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  1. Veronica Rodriguez Blanco (2006). The Methodological Problem in Legal Theory: Normative and Descriptive Jurisprudence Revisited. Ratio Juris 19 (1):26-54.
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  2. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (2011). The Anarchist Official: A Problem for Legal Positivism. Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 36:89-112.
    I examine the impact of the presence of anarchists among key legal officials upon the legal positivist theories of H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz. For purposes of this paper, an anarchist is one who believes that the law cannot successfully obligate or create reasons for action beyond prudential reasons, such as avoiding sanction. I show that both versions of positivism require key legal officials to endorse the law in some way, and that if a legal system can continue to exist (...)
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  3. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (2009). Defending the Possibility of a Neutral Functional Theory of Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29 (1):91.
    I argue that there is methodological space for a functional explanation of the nature of law that does not commit the theorist to a view about the value of that function for society, nor whether law is the best means of accomplishing it. A functional explanation will nonetheless provide a conceptual framework for a better understanding of the nature of law. First I examine the proper role for function in a theory of law and then argue for the possibility of (...)
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  4. Joseph S. Fulda (2010). The Logic of “Asked and Answered!”: The Case of the Traffic Light. Ratio Juris 23 (2):282-287.
    Uses erotetic logic to model the courtroom objection "Asked and Answered!".
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  5. Joseph S. Fulda (2000). The Logic of “Improper Cross”. Artificial Intelligence and Law 8 (4):337-341.
    Uses erotetic logic to model the courtroom objection "Improper Cross!". -/- Readers downloading the article should also please download the erratum et corrigendum, which is locally available.
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  6. Joseph S. Fulda (1989). The Logic of the Whole Truth. Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 15 (2):435-446.
    Note: The author holds the copyright, and there was no agreement, express or implied, not to use a facsimile PDF. -/- Using erotetic logic, the paper defines the "the whole truth" in a manner consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. It cannot mean "the whole story," as witnesses in an adversary system are permitted /only/ to answer the questions put to them, nor are they permitted to speculate, add irrelevant material, etc. Nor can it mean not to add an admixture (...)
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  7. Jaap C. Hage, Ronald Leenes & Arno R. Lodder (1993). Hard Cases: A Procedural Approach. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (2):113-167.
    Much work on legal knowledge systems treats legal reasoning as arguments that lead from a description of the law and the facts of a case, to the legal conclusion for the case. The reasoning steps of the inference engine parallel the logical steps by means of which the legal conclusion is derived from the factual and legal premises. In short, the relation between the input and the output of a legal inference engine is a logical one. The truth of the (...)
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  8. Andreas Hamfelt (1995). Formalizing Multiple Interpretation of Legal Knowledge. Artificial Intelligence and Law 3 (4):221-265.
    A representation methodology for knowledge allowing multiple interpretations is described. It is based on the following conception of legal knowledge and its open texture. Since indeterminate, legal knowledge must be adapted to fit the circumstances of the cases to which it is applied. Whether a certain adaptation is lawful or not is measured by metaknowledge. But as this too is indeterminate, its adaptation to the case must be measured by metametaknowledge, etc. This hierarchical model of law is quite well-established and (...)
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  9. Ori J. Herstein (2013). A Legal Right to Do Legal Wrong. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1):gqt022.
    The literature, as are the intuitions of many, is sceptical as to the coherence of ‘legal rights to do legal wrong’. A right to do wrong is a right against interference with wrongdoing. A legal right to do legal wrong is, therefore, a right against legal enforcement of legal duty. It is, in other words, a right that shields the right holder’s legal wrongdoing. The sceptics notwithstanding, the category of ‘legal right to do legal wrong’ coheres with the concepts of (...)
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