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  1. Rick A. Adams, Harriet R. Brown & Karl J. Friston (2015). Bayesian Inference, Predictive Coding and Delusions. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):51-88.
    This paper considers psychotic symptoms in terms of false inferences or beliefs. It is based on the notion that the brain is an organ of inference that actively constructs hypotheses to explain or predict its sensations. This perspective provides a normative (Bayes optimal) account of action and perception that emphasises probabilistic representations; in particular, the confidence or precision of beliefs about the world. We consider sensory attenuation deficits, catatonia and delusions as various expressions of the same core pathology: namely, an (...)
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  2. Ian O. Angell (2010). Science's First Mistake: Delusions in Pursuit of Theory. Bloomsbury Academic.
    because whenever an observer observes, he creates a contingent distinction between what is observed and what is by necessity left unobserved. ...
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  3. Armando Aranda-Anzaldo (1997). The Gene as the Unit of Selection: A Case of Evolutive Delusion: A Case of Evolutive Delusion. Ludus Vitalis 5 (9):91-120.
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  4. Anthony P. Atkinson (2001). Pathological Beliefs, Damaged Brains. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):225-229.
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  5. Musalek - Austria (2003). Meaning and Causes of Delusions. In Bill Fulford, Katherine Morris, John Z. Sadler & Giovanni Stanghellini (eds.), Nature and Narrative: An Introduction to the New Philosophy of Psychiatry. Oup Oxford.
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  6. Emily Barrett & Cory D. Wright (forthcoming). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly.
  7. Tim Bayne, Delusion and Self-Deception: Mapping the Terrain.
    The papers in this volume are drawn from a workshop on delusion and self-deception, held at Macquarie University in November of 2004. Our aim was to bring together theorists working on delusions and self-deception with an eye towards identifying and fostering connections—at both empirical and conceptual levels—between these domains. As the contributions to this volume testify, there are multiple points of contact between delusion and self-deception. This introduction charts the conceptual space in which these points of contact can be located (...)
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  8. Tim Bayne (2011). Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4):329-336.
    Although delusions are typically regarded as beliefs of a certain kind, there have been worries about the doxastic conception of delusions since at least Bleuler’s time. ‘Anti-doxasticists,’ as we might call them, do not merely worry about the claim that delusions are beliefs, they reject it. Reimer’s paper weighs into the debate between ‘doxasticists’ and ‘anti-doxasticists’ by suggesting that one of the main arguments given against the doxastic conception of delusions—what we might call the functional role objection—is based on a (...)
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  9. Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.) (2008). Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.
    This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception.
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  10. Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):1-11.
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  11. Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2005). In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of (...)
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  12. Rodger Beehler (1981). Moral Delusion. Philosophy 56 (217):313 - 331.
    My question is whether a prevalent conception of morality can admit the existence of moral delusion. The conception of morality I refer to is that of a set of rules, or principles, ‘accepted’ or ‘assented’ to by persons, which stipulate that certain kinds of human act or behaviour are permitted, or required, while other kinds are to be avoided. This conception of morality can be found virtually everywhere, outside as much as within philosophy, in anthropology, sociology, political studies, history, literary (...)
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  13. Ralf-Peter Behrendt (2005). Attentional Deficit Versus Impaired Reality Testing: What is the Role of Executive Dysfunction in Complex Visual Hallucinations? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):758-759.
    A “multifactorial” model should accommodate a psychological perspective, aiming to relate the phenomenology of complex visual hallucinations not only to neurobiological findings but also an understanding of the patient's psychological problems and situation in life. Greater attention needs to be paid to the role of the “lack of insight” patients may have into their hallucinations and its relationship to cognitive impairment.
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  14. Vaughan Bell, Peter W. Halligan & Hadyn D. Ellis (2006). Problems Defining Delusions. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):219-226.
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  15. David Benatar (2008). The Optimism Delusion. Think 6 (16):19-22.
    In the first of our three pieces responding to Richard Dawkins's The God Delusion, David Benatar suggests that Dawkins is preaching.
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  16. Peter Kinderman & Bentall & P. Richard (2006). The Functions of Delusional Beliefs. In Man Cheung Chung, Bill Fulford & George Graham (eds.), Reconceiving Schizophrenia. Oup Oxford.
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  17. Richard P. Bentall (2014). What Are We to Believe About How We Believe? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):39-41.
    The status of delusions as beliefs has taxed some of the greatest minds in psychopathology. In their paper, Mullen and Gillett (2014) reflect on this issue, addressing a number of ways in which delusions have been conceptualized, on the whole finding them inadequate. They are particularly concerned that regarding delusions simply as false factual beliefs leads to undue emphasis on criteria such as conviction, resistance to counterargument, and falsity, arguing that, in fact, these criteria do not distinguish between delusions and (...)
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  18. Jose Luis Bermudez (2001). Normativity and Rationality in Delusional Psychiatric Disorders. Mind and Language 16 (5):457-493.
    Psychiatric treatment and diagnosis rests upon a richer conception of normativity than, for example, cognitive neuropsychology. This paper explores the role that considerations of rationality can play in defining this richer conception of normativity. It distinguishes two types of rationality and considers how each type can break down in different ways in delusional psychiatric disorders.
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  19. G. Berrios (1991). Delusions as 'Wrong Beliefs': A Conceptual History. British Journal of Psychiatry 159:6-13.
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  20. G. E. Berrios (1994). Delusions: Selected Historical and Clinical Aspects. In E. Critchley (ed.), The Neurological Boundaries of Reality. Farrand. 251--268.
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  21. W. Blankenburg (1980). Anthropological and Ontoanalytical Aspects of Delusion. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 11 (1):97-110.
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  22. R. Bodei (2004). On the Logics of Delusion. Diogenes 51 (4):37-48.
    Delusion is an exceptional test case for the principal categories of common sense and philosophical thought such as ‘reason’, ‘truth’ and ‘reality’. Via an engagement with the legacy of Freud and the most remarkable results of 20th-century psychiatry, the author’s aim is to analyse the paradoxical forms of delusion and to shed light on the logics that underlie and orient its specific modalities of temporalization, conceptualization and argumentation.
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  23. Lisa Bortolotti (forthcoming). Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematised Delusions in Schizophrenia. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    In this paper I ask whether elaborated and systematised delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. I define epistemic innocence as the status of those cognitions that have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time; and if alternative cognitions delivering the same epistemic benefit are unavailable to that (...)
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  24. Lisa Bortolotti (2015). The Epistemic Innocence of Motivated Delusions. Consciousness and Cognition (33):490-499.
    Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) and argue that some of their psychological benefits can convert into epistemic ones. Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, (...)
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  25. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions. Neuroethics 5 (1):39-53.
    Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are inbetween perceptual and doxastic states, defended by Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quitebeliefs, proposed by Eric Schwitzgebel and (...)
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  26. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Psychiatric Classification and Diagnosis. Delusions and Confabulations. Paradigmi (1):99-112.
    In psychiatry some disorders of cognition are distinguished from instances of normal cognitive functioning and from other disorders in virtue of their surface features rather than in virtue of the underlying mechanisms responsible for their occurrence. Aetiological considerations often cannot play a significant classificatory and diagnostic role, because there is no sufficient knowledge or consensus about the causal history of many psychiatric disorders. Moreover, it is not always possible to uniquely identify a pathological behaviour as the symptom of a certain (...)
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  27. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Précis of Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Neuroethics 5 (1):1-4.
    Here I summarise the main arguments in Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs [1]. The book addresses the question whether there is a rationality constraint on belief ascription and defends a doxastic account of clinical delusions.
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  28. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Continuing Commentary: Shaking the Bedrock. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (1):77-87.
    This feature in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology (PPP) is intended to provide ongoing commentary on main articles previously published in PPP. The essay by Bortolotti below is a response to John Rhodes and Richard Gipps's paper in PPP (15, no. 4:295-310).Can we understand people who report delusional beliefs? In their thought-provoking paper, "Delusions, Certainty, and the Background", John Rhodes and Richard Gipps (2008) present a novel account of delusions which has two main purposes: (1) offer an explanation of the truly (...)
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  29. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Shaking the Bedrock. Philosophy Psychiatry Psychology 18 (1):77-87.
    In this paper, I articulate the thesis that most delusional beliefs are continuous with other irrational beliefs. Any interpreter with some knowledge about the cognitive and affective life of subjects with delusions can at least partially understand their reports, and explain and predict their behavior in intentional terms. I identify similarities and differences between this approach to the nature of delusions and the approach adopted by Rhodes and Gipps, who have recently defended the view that people with delusions do not (...)
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  30. Lisa Bortolotti (2010). Double Bookkeeping in Delusions: Explaining the Gap Between Saying and Doing. In A. Buckareff, J. Aguilar & K. Frankish (eds.), New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan. 237--256.
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  31. Lisa Bortolotti, Delusion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on Delusions.
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  32. Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press.
    Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational. The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book (...)
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  33. Lisa Bortolotti (2005). Delusions and the Background of Rationality. Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.
    I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the (...)
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  34. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2012). Affective Dimensions of the Phenomenon of Double Bookkeeping in Delusions. Emotion Review 4 (2):187-191.
    It has been argued that schizophrenic delusions are “behaviourally inert.” This is evidence for the phenomenon of “double bookkeeping,” according to which people are not consistent in their commitment to the content of their delusions. The traditional explanation for the phenomenon is that people do not genuinely believe the content of their delusions. In the article, we resist the traditional explanation and offer an alternative hypothesis: people with delusions often fail to acquire or to maintain the motivation to act on (...)
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  35. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2009). A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
    Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by (...)
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  36. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2008). Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.
    Philosophers have been long interested in delusional beliefs and in whether, by reporting and endorsing such beliefs, deluded subjects violate norms of rationality (Campbell 1999; Davies & Coltheart 2002; Gerrans 2001; Stone & Young 1997; Broome 2004; Bortolotti 2005). So far they have focused on identifying the relation between intentionality and rationality in order to gain a better understanding of both ordinary and delusional beliefs. In this paper Matthew Broome and I aim at drawing attention to the extent to which (...)
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  37. Lisa Bortolotti, Rochelle Cox & Amanda Barnier (2011). Can We Recreate Delusions in the Laboratory? Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):109 - 131.
    Clinical delusions are difficult to investigate in the laboratory because they co-occur with other symptoms and with intellectual impairment. Partly for these reasons, researchers have recently begun to use hypnosis with neurologically intact people in order to model clinical delusions. In this paper we describe striking analogies between the behavior of patients with a clinical delusion of mirrored self misidentification, and the behavior of highly hypnotizable subjects who receive a hypnotic suggestion to see a stranger when they look in the (...)
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  38. Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli (2012). Self-Deception, Delusion and the Boundaries of Folk Psychology. Humana.Mente 20:203-221.
    In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folk-psychological terms.
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  39. Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono (forthcoming). Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions. Philosophy Compass.
    In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop. What processes may lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of challenges and counter-evidence? Do the formation and maintenance of delusions (...)
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  40. Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono (forthcoming). The Ethics of Delusional Belief. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can (...)
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  41. Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono (2015). Are Alien Thoughts Beliefs? Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):134-148.
    Thought insertion is a common delusion in schizophrenia. People affected by it report that there are thoughts in their heads that have been inserted by a third party. These thoughts are self-generated but subjec-tively experienced as alien (hereafter, we shall call them alien thoughts for convenience). In chapter 5 of Transparent Minds, Jordi Fernández convincingly argues that the phenomenon of thought insertion can be accounted for as a pathology of self-knowledge. In particular, he argues that the application of the bypass (...)
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  42. Maarten Boudry & Johan Braeckman (2012). How Convenient! The Epistemic Rationale of Self-Validating Belief Systems. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):341-364.
    This paper offers an epistemological discussion of self-validating belief systems and the recurrence of ?epistemic defense mechanisms? and ?immunizing strategies? across widely different domains of knowledge. We challenge the idea that typical ?weird? belief systems are inherently fragile, and we argue that, instead, they exhibit a surprising degree of resilience in the face of adverse evidence and criticism. Borrowing from the psychological research on belief perseverance, rationalization and motivated reasoning, we argue that the human mind is particularly susceptible to belief (...)
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  43. Nora Breen, Diana Caine, Max Coltheart, Julie Hendy & Corrine Roberts (2000). Towards an Understanding of Delusions of Misidentification: Four Case Studies. Mind and Language 15 (1):74–110.
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  44. Frederick Burwick (1990). The Grotesque: Illusion Vs. Delusion. In Frederick Burwick & Walter Pape (eds.), Aesthetic Illusion: Theoretical and Historical Approaches. W. De Gruyter. 122--132.
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  45. J. Campbell (2001). Rationality, Meaning, and the Analysis of Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.
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  46. John Campbell (2002). The Ownership of Thoughts. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):35-39.
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  47. Glenn Carruthers (2009). Is the Body Schema Sufficient for the Sense of Embodiment? An Alternative to de Vignmont's Model. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):123-142.
    De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de Vignemont (...)
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  48. Ruth F. Chadwick (1994). Kant, Thought Insertion, and Mental Unity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2):105-113.
  49. Eric Yh Chen & German E. Berrios (1998). The Nature of Delusions: A Hierarchical Neural Network Approach. In Dan J. Stein & J. Ludick (eds.), Neural Networks and Psychopathology. Cambridge University Press.
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  50. J. Cheyne & T. Girard (2007). Paranoid Delusions and Threatening Hallucinations: A Prospective Study of Sleep Paralysis Experiences☆. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):959-974.
    Previously we reported a three-factor structure for hallucinations accompanying sleep paralysis . These earlier analyses were, however, based on retrospective accounts. In a prospective study, 383 individuals reported individual episodes online providing further evidence for the three-factor structure as well as clearer conceptually meaningful relations among factors than retrospective studies. In addition, reports of individual episodes permitted a more fine-grained analysis of the internal structure of factors to assess predictions based on the hypothesis that a sensed or felt presence is (...)
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