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  1. A. Spafadora (ed.) (1995). Iride: Luoghi Della Memoria E Dell'oblio.
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  2. Kathleen Akins (ed.) (1996). [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.
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  3. Kathleen Akins (1996). Lost the Plot? Reconstructing Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness. Mind and Language 11 (1):1-43.
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  4. Kathleen Akins (ed.) (1996). Perception. Oxford University Press.
  5. Kathleen Akins (1996). Ships in the Night: Churchland and Ramachandran on Dennett's Theory of Consciousness. In , Perception. Oxford University Press.
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  6. Michael V. Antony (2002). Toward an Ontological Interpretation of Dennett's Theory of Consciousness. Philosophia 29 (1-4):343-370.
    While "Consciousness Explained" has received an enormous amount of attention since its publication, there is still little agreement on what Dennett’s account of consciousness is. Most interpreters treat his view as an instance of one or another of the standard ontological positions (functionalism, behaviorism, eliminativism, instrumentalism). I believe a different metaphysical account underlies Dennett’s view, one that is important though ill-understood. In the paper I attempt to point in the direction of a proper characterization of that account through the use (...)
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  7. Michael A. Arbib (1972). Consciousness: The Secondary Role of Language. Journal of Philosophy 64 (5):579-591.
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  8. Lynne Rudder Baker (1995). Content Meets Consciousness. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):1-22.
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  9. John Barresi & John R. Christie (2002). Using Illusory Line Motion to Differentiate Misrepresentation (Stalinesque) and Misremembering (Orwellian) Accounts of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):347-365.
    It has been suggested that the difference between misremembering (Orwellian) and misrepresentation (Stalinesque) models of consciousness cannot be differentiated (Dennett, 1991). According to an Orwellian account a briefly presented stimulus is seen and then forgotten; whereas, by a Stalinesque account it is never seen. At the same time, Dennett suggested a method for assessing whether an individual is conscious of something. An experiment was conducted which used the suggested method for assessing consciousness to look at Stalinesque and Orwellian distinctions. A (...)
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  10. Ned Block (1995). What is Dennett's Theory a Theory Of? Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):23-40.
    A convenient locus of discussion is provided by Dennett.
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  11. Paul Bloomfield (1998). Dennett's Misrememberings. Philosophia 26 (1-2):207-218.
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  12. John Bricke (1985). Consciousness and Dennett's Intentionalist Net. Philosophical Studies 48 (September):249-56.
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  13. John Bricke (1984). Dennett's Eliminative Arguments. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):413-29.
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  14. Selmer Bringsjord, Explaining Phi Without Dennett's Exotica: Good Ol' Computation Suffices.
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  15. Andrew Brook (2002). The Appearance of Things. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press. 41.
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  16. Andrew Brook (2000). Judgments and Drafts Eight Years Later. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.
    Now that some years have passed, how does this picture of consciousness look? On the one hand, Dennett's work has vastly expanded the range of options for thinking about conscious experiences and conscious subjects. On the other hand, I suspect that the implications of his picture have been oversold (perhaps more by others than by Dennett himself). The rhetoric of _CE_ is radical in places but I do not sure that the actual implications for commonsense views of Seemings and Subjects (...)
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  17. Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.) (2002). Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press.
    Contemporary Philosophy in Focus will offer a series of introductory volumes to many of the dominant philosophical thinkers of the current age. Each volume will consist of newly commissioned essays that will cover all the major contributions of a preeminent philosopher in a systematic and accessible manner. Author of such groundbreaking and influential books as Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Daniel C. Dennett has reached a huge general and professional audience that extends way beyond the confines of academic philosophy. (...)
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  18. Taylor Carman (2007). Dennett on Seeming. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):99-106.
    Dennett’s eliminativist theory of consciousness rests on an implausible reduction of sensory seeming to cognitive judgment. The “heterophenomenological” testimony to which he appeals in urging that reduction poses no threat to phenomenology, but merely demonstrates the conceptual indeterminacy of small-scale sensory appearances. Phenomenological description is difficult, but the difficulty does not warrant Dennett’s neo-Cartesian claim that there is no such thing as seeming at all as distinct from judging.
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  19. David Carr (1998). Phenomenology and Fiction in Dennett. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (3):331-344.
    In Consciousness Explained and other works, Daniel Dennett uses the concept of phenomenology (along with his variant, called heterophenomenology) in almost complete disregard of the work of Husserl and his successors in German and French philosophy. Yet it can be argued that many of the most important ideas of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and others (and not just the idea of intentionality) reappear in Dennett's work in only slightly altered form. In this article I try to show this in two ways, first (...)
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  20. Patricia S. Churchland & Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (1993). Filling In: Why Dennett is Wrong. In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  21. Paul M. Churchland (2002). Catching Consciousness in a Recurrent Net. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett: Contemporary Philosophy in Focus. Cambridge University Press. 64-80.
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  22. Paul M. Churchland (1999). Densmore and Dennett on Virtual Machines and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):763-767.
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  23. Stephen R. L. Clark (1993). Minds, Memes, and Rhetoric. Inquiry 36 (1-2):3-16.
    Dennett's Consciousness Explained presents, but does not demonstrate, a fully naturalized account of consciousness that manages to leave out the very consciousness he purports to explain. If he were correct, realism and methodological individualism would collapse, as would the very enterprise of giving reasons. The metaphors he deploys actually testify to the power of metaphoric imagination that can no more be identified with the metaphors it creates than minds can be identified with memes. That latter equation, of minds with meme?complexes, (...)
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  24. Mark Crooks (2004). The Last Philosophical Behaviorist: Content and Consciousness Explained Away. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):50-121.
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  25. Mark Crooks (2003). Phenomenology in Absentia: Dennett's Philosophy of Mind. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):102-148.
    : Daniel Dennett's philosophical abolition of mind is examined with reference to its methodology, intent, philosophic origins, and internal consistency. His treatment of the contents of perception and introspection is shown to be derivative from realist reductionist misinterpretations of physics, physiology, and phenomenology of perception. In order to rectify inconsistencies of that realistic paradigm devolved from psycho-neural identity theory of mid-twentieth century, Dennett radicalizes its logic and redefines even veridical phenomenology of exteroception to be "illusory." This measure in extremis still (...)
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  26. B. Dahlbom (ed.) (1995). Dennett and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  27. Daniel C. Dennett (2005). Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.
    In the final essay, the "intrinsic" nature of "qualia" is compared with the naively imagined "intrinsic value" of a dollar in ...
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  28. Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet? Cognition 79 (1):221-37.
    Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of (...)
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  29. Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Seeing is Believing--Or is It? In Kathleen Akins (ed.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press. 158-172.
    We would all like to have a good theory of perception. Such a theory would account for all the known phenomena and predict novel phenomena, explaining everything in terms of processes occurring in nervous systems in accordance with the principles and laws already established by science: the principles of optics, physics, biochemistry, and the like. Such a theory might come to exist without our ever having to answer the awkward "philosophical" question that arises.
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  30. Daniel C. Dennett (1995). Get Real. Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):505-568.
    There could be no more gratifying response to a philosopher's work than such a bounty of challenging, high-quality essays. I have learned a great deal from them, and hope that other readers will be as delighted as I have been by the insights gathered here. One thing I have learned is just how much hard work I had left for others to do, by underestimating the degree of explicit formulation of theses and arguments that is actually required to bring (...)
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  31. Daniel C. Dennett (1995). Is Perception the "Leading Edge" of Memory? In A. Spafadora (ed.), Iride: Luoghi Della Memoria E Dell'oblio.
    Daniel C. Dennett Is Perception the 'Leading Edge' of Memory? Consciousness appears to us to consist of a sequence of contentful items, arranged in a sequence, the so-called "stream of consciousness," in which each item in turn bursts quite suddenly into consciousness and thereby enters memory, perhaps only briefly to be remembered, and then forgotten. I think that hidden in this comfortable and largely innocent picture of consciousness is a deep and seductive mistake. I intend to expose and elucidate that (...)
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  32. Daniel C. Dennett (1994). Tiptoeing Past the Covered Wagons. In U. Neisser & David A. Jopling (eds.), The Conceptual Self in Context: Culture, Experience, Self-Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
    David Carr complains, in "Dennett Explained, or The Wheel Reinvents Dennett," (Report #26), that I have ignored deconstructionism and Phenomenology. This charge is in some regards correct and in others not. Briefly, here is how my own encounters with these fields have looked to me.
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  33. Daniel C. Dennett (1994). Self-Portrait. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    In my opinion, the two main topics in the philosophy of mind are content and consciousness. As the title of my first book, _Content and Consciousness_ (1969) suggested, that is the order in which they must be addressed: first, a theory of content or intentionality--a phenomenon more fundamental than consciousness--and then, building on that foundation, a theory of consciousness. Over the years I have found myself recapitulating this basic structure twice, partly in order to respond to various philosophical objections, but (...)
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  34. Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Precis of Consciousness Explained. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):889-931.
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  35. Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Caveat Emptor. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (12-13):48-57.
    What I find particularly valuable in the juxtaposition of these three essays on my book is the triangulation made possible by their different versions of much the same story. I present my view as a product of cognitive science, but all three express worries that it may involve some sort of ominous backsliding towards the evils of behaviorism. I agree with Baars and McGovern when they suggest that philosophy has had some baleful influences on psychology during this century. Logical positivism (...)
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  36. Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Living on the Edge. Inquiry 36 (1-2):135-59.
    In a survey of issues in philosophy of mind some years ago, I observed that "it is widely granted these days that dualism is not a serious view to contend with, but rather a cliff over which to push one's opponents." (Dennett, 1978, p.252) That was true enough, and I for one certainly didn't deplore the fact, but this rich array of essays tackling my book amply demonstrates that a cliff examined with care is better than a cliff ignored. And, (...)
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  37. Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Consciousness Explained. Penguin.
    Little, Brown, 1992 Review by Glenn Branch on Jul 5th 1999 Volume: 3, Number: 27.
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  38. Daniel C. Dennett (1988). The Evolution of Consciousness. In J. Brockman (ed.), The Reality Club, Vol. Iii. Prentice-Hall. 3--99.
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  39. Daniel C. Dennett (1979). On the Absence of Phenomenology. In Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.), Body, Mind, and Method. Kluwer. 93--113.
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  40. Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
    This collection of 17 essays by the author offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will.
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  41. Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Reply to Arbib and Gunderson. In Brainstorms. MIT Press.
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  42. Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9.
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  43. Daniel C. Dennett (1975). Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology. In Richard Healy (ed.), Reduction, Time, and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences. Cambridge University Press.
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  44. Daniel C. Dennett (1968/1986). Content and Consciousness. Routledge.
    This paperback edition contains a preface placing the book in the context of recent work in the area.
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  45. Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1995). Multiple Drafts: An Eternal Golden Braid? Reply to Glicksohn and Salter. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):810-11.
    We have learned that the issues we raised are very difficult to think about clearly, and what "works" for one thinker falls flat for another, and leads yet another astray. So it is particularly useful to get these re-expressions of points we have tried to make. Both commentaries help by proposing further details for the Multiple Drafts Model, and asking good questions. They either directly clarify, or force us to clarify, our own account. They also both demonstrate how hard it (...)
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  46. Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1992). Escape From the Cartesian Theater. Reply to Commentaries on Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15:183-247.
    Damasio remarks, it "informs virtually all research on mind and brain, explicitly or implicitly." Indeed, serial information processing models generally run this risk (Kinsbourne, 1985). The commentaries provide a wealth of confirming instances of the seductive power of this idea. Our sternest critics Block, Farah, Libet, and Treisman) adopt fairly standard Cartesian positions; more interesting are those commentators who take themselves to be mainly in agreement with us, but who express reservations or offer support with arguments that betray a continuing (...)
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  47. Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1992). Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.
    _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.
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  48. Shannon Densmore & Daniel C. Dennett (1999). The Virtues of Virtual Machines. Philosophy and Phenemenological Research 59 (3):747-61.
    Paul Churchland's book (hereafter ER)is an entertaining and instructive advertisement for a "neurocomputational" vision of how the brain (and mind) works. While we agree with its general thrust, and commend its lucid pedagogy on a host of difficult topics, we note that such pedagogy often exploits artificially heightened contrast, and sometimes the result is a misleading caricature instead of a helpful simplification. In particular, Churchland is eager to contrast the explanation of consciousness that can be accomplished by his "aspiring new (...)
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  49. Anthony A. Derksen (2005). Dennett's Rhetorical Strategies in Consciousness Explained. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (1):29-48.
    Dennett's "Consciousness Explained" (1991) is an inspiring but also a highly frustrating book. The line of the argument seems to be clear, but then at second sight it fades away. It turns out that Dennett uses six of the seven strategies which I discuss in my 'The Seven Strategies of the Sophisticated Pseudo-Scientist: A Look into Freud's Rhetorical Tool Box' (J. Gen. Phil. Sci., 2001) Discussing important examples of these strategies I show why "Consciousness Explained" is such a frustrating book. (...)
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  50. Fred Dretske (1995). Differences That Make No Difference. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):41-57.
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