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  1. Mark Alfano (2012). Wilde Heuristics and Rum Tum Tuggers: Preference Indeterminacy and Instability. Synthese 189 (S1):5-15.
    Models in decision theory and game theory assume that preferences are determinate: for any pair of possible outcomes, a and b, an agent either prefers a to b, prefers b to a, or is indifferent as between a and b. Preferences are also assumed to be stable: provided the agent is fully informed, trivial situational influences will not shift the order of her preferences. Research by behavioral economists suggests, however, that economic and hedonic preferences are to some degree indeterminate and (...)
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  2. Avery Archer (2015). Reconceiving Direction of Fit. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):171-180.
    I argue that the concept of direction of fit is best seen as picking out a certain inferential property of a psychological attitude. The property in question is one that believing shares with assuming and fantasizing and fails to share with desire. Unfortunately, the standard analysis of DOF obscures this fact because it conflates two very different properties of an attitude: that in virtue of which it displays a certain DOF, and that in virtue of which it displays certain revision (...)
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  3. Avery Archer (2015). What is Direction of Fit? Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (1):241-249.
  4. M. S. Brady (2007). Review: Value, Reality, and Desire. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (461):193-197.
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  5. David Braun (2015). Desiring, Desires, and Desire Ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):141-162.
    Delia Graff Fara maintains that many desire ascriptions underspecify the content of the relevant agent’s desire. She argues that this is inconsistent with certain initially plausible claims about desiring, desires, and desire ascriptions. This paper defends those initially plausible claims. Part of the defense hinges on metaphysical claims about the relations among desiring, desires, and contents.
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  6. K. Cassidy & M. Kelly (1992). Belief and Desire in the Development of Theory of Mind. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 30 (6):467-467.
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  7. Elif Çırakman (2014). Enduring Desire: Becoming Spirit. Hegel-Jahrbuch 2014 (1).
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  8. Sara Crangle (2010). Desires Dissolvent. Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry 6 (13):41-53.
    For Mina Loy, human appetites are often comical, even uproarious. This essay considers Loy’s use of risibility–the desire to laugh–as it accompanies and extends her examinations of longings such as sexuality and hunger. Modernist philosophers like Nietzsche, Bergson, and Freud were preoccupied with laughter; Loy responds to their approaches in her writing, as do many of her contemporaries, particularly Wyndham Lewis. Here it is argued that in her poetry and her thirties novel, Insel, Loy depicts a desiring body neither whole (...)
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  9. Marc-Kevin Daoust (2015). Le désir dans l’approche contractualiste hobbesienne. In Daoust Marc-Kevin (ed.), Le désir et la philosophie. Les Cahiers D'Ithaque 97-109.
    Ce bref commentaire a trois objectifs. La première section vise à présenter au lecteur la philosophie matérialiste et atomiste de Hobbes. Dans la seconde section, nous exposons le rôle des désirs dans l’escalade du conflit entre les agents dans l’état de nature. Au terme de cette analyse, le lecteur disposera de quelques clés interprétatives pour aborder les chapitres VI et XIII du Léviathan.
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  10. Marc-Kevin Daoust (ed.) (2015). Le désir et la philosophie. Les Cahiers d'Ithaque.
    Quels désirs sont dignes de la raison ? Comment satisfaire nos désirs sans perdre le contrôle de soi ? Ce recueil offre un éclairage sur les différents aspects de ces problèmes. Nous proposons au lecteur un parcours historique, allant de Platon à Hume, sur la question du désir et sa place dans les textes fondateurs de la philosophie.
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  11. Wayne A. Davis (1984). A Causal Theory of Intending. American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):43-54.
    My goal is to define intending. I defend the view that believing and desiring something are necessary for intending it. They are not sufficient, however, for some things we both expect and want (e.g., the sun to rise tomorrow) are unintendable. Restricting the objects of intention to our own future actions is unwarranted and unhelpful. Rather, the belief involved in intending must be based on the desire in a certain way. En route, I argue that expected but unwanted consequences are (...)
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  12. Wayne A. Davis (1984). The Two Senses of Desire. Philosophical Studies 45 (2):181-195.
    It has often been said that 'desire' is ambiguous. I do not believe the case for this has been made thoroughly enough, however. The claim typically occurs in the course of defending controversial philosophical theses, such as that intention entails desire, where it tends to look ad hoc. There is need, therefore, for a thorough and single-minded exploration of the ambiguity. I believe the results will be more profound than might be suspected.
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  13. Allan Hazlett, Belief and Truth, Desire and Goodness.
    There seems to be a special relationship between belief and truth that can be metaphorically expressed by saying that belief “aims” at truth or that belief ’s “direction of fit” is “to fit the world.” There is an Aristotelian thesis, according to which the special relationship between belief and truth is the same as the special relationship between desire and goodness. Assuming that belief “aims” at truth, then, desire “aims” at goodness. This contrasts with a Humean thesis, on which, while (...)
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  14. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2013). Propositional Faith: What It is and What It is Not. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):357-372.
    Reprinted in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Wadsworth 2015, 6th edition, eds Michael Rea and Louis Pojman. What is propositional faith? At a first approximation, we might answer that it is the psychological attitude picked out by standard uses of the English locution “S has faith that p,” where p takes declarative sentences as instances, as in “He has faith that they’ll win”. Although correct, this answer is not nearly as informative as we might like. Many people say that there (...)
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  15. Donovan Hulse, Cynthia Read & Timothy Schroeder (2004). The Impossibility of Conscious Desire. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):73 - 80.
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  16. Peter Kalkavage (2007). The Logic of Desire: An Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Paul Dry Books.
    Preparing the journey -- Consciousness -- Self-consciousness -- Reason -- Spirit -- Religion -- Absolute knowing.
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  17. Emar Maier (2015). Parasitic Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 38 (3):205-236.
    Karttunen observes that a presupposition triggered inside an attitude ascription, can be filtered out by a seemingly inaccessible antecedent under the scope of a preceding belief ascription. This poses a major challenge for presupposition theory and the semantics of attitude ascriptions. I solve the problem by enriching the semantics of attitude ascriptions with some independently argued assumptions on the structure and interpretation of mental states. In particular, I propose a DRT-based representation of mental states with a global belief-layer and a (...)
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  18. Patricia Marino (2009). On Essentially Conflicting Desires. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):274-291.
    It is sometimes argued that having inconsistent desires is irrational or otherwise bad for an agent. If so, if agents seem to want a and not-a, then either their attitudes are being misdescribed – what they really want is some aspect x of a and some aspect y of not-a – or those desires are somehow 'inconsistent' and thus inappropriate. I argue first that the proper characterization of inconsistency here does not involve logical form, that is, whether the desires involved (...)
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  19. Joshua May (2011). Relational Desires and Empirical Evidence Against Psychological Egoism. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):39–58.
    Roughly, psychological egoism is the thesis that all of a person's intentional actions are ultimately self-interested in some sense; psychological altruism is the thesis that some of a person's intentional actions are not ultimately self-interested, since some are ultimately other-regarding in some sense. C. Daniel Batson and other social psychologists have argued that experiments provide support for a theory called the "empathy-altruism hypothesis" that entails the falsity of psychological egoism. However, several critics claim that there are egoistic explanations of the (...)
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  20. Alfred Mele (1993). Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.
  21. Alfred R. Mele (1999). Motivation, Self-Control, and the Agglomeration of Desires. Facta Philosophica 1:77-86.
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  22. Alfred R. Mele (1990). Irresistible Desires. Noûs 24 (3):455-72.
    The topic of irresistible desires arises with unsurprising frequency in discussions of free agency and moral responsibility. Actions motivated by such desires are standardly viewed as compelled, and hence unfree. Agents in the grip of irresistible desires are often plausibly exempted from moral blame for intentional deeds in which the desires issue. Yet, relatively little attention has been given to the analysis of irresistible desire. Moreover, a popular analysis is fatally flawed. My aim in this paper is to construct and (...)
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  23. Daniel Nolan (2006). Selfless Desires. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):665–679.
    final version in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2006 73.3: 665-679.
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  24. Fiora Salis (2016). The Problem of Satisfaction Conditions and the Dispensability of I-Desire. Erkenntnis 81 (1):105-118.
    The problem of satisfaction conditions arises from the apparent difficulties of explaining the nature of the mental states involved in our emotional responses to tragic fictions. Greg Currie has recently proposed to solve the problem by arguing for the recognition of a class of imaginative counterparts of desires - what he and others call i-desires. In this paper I will articulate and rebut Currie's argument in favour of i-desires and I will put forward a new solution in terms of genuine (...)
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  25. G. F. Schueler (1991). Pro-Attitudes and Direction of Fit. Mind 100 (400):277-81.
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  26. Nicholas Shea (2013). Neural Mechanisms of Decision-Making and the Personal Level. In Kwm Fulford, M. Davies, G. Graham, J. Sadler, G. Stanghellini & T. Thornton (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. OUP 1063-1082.
    Can findings from psychology and cognitive neuroscience about the neural mechanisms involved in decision-making can tell us anything useful about the commonly-understood mental phenomenon of making voluntary choices? Two philosophical objections are considered. First, that the neural data is subpersonal, and so cannot enter into illuminating explanations of personal level phenomena like voluntary action. Secondly, that mental properties are multiply realized in the brain in such a way as to make them insusceptible to neuroscientific study. The paper argues that both (...)
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  27. David Shoemaker (2015). In Praise of Desire By Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder. Analysis 75 (4):679-682.
    This paper is a review of Arpaly and Schroeder's book, "In Praise of Desire" (OUP).
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  28. Hugh J. Silverman (ed.) (2000). Philosophy and Desire. Routledge.
    Philosophy and Desire , the seventh book in the well-known Continental Philosophy series, examines questions of desire--desire for another person, desire for happiness, desire for knowledge, desire for a better world, desire for the impossible, desire in text, desire in language and desire for desire itself. The theme of desire is explored through readings of contemporary figures such as Merleau-Ponty, Bataille, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Levinas, Irigaray, Barthes, Derrida, and Derrida. A hot, timely topic in philosophy today Expands the contemporary debates.
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  29. Marco Solinas (2008). Psiche: Platone e Freud. Desiderio, Sogno, Mania, Eros (pdf: indice, prefazione Vegetti, introduzione, capitolo I). Firenze University Press.
    Psiche sets up a close-knit comparison between the psychology of Plato's Republic and Freud's psychoanalysis. Convergences and divergences are discussed in relation both to the Platonic conception of the oneiric emergence of repressed desires that prefigures the main path of Freud's subconscious, to the analysis of the psychopathologies related to these theoretical formulations and to the two diagnostic and therapeutic approaches adopted. Another crucial theme is the Platonic eros - the examination of which is also extended to the Symposium and (...)
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  30. Marco Solinas (2005). Desideri: fenomenologia degenerativa e strategie di controllo. In Mario Vegetti (ed.), Platone. La Repubblica. Bibliopolis vol. VI, 471-498.
  31. Marco Solinas (2005). La paternità dell’eros: il “Simposio” e Freud. In Gherardo Ugolini (ed.), Die Kraft der Vergangenheit – La forza del passato. Georg Olms Verlag 231-241.
  32. Marco Solinas (2004). Unterdrückung, Traum und Unbewusstes in Platons „Politeia“ und bei Freud. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 111 (1):90-112.
    The essay concerns the reconstruction of the repression of desires, with reference to the analysis of their oneiric emersions expounded in the Republic, in comparison with Freud’s conception. Plato’s concept of suppression according to which specific desires are enslaved, so that they can find satisfaction usually only in dreams seems consistent with Freud’s concept of remotion; therefore both the condition of the suppressed desires and the intrapsychic place of their enslavement seem to be interpretable in the light of Freud’s concept (...)
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  33. H. Orri Stefánsson (2014). Desires, Beliefs and Conditional Desirability. Synthese 191 (16):4019-4035.
    Does the desirability of a proposition depend on whether it is true? Not according to the Invariance assumption, held by several notable philosophers. The Invariance assumption plays an important role in David Lewis’ famous arguments against the so-called Desire-as-Belief thesis (DAB), an anti-Humean thesis according to which a rational agent desires a proposition exactly to the degree that she believes the proposition to be desirable. But the assumption is of interest independently of Lewis’ arguments, for instance since both Richard Jeffrey (...)
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  34. Christian von Ehrenfels (1897). System der Werttheorie. O.R.Reisland.
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  35. Jonathan Webber (forthcoming). Habituation and First-Person Authority. In Roman Altshuler & Michael Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. Routledge
    Richard Moran’s theory of first-person authority as the agential authority to make up one’s own mind rests on a form of mind-body dualism that does not allow for habituation as part of normal psychological functioning. We have good intuitive and empirical reason to accept that habituation is central to the normal functioning of desire. There is some empirical support for the idea that habituation plays a parallel role in belief. In particular, at least one form of implicit bias seems better (...)
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