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  1. Richard J. Arneson (2007). Desert and Equality. In Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Clarendon Press. 262--293.
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  2. Sorin Baiasu (2007). Institutions and the Normativity of Desert. Contemporary Political Theory 6 (2):175.
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  3. Adrian Bardon (2000). From Nozick to Welfare Rights: Self‐Ownership, Property, and Moral Desert. Critical Review 14 (4):481-501.
    Abstract The Kantian moral foundations of Nozickian libertarianism suggest that the claim that self?ownership grounds only negative rights to property should be rejected. The moral foundations of Nozick's libertarianism better support basing property rights on moral desert. It is neither incoherent nor implausible to say that need can be a basis for desert. By implication, the libertarian contention that persons ought to be respected as persons living self?shaping lives is inconsistent with the libertarian refusal to accept that claims of need (...)
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  4. Christian Barry, Redistribution. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  5. Christian Barry & Luara Ferracioli (2013). Young on Responsibility and Structural Injustice. Criminal Justice Ethics 32 (3):247-257.
    Our aim in this essay is to critically examine Iris Young’s arguments in her important posthumously published book against what she calls the liability model for attributing responsibility, as well as the arguments that she marshals in support of what she calls the social connection model of political responsibility. We contend that her arguments against the liability model of conceiving responsibility are not convincing, and that her alternative to it is vulnerable to damaging objections.
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  6. Christian Barry & Matt Peterson (2011). Who Should Pay for the Damage of the Global Financial Crisis? In Ned Dobos Christian Barry & Thomas Pogge (eds.), Global Financial Crisis:The Ethical Issues. Palgrave.
  7. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2010). Why Remittances to Poor Countries Should Not Be Taxed. NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 42 (1):1180-1207.
  8. Robert Bass (2012). David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (2):255-257.
    From Schmidtz, one might expect a theory of justice, basically along libertarian lines. The book may surprise, though not disappoint, for that is not quite what one would find. Instead, the title is apt. Schmidtz says that there is a terrain of justice, the terrain of what people are due, and it has a certain kind of unity.
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  9. Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift (2008). Putting Educational Equality in its Place. Educational Policy and Finance 3 (4):444-466.
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  10. Thom Brooks (2012). Punishment. Routledge.
    Punishment is a topic of increasing importance for citizens and policy makers. Why should we punish criminals? Which theory of punishment is most compelling? Is the death penalty ever justified? These questions and many others are addressed in this highly engaging guide. Punishment is a critical introduction to the philosophy of punishment offering a new and refreshing approach that will benefit readers of all backgrounds and interests. This is the first critical guide to examine all leading contemporary theories of punishment, (...)
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  11. Thom Brooks (2008). Shame on You, Shame on Me? Nussbaum on Shame Punishment. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (4):322-334.
    abstract Shame punishments have become an increasingly popular alternative to traditional punishments, often taking the form of convicted criminals holding signs or sweeping streets with a toothbrush. In her Hiding from Humanity, Martha Nussbaum argues against the use of shame punishments because they contribute to an offender's loss of dignity. However, these concerns are shared already by the courts which also have concerns about the possibility that shaming might damage an offender's dignity. This situation has not led the courts to (...)
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  12. Peter Celello (2009). Against Desert as a Forward-Looking Concept. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):144-159.
    Fred Feldman and, more recently, David Schmidtz have challenged the standard view that a person's desert is based strictly on past and present facts about him. I argue that Feldman's attempt to overturn this 'received wisdom' about desert's temporal orientation is unsuccessful, since his examples do not establish that what a person deserves now can be based on what will occur in the future. In addition, his forward-looking account introduces an unnecessary asymmetry regarding desert's temporal orientation in different contexts. Schmidtz (...)
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  13. Giovanni De Grandis (2007). Moral Agents and Political Spectators. On Some Virtues and Vices of Rawls’s Liberalism. Politics and Ethics Review 2 (3):217-235.
  14. Teun J. Dekker (2009). Choices, Consequences and Desert. Inquiry 52 (2):109 – 126.
    It is a commonly held position in the literature on distributive justice that choices individuals make from an equalized background may lead to inequalities of outcome. This raises the question of how to assign consequences to particular types of behaviour. Theories of justice based on the concept of moral responsibility offer considerable guidance as to how society should be structured, but they rarely address the question of what the consequences of making a particular choice should be. To fill this lacuna, (...)
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  15. David Ellerman (1995). Intellectual Trespassing as a Way of Life: Essays in Philosophy, Economics, and Mathematics. Rowman and Littlefield.
    Collection of published and unpublished essays covering most of my work up to 1990. Chapters 1 & 2 are about orthodox economics. Chapter 3 is the infamous pseudonymous spoof of Nozick, whose context and reaction is explained in the introduction. Chapter 4 puts the labor theory of property and democratic theory in a Kantian framework of treating persons as ends in themselves (instead of as rentable instruments of production). Chapter 5 shows how to reformulate marginal productivity theory using the fact (...)
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  16. Jill Frank (1998). Democracy and Distribution: Aristotle on Just Desert. Political Theory 26 (6):784-802.
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  17. Christopher Freiman & Shaun Nichols (2011). Is Desert in the Details? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):121-133.
  18. Robert E. Goodin (1985). Negating Positive Desert Claims. Political Theory 13 (4):575-598.
  19. Jake Greenblum (2010). Distributive and Retributive Desert in Rawls. Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (2):169-184.
    In this paper I examine John Rawls’s understanding of desert. Against Samuel Scheffler, I maintain that the reasons underlying Rawls’s rejection of the traditional view of distributive desert in A Theory of Justice also commit him to rejecting the traditional view of retributive desert. Unlike Rawls’s critics, however, I view this commitment in a positive light. I also argue that Rawls’s later work commits him to rejecting retributivism as a public justification for punishment.
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  20. Stephen Kershnar (2008). Desert Tracks Character Alone. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):71-88.
    In this paper, I argue that character alone grounds desert. I begin by arguing that desert is grounded by a person’s character, action, or both. In the second section, I defend the claim that character grounds desert. My argument rests on intuitions that other things being equal, it would be intrinsically better for virtuous persons to flourish and vicious persons suffer than vice versa. In the third section, I argue that actions do not ground desert. I give three arguments in (...)
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  21. Carl Knight (2011). Responsibility, Desert, and Justice. In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter identifies three contrasts between responsibility-sensitive justice and desert-sensitive justice. First, while responsibility may be appraised on prudential or moral grounds, it is argued that desert is necessarily moral. As moral appraisal is much more plausible, responsibility-sensitive justice is only attractive in one of its two formulations. Second, strict responsibility sensitivity does not compensate for all forms of bad brute luck, and forms of responsibility-sensitive justice like luck egalitarianism that provide such compensation do so by appealing to independent moral (...)
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  22. Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska Carl (2011). Responsibility and Distributive Justice: An Introduction. In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
    This introductory chapter provides an overview of the recent debate about responsibility and distributive justice. It traces the recent philosophical focus on distributive justice to John Rawls and examines two arguments in his work which might be taken to contain the seeds of the focus on responsibility in later theories of distributive justice. It examines Ronald Dworkin's ‘equality of resources’, the ‘luck egalitarianism’ of Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen, as well as the criticisms of their work put forward by (...)
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  23. Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.) (2011). Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
    Under what conditions are people responsible for their choices and the outcomes of those choices? How could such conditions be fostered by liberal societies? Should what people are due as a matter of justice depend on what they are responsible for? For example, how far should healthcare provision depend on patients' past choices? What values would be realized and which hampered by making justice sensitive to responsibility? Would it give people what they deserve? Would it advance or hinder equality? The (...)
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  24. David Koepsell (2010). On Genies and Bottles: Scientists' Moral Responsibility and Dangerous Technology R&D. Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (1):119-133.
    The age-old maxim of scientists whose work has resulted in deadly or dangerous technologies is: scientists are not to blame, but rather technologists and politicians must be morally culpable for the uses of science. As new technologies threaten not just populations but species and biospheres, scientists should reassess their moral culpability when researching fields whose impact may be catastrophic. Looking at real-world examples such as smallpox research and the Australian “mousepox trick”, and considering fictional or future technologies like Kurt Vonnegut’s (...)
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  25. Andy Lamey (2010). The Thinking Man's Marxist. [REVIEW] The Literary Review of Canada (June).
    An essay-review of the work of G. A. Cohen, timed to the publication of Why Not Socialism?.
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  26. Ryan Long (2011). The Incompleteness of Luck Egalitarianism. Social Philosophy Today 27:87-96.
    Luck egalitarianism makes a fundamental distinction between inequalities for which agents are responsible and inequalities stemming from luck. I give several reasons to find luck egalitarianism a compelling view of distributive justice. I then argue that it is an incomplete theory of equality. Luck egalitarianism lacks the normative resources to achieve its ends. It is unable to specify the prior conditions under which persons are situated equivalently such that their choices can bear this tremendous weight. This means that luck egalitarians (...)
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  27. Jon Mandle (1997). Justice, Desert, and Ideal Theory. Social Theory and Practice 23 (3):399-425.
  28. Eric Moore (2000). Desert, Virtue, and Justice. Social Theory and Practice 26 (3):417-442.
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  29. Jeffrey Moriarty (2005). The Epistemological Argument Against Desert. Utilitas 17 (2):205-221.
    Most contemporary political philosophers deny that justice requires giving people what they deserve. According to a familiar anti-desert argument, the influence of genes and environment on people's actions and traits undermines all desert-claims. According to a less familiar – but more plausible – argument, the influence of genes and environment on people's actions and traits undermines some desert-claims (or all desert-claims to an extent). But, it says, we do not know which ones (or to what extent). This article examines this (...)
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  30. Jeffrey Moriarty (2003). Against the Asymmetry of Desert. Noûs 37 (3):518–536.
    Desert plays a central role in most contemporary theories of retributive justice, but little or no role in most contemporary theories of distributive justice. This asymmetric treatment of desert is prima facie strange. I consider several popular arguments against the use of desert in distributive justice, and argue that none of them can be used to justify the asymmetry.
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  31. Jeffrey Moriarty (2002). Desert and Distributive Justice in a Theory of Justice. Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (1):131–143.
    Some writers think that John Rawls rejects desert as a distributive criterion because he thinks that people are not capable of deserving anything. I argue that Rawls does not think this, and that he rejects desert because he thinks that we cannot tell what people deserve. I then offer a criticism of Rawls's rejection of desert based on its correct interpretation.
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  32. Shaun Nichols (2011). Is Desert in the Details? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):121 - 133.
    Modern political philosophers have been notoriously reluctant to recognize desert in their theories of distributive justice.2 A large measure of the philosophical resistance to desert can be attributed to the fact that much of what people possess ultimately derives from brute luck. If a person’s assets come from brute luck, then she cannot be said truly to deserve those assets. John Rawls suggests that this idea is “one of the fixed points of our considered judgments;”3 Eric Rakowski calls it “uncontroversial;”4 (...)
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  33. Finbarr O'Connor (1976). Justice, Desert and Rawls. Philosophical Studies 25:170-191.
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  34. Joshua Preiss (2012). American Inequality and the Idea of Personal Reponsibility. Public Affairs Quarterly 26 (4):337-360.
    In terms of income and wealth (and a variety of other measures), citizens of the United States are significantly less equal than their peers in Canada and Europe. In addition, American society is becoming increasingly less equal. Some theorists argue that this inequality is inefficient. Others claim that is unjust. Many Americans, however, are less concerned with the potential inefficiency and injustice of growing inequality. Distinguishing as Milton Friedman does between equality of result and equality of opportunity, many claim that (...)
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  35. Nicole A. Vincent (2009). What Do You Mean I Should Take Responsibility for My Own Ill Health? Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy 1 (1):39-51.
    Luck egalitarians think that considerations of responsibility can excuse departures from strict equality. However critics argue that allowing responsibility to play this role has objectionably harsh consequences. Luck egalitarians usually respond either by explaining why that harshness is not excessive, or by identifying allegedly legitimate exclusions from the default responsibility-tracking rule to tone down that harshness. And in response, critics respectively deny that this harshness is not excessive, or they argue that those exclusions would be ineffective or lacking in justification. (...)
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  36. Nicole A. Vincent (2006). Equality, Responsibility and Talent Slavery. Imprints 9 (2):118-39.
    Egalitarians must address two questions: i. What should there be an equality of, which concerns the currency of the ‘equalisandum’; and ii. How should this thing be allocated to achieve the so-called equal distribution? A plausible initial composite answer to these two questions is that resources should be allocated in accordance with choice, because this way the resulting distribution of the said equalisandum will ‘track responsibility’ — responsibility will be tracked in the sense that only we will be responsible for (...)
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