Political philosophers have been concerned for some time with the epistemic caliber of the general public, qua the body that is, ultimately, tasked with political decision-making in democratic societies. Unfortunately, the empirical data paints a pretty dismal picture here, indicating that the public tends to be largely ignorant on the issues relevant to governance. To make matters worse, social psychological research on how ignorance tends to breed overconfidence gives us reason to believe that the public will not only lack knowledge (...) on the relevant issues, but also wisdom, in the Socratic sense of an awareness of your ignorance. It might be thought that an obvious remedy would be to increase the knowledge and wisdom of the public. However, as far as sound political decision-making and action is concerned, there is nothing particularly valuable about knowledge or wisdom per se—irrespective of what account of wisdom available in the literature we opt for. In fact, it might just be that what the public needs is nothing but the most basic epistemic good: true belief. (shrink)

Jason Brennan argues that people are morally obligated not to vote badly, where voting badly is voting “without sufficient reason” for harmful or unjust policies or candidates. His argument is: (1) One has an obligation not to engage in collectively harmful activities when refraining from such activities does not impose significant personal costs. (2) Voting badly is to engage in a collectively harmful activity, while abstaining imposes low personal costs. (3) Therefore, one should not vote badly. This paper shows that (...) Brennan never adequately clarifies (1) and that, on every plausible clarification, (2) is false. (shrink)

When the Supreme Court in 2003 struck down a Texas law prohibiting homosexual sodomy, it cited the right to privacy based on the guarantee of "substantive due process" embodied by the Constitution. But did the court act undemocratically by overriding the rights of the majority of voters in Texas? Scholars often point to such cases as exposing a fundamental tension between the democratic principle of majority rule and the liberal concern to protect individual rights. Democratic Rights challenges this view by (...) showing that, in fact, democracy demands many of these rights. Corey Brettschneider argues that ideal democracy is comprised of three core values--political autonomy, equality of interests, and reciprocity--with both procedural and substantive implications. These values entitle citizens not only to procedural rights of participation (e.g., electing representatives) but also to substantive rights that a "pure procedural" democracy might not protect. What are often seen as distinctly liberal substantive rights to privacy, property, and welfare can, then, be understood within what Brettschneider terms a "value theory of democracy." Drawing on the work of John Rawls and deliberative democrats such as Jürgen Habermas, he demonstrates that such rights are essential components of--rather than constraints on--an ideal democracy. Thus, while defenders of the democratic ideal rightly seek the power of all to participate, they should also demand the rights that are the substance of self-government. (shrink)

Book review of Ian Shapiro - "The State of Democratic Theory".

Technological advances in media communications have raised questions about the appropriateness of media ownership rules for traditional TV and radio broadcast. This article contributes to this debate by defending a set of principles that ought to govern the distribution of broadcast spectrum. In particular, it defends principles reflecting the ‹public interest’ constraint currently informing broadcast media ownership rules, and argues against a free-market procedure for distributing spectrum use. The argument relies upon the application of a political constructivist approach typical to (...) many political theories. In applying this approach, the author illustrates the strengths and weakness of constructivism and in the process provide an example for how constructivism can be applied to other subjects. As a result, the article has two aims. First, it defends a set of broadcast ownership principles. Second, it provides a model for how philosophers might apply constructivism to other subjects. (shrink)

Riječ “intelektualac” francuskog je porijekla, nastala krajem 19. vijeka. Stvorena tokom afere Dreyfus, uglavnom se odnosi na one mislioce koji su spremni da interveniraju u javnom forumu, čak i ako to znači da sebe izlažu riziku (Le Sueur 2001:2). Teoretičari kao što su Edward Said, Paul Ricoeur, Jean-Paul Sartre i Michael Waltzer dali su doprinos diskusiji o intelektualcima: intelektualca Said vidi kao kritički nastrojenog autsajdera, Ricoeur kao političkog edukatora, Sartre kao čovjeka od akcije, a Waltzer kao brižnog insajdera. Opisati intelektualca (...) na ovaj način, pak, ne spominje prostor unutar kojeg intelektualac djeluje, tj. građansko društvo. Upravo se u takvom prostoru ljudskog udruživanja i odnosnih mreža može promovirati kultura dijaloga, tolerancije, umjerenosti i uzajamno korisnog rješavanja sukoba, upravo onakva kultura kakva otjelotvorava stavove i vrijednosti demokratizacije. Mada intelektualac, onakav kakav je gore opisan, igra značajnu ulogu u održavanju dobro razvijenih demokratskih društava, u postkonfliktnim društvima, kakva su i kosovsko i bosanskohercegovačko, pojavljuje se potreba za intelektualcem koji je više od pukog kritičara društva, edukatora, čovjeka od akcije i saosjećajnog pojedinca. I tu na scenu stupa hiperintelektualac. Najupečatljivija karakteristika hiperintelektualca je možda upravo stepen u kojem se intelektualac bavi društvenom kritikom, političkim obrazovanjem, akcijom i “insajderizmom”, ne kao ideolog, već kao nestranačka fi gura. Društvena kritika i političko obrazovanje hiperintelektualca manifestiraju se na nestranački način, tako da se jasno čuje sve što je moguće i napadati i braniti, i sa jedne i sa druge strane. To je poseb-. (shrink)

In most of the vast scholarly literature on constitutional-democratic regimes, the major emphasis has been on the broader social, economic, or cultural conditions conductive to their development, breakdown, or consolidation and continuity (Diamond 1993b; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1989, 1990). The major thesis of this essay is that fragility and instability are inherent in the very constitution of modern constitutional-democratic regimes, and are rooted in (1) the tensions between the different conceptions of democracy (especially between constitutional and participatory democracy) and (...) (2) the central aspects of the political and cultural program of modernity. The common core of these premises is the openness of the political process (particularly with regard to protest) and the concomitant tendency toward continual redefinition of the political realm. Openness is an important contributor to the fragility of modern democratic regimes; paradoxically, it also allows for their continuity. The key question, then, is how and under what conditions non-zero-sum conceptions of the "game" of politics develop. The second part of this essay takes up this question, with special emphasis on the development and reproduction of trust among different sectors of society, the relationships between such sectors and the centers of society, and the construction of different types of collective identity. (shrink)

This reply to criticism of Questioning Technology by Gerald Doppeltaddresses differences between political philosophy and philosophy oftechnology. While political philosophers such as Doppelt emphasize procedural aspects of democracy and equal rights, many philosophers of technologyimplicitly assume a substantive criterion of the good centered on thedevelopment of human capacities. Questioning Technology alsoemphasizes the diminishing agency of individuals in technologically advanced societies dominated by large scale organizations and themass media. These themes of social critique complement the main focusof political philosophy. Political philosophy (...) must learn to addresstechnical issues as it has learned to address other social issuessuch as race and gender. (shrink)

This paper explores the issue of democracy and the role of the democratic classroom in the development of society in general, and the way in which educators understand and deal with diversity in particular. The first part of the paper explores different meanings of democracy and how they can be manifested in the classroom. We argue that the idea of a ‘democratic classroom’ is far too broad a category; democracy is defined in action and can have realist or pragmatic characteristics, (...) elitist or pluralist roots. The realist form of social education was championed by political scientist Charles Merriam, while a social educative process more dependent on pragmatic problem solving was pursued by educational philosopher John Dewey and those who followed in his theoretical wake. The history of democracy in the United States, and the battles of how to import different meanings of democracy into the classroom over the course of the 20th century is explored, suggesting that the educational establishment has a tendency to adopt more realist/elitist forms of civic education. We present five ‘democratic’ classrooms with different characteristics to illustrate the different characteristics social education can exhibit. In the second part of the paper we discuss the relationship between different types of democratic classrooms and issues of race/ethnicity/culture. (shrink)

Under the assumptions of the standard Condorcet Jury Theorem, majority verdicts are virtually certain to be correct if the competence of voters is greater than one-half, and virtually certain to be incorrect if voter competence is less than one-half. But which is the case? Here we turn the Jury Theorem on its head, to provide one way of addressing that question. The same logic implies that, if the outcome saw 60 percent of voters supporting one proposition and 40 percent the (...) other, then average voter competence must either be 0.60 or 0.40. We still have to decide which, but limiting the choice to those two values is a considerable aid in that. Key Words: Condorcet Jury Theorem • epistemic democracy • voter competence. (shrink)

Hall discusses the ideas of modern day legal philosophers such as Duguit, Geny, Ehrlich, & Kelsen, & what their conceptions mean to a democratic society.

Bruno Latour has been attempting to transform his sociological account of science into an ambitious theory of democracy. In a key early moment in this project, Latour alleges that Plato’s Gorgias introduces an impossibly ratio-nalistic and deeply anti-democratic philosophy which continues to this day to distort our understandings of science and democracy. Latour reckons that if he can successfully refute the Gorgias , then he will have opened up a space in which to authorize his own theory of democracy. I (...) argue that Latour’s refutation of the Gorgias is a failure. Hence, his political theory is, by his own standards, horribly underdetermined. I present another reading of the Gorgias , and consider the dialogue’s possible relevance for current theories of deliberative democracy. Key Words: Latour • Gorgias • Socrates • rhetoric • elenchus • deliberative democracy. (shrink)

This paper offers a sympathetic critique of Christopher McMahon’s Authority and Democracy: A General Theory of Government and Management. Although I find fault with some of his arguments, my goal is not to show that these arguments are irreparable, but to highlight issues that deserve further consideration. After defining some terms, first, I raise an objection to McMahon’s rejection of the moral unity of management (MUM) thesis. Second, I draw attention to his “moralization” of the workplace, and examine the role (...) it plays in his arguments about the relative strengths of the different kinds of authority. Third, I raise questions about his reliance on an analogy between states and firms. I suggest that states and firms are in some ways more alike, but in other ways less alike, than he allows. (shrink)

Against several recent interpretations, I argue in this paper that Immanuel Kant's support for enlightened absolutism was a permanent feature of his political thought that fit comfortably within his larger philosophy, though he saw such rule as part of a transition to democratic self-government initiated by the absolute monarch himself. I support these contentions with (1) a detailed exegesis of Kant’s essay "What is Enlightenment?" (2) an argument that Kantian republicanism requires not merely a separation of powers but also a (...) representative democratic legislature, and (3) a demonstration that each stage of a democratic transition can potentially be in an absolute monarch’s short-run self-interest. I conclude the paper by defending Kant's theory of democratization against charges of consequentialism and paternalism and by pointing out its similarity to other accounts of democratic transitions (for example, those of Samuel Huntington and Guillermo O'Donnell), suggesting a previously unnoticed opportunity for cross-fertilization between political philosophy and comparative politics. (shrink)

This much-anticipated work is a rich and insightful collection of essays that restores women and minorities to the arena of political theory and debate.