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  1. Anthony Robert Booth (2012). All Things Considered Duties to Believe. Synthese 187 (2):509-517.
    To be a doxastic deontologist is to claim that there is such a thing as an ethics of belief (or of our doxastic attitudes in general). In other words, that we are subject to certain duties with respect to our doxastic attitudes, the non-compliance with which makes us blameworthy and that we should understand doxastic justification in terms of these duties. In this paper, I argue that these duties are our all things considered duties, and not our epistemic or moral (...)
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  2. Stephen L. Darwall (ed.) (2003). Deontology. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Deontology brings together some of the most significant philosophical work on ethics, presenting canonical essays on core questions in moral philosophy. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative theory.
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  3. Sam Fleischacker (2009). Stephen Darwall, the Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), Pp. XII + 348. Utilitas 21 (1):117-123.
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  4. Pablo Gilabert (2005). Should Discourse Ethics Do Without a Principle of Universalization? Philosophical Forum 36 (2):183–191.
  5. Adam Hosein, Numbers, Fairness and Charity.
    This paper discusses the "numbers problem," the problem of explaining why you should save more people rather than fewer when forced to choose. Existing non-consequentialist approaches to the problem appeal to fairness to explain why. I argue that this is a mistake and that we can give a more satisfying answer by appealing to requirements of charity or beneficence.
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  6. Paul Hurley (2009). Beyond Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
    Consequentialism, the theory that morality requires us to promote the best overall outcome, is the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy, and is highly influential in public discourses beyond academic philosophy. Paul Hurley argues that current discussions of the challenge consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism. The standard consequentialist account of the content of morality, he argues, cannot be reconciled to the authoritativeness of moral standards for rational agents. If rational agents typically have decisive reasons to do (...)
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  7. Tea Logar (2005). Moral Obligations and Practical Identities. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (14):359-372.
    A discussion of Christine Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity.
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  8. Elinor Mason (2009). What is Consequentialism? Think 8 (21):19-28.
    Elinor Mason explains and contrasts consequentialist and duty-based theories of ethics.
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  9. David McCarthy (1997). Rights, Explanation, and Risks. Ethics 107 (2):205-225.
    Theories of rights seem well equipped to explain widely accepted claims about the morality of harming. But can they explain popular claims about the morality of imposing risks of harm? Many think not. But a plausible theory of rights can explain those claims if it says we have the right that others not impose risks of harm upon us. That is a good reason to believe we have that right. There are many objections to the claim that we have that (...)
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  10. Henry S. Richardson (2008). Discerning Subordination and Inviolability: A Comment on Kamm's Intricate Ethics. Utilitas 20 (1):81-91.
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  11. Holly M. Smith (2011). The Prospective View of Obligation. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
  12. Cynthia A. Stark (1997). Decision Procedures, Standards of Rightness and Impartiality. Noûs 31 (4):478-495.
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  13. Erin Taylor (2013). Irreconcilable Differences. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):181-192.
    This paper argues that theoretical consistency and actionguidingness—as these have been formulated in the moral dilemmas debate—do not rule out interpersonal moral conflict. This leaves open the possibility that theoretical consistency and action-guidingness may demand more than what has been traditionally assumed. That question is considered here. Do these resources rule out all-things-considered interpersonal moral conflict in non-consequentialist theories? This paper argues that neither theoretical consistency nor action-guidingness can rule out such conflict, but action-guidingness properly construed provides a desideratum against (...)
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  14. C. L. ten (1989). Moral Rights and Duties in Wicked Legal Systems. Utilitas 1 (01):135-.
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  15. Sergio Tenenbaum (2014). The Perils of Earnest Consequentializing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):233-240.
  16. Sergio Tenenbaum (2012). The Idea of Freedom and Moral Cognition in Groundwork III. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):555-589.
    Kant’s views on the relation between freedom and moral law seem to undergo a major, unannounced shift. In the third section of the Groundwork, Kant seems to be using the fact that we must act under the idea of freedom as a foundation for the moral law. However, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that our awareness of our freedom depends on our awareness of the moral law. I argue that the apparent conflict between the two texts depends (...)
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  17. Mark van Roojen (2008). Some Advantages of One Form of Argument for the Maximin Principle. Acta Analytica 23 (4):319-335.
    This paper presents a non-consequentialist defense of Rawls’s general conception of justice requiring that primary social goods be distributed so that the least share is as great as possible. It suggests that a defense of this idea can be offered within a Rossian framework of prima facie duties. The prima facie duty not to harm constrains people from supporting social institutions which do not leave their fellows with goods and resources above a certain threshold. The paper argues that societies in (...)
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  18. Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). Hobbes and Normative Egoism. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    Is Hobbes a normative egoist? That is: does Hobbes think that an agent’s normative reasons are all grounded in her own good? A once-dominant tradition of Hobbes scholarship answers ‘yes’. In an important recent work, however, S.A. Lloyd has argued that the answer to the question is ‘no’, and built an alternative non-egoistic interpretation of Hobbes that stresses reciprocity and mutual justifiability. My aim in this paper is to articulate and defend an original ‘middle way’ interpretation of Hobbes which steers (...)
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  19. Bill Wringe (2014). Collective Obligations: Their Existence, Their Explanatory Power, and Their Supervenience on the Obligations of Individuals. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4).
    In this paper I discuss a number of different relationships between two kinds of (moral) obligation: those which have individuals as their subject, and those which have groups of individuals as their subject. I use the name collective obligations to refer to obligations of the second sort. I argue that there are collective obligations, in this sense; that such obligations can give rise to and explain obligations which fall on individuals; that because of these facts collective obligations are not simply (...)
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