard accounts of epistemic contextualism, the paper points, in its second half, to some interesting new features of the emerging account, such as its compatibility (...)
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  15. Christian L. Bonnet (1942). The Analysis of Knowledge. Modern Schoolman 19 (2):37-38.
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  16. David Braine (1971). The Nature of Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72:41 - 63.
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  17. Ben Bronner (2012). Problems with the Dispositional Tracking Theory of Knowledge. Logos and Episteme 3 (3):505-507.
    Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan attempt to improve on Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge by providing a modified, dispositional tracking theory. The dispositional theory, however, faces more problems than those previously noted by John Turri. First, it is not simply that satisfaction of the theory’s conditions is unnecessary for knowledge – it is insufficient as well. Second, in one important respect, the dispositional theory is a step backwards relative to the original tracking theory: the original but not the dispositional theory (...)
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  18. Bernd Buldt, Gettier-Problem.
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  19. Eugenio Bulygin, Jean Louis Gardies & Ilkka Nilniluoto (eds.) (1985). MAN, LAW AND MODERN FORMS OF LIFE, Vol. 1 Law and Philosophy Library, Pp. 251-261. D. Reidel.
    In this paper I argue that the rationality of law and legal decision making would be enhanced by a systematic attempt to recognize and respond to the implications of empirical uncertainty for policy making and decision making. Admission of uncertainty about the accuracy of facts and the validity of assumptions relied on to make inferences of fact is commonly avoided in law because it raises the spectre of paralysis of the capacity to decide issues authoritatively. The roots of this short-sighted (...)
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  20. Panayot Butchvarov (1970). The Concept of Knowledge. Evanston,Northwestern University Press.
    not analytic. This seems to be the point of Kant's claim that the concept of the sum of seven and five does not include its equality to the number twelve ...
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  21. Stephen A. Butterfill (2013). 11. What Does Knowledge Explain? Commentary on Iennifer Nagel,'Knowledge as a Mental State'. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:309.
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  22. John Campbell (2009). Does Knowledge of Material Objects Depend on Spatial Perception? Comments on Quassim Cassam's the Possibility of Knowledge. Analysis 69 (2):309-317.
    1. The spatial perception requirementCassam surveys arguments for what he calls the ‘Spatial Perception Requirement’ . This is the following principle: " SPR: In order to perceive that something is the case and thereby to know that it is the case one must be capable of spatial perception. " A couple of preliminary glosses. By ‘spatial perception’ Cassam means either perception of location, or perception of specifically spatial properties of an object, such as its size and shape. Second, Cassam takes (...)
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  23. Lawrence R. Carleton (1982). Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Edited by George Pappas. Modern Schoolman 60 (1):60-61.
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  24. Quassim Cassam (2009). Can the Concept of Knowledge Be Analysed? In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oup Oxford.
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  25. Albert Casullo (2012). Essays on a Priori Knowledge and Justification: Essays. Oup Usa.
    The past twenty-five years have seen a major renewal of interest in the topic of a priori knowledge. In the sixteen essays collected here, which span this entire period, philosopher Albert Casullo documents the complex set of issues motivating the renewed interest, identifies the central epistemological questions, and provides the leading ideas of a unified response to them.
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  26. Albert Casullo, Annotated Bibliography on A Priori Knowledge.
    Contents 1. Introduction 2. General Overviews 3. Textbooks 4. Anthologies 5. Historical Background to the Contemporary Debate 6. General Accounts 7. Mathematical Knowledge 8. Logical Knowledge 9. Intuitions and Conceptual Analysis 10. Modal Knowledge a. Overviews b. Primary Sources 11. Testimonial Knowledge 12. Naturalism 13. Scepticism 14. New Developments..
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  27. Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña (2013). Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic. Inquiry 56 (1):15-29.
    Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that figures in (...)
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  28. Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña (2013). Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a Reply. Inquiry 56 (4):400-415.
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  29. Juan Comesaña & Holly Kantin (2010). Is Evidence Knowledge? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):447 - 454.
    We argue that if evidence were knowledge, then there wouldn’t be any Gettier cases, and justification would fail to be closed in egregious ways. But there are Gettier cases, and justification does not fail to be close in egregious ways. Therefore, evidence isn’t knowledge.
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  30. Earl Conee (1988). Why Solve the Gettier Problem? In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 55--58.
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  31. Claudio Ferreira Costa (2010). A Definição Tradicional de Conhecimento. Princípios 4 (5):63-102.
    In this paper the relevance of so-called "propositional knowledge" is at first compared witho ther forms of knowledge. Secondly,the traditional and standard definition of propositional knowledge as justified true belief is discussed and defended against its most relevant objections. The third and main focus of this paper is a discussion of Gettier's objection to the tradicional definition and some answers to it,with the purpose of developing a more elaborate version of the traditional definition, one which makes it immune to counter-examples, (...)
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  32. Zvonimir Čuljak (2003). Gettier's Counterexamples and the Analysis of Knowledge. Prolegomena 2 (2):197-217.
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  33. Zvonimir Čuljak (2003). Gettierovi protuprimjeri i analiza znanja. Prolegomena 2 (2):197-217.
    Suprotno općeprihvaćenom mišljenju, argumentiram da Gettierovi protuprimjeri za trodijelnu analizu znanja kao opravdanoga istinitog vjerovanja nisu uspjeli zato što uvjet opravdanja, a pogotovo uvjet istinitosti za znanje u tim slučajevima nisu jednoznačno ispunjeni. Jer sudovi u koje se vjeruje jesu semantički ambivalentni te se za njih ne može jasno reći jesu ili istiniti ili neistiniti, pa stoga ni jesu li predmeti opravdanih istinitih vjerovanja. To je zbog zbunjujuće semantičke uloge koju igra odreðeni opis i ekskluzivna disjunkcija . Stoga nijedan od (...)
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  34. Friedrich Dudda (2007). Gettier-Beispiele Und Eine Gebrauchsdefinition des Begriffs des Propositionalen Wissens. Facta Philosophica 9 (1):161-176.
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  35. Katalin Farkas (2015). Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge. Erkenntnis 80 (1):185-200.
    Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.
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  36. Michael P. Fenton, The Possibility of Empirical Knowledge.
    This thesis offers a reassessment of the philosophical problem of scepticism about knowledge of the external world. It distinguishes between different forms of this sceptical problem and considers two kinds of response: a strategy developed by Tim Williamson, and a disjunctivist approach. Chapters one and two offer an introduction to the problem of scepticism: the sceptical arguments of Descartes and Hume are compared, and Williamson’s approach to scepticism is introduced. Chapter three considers three different ways of responding to Humean scepticism. (...)
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  37. Juan José Acero Fernández (2009). The Gettier Problem and the Demands of Inquiry. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):49-64.
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  38. Richard Foley, A Trial Separation Between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief.
    In his 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”1 Edmund Gettier devised a pair of counterexamples designed to illustrate that knowledge cannot be adequately defined as justified true belief. The basic idea behind both of his counterexamples is that one can be justified in believing a falsehood P from which one deduces a truth Q, in which case one has a justified true belief in Q but does not know Q. Gettier’s article inspired numerous other counterexamples, and the search was (...)
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  39. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 2. Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge. In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 6-8.
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  40. Todd Michael Furman (1992). Living in the Gettier Fallout. Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    In a nutshell, I construct and defend an analysis of empirical knowledge. Call this analysis A . A is very eclectic, but it is best described as a reliabilistic-defeasibility analysis of knowledge. Its virtues are these: A seems to be able to handle Gettier examples. A overcomes the 'social aspects problem' of knowing. A makes sense of this phenomenon: Sometimes we are willing to attribute knowledge to S who has evidence E for believing that P. But, at other times, we (...)
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  41. Carlos Emilio García (2007). Casos Gettier y razonadores normales. Ideas Y Valores 56 (135):77-88.
    Como bien se sabe, la caracterización del conocimiento en términos de "creencia verdadera justificada" (CVJ) se ha considerado fallida desde la popularización de contraejemplos tipo Gettier. En este artículo se revisa el trabajo seminal de Gettier y sus argumentos. Se sostiene que los contraejemplos..
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  42. Carlos Emilio García (2007). Gettier Cases and Normal Reasoners. Ideas Y Valores 56 (135):73-84.
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  43. Edmund L. Gettier (2003). 11. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge. In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. 104.
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  44. Lars Gundersen (2010). Tracking, Epistemic Dispositions and the Conditional Analysis. Erkenntnis 72 (3):353 - 364.
    According to Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge, an agent a knows that p just in case her belief that p is true and also satisfies the two tracking conditionals that had p been false, she would not have believed that p , and had p been true under slightly different circumstances, she would still have believed that p . In this paper I wish to highlight an interesting but generally ignored feature of this theory: namely that it is reminiscent of (...)
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  45. Joseph Y. Halpern, Dov Samet & Ella Segev (2009). Defining Knowledge in Terms of Belief: The Modal Logic Perspective. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):469-487.
    The question of whether knowledge is definable in terms of belief, which has played an important role in epistemology for the last 50 years, is studied here in the framework of epistemic and doxastic logics. Three notions of definability are considered: explicit definability, implicit definability, and reducibility, where explicit definability is equivalent to the combination of implicit definability and reducibility. It is shown that if knowledge satisfies any set of axioms contained in S5, then it cannot be explicitly defined in (...)
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  46. Sally Haslanger (2000). Defining Knowledge. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:41-55.
    With some notable exceptions, feminist epistemologists have not focused (like many contemporary analytic epistemologists) on the the semantics of claims to know: What are the truth conditions of claims of the form S knows that p? My goal in this paper is to suggest a way of approaching the task of specifying the truth conditions for knowledge while (hopefully) making clear how a broad range of feminist work that is often deemed irrelevant to the philosophical inquiry into knowledge is, in (...)
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  47. Allan Hazlett (2015). The Maturation of the Gettier Problem. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):1-6.
    Edmund Gettier’s paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” first appeared in an issue of Analysis , dated June of 1963, and although it’s tempting to wax hyperbolic when discussing the paper’s importance and influence, it is fair to say that its impact on contemporary philosophy has been substantial and wide-ranging. Epistemology has benefited from 50 years of sincere and rigorous discussion of issues arising from the paper, and Gettier’s conclusion that knowledge is not justified true belief is sometimes offered as (...)
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  48. Peter H. Hess (1981). Justified True Belief is Knowledge. Dialogue 20 (04):665-673.
    Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.
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  49. Stephen Hetherington (2012). The Gettier-Illusion: Gettier-Partialism and Infallibilism. Synthese 188 (2):217-230.
    Could the standard interpretation of Gettier cases reflect a fundamental confusion? Indeed so. How well can epistemologists argue for the truth of that standard interpretation? Not so well. A methodological mistake is allowing them not to notice how they are simply (and inappropriately) being infallibilists when regarding Gettiered beliefs as failing to be knowledge. There is no Gettier problem that we have not merely created for ourselves by unwittingly being infallibilists about knowledge.
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  50. Frank Hofmann (2014). Gettier For Justification. Episteme 11 (3):305-318.
    I will present a problem for any externalist evidentialism that allows for accidental possession of evidence. There are Gettier cases for justification. I will describe two such cases – cases involving veridical hallucination. An analysis of the cases is given, along the lines of virtue epistemology . The cases show that certain externalist evidentialist accounts of justification do not provide sufficient conditions. The reason lies in the fact that one can be luckily in possession of evidence, and then one will (...)
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