This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:History/traditions: Definitions
69 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 69
  1. C. Anthony Anderson (1993). Analyzing Analysis. Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):199 - 222.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jeremy Avigad, Eliminating Definitions and Skolem Functions in First-Order Logic.
    From proofs in any classical first-order theory that proves the existence of at least two elements, one can eliminate definitions in polynomial time. From proofs in any classical first-order theory strong enough to code finite functions, including sequential theories, one can also eliminate Skolem functions in polynomial time.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Zainal Abidin Baqir (1998). The Problem of Definition in Islamic Logic: A Study of Abū Al-Najā Al-Farīd's Kasr Al-Mantiq in Comparison with Ibn Taimiyyah's Kitāb Al-Radd Alā Al-Manṭiqiyyīn. International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. David Barnett (2008). Indeterminacy and Incomplete Definitions. Journal of Philosophy 105 (4):167-191.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. George Bealer (2006). A Definition of Necessity. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):17–39.
    In the history of philosophy, especially its recent history, a number of definitions of necessity have been ventured. Most people, however, find these definitions either circular or subject to counterexamples. I will show that, given a broadly Fregean conception of properties, necessity does indeed have a noncircular counterexample-free definition.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Nuel Belnap (1993). On Rigorous Definitions. Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):115 - 146.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. José A. Benardete (1993). Real Definitions: Quine and Aristotle. Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):265 - 282.
    Re-activating the philosophical quest for real definitions, I dare propose that its fulfillment is most convincingly represented, close to home, where one probably least expects it, notably in the first half of Section 36 of Word and Object, in the pages of Quine. Aristotle must inevitably remain our guide even as we insist on respecting Quine's anti-essentialism, and I must then explain how Aristotle, truncated, can be put here to use. Well, we may begin, appropriately, with a definition or with (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Ernest Charles Benecke (1881). On Definitions. Mind 6 (24):530-542.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Gustav Bergmann (1948). Contextual Definitions in Nonextensional Languages. Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 (3):140.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Max Black (1952). Definition, Presupposition, and Assertion. Philosophical Review 61 (4):532-550.
  11. Steven E. Boër (1974). Cluster-Concepts and Sufficiency Definitions. Philosophical Studies 26 (2):119 - 125.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Myles Brand (1975). On Philosophical Definitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (2):151-172.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. James Robert Brown (1998). What is a Definition? Foundations of Science 3 (1):111-132.
    According to the standard view of definition, all defined terms are mere stipulations, based on a small set of primitive terms. After a brief review of the Hilbert-Frege debate, this paper goes on to challenge the standard view in a number of ways. Examples from graph theory, for example, suggest that some key definitions stem from the way graphs are presented diagramatically and do not fit the standard view. Lakatos's account is also discussed, since he provides further examples that suggest (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Tyler Burge (1993). Concepts, Definitions, and Meaning. Metaphilosophy 24 (4):309-25.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. J. A. Burgess (2008). When is Circularity in Definitions Benign? Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):214–233.
    I aim to show how and why some definitions can be benignly circular. According to Lloyd Humberstone, a definition that is analytically circular need not be inferentially circular and so might serve to illuminate the application-conditions for a concept. I begin by tidying up some problems with Humberstone's account. I then show that circular definitions of a kind commonly thought to be benign have inferentially circular truth-conditions and so are malign by Humberstone's test. But his test is too demanding. The (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Wilhelm Büttemeyer (2005). Popper on Definitions. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (1):15 - 28.
    In the present paper I shall first summarize Popper's criticism of the traditional method of definition, and then go on to comment critically on his own views on the form and function of so-called nominalist definitions.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Douglas Cenzer (1974). Analytic Inductive Definitions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (2):310-312.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. David Charles (ed.) (2010). Definition in Greek Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Socrates' greatest philosophical contribution was to have initiated the search for definitions. In Definition in Greek Philosophy his views on definition are examined, together with those of his successors, including Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Galen, the Sceptics and Plotinus. Although definition was a major pre-occupation for many Greek philosophers, it has rarely been treated as a separate topic in its own right in recent years. This volume, which contains fourteen new essays by leading scholars, aims to reawaken interest in a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. L. Jonathan Cohen (1993). Should Natural-Language Definitions Be Insulated From, or Interactive with, One Another in Sentence Composition? Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):177 - 197.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. David Cole, Note on Analyticity and the Definability of "Bachelor".
    Those who have a brief against the analytic-synthetic distinction raise problems for what seem to supporters of the distinction to be some of the clearest cases. That bachelors are unmarried seems to many to be analytically true. But to hold this seems to imply that there is a definition of "bachelor" that includes being unmarried. But critics of the analytic-synthetic distinction, such as Jerry Fodor, deny that there are true definitions (reportive, not stipulative). So there can be no definition of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. David E. Cooper (1972). Definitions and `Clusters'. Mind 81 (324):495-503.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Ken Daley (2010). The Structure of Lexical Concepts. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):349 - 372.
    Jerry Fodor (Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) famously argued that lexical concepts are unstructured. After examining the advantages and disadvantages of both the classical approach to concepts and Fodor's conceptual atomism, I argue that some lexical concepts are, in fact, structured. Roughly stated, I argue that structured lexical concepts bear a necessary biconditional entailment relation to their structural constituents. I develop this account of the structure of lexical concepts within the framework of Pavel (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Rem B. Edwards (1966). The Truth and Falsity of Definitions. Philosophy of Science 33 (1/2):76-79.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Kathrin Glüer (2003). Analyticity and Implicit Definition. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):37-60.
    Paul Boghossian advocates a version of the analytic theory of a priori knowledge. His defense of an "epistemic" notion of analyticity is based on an implicit definition account ofthe meaning of the logical constants. Boghossian underestimates the power of the classical Quinean criticisms, however; the challenge to substantiate the distinction between empirical and non-empirical sentences, as forcefully presented in Two Dogmas, still stands, and the regress from Truth by Convention still needs to be avoided. Here, Quine also showed that there (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. D. P. Gorskiĭ (1981). Definition: Logico-Methodological Problems. Progress.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Anil Gupta, Definitions. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Donald F. Henze (1960). Are Lexical Definitions True? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (3):383-388.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Richard Horsey (2001). Definitions: Implications for Syntax, Semantics, and the Language of Thought, by Annabel Cormack. Mind and Language 16 (3):345–349.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. John F. Horty (1993). Frege on the Psychological Significance of Definitions. Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):223 - 263.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. John Francis Horty (2007). Frege on Definitions: A Case Study of Semantic Content. Oxford University Press.
    The book begins by focusing on the psychological constraints governing Frege's notion of sense, or meaning, and argues that, given these constraints, even the ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Andreas Kamlah (2006). Die Logische Struktur der Operationalen Definitionen. Philosophia Naturalis 43 (2):195-213.
    Operational definitions were once considered the backbone of semantics of natural science. Still in 1955 A. W. Burks published an explication of the general scheme of these definitions. In the fifties of the last century however they became outmoded, while high school teachers for presumably good reasons were still in favour of them. I consider the banishment of this kind of definitions premature, and try to improve the explication of Burks in a way which qualifies them for a rehabilitation. In (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Joongol Kim (2011). A Strengthening of the Caesar Problem. Erkenntnis 75 (1):123-136.
    The neo-Fregeans have argued that definition by abstraction allows us to introduce abstract concepts such as direction and number in terms of equivalence relations such as parallelism between lines and one-one correspondence between concepts. This paper argues that definition by abstraction suffers from the fact that an equivalence relation may not be sufficient to determine a unique concept. Frege’s original verdict against definition by abstraction is thus reinstated.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Daniel Z. Korman (2010). The Contingent a Priori and the Publicity of a Priori Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):387 - 393.
    Kripke maintains that one who stipulatively introduces the term ' one meter' as a rigid designator for the length of a certain stick s at time t is in a position to know a priori that if s exists at t then the length of s at t is one meter. Some (e.g., Soames 2003) have objected to this alleged instance of the contingent a priori on the grounds that the stipulator's knowledge would have to be based in part on (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Daniel Z. Korman (2010). The Contingent a Priori and the Publicity of a Priori Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):387 - 393.
    Kripke maintains that one who stipulatively introduces the term ‘one meter’ as a rigid designator for the length of a certain stick s at time t is in a position to know a priori that if s exists at t then the length of s at t is one meter. Some (e.g., Soames 2003) have objected to this alleged instance of the contingent a priori on the grounds that the stipulator's knowledge would have to be based in part on substantive (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Janina Kotarbinska (1960). On Ostensive Definitions. Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-22.
    The first part deals with the problem of the external form of ostensive definition. It is concluded that the definition statement is not complete. The proper form of this statement is not a sentence, but a sentential function, namely a sentential function of the type: ``Π x [N(x)=x is in the respect R and in the degree D such as A, B... and not such as K, L...]" where "N" stands for the term being defined. Thus the ostensive definition informs (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Hugues Leblanc (1950). On Definitions. Philosophy of Science 17 (4):302-309.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Hannes Leitgeb (2005). Paradox by (Non-Wellfounded) Definition. Analysis 65 (288):275–278.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Czesław Lejewski (1958). On Implicational Definitions. Studia Logica 8 (1):189 - 211.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. John MacFarlane (2009). Double Vision: Two Questions About the Neo-Fregean Program. Synthese 170 (3):443 - 456.
    Much of The Reason’s Proper Study is devoted to defending the claim that simply by stipulating an abstraction principle for the “number-of” functor, we can simultaneously fix a meaning for this functor and acquire epistemic entitlement to the stipulated principle. In this paper, I argue that the semantic and epistemological principles Hale and Wright offer in defense of this claim may be too strong for their purposes. For if these principles are correct, it is hard to see why they do (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Alexander Matthews (1998). A Diagram of Definition: The Defining of Definition. Van Gorcum.
    Chapter I: The Problem Stated Section: The Paradox of Definition i) Here is the problem which is the main concern of this book. ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. H. Meyer (1946). On Definitions in Symbolic Logic. Synthese 5 (5-6):353 - 361.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Nenad Miščević (2005). Empirical Concepts and A Priori Truth. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):289-315.
    Merely conceptual knowledge, not based on specific sensitivity to the referential domain, is not seriously a priori. It is argued here that it is either weakly and superficially a priori, or downright a posteriori. This is done starting from the fact that many of our definitions (or concepts) are recognizably empirically established, and pointing out that recognizably empirical grounding yields superficial apriority. Further, some (first-order) concept analyzing propositions are empirically false about their referents and thus empirically refutable. Therefore, our empirical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. M. E. Olds (1958). Ostension and Analyticity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 18 (3):359-367.
  44. Francesco Orilia (2000). Meaning and Circular Definitions. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):155-169.
    Gupta's and Belnap's Revision Theory of Truth defends the legitimacy of circular definitions. Circularity, however, forces us to reconsider our conception of meaning. A readjustment of some standard theses about meaning is here proposed, by relying on a novel version of the sense-reference distinction.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Humphrey Polanen Petevanl (2007). A Perceptual Account of Definitions. Axiomathes 17 (1).
    The traditional definition per genus et differentiam is argued to be cognitively grounded in perception and in order to avoid needless argument, definitions are stipulated to assert boundaries. An analysis of the notion of perspective shows that a boundary is a composite of two distinctions: similarity that includes and difference that excludes. The concept is applied to the type-token distinction and percepts are shown to be the result of a comparison between a token as representing some phenomenon and a type (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. David Pitt (1999). In Defense of Definitions. Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):139-156.
    The arguments of Fodor, Garret, Walker and Parkes [(1980) Against definitions, Cognition, 8, 263-367] are the source of widespread skepticism in cognitive science about lexical semantic structure. Whereas the thesis that lexical items, and the concepts they express, have decompositional structure (i.e. have significant constituents) was at one time "one of those ideas that hardly anybody [in the cognitive sciences] ever considers giving up" (p. 264), most researchers now believe that "[a]ll the evidence suggests that the classical [(decompositional)] view is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Richard Popkin (1943). The Function of Definitions in Social Science. Journal of Philosophy 40 (18):491-495.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. M. Przełeccki (1955). On so Called Operational Definitions. Studia Logica 3 (1):179-183.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Colin Radford (1964). Ostensive Definitions, Coordinative Definitions, and Necessary Empirical Statements: A Reply to Arthur Pap. Mind 73 (290):270-272.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. John R. Reid (1946). What Are Definitions? Philosophy of Science 13 (2):170-175.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 69