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  1. Ian O. Angell (2010). Science's First Mistake: Delusions in Pursuit of Theory. Bloomsbury Academic.
    because whenever an observer observes, he creates a contingent distinction between what is observed and what is by necessity left unobserved. ...
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  2. Anthony P. Atkinson (2001). Pathological Beliefs, Damaged Brains. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):225-229.
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  3. Tim Bayne, Delusion and Self-Deception: Mapping the Terrain.
    The papers in this volume are drawn from a workshop on delusion and self-deception, held at Macquarie University in November of 2004. Our aim was to bring together theorists working on delusions and self-deception with an eye towards identifying and fostering connections—at both empirical and conceptual levels—between these domains. As the contributions to this volume testify, there are multiple points of contact between delusion and self-deception. This introduction charts the conceptual space in which these points of contact can be located (...)
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  4. Tim Bayne (2011). Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4):329-336.
    Although delusions are typically regarded as beliefs of a certain kind, there have been worries about the doxastic conception of delusions since at least Bleuler’s time. ‘Anti-doxasticists,’ as we might call them, do not merely worry about the claim that delusions are beliefs, they reject it. Reimer’s paper weighs into the debate between ‘doxasticists’ and ‘anti-doxasticists’ by suggesting that one of the main arguments given against the doxastic conception of delusions—what we might call the functional role objection—is based on a (...)
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  5. Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.) (2008). Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.
    This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception.
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  6. Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):1-11.
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  7. Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2005). In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of (...)
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  8. Rodger Beehler (1981). Moral Delusion. Philosophy 56 (217):313 - 331.
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  9. Ralf-Peter Behrendt (2005). Attentional Deficit Versus Impaired Reality Testing: What is the Role of Executive Dysfunction in Complex Visual Hallucinations? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):758-759.
    A “multifactorial” model should accommodate a psychological perspective, aiming to relate the phenomenology of complex visual hallucinations not only to neurobiological findings but also an understanding of the patient's psychological problems and situation in life. Greater attention needs to be paid to the role of the “lack of insight” patients may have into their hallucinations and its relationship to cognitive impairment.
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  10. Jose Luis Bermudez (2001). Normativity and Rationality in Delusional Psychiatric Disorders. Mind and Language 16 (5):457-493.
  11. G. Berrios (1991). Delusions as 'Wrong Beliefs': A Conceptual History. British Journal of Psychiatry 159:6-13.
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  12. W. Blankenburg (1980). Anthropological and Ontoanalytical Aspects of Delusion. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 11 (1):97-110.
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  13. R. Bodei (2004). On the Logics of Delusion. Diogenes 51 (4):37-48.
    Delusion is an exceptional test case for the principal categories of common sense and philosophical thought such as ‘reason’, ‘truth’ and ‘reality’. Via an engagement with the legacy of Freud and the most remarkable results of 20th-century psychiatry, the author’s aim is to analyse the paradoxical forms of delusion and to shed light on the logics that underlie and orient its specific modalities of temporalization, conceptualization and argumentation.
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  14. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Psychiatric Classification and Diagnosis. Delusions and Confabulations. Paradigmi (1):99-112.
    In psychiatry some disorders of cognition are distinguished from instances of normal cognitive functioning and from other disorders in virtue of their surface features rather than in virtue of the underlying mechanisms responsible for their occurrence. Aetiological considerations often cannot play a significant classificatory and diagnostic role, because there is no sufficient knowledge or consensus about the causal history of many psychiatric disorders. Moreover, it is not always possible to uniquely identify a pathological behaviour as the symptom of a certain (...)
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  15. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Continuing Commentary: Shaking the Bedrock. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (1):77-87.
    This feature in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology (PPP) is intended to provide ongoing commentary on main articles previously published in PPP. The essay by Bortolotti below is a response to John Rhodes and Richard Gipps's paper in PPP (15, no. 4:295-310).Can we understand people who report delusional beliefs? In their thought-provoking paper, "Delusions, Certainty, and the Background", John Rhodes and Richard Gipps (2008) present a novel account of delusions which has two main purposes: (1) offer an explanation of the truly (...)
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  16. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Shaking the Bedrock. Philosophy Psychiatry Psychology 18 (1):77-87.
    In this paper, I articulate the thesis that most delusional beliefs are continuous with other irrational beliefs. Any interpreter with some knowledge about the cognitive and affective life of subjects with delusions can at least partially understand their reports, and explain and predict their behavior in intentional terms. I identify similarities and differences between this approach to the nature of delusions and the approach adopted by Rhodes and Gipps, who have recently defended the view that people with delusions do not (...)
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  17. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions. Neuroethics 5 (1):39-53.
    Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are inbetween perceptual and doxastic states, defended by Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quitebeliefs, proposed by Eric Schwitzgebel and (...)
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  18. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Précis of Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Neuroethics 5 (1):1-4.
    Here I summarise the main arguments in Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs [1]. The book addresses the question whether there is a rationality constraint on belief ascription and defends a doxastic account of clinical delusions.
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  19. Lisa Bortolotti, Delusion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on Delusions.
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  20. Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press.
    Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational. The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book (...)
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  21. Lisa Bortolotti (2005). Delusions and the Background of Rationality. Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.
    I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the (...)
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  22. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2012). Affective Dimensions of the Phenomenon of Double Bookkeeping in Delusions. Emotion Review 4 (2):187-191.
    It has been argued that schizophrenic delusions are “behaviourally inert.” This is evidence for the phenomenon of “double bookkeeping,” according to which people are not consistent in their commitment to the content of their delusions. The traditional explanation for the phenomenon is that people do not genuinely believe the content of their delusions. In the article, we resist the traditional explanation and offer an alternative hypothesis: people with delusions often fail to acquire or to maintain the motivation to act on (...)
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  23. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2009). A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
    Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by (...)
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  24. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2008). Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.
    Philosophers have been long interested in delusional beliefs and in whether, by reporting and endorsing such beliefs, deluded subjects violate norms of rationality (Campbell 1999; Davies & Coltheart 2002; Gerrans 2001; Stone & Young 1997; Broome 2004; Bortolotti 2005). So far they have focused on identifying the relation between intentionality and rationality in order to gain a better understanding of both ordinary and delusional beliefs. In this paper Matthew Broome and I aim at drawing attention to the extent to which (...)
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  25. Lisa Bortolotti, Rochelle Cox & Amanda Barnier (2011). Can We Recreate Delusions in the Laboratory? Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):109 - 131.
    Clinical delusions are difficult to investigate in the laboratory because they co-occur with other symptoms and with intellectual impairment. Partly for these reasons, researchers have recently begun to use hypnosis with neurologically intact people in order to model clinical delusions. In this paper we describe striking analogies between the behavior of patients with a clinical delusion of mirrored self misidentification, and the behavior of highly hypnotizable subjects who receive a hypnotic suggestion to see a stranger when they look in the (...)
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  26. Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli (2012). Self-Deception, Delusion and the Boundaries of Folk Psychology. Humana.Mente 20:203-221.
    In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folk-psychological terms.
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  27. Maarten Boudry & Johan Braeckman (2012). How Convenient! The Epistemic Rationale of Self-Validating Belief Systems. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):341-364.
    This paper offers an epistemological discussion of self-validating belief systems and the recurrence of ?epistemic defense mechanisms? and ?immunizing strategies? across widely different domains of knowledge. We challenge the idea that typical ?weird? belief systems are inherently fragile, and we argue that, instead, they exhibit a surprising degree of resilience in the face of adverse evidence and criticism. Borrowing from the psychological research on belief perseverance, rationalization and motivated reasoning, we argue that the human mind is particularly susceptible to belief (...)
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  28. Nora Breen, Diana Caine, Max Coltheart, Julie Hendy & Corrine Roberts (2000). Towards an Understanding of Delusions of Misidentification: Four Case Studies. Mind and Language 15 (1):74–110.
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  29. J. Campbell (2001). Rationality, Meaning, and the Analysis of Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.
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  30. John Campbell (2002). The Ownership of Thoughts. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):35-39.
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  31. Glenn Carruthers (2009). Is the Body Schema Sufficient for the Sense of Embodiment? An Alternative to de Vignmont's Model. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):123-142.
    De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de Vignemont (...)
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  32. Ruth F. Chadwick (1994). Kant, Thought Insertion, and Mental Unity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2):105-113.
  33. J. Cheyne & T. Girard (2007). Paranoid Delusions and Threatening Hallucinations: A Prospective Study of Sleep Paralysis Experiences☆. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):959-974.
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  34. M. Chung, K. William M. Fulford & George Graham (2005). The Philosophical Understanding of Schizophrenia. Oxford University Press.
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  35. Thomas I. Cochrane (2007). Religious Delusions and the Limits of Spirituality in Decision-Making. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (7):14 – 15.
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  36. Annalisa Coliva (2002). On What There Really Is to Our Notion of Ownership of a Thought. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):41-46.
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  37. Max Coltheart (2005). Commentary: Conscious Experience and Delusional Belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.
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  38. Max Coltheart (2005). Conscious Experience and Delusional Belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.
  39. Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (2000). Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell.
    Blackwell, 2000 Review by George Graham, Ph.D on Oct 27th 2000 Volume: 4, Number: 43.
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  40. David E. Cooper (1981). Delusions of Modesty: A Reply to My Critics. Journal of Philosophy of Education 15 (1):125–135.
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  41. J. Angelo Corlett (2009). Dawkins' God Less Delusion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (3):125 - 138.
    A philosophical assessment of Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion, exposing some errors of reasoning that undermine part of the foundation of his atheism. Distinctions between theism, atheism and agnosticism are also provided and explored for their significance to Dawkins' argument.
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  42. Fraser Cowley (1991). Metaphysical Delusion. Prometheus Books.
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  43. Gregory Currie (2000). Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations. In Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (eds.), Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell. 168-183.
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  44. Gregory Currie & Nicholas Jones (2006). McGinn on Delusion and Imagination. Philosophical Books 47 (4):306-313.
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  45. Gregory Currie & Jon Jureidini (2001). Delusion, Rationality, Empathy. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):159-62.
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  46. Hugh Dalton (1914). Book Review:Social Reforms: As Related to Realities and Delusions; an Examination of the Increase and Distribution of Wealth, From 1801 to 1910. W. H. Mallock. [REVIEW] Ethics 25 (1):119-.
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  47. Larry Davidson (2002). Intentionality, Identity, and Delusions of Control in Schizophrenia: A Husserlian Perspective. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 33 (1):39-58.
  48. Larry Davidson (1994). Commentary on Insight, Delusion, and Belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (4):243-244.
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  49. Martin Davies & Max Coltheart (2000). Introduction: Pathologies of Belief. Mind and Language 15 (1):1–46.
    who are unrecognizable because they are in disguise. ¼ The person I see in the mirror is not really me. ¼ A person I knew who died is nevertheless in the hospital ward today. ¼ This arm [the speaker’s left arm] is not mine it is yours; you have..
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  50. Martin Davies & Max Coltheart (2000). Pathologies of Belief. Mind and Language 15:1-46.
    1923; Young, this volume); the Cotard delusion (Cotard, 1882; Berrios and Luque, 1995; Young, this volume); the Fregoli delusion (Courbon and Fail, 1927; de Pauw, Szulecka and Poltock, 1987; Ellis, Whitley and Luaute´, 1994); the delusion of mirrored-self misidentifi- cation (Foley and Breslau, 1982; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion of reduplicative param- nesia (Benson, Gardner and Meadows, 1976; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion sometimes found in patients suffering from unilateral neglect (Bisiach, 1988); and the delusions of (...)
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