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Delusions

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  1. Ian O. Angell (2010). Science's First Mistake: Delusions in Pursuit of Theory. Bloomsbury Academic.
    because whenever an observer observes, he creates a contingent distinction between what is observed and what is by necessity left unobserved. ...
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  2. Anthony P. Atkinson (2001). Pathological Beliefs, Damaged Brains. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):225-229.
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  3. Tim Bayne, Delusion and Self-Deception: Mapping the Terrain.
    The papers in this volume are drawn from a workshop on delusion and self-deception, held at Macquarie University in November of 2004. Our aim was to bring together theorists working on delusions and self-deception with an eye towards identifying and fostering connections—at both empirical and conceptual levels—between these domains. As the contributions to this volume testify, there are multiple points of contact between delusion and self-deception. This introduction charts the conceptual space in which these points of contact can be located (...)
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  4. Tim Bayne (2011). Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4).
    Although delusions are typically regarded as beliefs of a certain kind, there have been worries about the doxastic conception of delusions since at least Bleuler’s time. ‘Anti-doxasticists,’ as we might call them, do not merely worry about the claim that delusions are beliefs, they reject it. Reimer’s paper weighs into the debate between ‘doxasticists’ and ‘anti-doxasticists’ by suggesting that one of the main arguments given against the doxastic conception of delusions—what we might call the functional role objection—is based on a (...)
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  5. Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (2008). Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.
    This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception.
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  6. Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2005). In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of (...)
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  7. Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 11 (1):1-11.
    Some otherwise rational people appear to believe strange things. Sometimes people believe that someone, usually a near relative or member of their family - often their spouse - has been replaced by an impostor. Sometimes people believe that they are dead. These two delusions – known as the Capgras and Cotard delusion respectively – are instances of monothematic delusions, for they are limited to very specific topics. Other monothematic delusions involve the delusion that one is being followed by known people (...)
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  8. Rodger Beehler (1981). Moral Delusion. Philosophy 56 (217):313 - 331.
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  9. Ralf-Peter Behrendt (2005). Attentional Deficit Versus Impaired Reality Testing: What is the Role of Executive Dysfunction in Complex Visual Hallucinations? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):758-759.
    A “multifactorial” model should accommodate a psychological perspective, aiming to relate the phenomenology of complex visual hallucinations not only to neurobiological findings but also an understanding of the patient's psychological problems and situation in life. Greater attention needs to be paid to the role of the “lack of insight” patients may have into their hallucinations and its relationship to cognitive impairment.
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  10. Jose Luis Bermudez (2001). Normativity and Rationality in Delusional Psychiatric Disorders. Mind and Language 16 (5):457-493.
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  11. G. Berrios (1991). Delusions as 'Wrong Beliefs': A Conceptual History. British Journal of Psychiatry 159:6-13.
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  12. W. Blankenburg (1980). Anthropological and Ontoanalytical Aspects of Delusion. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 11 (1):97-110.
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  13. R. Bodei (2004). On the Logics of Delusion. Diogenes 51 (4):37-48.
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  14. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Continuing Commentary: Shaking the Bedrock. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (1):77-87.
    This feature in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology (PPP) is intended to provide ongoing commentary on main articles previously published in PPP. The essay by Bortolotti below is a response to John Rhodes and Richard Gipps's paper in PPP (15, no. 4:295-310).Can we understand people who report delusional beliefs? In their thought-provoking paper, "Delusions, Certainty, and the Background", John Rhodes and Richard Gipps (2008) present a novel account of delusions which has two main purposes: (1) offer an explanation of the truly (...)
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  15. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Précis of Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Neuroethics.
    Here I summarise the main arguments in Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs [1]. The book addresses the question whether there is a rationality constraint on belief ascription and defends a doxastic account of clinical delusions.
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  16. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions. Neuroethics.
    Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are inbetween perceptual and doxastic states, defended by Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quitebeliefs, proposed by Eric Schwitzgebel and (...)
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  17. Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press.
    Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational. The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book (...)
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  18. Lisa Bortolotti, Delusion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on Delusions.
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  19. Lisa Bortolotti (2005). Delusions and the Background of Rationality. Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.
    I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the (...)
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  20. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2009). A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
    Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by (...)
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  21. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2008). Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.
    Philosophers have been long interested in delusional beliefs and in whether, by reporting and endorsing such beliefs, deluded subjects violate norms of rationality (Campbell 1999; Davies & Coltheart 2002; Gerrans 2001; Stone & Young 1997; Broome 2004; Bortolotti 2005). So far they have focused on identifying the relation between intentionality and rationality in order to gain a better understanding of both ordinary and delusional beliefs. In this paper Matthew Broome and I aim at drawing attention to the extent to which (...)
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  22. Lisa Bortolotti, Rochelle Cox & Amanda Barnier (2011). Can We Recreate Delusions in the Laboratory? Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):109 - 131.
    Clinical delusions are difficult to investigate in the laboratory because they co-occur with other symptoms and with intellectual impairment. Partly for these reasons, researchers have recently begun to use hypnosis with neurologically intact people in order to model clinical delusions. In this paper we describe striking analogies between the behavior of patients with a clinical delusion of mirrored self misidentification, and the behavior of highly hypnotizable subjects who receive a hypnotic suggestion to see a stranger when they look in the (...)
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  23. Maarten Boudry & Johan Braeckman (forthcoming). How Convenient! The Epistemic Rationale of Self-Validating Belief Systems. Philosophical Psychology:1-24.
    This paper offers an epistemological discussion of self-validating belief systems and the recurrence of ?epistemic defense mechanisms? and ?immunizing strategies? across widely different domains of knowledge. We challenge the idea that typical ?weird? belief systems are inherently fragile, and we argue that, instead, they exhibit a surprising degree of resilience in the face of adverse evidence and criticism. Borrowing from the psychological research on belief perseverance, rationalization and motivated reasoning, we argue that the human mind is particularly susceptible to belief (...)
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  24. Nora Breen, Diana Caine, Max Coltheart, Julie Hendy & Corrine Roberts (2000). Towards an Understanding of Delusions of Misidentification: Four Case Studies. Mind and Language 15 (1):74–110.
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  25. J. Campbell (2001). Rationality, Meaning, and the Analysis of Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.
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  26. Glenn Carruthers (2009). Is the Body Schema Sufficient for the Sense of Embodiment? An Alternative to de Vignmont's Model. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):123-142.
    De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de Vignemont (...)
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  27. J. Cheyne & T. Girard (2007). Paranoid Delusions and Threatening Hallucinations: A Prospective Study of Sleep Paralysis Experiences☆. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):959-974.
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  28. Thomas I. Cochrane (2007). Religious Delusions and the Limits of Spirituality in Decision-Making. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (7):14 – 15.
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  29. Max Coltheart (2005). Conscious Experience and Delusional Belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.
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  30. Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (2000). Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell.
    Blackwell, 2000 Review by George Graham, Ph.D on Oct 27th 2000 Volume: 4, Number: 43.
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  31. David E. Cooper (1981). Delusions of Modesty: A Reply to My Critics. Journal of Philosophy of Education 15 (1):125–135.
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  32. J. Angelo Corlett (2009). Dawkins' God Less Delusion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (3):125 - 138.
    A philosophical assessment of Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion, exposing some errors of reasoning that undermine part of the foundation of his atheism. Distinctions between theism, atheism and agnosticism are also provided and explored for their significance to Dawkins' argument.
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  33. Gregory Currie (2000). Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations. In Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (eds.), Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell.
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  34. Gregory Currie & Nicholas Jones (2006). McGinn on Delusion and Imagination. Philosophical Books 47 (4):306-313.
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  35. Gregory Currie & Jon Jureidini (2001). Delusion, Rationality, Empathy. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):159-62.
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  36. Hugh Dalton (1914). Book Review:Social Reforms: As Related to Realities and Delusions; an Examination of the Increase and Distribution of Wealth, From 1801 to 1910. W. H. Mallock. Ethics 25 (1):119-.
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  37. Larry Davidson (2002). Intentionality, Identity, and Delusions of Control in Schizophrenia: A Husserlian Perspective. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 33 (1):39-58.
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  38. Martin Davies & Max Coltheart (2000). Introduction: Pathologies of Belief. Mind and Language 15 (1):1–46.
    who are unrecognizable because they are in disguise. ¼ The person I see in the mirror is not really me. ¼ A person I knew who died is nevertheless in the hospital ward today. ¼ This arm [the speaker’s left arm] is not mine it is yours; you have..
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  39. Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & N. Breen (2001). Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.
    We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the (...)
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  40. Martin Davies, Anne Aimola Davies & Max Coltheart (2005). Anosognosia and the Two-Factor Theory of Delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):241-57.
    Anosognosia is literally ‘unawareness of or failure to acknowledge one’s hemi- plegia or other disability’ (OED). Etymology would suggest the meaning ‘lack of knowledge of disease’ so that anosognosia would include any denial of impairment, such as denial of blindness (Anton’s syndrome). But Babinski, who introduced the term in 1914, applied it only to patients with hemiplegia who fail to acknowledge their paralysis. Most commonly, this is failure to acknowledge paralysis of the left side of the body following damage to (...)
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  41. Richard Dawkins (1998). Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion, and the Appetite for Wonder. Houghton Mifflin.
    Did Newton "unweave the rainbow" by reducing it to its prismatic colors, as Keats contended? Did he, in other words, diminish beauty? Far from it, says Dawkins--Newton's unweaving is the key too much of modern astronomy and to the breathtaking poetry of modern cosmology. Mysteries don't lose their poetry because they are solved: the solution often is more beautiful than the puzzle, uncovering deeper mystery. (The Keats who spoke of "unweaving the rainbow" was a very young man, Dawkins reminds us.) (...)
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  42. Daniel Dennett, Review of Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion for Free Inquiry.
    We agree about most matters, and have learned a lot from each other, but on one central issue we are not (yet) of one mind: Dawkins is quite sure that the world would be a better place if religion were hastened to extinction and I am still agnostic about that. I don’t know what could be put in religion’s place–or what would arise unbidden–so I am still eager to explore the prospect of reforming religion, a task that cries out for (...)
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  43. D. A. Drennen (1966). The Self-Delusions of the Analytic Self. World Futures 4 (4):90-92.
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  44. Denis Dutton, Delusions of Postmodernism.
    That postmodernism is a general cultural mood and a style in art, architecture, and literature is uncontroversial. But does postmodernism present a coherent intellectual doctrine or theory of politics, art, or life? In the discussion which follows, I will concentrate on two aspects of the intellectual pretensions of postmodernism. First, I examine the postmodernist claim that to justify the idea that the postmodern world is characterized by a general indeterminacy of meaning. Next I will look at aspects of the (...)
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  45. Andy Egan (2008). Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception. In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.
    Subjects with delusions profess to believe some extremely peculiar things. Patients with Capgras delusion sincerely assert that, for example, their spouses have been replaced by impostors. Patients with Cotard’s delusion sincerely assert that they are dead. Many philosophers and psychologists are hesitant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the contents of their delusions.2 One way to reinterpret delusional subjects is to say that we’ve misidentified the content of the problematic belief. So for example, rather than believing that his wife (...)
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  46. Eugen Fischer (2011). Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy: Outline of a Philosophical Revolution. Routledge.
    Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy provides new foundations and methods for the revolutionary project of philosophical therapy pioneered by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The book vindicates this currently much-discussed project by reconstructing the genesis of important philosophical problems: With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, the book analyses how philosophical reflection is shaped by pictures and metaphors we are not aware of employing and are prone to misapply. Through innovative case-studies on the genesis of classical problems about (...)
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  47. Paul Franceschi, A Logical Defence of Maher's Model of Polythematic Delusions.
    We proceed to describe a model for the formation and maintenance of polythematic delusions encountered in schizophrenia, which is in adequacy with Brendan Maher's account of delusions. Polythematic delusions are considered here as the conclusions of arguments triggered by apophenia that include some very common errors of reasoning such as post hoc fallacy and confirmation bias. We describe first the structure of reasoning which leads to delusions of reference, of telepathy and of influence, by distinguishing between the primary, secondary, tertiary (...)
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  48. Paul Franceschi, An Analytic View of Delusion.
    The present article proposes a logical account of delusions, which are regarded as conclusions resulting from fallacious arguments. This leads to distinguish between primary, secondary, ..., n-ary types of delusional arguments. Examples of delusional arguments leading to delusion of reference, delusion of influence, thought-broadcasting delusion and delusion of grandeur are described and then analyzed. This suggests finally a way susceptible of improving the efficiency of cognitive therapy for delusions.
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  49. Keith Frankish, Delusions: A Two-Level Framework.
    Although well-documented, delusions have proved extremely hard to explain, and many important questions remain open, including the basic one of what kind of mental state a delusion is. The standard position is that delusions are beliefs (the doxastic conception); but there are difficulties for this view, and alternative characterizations have been offered. In this chapter I shall propose a new framework for conceptualizing delusions, building on recent work in philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. There are good reasons for thinking (...)
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  50. Keith Frankish (forthcoming). Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-Doxastic Acceptances. Neuroethics.
    In Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs, Lisa Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of delusions is no barrier to their being classified as beliefs. This comment asks how Bortolotti’s position may be affected if we accept that there are two distinct types of belief, belonging to different levels of mentality and subject to different ascriptive constraints. It addresses some worries Bortolotti has expressed about the proposed two-level framework and outlines some questions that arise for her if the framework is adopted. It (...)
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  51. Chris Frith (forthcoming). Explaining Delusions of Control: The Comparator Model 20years On. Consciousness and Cognition:-.
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  52. Chris Frith (2005). The Self in Action: Lessons From Delusions of Control. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):752-770.
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  53. K. W. M. Fulford (1993). Mental Illness and the Mind-Brain Problem: Delusion, Belief and Searle's Theory of Intentionality. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (2).
    Until recently there has been little contact between the mind-brain debate in philosophy and the debate in psychiatry about the nature of mental illness. In this paper some of the analogies and disanalogies between the two debates are explored. It is noted in particular that the emphasis in modern philosophy of mind on the importance of the concept of action has been matched by a recent shift in the debate about mental illness from analyses of disease in terms of failure (...)
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  54. Kwm Fulford (2004). Neuro-Ethics or Neuro-Values? Delusion and Religious Experience as a Case Study in Values-Based Medicine. Poiesis and Praxis 2 (4):297-313.
    Values-Based Medicine (VBM) is the theory and practice of clinical decision-making for situations in which legitimately different values are in play. VBM is thus to values what Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) is to facts. The theoretical basis of VBM is a branch of analytic philosophy called philosophical value theory. As a set of practical tools, VBM has been developed to meet the challenges of value diversity as they arise particularly in psychiatry. These challenges are illustrated in this paper by a case (...)
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  55. M. Fumaroli (1997). "I is an Other": Delusions of Identity. Diogenes 45 (177):111-122.
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  56. Brian Garvey (1999). Adolf Grünbaum on Religious Delusions. Religious Studies 35 (1):19-35.
    Grünbaum claims it is possible that all belief in God is a delusion, meaning a false belief which is engendered by irrational psychological motives. I dispute this on the grounds that in many cases belief in God is engendered by purely cultural factors, and this is incompatible with its being engendered by psychological ones. Grünbaum also claims that saying a culturally engendered belief cannot be a delusion makes social consensus the sole arbiter of reality. I dispute this on the grounds (...)
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  57. Jerome Gellman (2008). Critical Study of Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion. Philo: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):193-202.
    I examine the two main arguments that Richard Dawkins offers in The God Delusion to convince believers that God does not exist. Dawkins’ arguments, as stated, are not successful. Neither do sympathetic extensive reformulations have what it takes to require a believer to admit that God probably does not exist. I further argue against Dawkins’ assuming that belief in God, if legitimate, can be only a scientific hypothesis.
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  58. Eugenie Georgaca (2004). Talk and the Nature of Delusions: Defending Sociocultural Perspectives on Mental Illness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):87-94.
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  59. C. Gere (2004). The Technologies and Politics of Delusion: An Interview with Artist Rod Dickinson. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 35 (2):333-349.
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  60. Philip Gerrans (2002). A One-Stage Explanation of the Cotard Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 9 (1):47-53.
    Cognitive neuropsychiatry (CN) is the explanation of psychiatric disorder by the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. Within CN there are, broadly speaking, two approaches to delusion. The first uses a one-stage model, in which delusions are explained as rationalizations of anomalous experiences via reasoning strategies that are not, in themselves, abnormal. Two-stage models invoke additional hypotheses about abnormalities of reasoning. In this paper, I examine what appears to be a very strong argument, developed within CN, in favor of a twostage explanation (...)
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  61. Philip Gerrans (2001). Delusions as Performance Failures. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 6 (3).
    Delusions are explanations of anomalous experiences. A theory of delusion requires an explanation of both the anomalous experience _and _the apparently irrational explanation generated by the delusional subject. Hence, we require a model of rational belief formation against which the belief formation of delusional subjects can be evaluated. _Method. _I first describe such a model, distinguishing procedural from pragmatic rationality. Procedural rationality is the use of rules or procedures, deductive or inductive, that produce an inferentially coherent set of propositions. Pragmatic (...)
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  62. Philip Gerrans (2000). Refining the Explanation of Cotard's Delusion. Mind and Language 15 (1):111-122.
    An elegant theory in cognitive neuropsychiatry explains the Capgras and Cotard delusions as resulting from the same type of anomalous phenomenal experience explained in different ways by different sufferers. ‘Although the Capgras and Cotard delusions are phenomenally distinct, we thus think that they represent patients’ attempts to make sense of fundamentally similar experiences’ (Young and Leafhead, 1996, p. 168). On the theory proposed by Young and Leafhead, the anomalous experience results from damage to an information processing subsystem which associates an (...)
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  63. S. Nassir Ghaemi (2004). The Perils of Belief: Delusions Reexamined. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):49-54.
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  64. S. Nassir Ghaemi (1999). An Empirical Approach to Understanding Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):21-24.
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  65. Paul J. Gibbs (2000). Thought Insertion and the Inseparability Thesis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):195-202.
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  66. Paul J. Gibbs (2000). The Limits of Subjectivity: A Response to the Commentary. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):207-208.
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  67. Grant Gillett (1990). Insight From Delusion. Inquiry 33 (2):231 – 244.
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  68. Richard G. T. Gipps & John Rhodes (2009). The Background Theory of Delusion and Existential Phenomenology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (4):321-326.
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  69. Ian Gold & Jakob Hohwy (2000). Rationality and Schizophrenic Delusion. Mind and Language 15 (1):146-167.
    The theory of rationality has traditionally been concerned with the investigation of the norms of rational thought and behaviour, and with the reasoning procedures that satisfy them. As a consequence, the investigation of irrationality has largely been restricted to the behaviour or thought that violates these norms. There are, however, other forms of irrationality. Here we propose that the delusions that occur in schizophrenia constitute a paradigm of irrationality. We examine a leading theory of schizophrenic delusion and propose that some (...)
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  70. Tony Hak (1998). "There Are Clear Delusions." The Production of a Factual Account. Human Studies 21 (4):419-436.
    This paper presents a case study of a psychiatric intervention as an example of an institutional ethnography of psychiatric work. Institutional ethnography, a mode of inquiry outlined by Dorothy Smith (1987), is conceived here as an approach to the analysis of work in institutions as the contingent, local and context-bound insertion of a particular "case" - a patron, a pupil, a client, a patient - into both institutional and other social (e. g. gender, class) relations. The case presented in this (...)
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  71. David J. Harper (2004). Delusions and Discourse: Moving Beyond the Constraints of the Modernist Paradigm. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):55-64.
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  72. Pieter Sjoerd Hasper (2006). Sources of Delusion in Analytica Posteriora 1. Phronesis 51 (3):252-284.
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  73. Pieter Sjoerd Hasper (2006). Sources of Delusion in Analytica Posteriora 1. Phronesis 51 (3):252-284.
    Aristotle's philosophically most explicit and sophisticated account of the concept of a (primary-)universal proof is found, not in Analytica Posteriora 1.4, where he introduces the notion, but in 1.5. In 1.4 Aristotle merely says that a universal proof must be of something arbitrary as well as of something primary and seems to explain primacy in extensional terms, as concerning the largest possible domain. In 1.5 Aristotle improves upon this account after considering three ways in which we may delude ourselves into (...)
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  74. Markus Heinimaa (2002). Incomprehensibility: The Role of the Concept in DSM-IV Definition of Schizophrenic Delusions. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 5 (3):291-295.
    In this paper the role of incomprehensibility in the conceptualization of the DSM-IV definition of delusion is discussed. According to the analysis, the conceptual dependence of DSM-IV definition of delusion on incomprehensibility is manifested in several ways and infested with ambiguity. Definition of bizarre delusions is contradictory and gives room for two incompatible readings. Also the definition of delusion manifests internal inconsistencies and its tendency to account for delusions in terms of misinterpretation is bound to miss the content of the (...)
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  75. Allan Hobson & Ursula Voss (forthcoming). A Mind to Go Out Of: Reflections on Primary and Secondary Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition:-.
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  76. Christoph Hoerl (2001). On Thought Insertion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):189-200.
    In this paper, I investigate in detail one theoretical approach to the symptom of thought insertion. This approach suggests that patients are lead to disown certain thoughts they are subjected to because they lack a sense of active participation in the occurrence of those thoughts. I examine one reading of this claim, according to which the patients’ anomalous experiences arise from a breakdown of cognitive mechanisms tracking the production of occurrent thoughts, before sketching an alternative reading, according to which their (...)
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  77. Ralph E. Hoffman, Maxine Varanko, Thomas H. McGlashan & Michelle Hampson (2004). Auditory Hallucinations, Network Connectivity, and Schizophrenia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):860-861.
    Multidisciplinary studies indicate that auditory hallucinations may arise from speech perception neurocircuitry without disrupted theory of mind capacities. Computer simulations of excessive pruning in speech perception neural networks provide a model for these hallucinations and demonstrate that connectivity reductions just below a “psychotogenic threshold” enhance information processing. These data suggest a process whereby vulnerability to schizophrenia is maintained in the human population despite reproductive disadvantages of this illness.
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  78. Jakob Hohwy (2004). Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion Formation. Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 11 (1):65-70.
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  79. Jakob Hohwy & Bryan Paton (2010). Explaining Away the Body: Experiences of Supernaturally Caused Touch and Touch on Non-Hand Objects Within the Rubber Hand Illusion. PLoS ONE 5 (2):e9416.
    In rubber hand illusions and full body illusions, touch sensations are projected to non-body objects such as rubber hands, dolls or virtual bodies. The robustness, limits and further perceptual consequences of such illusions are not yet fully explored or understood. A number of experiments are reported that test the limits of a variant of the rubber hand illusion. Methodology/Principal Findings -/- A variant of the rubber hand illusion is explored, in which the real and foreign hands are aligned in personal (...)
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  80. Jakob Hohwy & Vivek Rajan (forthcoming). Delusions as Forensically Disturbing Perceptual Inferences. Neuroethics.
    Abstract Bortolotti’s Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs defends the view that delusions are beliefs on a continuum with other beliefs. A different view is that delusions are more like illusions, that is, they arise from faulty perception. This view, which is not targeted by the book, makes it easier to explain why delusions are so alien and disabling but needs to appeal to forensic aspects of functioning. Content Type Journal Article Category Original Paper Pages 1-7 DOI 10.1007/s12152-011-9124-6 Authors Jakob Hohwy, (...)
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  81. Jakob Hohwy & Raben Rosenberg (2005). Unusual Experiences, Reality Testing and Delusions of Alien Control. Mind and Language 20 (2):141-162.
    Some monothematic types of delusions may arise because subjects have unusual experiences. The role of this experiential component in the pathogenesis of delusion is still not understood. Focussing on delusions of alien control, we outline a model for reality testing competence on unusual experiences. We propose that nascent delusions arise when there are local failures of reality testing performance, and that monothematic delusions arise as normal responses to these. In the course of this we address questions concerning the tenacity with (...)
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  82. Vered Lev Kenaan (2004). Delusion and Dream in Apuleius'Metamorphoses. Classical Antiquity 23 (2):247-284.
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  83. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2003). Delusion, Dissociation and Identity. Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.
    The condition known as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is metaphysically strange. Can there really be several distinct persons operating in a single body? Our view is that DID sufferers are single persons with a severe mental disorder. In this paper we compare the phenomenology of dissociation between personality states in DID with certain delusional disorders. We argue both that the burden of proof must lie with those who defend the metaphysically extravagant Multiple Persons view and (...)
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  84. Eva Feder Kittay (2010). Planning a Trip to Italy, Arriving in Holland: The Delusion of Choice in Planning a Family. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 3 (2).
    The title of this paper deserves an explanation—or rather two explanations, one for the portion preceding the colon, the other for that following as the subtitle. The first part is derived from a short essay by Emily Perl Kingsley, written in 1987 in response to questions she had received about what it is like to raise a child with Down Syndrome.1 Kingsley suggests that planning for a child is like planning a trip to some wonderful destination—in her example, Italy. She (...)
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  85. Robert Klee (2004). Why Some Delusions Are Necessarily Inexplicable Beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):25-34.
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  86. Alfred Kraus (1994). Phenomenology of the Technical Delusion in Schizophrenics. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 25 (1):51-69.
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  87. Robyn Langdon (2009). Confabulation and Delusion: A Review of Hirstein's Brain Fiction. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):785 – 802.
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  88. Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart (2000). The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Delusions. Mind and Language 15 (1):183-216.
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  89. Peter Langland-Hassan (2008). Fractured Phenomenologies: Thought Insertion, Inner Speech, and the Puzzle of Extraneity. Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401.
    Abstract: How it is that one's own thoughts can seem to be someone else's? After noting some common missteps of other approaches to this puzzle, I develop a novel cognitive solution, drawing on and critiquing theories that understand inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia as stemming from mismatches between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Considerable attention is paid to forging links between the first-person phenomenology of thought insertion and the posits (e.g. efference copy, corollary discharge) of current cognitive (...)
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  90. Marion Ledwig (2007). Richard Dawkins the God Delusion. (London: Bantam Press; New York NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006). Pp. X+406. £20.00; $27.00 (Hbk). ISBN 0618680004. Religious Studies 43 (3):368-372.
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  91. Hermann Lenz (1983). Belief and Delusion: Their Common Origin but Different Course of Development. Zygon 18 (2):117-137.
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  92. Don S. Levi (2004). The Root Delusion Enshrined in Common Sense and Language. Asian Philosophy 14 (1):3 – 23.
    This paper is a critique of certain arguments given by the Milindapanha and Jay Garfield for the conventional nature of reality or existence. These arguments are of interest in their own right. They also are significant if they are presumed to attack an obstacle we all face in achieving non-attachment, namely, our belief in the inherent or substantial existence of ourselves and the familiar objects of our world. The arguments turn on a distinction between these objects, and some other way (...)
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  93. Angus W. MacDonald (2008). A Sneaking Suspicion: The Semantics of Emotional Beliefs and Delusions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):719-720.
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  94. Kishore Mahbubani (2009). The Dangers of Democratic Delusions. Ethics and International Affairs 23 (1):19-25.
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  95. B. A. Maher (2003). Schizophrenia, Aberrant Utterance and Delusions of Control: The Disconnection of Speech and Thought, and the Connection of Experience and Belief. Mind and Language 18 (1):1-22.
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  96. Luca Malatesti (2011). Review of Bortolotti, L., Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. [REVIEW] Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):93-96.
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  97. Bradford McCall (2011). Beyond the God Delusion: How Radical Theology Harmonizes Science & Religion. By Richard Grigg. Heythrop Journal 52 (2):348-349.
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  98. R. Mckay & L. CipoLotti (2007). Attributional Style in a Case of Cotard Delusion. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):349-359.
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  99. R. Mckay, R. Langdon & M. Coltheart (2007). Models of Misbelief: Integrating Motivational and Deficit Theories of Delusions. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):932-941.
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  100. Peter Milward (2008). The God Delusion. By Richard Dawkins. Heythrop Journal 49 (4):696–700.
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