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  1. Christian Barry & David Wiens (2014). Benefiting From Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm. Brill.
    _ Source: _Page Count 23 Some moral theorists argue that innocent beneficiaries of wrongdoing may have special remedial duties to address the hardships suffered by the victims of the wrongdoing. These arguments generally aim to simply motivate the idea that being a beneficiary can provide an independent ground for charging agents with remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing. Consequently, they have neglected contexts in which it is implausible to charge beneficiaries with remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing, thereby (...)
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  2. Paweł Bernat (2015). The Moral Status of Abortion in Islam: A Comparative Study of Muslim and Western Normative Ethics Regarding the Act of Terminating the Life of A Foetus. International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research 3 (4):273-278.
    In the West there seems to be a clear cut-line between the proponents and opponents of abortion. The former tend to justify their choice by calling for consequentialistic arguments, while the latter are, in huge majority, deontologists. The issue of abortion has been long debated in Islam. Those debates however lacked in intensity and rabidity when compared with their Western counterparts. This article is an attempt to compare the two standpoints and point at the reasons of that discrepancy. The paper (...)
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  3. Anthony Robert Booth (2012). All Things Considered Duties to Believe. Synthese 187 (2):509-517.
    To be a doxastic deontologist is to claim that there is such a thing as an ethics of belief (or of our doxastic attitudes in general). In other words, that we are subject to certain duties with respect to our doxastic attitudes, the non-compliance with which makes us blameworthy and that we should understand doxastic justification in terms of these duties. In this paper, I argue that these duties are our all things considered duties, and not our epistemic or moral (...)
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  4. Stephen L. Darwall (ed.) (2003). Deontology. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Deontology brings together some of the most significant philosophical work on ethics, presenting canonical essays on core questions in moral philosophy. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative theory.
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  5. Dan Demetriou, Honor for Intro.
    This piece is written as a public service to ethics professors and students interested in learning more about honor ethics. To facilitate its use in classrooms, it’s written in the style of many contemporary textbooks: it focuses on ideas, principles, and intuitions and ignores scholarly figures and intellectual history. Readers should note this is an “opinionated” introduction, as it focuses on the agonistic conception of honor. It also takes for granted that the agonistic ethos described counts as a “moral” theory. (...)
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  6. Ryan Fanselow (2008). A Kantian Solution to Thompson's Puzzle About Justice. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:91-99.
    In a recent paper, Michael Thompson (2006) argues that there is a problem about justice that holds for Aristotlean, Humean, and Kantian views of ethics. To see his problem, consider the normative judgment that “X wronged Y by killing her.” Thompson thinks that Aristotelian, Humean, and Kantian views can show why Xdid something wrong by killing Y but they cannot show that X wronged Y, at least not without taking on intolerable moral, metaphysical, or epistemological commitments. I argue that the (...)
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  7. Sam Fleischacker (2009). Stephen Darwall, the Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), Pp. XII + 348. Utilitas 21 (1):117-123.
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  8. Samuel Freeman (2003). Jon Mandle, What's Left of Liberalism: An Interpretation and Defense of Justice as Fairness, Lanham MD, Lexington Books, 2000, Pp. Xi + 323. Utilitas 15 (3):382.
  9. Timothy Fuller (1991). Nancy L. Rosenblum, Ed., Liberalism and the Moral Life, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, Harvard University Press, 1989, Pp. 302. [REVIEW] Utilitas 3 (1):144.
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  10. Molly Gardner (2016). F. M. Kamm, The Trolley Problem Mysteries. [REVIEW] Ethics 126 (4).
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  11. Pablo Gilabert (2005). Should Discourse Ethics Do Without a Principle of Universalization? Philosophical Forum 36 (2):183–191.
  12. Joseph Heath (2002). Logi Gunnarsson, Making Moral Sense: Beyond Habermas and Gauthier, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, Pp. Xi + 286. Utilitas 14 (1):130.
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  13. Adam Hosein, Numbers, Fairness and Charity.
    This paper discusses the "numbers problem," the problem of explaining why you should save more people rather than fewer when forced to choose. Existing non-consequentialist approaches to the problem appeal to fairness to explain why. I argue that this is a mistake and that we can give a more satisfying answer by appealing to requirements of charity or beneficence.
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  14. Paul Hurley (2009). Beyond Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
    Consequentialism, the theory that morality requires us to promote the best overall outcome, is the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy, and is highly influential in public discourses beyond academic philosophy. Paul Hurley argues that current discussions of the challenge consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism. The standard consequentialist account of the content of morality, he argues, cannot be reconciled to the authoritativeness of moral standards for rational agents. If rational agents typically have decisive reasons to do (...)
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  15. Peter Jones (1992). Neil MacCormick and Zenon Bankowski, Ed., Enlightenment, Rights and Revolution: Essays in Legal and Social Philosophy, Aberdeen, Aberdeen University Press, 1989, Pp. 396. Utilitas 4 (1):173.
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  16. Steve Jones (2013). Torture Porn: Popular Horror After Saw. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Torture Porn is a term that has generated a great deal of controversy during the last decade, critics utilizing the term to dismiss contemporary popular horror cinema as obscene and morally depraved. Arguing primarily in defense of torture-themed horror films, this book seeks to offer a critical overview and examination of the Torture Porn phenomenon, discussing the generic contexts in which it is situated, scrutinizing press responses to the sub-genre, and offering narrative analyses of the sub-genre’s central films; including the (...)
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  17. Tea Logar (2005). Moral Obligations and Practical Identities. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (14):359-372.
    A discussion of Christine Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity.
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  18. Elinor Mason (2009). What is Consequentialism? Think 8 (21):19-28.
    Elinor Mason explains and contrasts consequentialist and duty-based theories of ethics.
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  19. David McCarthy (1997). Rights, Explanation, and Risks. Ethics 107 (2):205-225.
    Theories of rights seem well equipped to explain widely accepted claims about the morality of harming. But can they explain popular claims about the morality of imposing risks of harm? Many think not. But a plausible theory of rights can explain those claims if it says we have the right that others not impose risks of harm upon us. That is a good reason to believe we have that right. There are many objections to the claim that we have that (...)
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  20. Robert J. Mulvaney (1990). Review: What Morality Requires. [REVIEW] Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):81 - 83.
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  21. Howard Nye (2014). Chaos and Constraints. In David Boersema (ed.), Dimensions of Moral Agency. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 14-29.
    Agent-centered constraints on harming hold that some harmful upshots of our conduct cannot be justified by its generating equal or somewhat greater benefits. In this paper I argue that all plausible theories of agent-centered constraints on harming are undermined by the likelihood that our actions will have butterfly effects, or cause cascades of changes that make the world dramatically different than it would have been. Theories that impose constraints against only intended harming or proximally caused harm have unacceptable implications for (...)
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  22. Henry S. Richardson (2008). Discerning Subordination and Inviolability: A Comment on Kamm's Intricate Ethics. Utilitas 20 (1):81-91.
    Frances Kamm has for some time now been a foremost champion of non-consequentialist ethics. One of her most powerful non-consequentialist themes has been the idea of inviolability. Morality's prohibitions, she argues, confer on persons the status of inviolability. This thought helps articulate a rationale for moral prohibitions that will resist the protean threat posed by the consequentialist argument that anyone should surely be willing to violate a constraint if doing so will minimize the overall number of such violations. As Kamm (...)
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  23. Holly M. Smith (2011). The Prospective View of Obligation. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
  24. Cynthia A. Stark (1997). Decision Procedures, Standards of Rightness and Impartiality. Noûs 31 (4):478-495.
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  25. Asger Sørensen (2008). Deontology: Born and Kept in Servitude by Utilitarianism. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 43:69-95.
    The distinction between teleology and deontology is today almost universally accepted within practical philosophy, but deontology is and has from the beginning been subordinate to utili-tarianism. ‘Deontology’ was constructed by Bentham to signify the art and science of private morality within a utilitarian worldview. The classical distinction was constructed by Broad as a refinement of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism, and then adopted by Frankena. To Broad it signified two opposite tendencies in ethics, in Frankena’s textbooks, however, it becomes an exclusive distinction, where (...)
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  26. Erin Taylor (2013). Irreconcilable Differences. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):181-192.
    This paper argues that theoretical consistency and actionguidingness—as these have been formulated in the moral dilemmas debate—do not rule out interpersonal moral conflict. This leaves open the possibility that theoretical consistency and action-guidingness may demand more than what has been traditionally assumed. That question is considered here. Do these resources rule out all-things-considered interpersonal moral conflict in non-consequentialist theories? This paper argues that neither theoretical consistency nor action-guidingness can rule out such conflict, but action-guidingness properly construed provides a desideratum against (...)
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  27. C. L. ten (1989). Moral Rights and Duties in Wicked Legal Systems. Utilitas 1 (1):135.
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  28. Sergio Tenenbaum (2014). The Perils of Earnest Consequentializing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):233-240.
  29. Sergio Tenenbaum (2012). The Idea of Freedom and Moral Cognition in Groundwork III. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):555-589.
    Kant’s views on the relation between freedom and moral law seem to undergo a major, unannounced shift. In the third section of the Groundwork, Kant seems to be using the fact that we must act under the idea of freedom as a foundation for the moral law. However, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that our awareness of our freedom depends on our awareness of the moral law. I argue that the apparent conflict between the two texts depends (...)
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  30. Mark van Roojen (2008). Some Advantages of One Form of Argument for the Maximin Principle. Acta Analytica 23 (4):319-335.
    This paper presents a non-consequentialist defense of Rawls’s general conception of justice requiring that primary social goods be distributed so that the least share is as great as possible. It suggests that a defense of this idea can be offered within a Rossian framework of prima facie duties. The prima facie duty not to harm constrains people from supporting social institutions which do not leave their fellows with goods and resources above a certain threshold. The paper argues that societies in (...)
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  31. Alex Worsnip (2015). Hobbes and Normative Egoism. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 97 (4):481-512.
    Is Hobbes a normative egoist? That is: does Hobbes think that an agent’s normative reasons are all grounded in her own good? A once-dominant tradition of Hobbes scholarship answers ‘yes’. In an important recent work, however, S.A. Lloyd has argued that the answer to the question is ‘no’, and built an alternative non-egoistic interpretation of Hobbes that stresses reciprocity and mutual justifiability. My aim in this paper is to articulate and defend an original ‘middle way’ interpretation of Hobbes which steers (...)
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  32. Bill Wringe (2014). Collective Obligations: Their Existence, Their Explanatory Power, and Their Supervenience on the Obligations of Individuals. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4).
    In this paper I discuss a number of different relationships between two kinds of (moral) obligation: those which have individuals as their subject, and those which have groups of individuals as their subject. I use the name collective obligations to refer to obligations of the second sort. I argue that there are collective obligations, in this sense; that such obligations can give rise to and explain obligations which fall on individuals; that because of these facts collective obligations are not simply (...)
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