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  1. Sam Alxatib, Peter Pagin & Uli Sauerland (2013). Acceptable Contradictions: Pragmatics or Semantics? A Reply to Cobreros Et Al. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (4):619-634.
    Naive speakers find some logical contradictions acceptable, specifically borderline contradictions involving vague predicates such as Joe is and isn’t tall. In a recent paper, Cobreros et al. (J Philos Logic, 2012) suggest a pragmatic account of the acceptability of borderline contradictions. We show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong truth conditions for some examples with disjunction. As a remedy, we propose a semantic analysis instead. The analysis is close to a variant of fuzzy logic, but conjunction and disjunction (...)
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  2. Sam Alxatib & Francis Jeffry Pelletier (2011). The Psychology of Vagueness: Borderline Cases and Contradictions. Mind and Language 26 (3):287-326.
    In an interesting experimental study, Bonini et al. (1999) present partial support for truth-gap theories of vagueness. We say this despite their claim to find theoretical and empirical reasons to dismiss gap theories and despite the fact that they favor an alternative, epistemic account, which they call ‘vagueness as ignorance’. We present yet more experimental evidence that supports gap theories, and argue for a semantic/pragmatic alternative that unifies the gappy supervaluationary approach together with its glutty relative, the subvaluationary approach.
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  3. C. M. Amus (2012). Paraconsistency on the Rocks of Dialetheism. Logique Et Analyse 55 (217):3.
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  4. Constantin Antonopoulos (1993). 'Neither-Nor' Statements and 'Neither-Nor' States. History and Philosophy of Logic 14 (2):183-199.
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  5. O. Arieli, A. Avron & A. Zamansky (2011). Ideal Paraconsistent Logics. Studia Logica 99 (1-3):31-60.
    We define in precise terms the basic properties that an ‘ideal propositional paraconsistent logic’ is expected to have, and investigate the relations between them. This leads to a precise characterization of ideal propositional paraconsistent logics. We show that every three-valued paraconsistent logic which is contained in classical logic, and has a proper implication connective, is ideal. Then we show that for every n > 2 there exists an extensive family of ideal n -valued logics, each one of which is not (...)
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  6. B. Armour-Garb (2012). No Consistent Way with Paradox. Analysis 72 (1):66-75.
    In ‘A Consistent Way with Paradox’, Laurence Goldstein (2009) clarifies his solution to the liar, which he touts as revenge immune . In addition, he (Ibid.) responds to one of the objections that Armour-Garb and Woodbridge (2006) raise against certain solutions to the open pair and argues that his proffered solution to the liar family of paradoxes undermines what they (Ibid.) call the dialetheic conjecture . In this paper, after critically evaluating Goldstein’s response to A-G&W, I turn to his proposed (...)
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  7. Bradley Armour-Garb (2005). Wrestling with (and Without) Dialetheism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):87 – 102.
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  8. Bradley Armour-Garb (2004). Diagnosing Dialetheism. In Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press 113--25.
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  9. Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (2001). Can Deflationists Be Dialetheists? Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):593-608.
    Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his "Deflationary Truth and the Liar" (JPL 28:455-488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for inflationist conceptions. (...)
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  10. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2012). Liars, Truthtellers and Naysayers: A Broader View of Semantic Pathology I. Language and Communication 32 (4):293-311.
    Semantic pathology is most widely recognized in the liar paradox, where an apparent inconsistency arises in ‘‘liar sentences’’ and their ilk. But the phenomenon of semantic pathology also manifests a sibling symptom—an apparent indeterminacy—which, while not largely discussed (save for the occasional nod to ‘‘truthteller sentences’’), is just as pervasive as, and exactly parallels, the symptom of inconsistency. Moreover, certain ‘‘dual symptom’’ cases, which we call naysayers, exhibit both inconsistency and indeterminacy and also manifest a higher-order indeterminacy between them. In (...)
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  11. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2006). Dialetheism, Semantic Pathology, and the Open Pair. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):395 – 416.
    Over the past 25 years, Graham Priest has ably presented and defended dialetheism, the view that certain sentences are properly characterized as true with true negations. Our goal here is neither to quibble with the tenability of true, assertable contradictions nor, really, with the arguments for dialetheism. Rather, we wish to address the dialetheist's treatment of cases of semantic pathology and to pose a worry for dialetheism that has not been adequately considered. The problem that we present seems to have (...)
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  12. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2003). Curried Katz with Epimenidean Dilemma. Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):351-366.
  13. Jack Arnold & Stewart Shapiro (2007). Where in the (World Wide) Web of Belief is the Law of Non-Contradiction? Noûs 41 (2):276–297.
    It is sometimes said that there are two, competing versions of W. V. O. Quine’s unrelenting empiricism, perhaps divided according to temporal periods of his career. According to one, logic is exempt from, or lies outside the scope of, the attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. This logic-friendly Quine holds that logical truths and, presumably, logical inferences are analytic in the traditional sense. Logical truths are knowable a priori, and, importantly, they are incorrigible, and so immune from revision. The other, radical (...)
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  14. J. C. Beall (2009). Spandrels of Truth. Oxford University Press.
    In Spandrels of Truth, Beall concisely presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.
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  15. Jc Beall (2012). Future Contradictions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):547-557.
    A common and much-explored thought is ?ukasiewicz's idea that the future is ?indeterminate??i.e., ?gappy? with respect to some claims?and that such indeterminacy bleeds back into the present in the form of gappy ?future contingent? claims. What is uncommon, and to my knowledge unexplored, is the dual idea of an overdeterminate future?one which is ?glutty? with respect to some claims. While the direct dual, with future gluts bleeding back into the present, is worth noting, my central aim is simply to sketch (...)
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  16. JC Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (2003). Should Deflationists Be Dialetheists? Noûs 37 (2):303–324.
  17. Jc Beall & Graham Priest (2007). Not So Deep Inconsistency. Australasian Journal of Logic 5:74-84.
    In his “Deep Inconsistency?” Eklund attacks arguments to the effect that some contradictions are true, and especially those based on the liar paradox, to be found in Priest’ In Contradiction. The point of this paper is to evaluate his case.
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  18. Jc Beall & David Ripley (2004). Analetheism and Dialetheism. Analysis 64 (281):30–35.
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  19. Francesco Berto (2014). Absolute Contradiction, Dialetheism, and Revenge. Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):193-207.
    Is there a notion of contradiction—let us call it, for dramatic effect, “absolute”—making all contradictions, so understood, unacceptable also for dialetheists? It is argued in this paper that there is, and that spelling it out brings some theoretical benefits. First it gives us a foothold on undisputed ground in the methodologically difficult debate on dialetheism. Second, we can use it to express, without begging questions, the disagreement between dialetheists and their rivals on the nature of truth. Third, dialetheism has an (...)
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  20. Francesco Berto (2008). Adynaton and Material Exclusion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):165 – 190.
    Philosophical dialetheism, whose main exponent is Graham Priest, claims that some contradictions hold, are true, and it is rational to accept and assert them. Such a position is naturally portrayed as a challenge to the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). But all the classic formulations of the LNC are, in a sense, not questioned by a typical dialetheist, since she is (cheerfully) required to accept them by her own theory. The goal of this paper is to develop a formulation of the (...)
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  21. Francesco Berto (2007). How to Sell a Contradiction. College Publications.
    There is a principle in things, about which we cannot be deceived, but must always, on the contrary, recognize the truth – viz. that the same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be": with these words of the Metaphysics, Aristotle introduced the Law of Non-Contradiction, which was to become the most authoritative principle in the history of Western thought. However, things have recently changed, and nowadays various philosophers, called dialetheists, claim that this Law does not (...)
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  22. Francesco Berto (2007). Is Dialetheism an Idealism? The Russellian Fallacy and the Dialetheist's Dilemma. Dialectica 61 (2):235–263.
    In his famous work on vagueness, Russell named “fallacy of verbalism” the fallacy that consists in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things. In this paper, I examine two (clusters of) mainstream paraconsistent logical theories – the non-adjunctive and relevant approaches –, and show that, if they are given a strongly paraconsistent or dialetheic reading, the charge of committing the Russellian Fallacy can be raised against them in a sophisticated way, by appealing to the intuitive reading of (...)
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  23. Francesco Berto (2006). Meaning, Metaphysics, and Contradiction. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (4):283-297.
  24. Francesco Berto (2006). Teorie Dell'assurdo: I Rivali Del Principio di Non-Contraddizione. Carocci.
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  25. Francesco Berto (2006). Characterizing Negation to Face Dialetheism. Logique Et Analyse 49 (195):241-263.
  26. Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.) (2013). Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications. Springer.
    A logic is called 'paraconsistent' if it rejects the rule called 'ex contradictione quodlibet', according to which any conclusion follows from inconsistent premises. While logicians have proposed many technically developed paraconsistent logical systems and contemporary philosophers like Graham Priest have advanced the view that some contradictions can be true, and advocated a paraconsistent logic to deal with them, until recent times these systems have been little understood by philosophers. This book presents a comprehensive overview on paraconsistent logical systems to change (...)
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  27. Francesco Berto & Graham Priest (2008). Dialetheism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008).
    A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth-bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.
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  28. Michela Bordignon (2012). Contradiction or Non-Contradiction? Hegel's Dialectic Between Brandom and Priest. Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 41 (1-3).
    The aim of the paper is to analyse Brandom’s account of Hegel’s conception of determinate negation and the role this structure plays in the dialectical process with respect to the problem of contradiction. After having shown both the merits and the limits of Brandom’s account, I will refer to Priest’s dialetheistic approach to contradiction as an alternative contemporary perspective from which it is possible to capture essential features of Hegel’s notion of contradiction, and I will test the equation of Hegel’s (...)
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  29. Manuel Bremer (2008). The Logic of Truth in Paraconsistent Internal Realism. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):76-83.
    The paper discusses which modal principles should hold for a truth operator answering to the truth theory of internal realism. It turns out that the logic of truth in internal realism is isomorphic to the modal system S4.
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  30. Manuel Bremer (2008). Why and How to Be a Dialetheist. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):208-227.
    In the first part the paper rehearses the main arguments why to be a dialetheist (i.e. why to assume that some contradictions are true). Dialetheism, however, has been criticised as irrational or self-refutating. Therefore the second part of the paper outlines one way to make dialetheism rational assertable. True contradictions turn out to be both believable and assertable. The argument proceeds by setting out basic principles of assertion and denial, and employing bivalent truth value operators.
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  31. Manuel Bremer (2007). Believing and Asserting Contradictions. Logique Et Analyse (200):341.
    The debate around “strong” paraconsistency or dialetheism (the view that there are true contradictions) has – apart from metaphysical concerns - centred on the questions whether dialetheism itself can be definitely asserted or has a unique truth value, and what it should mean, if it is possible at all, to believe a contradiction one knows to be contradictory (i.e. an explicit contradiction). And what should it mean, if it is possible at all, to assert a sentence one knows to be (...)
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  32. Sri Chandra (1983). Contradiction. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 10 (4):465.
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  33. Stephen R. L. Clark (2008). Deconstructing the Laws of Logic. Philosophy 83 (1):25-53.
    I consider reasons for questioning 'the laws of logic' (identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, and negation), and suggest that these laws do not accord with everyday reality. Either they are rhetorical tools rather than absolute truths, or else Plato and his successors were right to think that they identify a reality distinct from the ordinary world of experience, and also from the ultimate source of reality.
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  34. Pablo Cobreros (2010). Paraconsistent Vagueness: A Positive Argument. Synthese 183 (2):211-227.
    Paraconsistent approaches have received little attention in the literature on vagueness (at least compared to other proposals). The reason seems to be that many philosophers have found the idea that a contradiction might be true (or that a sentence and its negation might both be true) hard to swallow. Even advocates of paraconsistency on vagueness do not look very convinced when they consider this fact; since they seem to have spent more time arguing that paraconsistent theories are at least as (...)
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  35. John R. Cook (2005). Review of Doris Olin's Paradox. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review (6):422-424.
    Doris Olin's Paradox is a very helpful book for those who want to be introduced to the philosophical treatment of paradoxes, or for those who already have knowledge of the general area and would like to have a helpful resource book.
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  36. Maria L. Corte-Real (1991). On Contradiction. Analecta Husserliana 34:493.
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  37. N. C. A. da Costa (1989). In Contradiction. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (57):498.
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  38. Nicholas Denyer (1989). Dialetheism and Trivialization. Mind 98 (390):259-263.
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  39. Eric Dietrich & Julietta Rose (2009). The Paradox of Consciousness and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate. Logos Architekton 3 (1):7-37.
    Beginning with the paradoxes of zombie twins, we present an argument that dualism is both true and false. We show that avoiding this contradiction is impossible. Our diagnosis is that consciousness itself engenders this contradiction by producing contradictory points of view. This result has a large effect on the realism/anti-realism debate, namely, it suggests that this debate is intractable, and furthermore, it explains why this debate is intractable. We close with some comments on what our results mean for metaphysics and (...)
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  40. Bradley H. Dowden (1984). Accepting Inconsistencies From the Paradoxes. Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):125-30.
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  41. Manuel Dries (2010). On the Logic of Values. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 39 (1):30-50.
    This article argues that Nietzsche's transvaluation project refers not to a mere inversion or negation of a set of values but, instead, to a different conception of what a value is and how it functions. Traditional values function within a standard logical framework and claim legitimacy and bindingness based on exogenous authority with absolute extension. Nietzsche regards this framework as unnecessarily reductive in its attempted exclusion of contradiction and real opposition among competing values and proposes a nonstandard, dialetheic model of (...)
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  42. Du Ruji (1982). A Dialectical Contradiction is Not "a and Not-A". Chinese Studies in Philosophy 13 (4):3.
    Both "dialectical contradiction" and "logical contradiction" use the word "contradiction." This is misleading; it may easily lead people to believe that the word "contradiction" has only one meaning and thus confuse dialectical contradiction with logical contradiction. As a matter of fact, in dialectics and logic "contradiction" implies different things. "Contradiction" as used in dialectics refers to the two contradictory aspects in a thing. In contrast, "contradiction" as described in formal logic means the self-contradictoriness in thinking. For example, contradictions between the (...)
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  43. J. Michael Dunn (2000). Partiality and its Dual. Studia Logica 66 (1):5-40.
    This paper explores allowing truth value assignments to be undetermined or "partial" (no truth values) and overdetermined or "inconsistent" (both truth values), thus returning to an investigation of the four-valued semantics that I initiated in the sixties. I examine some natural consequence relations and show how they are related to existing logics, including ukasiewicz's three-valued logic, Kleene's three-valued logic, Anderson and Belnap's (first-degree) relevant entailments, Priest's "Logic of Paradox", and the first-degree fragment of the Dunn-McCall system "R-mingle". None of these (...)
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  44. William Dwyer (1972). The Contradiction of "The Contradiction of Determinism". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1):94.
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  45. P. Eldridge-Smith (2012). Pinocchio Beards the Barber. Analysis 72 (4):749-752.
    The Pinocchio paradox poses one dialetheia too many for semantic dialetheists (Eldridge-Smith 2011). However, Beall (2011) thinks that the Pinocchio scenario is merely an impossible story, like that of the village barber who shaves just those villagers who do not shave themselves. Meanwhile, Beall maintains that Liar paradoxes generate dialetheia. The Barber scenario is self-contradictory, yet the Pinocchio scenario requires a principle of truth for a contradiction. In this and other respects the Pinocchio paradox is a version of the Liar, (...)
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  46. Luis Estrada-González (2014). On the Possibility of Realist Dialetheism. SATS 15 (2):197-217.
    Realist dialetheism is the view that there are contradictions in reality. One argument against this idea says that it is impossible because it has to make room for the possibility of a trivial reality, which is metaphysically impossible. Another argument against it says that the metaphysical structure of reality is such that it is impossible to have contradictions in it. I argue here that both arguments fail to establish the impossibility of realist dialetheism because they are based on a misconception (...)
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  47. Elena Ficara (2013). Dialectic and Dialetheism. History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (1):35-52.
    In this article, I consider the possibility of interpreting Hegel’s dialectic as dialetheism. After a first basic recapitulation about the meaning of the words ‘dialetheism’ and ‘dialectic’ and a consideration of Priest’s own account of the relation between dialectical and dialetheic logic in 1989, I discuss some controversial issues, not directly considered by Priest. As a matter of fact, the reflection on paraconsistent logics and dialetheism has enormously grown in recent years. In addition, the reception of Hegel’s logic and metaphysics (...)
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  48. Danny Frederick (2011). Confusion About the Right to Life. The Reasoner 5 (1):4-5.
    I defend the consistency of affirming the right to life while rejecting universal healthcare and liveable income programmes. I also defend the rationality of accepting inconsistency.
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  49. Silvia Gaio (2006). The Principle of Non Contradiction. The Debate on Dialetheism. Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 35 (1-2).
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  50. Christian Godin (1997). Tensions et apories de l'encyclopédisme. Philosophiques 24 (2):285-298.
    L'idéal encyclopédique, qui est un idéal de totalité, se trouve pris dans quatre contradictions : celle du réel et du symbolique , celle de l'unité et de la multiplicité , celle de l'exhaustivité et du choix , celle de la fermeture et de l'ouverture . Ces contradictions ne peuvent être résolues : elles constituent la limite de l'encyclopédisme mais aussi sa grandeur.The encyclopaedic ideal, which is an ideal of describing totality, is caught in four contradictions: the contradiction of the real (...)
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