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Descriptive Jurisprudence

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  1. Veronica Rodriguez Blanco (2006). The Methodological Problem in Legal Theory: Normative and Descriptive Jurisprudence Revisited. Ratio Juris 19 (1):26-54.
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  2. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (2011). The Anarchist Official: A Problem for Legal Positivism. Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 36:89-112.
    I examine the impact of the presence of anarchists among key legal officials upon the legal positivist theories of H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz. For purposes of this paper, an anarchist is one who believes that the law cannot successfully obligate or create reasons for action beyond prudential reasons, such as avoiding sanction. I show that both versions of positivism require key legal officials to endorse the law in some way, and that if a legal system can continue to exist (...)
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  3. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (2009). Defending the Possibility of a Neutral Functional Theory of Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29:91.
    I argue that there is methodological space for a functional explanation of the nature of law that does not commit the theorist to a view about the value of that function for society, nor whether law is the best means of accomplishing it. A functional explanation will nonetheless provide a conceptual framework for a better understanding of the nature of law. First I examine the proper role for function in a theory of law and then argue for the possibility of (...)
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  4. Joseph S. Fulda (2010). The Logic of “Asked and Answered!”: The Case of the Traffic Light. Ratio Juris 23 (2):282-287.
    Courtroom dialogue involves questions and answers, which may be modeled by erotetic logic. In this short communication, we model the courtroom objection "Asked and Answered!" using such a logic. The model is applied to the case of the traffic light.
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  5. Joseph S. Fulda (1989). The Logic of the Whole Truth. Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 15 (2):435-446.
    Exactly what is meant by the requirement that witnesses swear in a court of law to tell "the whole truth"? It cannot mean simply the "truth," because that's a separate and prior requirement. It cannot mean "nothing but the truth," because that's also a separate requirement. It cannot mean "the whole story," because the adversary system not only does not require that, it does not even permit that. All it permits the witness to do is answer the questions put to (...)
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