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  1. Alfred Archer (forthcoming). Review: M. V. Ackeren and M. Kühler (Eds.) The Limits of Moral Obligation: Moral Demandingness and Ought Implies Can (New York: Routledge, 2016), 210 Pages. ISBN: 9781138824232 (Hbk). Hardback: £90.00. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy.
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  2. Matthew Braddock (2013). Defusing the Demandingness Objection: Unreliable Intuitions. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (2):169-191.
    Dogged resistance to demanding moral views frequently takes the form of The Demandingness Objection. Premise (1): Moral view V demands too much of us. Premise (2): If a moral view demands too much of us, then it is mistaken. Conclusion: Therefore, moral view V is mistaken. Objections of this form harass major theories in normative ethics as well as prominent moral views in applied ethics and political philosophy. The present paper does the following: (i) it clarifies and distinguishes between various (...)
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  3. Michael E. Bratman (1994). Kagan on "the Appeal to Cost". Ethics 104 (2):325-332.
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  4. Vanessa Carbonell (2015). Sacrifices of Self. Journal of Ethics 19 (1):53-72.
    We emerge from certain activities with an altered sense of self. Whether returning from a warzone or from an experience as common as caring for an aging parent, one might remark, “I’m not the same person I was.” I argue that such transformations are relevant to debates about what morality requires of us. To undergo an alteration in one’s self is to make a special kind of sacrifice, a sacrifice of self. Since projects can be more or less morally obligatory (...)
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  5. Vanessa Carbonell (2013). What We Know and What We Owe. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 3.
    Knowledge is necessary for certain moral obligations. In learning something new, one sometimes triggers a moral obligation. This paper argues that the existence of these knowledge-based obligations poses a problem for the view that we are not only free to choose the course of our own lives, including our careers and personal projects, but also free to change our minds and quit at any time to pursue something else. For if our choice of life path has generated knowledge-based moral obligations (...)
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  6. Vanessa Carbonell (2012). The Ratcheting-Up Effect. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):228-254.
    I argue for the existence of a ‘ratcheting-up effect’: the behavior of moral saints serves to increase the level of moral obligation the rest of us face. What we are morally obligated to do is constrained by what it would be reasonable for us to believe we are morally obligated to do. Moral saints provide us with a special kind of evidence that bears on what we can reasonably believe about our obligations. They do this by modeling the level of (...)
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  7. Robert F. Card (2004). Consequentialism, Teleology, and the New Friendship Critique. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):149-172.
  8. Thomas Carson, Rule-Consequentialism and Demandingness: A Reply to Carson.
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  9. T. D. J. Chappell (ed.) (2009). The Problem of Moral Demandingness: New Philosophical Essays. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  10. Timothy Chappell (2007). Integrity and Demandingness. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):255 - 265.
    I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’ moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis. However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection to this proposal can be outflanked by (...)
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  11. Timothy Chappell (2002). Review: The Demands of Consequentialism. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (444):891-897.
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  12. Michael Cholbi (2014). Agents, Patients, and Obligatory Self-Benefit. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (2):159-184.
    Consequentialism is often criticized for rendering morality too pervasive. One somewhat neglected manifestation of this pervasiveness is the obligatory self-benefit objection. According to this objection, act-consequentialism has the counterintuitive result that certain self-benefitting actions turn out, ceteris paribus, to be morally obligatory rather than morally optional. The purposes of this paper are twofold. First, I consider and reject four strategies with which consequentialists might answer the obligatory self-benefit objection. Despite the apparent consequentialist credentials of these answers, none of these strategies (...)
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  13. Caleb Dewey, Why So Demanding?
    Although popular amongst anti-consequentialists, the demandingness objection has suffered terribly at the hands of consequentialists, most notably Sobel (2007). In this essay, I produce a new incarnation of the demandingness objection that consequentialism (as well as many other moral theories) cannot avoid. To rescue it from this new objection, I refine consequentialism by adding an infinitude of sub-dominant obligations. I show that this polyadic consequentialism significantly outperforms the alternatives: subjective, intentionally-restricted, and satisficing consequentialism. Finally, I offer an interpretation of polyadic (...)
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  14. Dale Dorsey (2012). Weak Anti-Rationalism and the Demands of Morality†. Noûs 46 (1):1-23.
    The demandingness of act consequentialism is well-known and has received much sophisticated treatment.1 Few have been content to defend AC’s demands. Much of the response has been to jettison AC in favor of a similar, though significantly less demanding view.2 The popularity of this response is easy to understand. Excessive demandingness appears to be a strong mark against any moral theory. And if excessive demandingness is a worry of this kind, AC’s goose appears cooked: attempts to show that AC is (...)
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  15. Mathieu Doucet (2013). Playing Dice with Morality: Weighted Lotteries and the Number Problem. Utilitas 25 (2):161-181.
    In this article I criticize the non-consequentialist Weighted Lottery (WL) solution to the choice between saving a smaller or a larger group of people. WL aims to avoid what non-consequentialists see as consequentialism's unfair aggregation by giving equal consideration to each individual's claim to be rescued. In so doing, I argue, WL runs into another common objection to consequentialism: it is excessively demanding. WL links the right action with the outcome of a fairly weighted lottery, which means that an agent (...)
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  16. Ben Eggleston (2009). Tim Mulgan, the Demands of Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), Pp. VI + 313. Utilitas 21 (1):123-125.
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  17. Björn Eriksson (1994). Heavy Duty: On the Demands of Consequentialism. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
    Various versions of the objection to utilitarianism that it is too demanding are discussed and rejected. It is argued that a scalar version of utilitarianism that makes wrongness a matter of degree further improves the prospects for utilitarianism to escape the demandingness-objection.
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  18. Robert E. Goodin (2009). Demandingness as a Virtue. Journal of Ethics 13 (1):1 - 13.
    Philosophers who complain about the ‹demandingness’ of morality forget that a morality can make too few demands as well as too many. What we ought be seeking is an appropriately demanding morality. This article recommends a ‹moral satisficing’ approach to determining when a morality is ‹demanding enough’, and an institutionalized solution to keeping the demands within acceptable limits.
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  19. Brad Hooker (2003). The Demands of Consequentialism, by Tim Mulgan. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, 313 Pp. + VI, ??35, $49.95 (Hbk). ISBN 0-1-825093-. [REVIEW] Philosophy 78 (2):289-307.
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  20. Brad Hooker (1991). Rule-Consequentialism and Demandingness: A Reply to Carson. Mind 100 (2):269-276.
    This paper replies to Carson's attacks on an earlier paper of Hooker's. Carson argued that rule-consequentialism--the theory that an act is morally right if and only if it is allowed by the set of rules and corresponding virtues the having of which by everyone would bring about the best consequences considered impartially--can and does require the comfortably off to make enormous sacrifices in order to help the needy. Hooker defends rule-consequentialism against Carson's arguments.
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  21. Brad Hooker, The Demandingness Objection.
    This paper’s first section invokes a relevant meta-ethical principle about what a moral theory needs in order to be plausible and superior to its rivals. In subsequent sections, I try to pinpoint exactly what the demandingness objection has been taken to be. I try to explain how the demandingness objection developed in reaction to impartial act-consequentialism’s requirement of beneficence toward strangers. In zeroing in on the demandingness objection, I distinguish it from other, more or less closely related, objections. In particular, (...)
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  22. Paul E. Hurley (2006). Does Consequentialism Make Too Many Demands, or None at All? Ethics 116 (4):680-706.
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  23. Shelly Kagan (1984). Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (3):239-254.
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  24. David Killoren, Consequentialism, Time, and Value.
    Is consequentialism consistent with common-sense morality? I argue for a negative answer to this question. In Sections 1-4, I develop and defend a definition for “consequentialism.” In Section 5, I attempt to show that, given this definition, consequentialism and common-sense morality cannot be reconciled. In Section 6, I argue that, on the definition of consequentialism I defend, consequentialism should be understood, not as a view about the relationship between the deontic and the evaluative (as many philosophers suppose), but as a (...)
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  25. David Lyons (1985). Book Review:The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. Samuel Scheffler. [REVIEW] Ethics 95 (4):936-.
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  26. Elinor Mason (2012). Coercion and Integrity. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 2. Oxford
    Williams argues that impartial moral theories undermine agents’ integrity by making them responsible for allowings as well as doings. I argue that in some cases of allowings, where there is an intervening agent, the agent has been coerced, and so is not fully responsible. -/- I provide an analysis of coercion. Whether an agent is coerced depends on various things (the coercer must provide strong reasons, and the coercer must have a mens rea), and crucially, the coercee’s action is rendered (...)
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  27. Elinor Mason (2004). Consequentialism and the Principle of Indifference. Utilitas 16 (3):316-321.
    James Lenman argues that consequentialism fails as a moral theory because it is impossible to predict the long-term consequences of our actions. I agree that it is impossible to predict the long-term consequences of actions, but argue that this does not count as a strike against consequentialism. I focus on the principle of indifference, which tells us to treat unforeseeable consequences as cancelling each other out, and hence value-neutral. I argue that though we cannot defend this principle independently, we cannot (...)
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  28. Brian McElwee (2007). Consequentialism, Demandingness and the Monism of Practical Reason. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):359-374.
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  29. Paul McNamara (1996). Making Room for Going Beyond the Call. Mind 105 (419):415-450.
    In the latter half of this century, there have been two mostly separate threads within ethical theory, one on 'superogation', one on 'common-sense morality'. I bring these threads together by systematically reflecting on doing more than one has to do. A rich and coherent set of concepts at the core of common-sense morality is identified, along with various logical connections between these core concepts. Various issues in common-sense morality emerge naturally, as does a demonstrably productive definition of doing more than (...)
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  30. Paul McNamara (1995). The Confinement Problem: How to Terminate Your Mom with Her Trust. Analysis 55 (4):310 - 313.
    Cliff Landesman provides a vivid description of a case where we have no best outcome available to us. He poses this as a problem for utilitarians who advise us to do the best we can. This does indeed make such advice impractical. I begin by contrasting older versions of utilitarianism with newer ones that have appeared in deontic logic and that were designed precisely to accommodate Landesman's sort of scenario. (I cast matters in terms of the Limit Assumption and world-theoretic (...)
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  31. Thaddeus Metz (2001). Review of Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 110 (4):614-617.
  32. Tim Mulgan (2001). The Demands of Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
    Tim Mulgan presents a penetrating examination of consequentialism: the theory that human behavior must be judged in terms of the goodness or badness of its consequences. The problem with consequentialism is that it seems unreasonably demanding, leaving us no room for our own aims and interests. In response, Mulgan offers his own, more practical version of consequentialism--one that will surely appeal to philosophers and laypersons alike.
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  33. Douglas W. Portmore (2011). Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford Univ Pr
    IN THIS PAPER, I make a presumptive case for moral rationalism: the view that agents can be morally required to do only what they have decisive reason to do, all things considered. And I argue that this view leads us to reject all traditional versions of act‐consequentialism. I begin by explaining how moral rationalism leads us to reject utilitarianism.
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  34. Peter Railton (1984). Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (2):134-171.
    The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
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  35. Alex Rajczi (2009). Consequentialism, Integrity, and Ordinary Morality. Utilitas 21 (3):377-392.
    According to the moral standards most of us accept and live by, morality generally permits us to refrain from promoting the good of others and instead engage in non-harmful projects of our own choice. This aspect of so-called ‘ordinary morality’ has turned out to be very difficult to justify. Recently, though, various authors, including Bernard Williams and Samuel Scheffler, have proposed “Integrity Theories” that would vindicate this aspect of ordinary morality, at least in part. They are generated by treating as (...)
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  36. S. Andrew Schroeder (2014). Imperfect Duties, Group Obligations, and Beneficence. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (5):557-584.
    There is virtually no philosophical consensus on what, exactly, imperfect duties are. In this paper, I lay out three criteria which I argue any adequate account of imperfect duties should satisfy. Using beneficence as a leading example, I suggest that existing accounts of imperfect duties will have trouble meeting those criteria. I then propose a new approach: thinking of imperfect duties as duties held by groups, rather than individuals. I show, again using the example of beneficence, that this proposal can (...)
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  37. Saul Smilansky (2005). The Paradoxical Relationship Between Morality and Moral Worth. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):490-500.
    If the social environment were arranged so that most people in the West could, with relatively little effort, be morally good to a reasonable degree, would this be a good thing? I claim that it is not entirely obvious that we should say yes. This is no idle question: mainstream Western social morality today seems to be approaching the prospect for a morality that is not taxing. This question has substantial theoretical interest because exploring it will help us understand the (...)
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  38. David Sobel (2007). The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (8):1-17.
    Consequentialism, many philosophers have claimed, asks too much of us to be a plausible ethical theory. Indeed, the theory's severe demandingness is often claimed to be its chief flaw. My thesis is that as we come to better understand this objection, we see that, even if it signals or tracks the existence of a real problem for Consequentialism, it cannot itself be a fundamental problem with the view. The objection cannot itself provide good reason to break with Consequentialism, because it (...)
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  39. David Sosa (1993). Consequences of Consequentialism. Mind 102 (405):101-122.
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  40. Attila Tanyi (2015). Moral Demands and Ethical Theory: The Case of Consequentialism. In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.), Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy. Bloomsbury 500-527.
    Morality is demanding; this is a platitude. It is thus no surprise when we find that moral theories too, when we look into what they require, turn out to be demanding. However, there is at least one moral theory – consequentialism – that is said to be beset by this demandingness problem. This calls for an explanation: Why only consequentialism? This then leads to related questions: What is the demandingness problematic about? What exactly does it claim? Finally, there is the (...)
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  41. Attila Tanyi (2013). Mennyire lehet nehéz? A túlzott követelések ellenvetésének újszerű megközelítései (‘How Hard Can It Get? Novel Approaches to the Overdemandingness Objection’). Cafe Babel:39-48.
    The paper begins with a detailed discussion of the Overdemandingness Objection to consequentialism. It argues that the best interpretation of the Objection is the one that focuses on reasons: consequentialism is overdemanding because it demands us, with decisive force, to do things that, intuitively, we do not have decisive reason to do. After this, the paper goes on to offer three – so far in the literature unpursued – responses to the Objection. The first puts forward a constitutive role of (...)
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  42. Attila Tanyi & Martin Bruder (2014). Consequentialism and Its Demands: A Representative Study. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):293-314.
    An influential objection to act-consequentialism holds that the theory is unduly demanding. This paper is an attempt to approach this critique of act-consequentialism – the Overdemandingness Objection – from a different, so far undiscussed, angle. First, the paper argues that the most convincing form of the Objection claims that consequentialism is overdemanding because it requires us, with decisive force, to do things that, intuitively, we do not have decisive reason to perform. Second, in order to investigate the existence of the (...)
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  43. Attila Tanyi & Martin Bruder (2014). How to Gauge Moral Intuitions? Prospects for a New Methodology. In Christoph Luetge, Hannes Rusch & Matthias Uhl (eds.), Experimental Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan 157-174.
    Examining folk intuitions about philosophical questions lies at the core of experimental philosophy. This requires both a good account of what intuitions are and methods allowing to assess them. We propose to combine philosophical and psychological conceptualisations of intuitions by focusing on three of their features: immediacy, lack of inferential relations, and stability. Once this account of intuition is at hand, we move on to propose a methodology that can test all three characteristics without eliminating any of them. In the (...)
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  44. Matthew Tedesco (2011). Intuitions and the Demands of Consequentialism. Utilitas 23 (1):94-104.
    One response to the demandingness objection is that it begs the question against consequentialism by assuming a moral distinction between what a theory requires and what it permits. According to the consequentialist, this distinction stands in need of defense. However, this response may also beg the question, this time at the methodological level, regarding the credibility of the intuitions underlying the objection. The success of the consequentialist's response thus turns on the role we assign to intuitions in our moral methodology. (...)
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  45. Alan Thomas, Consequentialism, Integrity and Demandingness.
    In this paper I will develop the argument that a cognitivist and virtue ethical approach to moral reasons is the only approach that can sustain a non-alienated relation to one’s character and ethical commitments. [Thomas, 2005] As a corollary of this claim, I will argue that moral reasons must be understood as reasonably partial. A view of this kind can, nevertheless, recognise the existence of general and positive obligations to humanity. Doing so does not undermine the view by leading to (...)
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  46. Marcel van Ackeren & Michael Kühler (eds.) (2015). The Limits of Moral Obligation: Moral Demandingness and Ought Implies Can. Routledge.
    This volume responds to the growing interest in finding explanations for why moral claims may lose their validity based on what they ask of their addressees. Two main ideas relate to that question: the moral demandingness objection and the principle "ought implies can." Though both of these ideas can be understood to provide an answer to the same question, they have usually been discussed separately in the philosophical literature. The aim of this collection is to provide a focused and comprehensive (...)
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