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Siblings:History/traditions: Demarcation of Science
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  1. Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour & Robert B. Talisse (2010). Nagel on Public Education and Intelligent Design. Journal of Philosophical Research 35:209-219.
    In a recent article, Thomas Nagel argues against the court’s decision to strike down the Dover school district’s requirement that biology teachers in Dover public schools inform their students about Intelligent Design. Nagel contends that this ruling relies on questionable demarcation between science and nonscience and consequently misapplies the Establishment Clause of the constitution. Instead, he argues in favor of making room for an open discussion of these issues rather than an outright prohibition against Intelligent Design. We contend that Nagel’s (...)
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  2. Daniel Andler (2006). Federalism in Science — Complementarity Vs Perspectivism: Reply to Harré. Synthese 151 (3):519 - 522.
  3. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). The Concept of Scientific Research. In Carlos Maria Romeo Casabona (ed.), Los Nuevos Horizontes de la Investigacion Genetica. Comares
    Chapter discussing what it takes for an activity to be an instance of scientific research.
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  4. Maarten Boudry (2013). Loki's Wager and Laudan's Error: On Genuine and Territorial Demarcation. In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press 79--98.
  5. Maarten Boudry (2011). Exploring the Hinterland of Science. Metascience 20 (1):173-176.
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  6. Maarten Boudry (2010). Exploring the Hinterland of Science: Massimo Pigliucci: Nonsense on Stilts: How to Tell Science From Bunk. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2010, 332pp, $20.00 PB. [REVIEW] Metascience 20 (1):173-176.
    Book review of "<span class='Hi'>Massimo</span> Pigliucci: Nonsense on stilts: How to tell science from bunk. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2010".
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  7. Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke & Johan Braeckman (2010). How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism: Philosophical Misconceptions About Methodological Naturalism. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 15 (3):227-244.
    In recent controversies about Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC), the principle of methodological naturalism (MN) has played an important role. In this paper, an often neglected distinction is made between two different conceptions of MN, each with its respective rationale and with a different view on the proper role of MN in science. According to one popular conception, MN is a self-imposed or intrinsic limitation of science, which means that science is simply not equipped to deal with claims of the (...)
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  8. Danny Frederick, A Regimented and Concise Exposition of Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalist Epistemology.
  9. Philip Kitcher (2003). 17 Giving Darwin His Due. In J. Hodges & Gregory Radick (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Darwin. Cambridge University Press 399.
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  10. Noretta Koertge (1990). The Function of Credit in Hull's Evolutionary Model of Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:237 - 244.
    This paper first argues that evolutionary models of conceptual development which are patterned on Darwinian selection are unlikely to solve the demarcation problem. The persistence of myths shows that in most social environments unfalsifiable ideas are more likely to survive than ones which can be subjected to empirical scrutiny. I then analyze Hull's claims about how the credit system operates in science and conclude with him that it can perform a surprising variety of functions. However I argue that the credit (...)
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  11. Hugh Lacey & Pablo R. Mariconda (2012). The Eagle and the Starlings: Galileo's Argument for the Autonomy of Science—How Pertinent is It Today? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):122-131.
  12. Larry Laudan (1983). More on Creationism. Science, Technology, and Human Values 8 (1):36-38.
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  13. Larry Laudan (1983). The Demise of the Demarcation Problem. In Robert S. Cohen & Larry Laudan (eds.), Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum. D. Reidel 111--127.
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  14. Larry Laudan (1982). Commentary: Science at the Bar-Causes for Concern. Science, Technology, and Human Values 7 (41):16-19.
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  15. Robert W. P. Luk (2010). Understanding Scientific Study Via Process Modeling. Foundations of Science 15 (1):49-78.
    This paper argues that scientific studies distinguish themselves from other studies by a combination of their processes, their (knowledge) elements and the roles of these elements. This is supported by constructing a process model. An illustrative example based on Newtonian mechanics shows how scientific knowledge is structured according to the process model. To distinguish scientific studies from research and scientific research, two additional process models are built for such processes. We apply these process models: (1) to argue that scientific progress (...)
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  16. Sebastian Lutz (forthcoming). Carnap on Empirical Significance. Synthese.
    Carnap’s search for a criterion of empirical significance is usually considered a failure. I argue that the results from two out of his three different approaches are at the very least problematic, but that one approach led to success. Carnap’s criterion of translatability into logical syntax is too vague to allow definite results. His criteria for terms—introducibility by reduction sentences and his criterion from “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”—are almost trivial and have no clear relation to the empirical significance (...)
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  17. Sebastian Lutz (2011). On an Allegedly Essential Feature of Criteria for the Demarcation of Science. The Reasoner 5 (8):125-126.
    Laudan’s argument against the possibility of a demarcation criterion for scientific theories rests on establishing that any criterion must be a necessary and sufficient condition. But Laudan’s argument at most establishes that any criterion must provide a necessary condition and a possibly different sufficient condition. His own claims suggest that such a criterion is possible.
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  18. Sebastian Lutz (2011). On an Allegedly Essential Feature of Demarcation Criteria of Science. The Reasoner 5 (8):125–126.
    Laudan’s argument against the possibility of a demarcation criterion for scientific theories rests on establishing that any criterion must be a necessary and sufficient condition. But Laudan’s argument at most establishes that any criterion must provide a necessary condition and a possibly different sufficient condition. His own claims suggest that such a criterion is possible.
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  19. María Laura Martínez (2009). Ian Hacking's Proposal for the Distinction Between Natural and Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (2):212-234.
    This article explores the proposal offered by Ian Hacking for the distinction between natural and social sciences—a proposal that he has defined from the outset as complex and different from the traditional ones. Our objective is not only to present the path followed by Hacking 's distinction, but also to determine if it constitutes a novelty or not. For this purpose, we deemed it necessary to briefly introduce the core notions Hacking uses to establish his strategic approach to social sciences, (...)
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  20. Deborah G. Mayo (1996). Ducks, Rabbits, and Normal Science: Recasting the Kuhn's-Eye View of Popper's Demarcation of Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (2):271-290.
    Kuhn maintains that what marks the transition to a science is the ability to carry out ‘normal’ science—a practice he characterizes as abandoning the kind of testing that Popper lauds as the hallmark of science. Examining Kuhn's own contrast with Popper, I propose to recast Kuhnian normal science. Thus recast, it is seen to consist of severe and reliable tests of low-level experimental hypotheses (normal tests) and is, indeed, the place to look to demarcate science. While thereby vindicating Kuhn on (...)
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  21. Seungbae Park (2016). To Be Scientific Is To Be Interactive. European Journal of Science and Theology 12 (1):77-86.
    Hempel, Popper, and Kuhn argue that to be scientific is to be testable, to be falsifiable, and most nearly to do normal science, respectively. I argue that to be scientific is largely to be interactive, offering some examples from science to show that the ideas from different fields of science interact with one another. The results of the interactions are that hypotheses become more plausible, new phenomena are explained and predicted, we understand phenomena from a new perspective, and our worldview (...)
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  22. Lorenzo Peña, Sofia.
    The main claim of this paper is that the boundary between scientific and non scientific knowledge does exist -- which means several things. First, it's not the case that anything goes: some irrationalists have been mistaken into acceptance of that wrong conclusion because they have remarked that, however the boundary might be drawn, some important scientific developments would fall afoul of the standards entitling a research practice to count as scientific. Second, the boundary is not an imaginary one, that is (...)
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  23. Robert T. Pennock (2011). Can't Philosophers Tell the Difference Between Science and Religion? Demarcation Revisited. Synthese 178 (2):177-206.
    In the 2005 Kitzmiller v Dover Area School Board case, a federal district court ruled that Intelligent Design creationism was not science, but a disguised religious view and that teaching it in public schools is unconstitutional. But creationists contend that it is illegitimate to distinguish science and religion, citing philosophers Quinn and especially Laudan, who had criticized a similar ruling in the 1981 McLean v. Arkansas creation-science case on the grounds that no necessary and sufficient demarcation criterion was possible and (...)
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  24. Massimo Pigliucci (2010). Nonsense on Stilts: How to Tell Science From Bunk. University of Chicago Press.
    Introduction : science versus pseudoscience and the "demarcation problem" -- Hard science, soft science -- Almost science -- Pseudoscience -- Blame the media? -- Debates on science : the rise of think tanks and the decline of public intellectuals -- Science and politics : the case of global warming -- Science in the courtroom : the case against intelligent design -- From superstition to natural philosophy -- From natural philosophy to modern science -- The science wars I : do we (...)
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  25. Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.) (2013). The Philosophy of Pseudoscience. University of Chicago Press.
    What sets the practice of rigorously tested, sound science apart from pseudoscience? In this volume, the contributors seek to answer this question, known to philosophers of science as “the demarcation problem.” This issue has a long history in philosophy, stretching as far back as the early twentieth century and the work of Karl Popper. But by the late 1980s, scholars in the field began to treat the demarcation problem as impossible to solve and futile to ponder. However, the essays that (...)
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  26. Karl R. Popper (1959/1992). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Routledge.
    Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.
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  27. Philip L. Quinn (1984). The Philosopher of Science as Expert Witness. In James T. Cushing, C. F. Delany & Gary M. Gutting (eds.), Science and Reality: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science. University of Notre Dame Press
  28. Peter W. Ross & Dale Turner (2013). Existence Problems in Philosophy and Science. Synthese 190 (18):4239-4259.
    We initially characterize what we’ll call existence problems as problems where there is evidence that a putative entity exists and this evidence is not easily dismissed; however, the evidence is not adequate to justify the claim that the entity exists, and in particular the entity hasn’t been detected. The putative entity is elusive. We then offer a strategy for determining whether an existence problem is philosophical or scientific. According to this strategy (1) existence problems are characterized in terms of causal (...)
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  29. Michael Ruse (1982). Creation Science Is Not Science. Science, Technology, and Human Values 7 (40):72-8.
  30. Michael Ruse (1982). Response to the Commentary: Pro Judice. Science, Technology, and Human Values 7 (41):19-23.
  31. Edward Slowik (2001). Rouse-Ing Out the Legitimation Project: Scientific Practice and the Problem of Demarcation. Ratio 14 (2):171–184.
    This essay critically examines Joseph Rouse's arguments against, what he dubs, the "legitimation project", which are the attempts to delimit and justify the scientific enterprise by means of global, "a priori" principles. Stipulating that a more adequate picture of science can be obtained by viewing it as a continuously transforming pattern of situated activities, Rouse believes that only by refocusing attention upon the actual practice of science can philosophers begin to detach themselves from the irresolvable epistemological problems that have remained (...)
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  32. Roger Smith (2005). Does Reflexivity Separate the Human Sciences From the Natural Sciences? History of the Human Sciences 18 (4):1-25.
    A number of writers have picked out the way knowledge in the human sciences reflexively alters the human subject as what separates these sciences from the natural sciences. Furthermore, they take this reflexivity to be a condition of moral existence. The article sympathetically examines this emphasis on reflexive processes, but it rejects the particular conclusion that the reflexive phenomenon enables us to demarcate the human sciences. The first sections analyse the different meanings that references to reflexivity have in the psychological (...)
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  33. Terrance Tomkow, Blackburn, Truth and Other Hot Topics.
    Quine taught us that the collapse of positivism entails that empirical theories are, in principle, undetermined-- not just by the available evidence-- but by all possible evidence. Without disputing that conclusion, contemporary philosophers-- exampled here by Simon Blackburn and Jerry Fodor-- have wanted to treat this as a merely abstract possibility that need not undermine our confidence in actual scientific theory and practice. I argue that there is no basis for this complacency.
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  34. Kirsten Walsh (2009). Has Laudan Killed the Demarcation Problem? Dissertation, University of Melbourne
    The ‘Demarcation Problem’ is to mark the boundary between things that are scientific and things that are not. Philosophers have worked on this problem for a long time, and yet there is still no consensus solution. Should we continue to hope, or must we draw a more sceptical conclusion? In his paper, ‘The Demise of the Demarcation Problem’, Larry Laudan (1983) does the latter. In this thesis, I address the three arguments he gives for this conclusion.
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  35. Karen Wendling (1996). Is Science Unique? Biology and Philosophy 11 (3):421-438.
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  36. Andrew S. Yang (2008). Matters of Demarcation: Philosophy, Biology, and the Evolving Fraternity Between Disciplines. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (2):211 – 225.
    The influence that philosophy of science has had on scientific practice is as controversial as it is undeniable, especially in the case of biology. The dynamic between philosophy and biology as disciplines has developed along two different lines that can be characterized as 'paternal', on the one hand, and more 'fraternal', on the other. The role Popperian principles of demarcation and falsifiability have played in both the systematics community as well as the ongoing evolution-creation debates illustrate these contrasting forms of (...)
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