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Anthropic Principle
  1. John D. Barrow (1986/1988). The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. Oxford University Press.
    Ever since Copernicus, scientists have continually adjusted their view of human nature, moving it further and further from its ancient position at the center of Creation. But in recent years, a startling new concept has evolved that places it more firmly than ever in a special position. Known as the Anthropic Cosmological Principle, this collection of ideas holds that the existence of intelligent observers determines the fundamental structure of the Universe. In its most radical version, the Anthropic Principle asserts that (...)
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  2. Yann Benétreau-Dupin (forthcoming). Blurring Out Cosmic Puzzles. Philosophy of Science.
    The Doomsday argument and anthropic arguments are illustrations of a paradox. In both cases, a lack of knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since they are formulated within a Bayesian framework, the paradox constitutes a challenge to Bayesianism. Several attempts, some successful, have been made to avoid these conclusions, but some versions of the paradox cannot be dissolved within the framework of orthodox Bayesianism. I show that adopting an imprecise framework of probabilistic reasoning allows for a more adequate representation of ignorance (...)
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  3. F. Bertola & Umberto Curi (eds.) (1988). The Anthropic Principle: Proceedings of the Second Venice Conference on Cosmology and Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    The questions that were purely in the realms of philosophy are now beginning to be answered by science. The second Venice Conference on Cosmology and Philosophy explores the anthropic principle which states that the Universe has the conditions we observe because we are here. Out of all possible universes we can only experience the restricted class that permits observers. This realization has profound implications for cosmology, philosophy and theology; all of which are explored in this book by thirteen contributors who (...)
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  4. Nick Bostrom (2002). Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy. Routledge.
    This book breaks new ground by drawing attention to certain kinds of biases that permeate many parts of science and by developing a theory of how to correct for these biases. Follow this link http://www.anthropic-principle.com/ to Nick Bostrom's web page on everything related to observation selection effects, the anthropic principle, self-locating belief, and associated applications and paradoxes in science and philosophy.
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  5. Nick Bostrom (2000). Observer-Relative Chances in Anthropic Reasoning? Erkenntnis 52 (1):93-108.
    John Leslie presents a thought experiment to show that chances are sometimes observer-relative in a paradoxical way. The pivotal assumption in his argument – a version of the weak anthropic principle – is the same as the one used to get the disturbing Doomsday argument off the ground. I show that Leslie's thought experiment trades on the sense/reference ambiguity and is fallacious. I then describe a related case where chances are observer-relative in an interesting way. But not in a paradoxical (...)
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  6. Milan M. Ćirković (2002). Anthropic Fluctuations Vs. Weak Anthropic Principle. Foundations of Science 7 (4):453-463.
    A modern assessment of the classical Boltzmann-Schuetz argument for large-scale entropy fluctuations as the origin of our observable cosmological domain is given.The emphasis is put on the central implication of this picture which flatly contradicts the weak anthropic principle as an epistemological statement about the universe. Therefore, to associate this picture with the anthropic principle as it is usually done is unwarranted. In particular, Feynman's criticism of theanthropic principle based on the entropy-fluctuation picture is a product of this semantic confusion.
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  7. William Lane Craig (1988). Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle Vs. Divine Design. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):389-395.
    Barrow and Tipler’s contention that the Anthropic Principle is obviously true and removes the need for an explanation of fine-tuning fails because the Principle is trivially true, and only within the context of a World Ensemble, whose existence is not obvious, does a selection effect become significant. Their objections to divine design as an explanation of fine-tuning are seen to be misconceived.
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  8. Louis Crane (2010). Possible Implications of the Quantum Theory of Gravity: An Introduction to the Meduso-Anthropic Principle. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 15 (4):369-373.
    If we assume that the constants of nature fluctuate near the singularity when a black hole forms (assuming, also, that physical black holes really do form singularities) then a process of evolution of universes becomes possible. We explore the implications of such a process for the origin of life, interstellar travel, and the human future.
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  9. John Jefferson Davis (1987). The Design Argument, Cosmic “Fine Tuning,” and the Anthropic Principle. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 22 (3):139 - 150.
  10. Gilbert Fulmer (2001). A Fatal Logical Flaw in Anthropic Principle Design Arguments. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 49 (2):101-110.
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  11. Ian Hacking (1987). The Inverse Gambler's Fallacy: The Argument From Design. The Anthropic Principle Applied to Wheeler Universes. Mind 96 (383):331-340.
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  12. Marcus Hutter (2010). Observer Localization in Multiverse Theories. In Harald Fritzsch & K. K. Phua (eds.), Proceedings of the Conference in Honour of Murray Gell-Mann's 80th Birthday. World Scientific.
    The progression of theories suggested for our world, from ego- to geo- to helio-centric models to universe and multiverse theories and beyond, shows one tendency: The size of the described worlds increases, with humans being expelled from their center to ever more remote and random locations. If pushed too far, a potential theory of everything (TOE) is actually more a theories of nothing (TON). Indeed such theories have already been developed. I show that including observer localization into such theories is (...)
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  13. Jonathan Katz (1988). Why There Is Something: The Anthropic Principle and Improbable Events. Dialogue 27 (01):111-.
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  14. John Leslie (1992). Design and the Anthropic Principle. Biology and Philosophy 7 (3):349-354.
  15. John Leslie (1992). Time and the Anthropic Principle. Mind 101 (403):521-540.
    Carter’s anthropic principle reminds us that intelligent life can find itself only in life-permitting times, places or universes. The principle concerns a possible observational selection effect, not a designing deity. It has no special concern with humans, nor does it say that intelligent life is inevitable and common. Barrow and Tipler, who discuss all this, are not biologically ignorant. As argued in "Universes" (Leslie, 1989) they may well be right in thinking that "fine tuning" of force strengths and particle masses, (...)
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  16. John Leslie (1983). Observership in Cosmology: The Anthropic Principle. Mind 92 (368):573-579.
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  17. Ernan McMullin (1993). Indifference Principle and Anthropic Principle in Cosmology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (3):359-389.
    The successes scored by the big bang model of cosmic evolution in the 1960’s led to an intensive application of quantum theory to the problem of how the expansion might have begun and what its likely first stages were. It seemed as though an incredibly precise setting of the initial conditions would have been needed in order that a long-lived galactic universe containing heavy elements might develop. One response was to suppose that the fine-tuning could somehow be explained by the (...)
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  18. Ulrich Mohrhoff (2002). Why the Laws of Physics Are Just So. Foundations of Physics 32 (8):1313-1324.
    Does a world that contains chemistry entail the validity of both the standard model of elementary particle physics and general relativity, at least as effective theories? This article shows that the answer may very well be affirmative. It further suggests that the very existence of stable, spatially extended material objects, if not the very existence of the physical world, may require the validity of these theories.
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  19. A. T. Nuyen (2001). The "Ethical Anthropic Principle" and the Religious Ethics of Levinas. Journal of Religious Ethics 29 (3):427 - 442.
    Why did Levinas choose Isaiah 45:7 ("I make peace and create evil: I the Lord do all that") as a superscription of his essay on evil? This article explores the role of evil in Levinas's religious ethics. The author discusses the structure of evil as revealed phenomenologically and juxtaposes it to the structure of subjectivity found in the writings of Levinas. The idea of the "ethical anthropic principle," modeled upon the cosmic anthropic principle, is then used to link evil to (...)
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  20. Joel Pust (2007). Cartesian Knowledge and Confirmation. Journal of Philosophy 104 (6):269-289.
    Bayesian conceptions of evidence have been invoked in recent arguments regarding the existence of God, the hypothesis of multiple physical universes, and the Doomsday Argument. Philosophers writing on these topics often claim that, given a Bayesian account of evidence, our existence or something entailed by our existence (perhaps in conjunction with some background knowledge or assumption) may serve as evidence for each of us. In this paper, I argue that this widespread view is mistaken. The mere fact of one's existence (...)
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  21. Kevin Sharpe & Jonathan Walgate (2002). The Anthropic Principle: Life in the Universe. Zygon 37 (4):925-939.
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  22. Quentin Smith, Time and Degrees of Existence: The Big Bang Anthropic Principle Religion Atheism.
    the rise of analytic philosophy early in the 20th century, specifically, with Russell's 1905 article "On Denoting", for in 1904 and earlier years he and G.E. Moore held a sort of Meinongian theory of degrees of existence (subsistence and existence are distinguished, with existence being a higher..
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  23. Quentin Smith (1985). The Anthropic Principle and Many-Worlds Cosmologies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (3):336 – 348.
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  24. Steven Weinstein, Anthropic Reasoning in Multiverse Cosmology and String Theory.
    Anthropic arguments in multiverse cosmology and string theory rely on the weak anthropic principle (WAP). We show that the principle, though ultimately a tautology, is nevertheless ambiguous. It can be reformulated in one of two unambiguous ways, which we refer to as WAP_1 and WAP_2. We show that WAP_2, the version most commonly used in anthropic reasoning, makes no physical predictions unless supplemented by a further assumption of "typicality", and we argue that this assumption is both misguided and unjustified. WAP_1, (...)
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  25. M. A. B. Whitaker (1988). On Hacking's Criticism of the Wheeler Anthropic Principle. Mind 97 (386):259-264.
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  26. Patrick A. Wilson (1994). Carter on Anthropic Principle Predictions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):241-253.
    A significant criticism of the anthropic principle as a scientific claim is that testable predictions cannot be derived from it. Brandon Carter has argued, however, that the principle can be used to predict on the one hand that the period of time biological evolution is intrinsically likely to require is very large, and on the other that the number of ‘critical steps’ that have occurred in the evolution of life on earth is related to the length of time life can (...)
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  27. Joseph M. Zycinski (1996). The Weak Anthropic Principle and the Design Argument. Zygon 31 (1):115-130.
    The design argument for God’s existence was critically assessed when in the growth of modern science the cognitive value of teleological categories was called into question. In recent discussions dealing with anthropic principles there has appeared a new version of the design argument, in which cosmic design is described without the use of teleological terms. The weak anthropic principle (WAP), a most critical version of all these principles, describes the fine-tuning of physical parameters necessary to the genesis of carbon-based life. (...)
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Fine-Tuning in Cosmology
  1. Dene Bebbington (2007). Fine-Tuning a Circular Argument. Think 14 (14):39 - 42.
    In issue 12 of Think, Rodney Holder developed a version of the fine-tuning argument for the existence of God, claiming that certain features of our universe make the probability that God exists high. Here, Dene Bebbington responds.
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  2. Darren Bradley (2012). Weisberg on Design: What Fine-Tuning's Got to Do with It. Erkenntnis 77 (3):435-438.
    Jonathan Weisberg (2010 ) argues that, given that life exists, the fact that the universe is fine-tuned for life does not confirm the design hypothesis. And if the fact that life exists confirms the design hypothesis, fine-tuning is irrelevant. So either way, fine-tuning has nothing to do with it. I will defend a design argument that survives Weisberg’s critique — the fact that life exists supports the design hypothesis, but it only does so given fine-tuning.
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  3. Darren Bradley (2009). Multiple Universes and Observation Selection Effects. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1):72.
    The fine-tuning argument can be used to support the Many Universe hypothesis. The Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy objection seeks to undercut the support for the Many Universe hypothesis. The objection is that although the evidence that there is life somewhere confirms Many Universes, the specific evidence that there is life in this universe does not. I will argue that the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy is not committed by the fine-tuning argument. The key issue is the procedure by which the universe with life (...)
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  4. Darren Bradley (2007). Bayesianism And Self-Locating Beliefs. Dissertation, Stanford University
    How should we update our beliefs when we learn new evidence? Bayesian confirmation theory provides a widely accepted and well understood answer – we should conditionalize. But this theory has a problem with self-locating beliefs, beliefs that tell you where you are in the world, as opposed to what the world is like. To see the problem, consider your current belief that it is January. You might be absolutely, 100%, sure that it is January. But you will soon believe it (...)
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  5. M. C. Bradley (2002). The Fine-Tuning Argument: The Bayesian Version. Religious Studies 38 (4):375-404.
    This paper considers the Bayesian form of the fine-tuning argument as advanced by Richard Swinburne. An expository section aims to identify the precise character of the argument, and three lines of objection are then advanced. The first of these holds that there is an inconsistency in Swinburne's procedure, the second that his argument has an unacceptable dependence on an objectivist theory of value, the third that his method is powerless to single out traditional theism from a vast number of (...)
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  6. M. C. Bradley (2001). The Fine-Tuning Argument. Religious Studies 37 (4):451-466.
    A frequent objection to the fine-tuning argument has been that although certain necessary conditions for life were admittedly exceedingly improbable, still, the many possible alternative sets of conditions were all equally improbable, so that no special significance is to be attached to the realization of the conditions of life. Some authors, however, have rejected this objection as fallacious. The object of this paper is to state the objection to the fine-tuning argument in a more telling form than has been done (...)
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  7. Stephen Coleman (2001). Fine-Tuning and Probability: Does the Universe Require Explanation? Sophia 40 (1):7 - 15.
    It has been suggested by many philosophers that the cosmos cries out for explanation. They base this claim on the fact that many of the fundamental characteristics of the cosmos seem to have to be incredibly ’fine-tuned’ to permit the existence of intelligent life. They further claim from this ’fine-tuning’ that the cosmos is highly improbable, and thus requires an explanation. In recent times, these views have been criticized by writers, such as Quentin Smith, who suggest that no explanation for (...)
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  8. Robin Collins (2008). The Case for Cosmic Design. In God or Blind Nature?: Philosopher’s Debate the Evidence (2007-2008). Internet Infidels (Online Publisher).
    This is a contribution to the first online book debating theism and naturalism. In this contribution, I present the case for theism from the fine-tuning of the universe, and the elegance and intelligibility/discoverability of the law of nature. Also included is Paul Draper’s response to my arguments, along with my replies. (The online book can be found at http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/debates/great-debate.html).
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  9. Robin Collins (2008). The Teleological Argument. In Paul Copan & Chad V. Meister (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: Classic and Contemporary Issues. Blackwell Pub..
    This is a condensed version of an in-process book on the fine-tuning argument for God’s existence. In this 48,000 word essay, I first develop a probabilistic framework for articulating the argument, and then use this framework to answer in detail many of the objections commonly raised against it. Along the way, I present some of the fine-tuning evidence itself and consider major objections against the evidence; further, there are two major sections dealing with the multiverse objection, particularly that based on (...)
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  10. Robin Collins (2005). Fine-Tuning Arguments and the Problem of the Comparison Range. Philosophia Christi 7 (2):385 - 404.
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  11. Robin Collins (2005). The Many-Worlds Hypothesis as an Explanation of Cosmic Fine-Tuning. Faith and Philosophy 22 (5):654-666.
    The most common objection to fine tuning arguments for theism is that there are, or might be, multiple universes among which the fundamental physicalconstants and parameters vary. This essays describes the two main variants of this objection and argues that they both fail.
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  12. Robin Collins (2003). Evidence for Fine-Tuning. In Neil A. Manson (ed.), God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science. Routledge. 80--178.
  13. Robin Collins (2003). God, Design, and Fine-Tuning. In God Matters: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion. Longman Publications.
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  14. Mark Colyvan, Jay L. Garfield & Graham Priest (2005). Problems with the Argument From Fine Tuning. Synthese 145 (3):325 - 338.
    The argument from fine tuning is supposed to establish the existence of God from the fact that the evolution of carbon-based life requires the laws of physics and the boundary conditions of the universe to be more or less as they are. We demonstrate that this argument fails. In particular, we focus on problems associated with the role probabilities play in the argument. We show that, even granting the fine tuning of the universe, it does not follow that the universe (...)
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  15. William Lane Craig (2010). Much Ado About Nothing: A Review Essay on 'The Grand Design'. Philosophia Christi 12 (2):409 - 418.
    While declaring philosophy to be dead, Hawking and Mlodinow are deeply engaged in philosophical speculation. Their treatment of the origin and fine tuning of the universe, though unsympathetic to theism, turns out upon examination to be quite supportive of natural theology.
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  16. William Lane Craig (2009). Vilenkin's Cosmic Vision. Philosophia Christi 11 (1):231 - 238.
    Alexander Vilenkin’s recent book is a wonderful popular introduction to contemporary cosmology. It contains provocative discussions of both the beginning of the universe and the fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life. Vilenkin is a prominent exponent of the multiverse hypothesis, which features in the book’s title. His defense of this hypothesis depends in a crucial and interesting way on conflating time and space. His claim that his theory of the quantum creation of the universe explains the origin of the (...)
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  17. William Lane Craig (2003). Design and the Anthropic Fine-Tuning of the Universe. In Neil A. Manson (ed.), God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science. Routledge.
    Studies in astrophysical cosmology have served to reveal the incomprehensible fine-tuning of the fundamental constants and cosmological quantities which must obtain if a universe like ours is to be life-permitting. Traditionally, such fine-tuning of the universe for life would have been taken as evidence of divine design. William Dembski’s ’generic chance elimination argument’ provides a framework for evaluating the hypothesis of design with respect to the fine-tuning of the universe. On Dembski’s model the key to a design inference is the (...)
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  18. William Lane Craig (1988). Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle Vs. Divine Design. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):389-395.
    Barrow and Tipler’s contention that the Anthropic Principle is obviously true and removes the need for an explanation of fine-tuning fails because the Principle is trivially true, and only within the context of a World Ensemble, whose existence is not obvious, does a selection effect become significant. Their objections to divine design as an explanation of fine-tuning are seen to be misconceived.
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  19. John Jefferson Davis (1987). The Design Argument, Cosmic “Fine Tuning,” and the Anthropic Principle. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 22 (3):139 - 150.
  20. Trent Dougherty & Ted Poston (2008). A User's Guide to Design Arguments. Religious Studies 44 (1):99-110.
    We argue that there is a tension between two types of design arguments-the fine-tuning argument (FTA) and the biological design argument (BDA). The tension arises because the strength of each argument is inversely proportional to the value of a certain currently unknown probability. Since the value of that probability is currently unknown, we investigate the properties of the FTA and BDA on different hypothetical values of this probability. If our central claim is correct this suggests three results: 1. It is (...)
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  21. Theodore M. Drange (2000). A Response to Parrish on the Fine-Tuning Argument. Philosophia Christi 2 (1):61 - 67.
    This is response to Stephen Parrish’s article "Theodore Drange on the Fine-Tuning Argument: A Critique," ’Philosophia Christi’, Series 2, 1 (No. 2, 1999), which attacked a section of my book ’Nonbelief and Evil: Two Arguments for God’s Nonexistence’ (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998). The Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA) maintains that the physical constants of our universe exhibit evidence of "fine-tuning" by an intelligent designer. In opposition, I suggest alternate explanations which are at least as good. Here I defend my objections to (...)
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  22. Theodore M. Drange (2000). The Fine-Tuning Argument Revisited. Philo 3 (2):38 - 49.
    A version of the fine-tuning argument (FTA) considered in a previous essay is replaced by an improved version, which is then refuted. Advocates of FTA must proclaim that there is no world ensemble, that a great many alternatives to the physical constants of our universe are physically possible and roughly equal in probability to them, and that alternate hypothetical worlds are all, or almost all, uninteresting in comparison to our universe. But no reason has been produced to believe ’any’ of (...)
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  23. Paul Draper (2008). God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence. Internet Infidels (Online Publisher).
    This book consists of four nonpartisan debates about the existence of God. Each debate examines distinct related areas of evidence for and against naturalism and theism. The topics of the first debate are the mind and the will, and the debaters are a naturalist, Andrew Melnyk, and two theists, Steward Goetz and Charles Taliaferro. Next, Paul Draper defends an evolutionary argument from evil against theism, while Alvin Plantinga argues that evolutionary naturalism is self-defeating. In the final two debates, Quentin Smith (...)
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