This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
39 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. F. de Vignemont (2004). The Co-Consciousness Hypothesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):97-114.
    Self-knowledge seems to be radically different from the knowledge of other people. However, rather than focusing on the gap between self and others, we should emphasize their commonality. Indeed, different mirror matching mechanisms have been found in monkeys as well as in humans showing that one uses the same representations for oneself and for the others. But do these shared representations allow one to report the mental states of others as if they were one''s own? I intend in this essay (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Fred Dretske (1973). Perception and Other Minds. Noûs 7 (March):34-44.
    We ordinarily speak of being able to see that there are people on the bus, Students in the class, And children playing in the street. If human beings are understood to be conscious entities, Then one of our ways of knowing that there are other conscious entities in the world besides ourselves is by seeing that there are. We also speak of seeing that he is angry, She is depressed, And so on. It is argued that this is, Indeed, One (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Nathalie A. Duddington (1921). Do We Know Other Minds Mediately or Immediately? Mind 30 (118):195-197.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Steven M. Duncan (2010). Seeing Other Minds. Seattle Critical Review (on Line) 1 (1):1-30.
    In this paper, I offer an account of our knowledge of other minds based on V. C. Aldrich's account of aesthetic perception, according to which there is a sense in which we literally see other minds.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Eva-Maria Engelen & Birgitt Röttger-Rössler (2012). Current Disciplinary and Interdisciplinary Debates on Empathy. Emotion Review 4 (1):3-8.
    Empathy as “Feelingly Grasping” Perhaps the central question concerning empathy is if and if so how it combines aspects of thinking and feeling. Indeed, the intellectual tradition of the past centuries has been marked by a dualism. Roughly speaking, there have been two pathways when it comes to understanding each other: 1) thinking or mind reading and 2) feeling or empathy. Nonetheless, one of the ongoing debates in psychology and philosophy concerns the question whether these two abilities, namely, understanding what (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Eva-Maria Engelen & Birgitt Röttger-Rössler (2012). Current Disciplinary and Interdisciplinary Debates on Empathy. Emotion Review 4 (1):3-8.
    Empathy as “Feelingly Grasping” Perhaps the central question concerning empathy is if and if so how it combines aspects of thinking and feeling. Indeed, the intellectual tradition of the past centuries has been marked by a dualism. Roughly speaking, there have been two pathways when it comes to understanding each other: 1) thinking or mind reading and 2) feeling or empathy. Nonetheless, one of the ongoing debates in psychology and philosophy concerns the question whether these two abilities, namely, understanding what (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Simon Glendinning (1998). On Being with Others: Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein. Routledge.
    On Being With Others is an outstanding and compelling work that uncovers one of the key questions in philosophy: how can we claim to have knowledge of minds other than our own? <span class='Hi'>Simon</span> Glendinning's fascinating analysis of this problem argues that it has polarized debate to such an extent that we do not know how to meet Wittgenstein's famous challenge that "to see the behavior of a living thing is to see its soul". This book sets out to discover (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Testimony and Other Minds. Erkenntnis:1-11.
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Anil Gomes (2011). Is There a Problem of Other Minds? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):353-373.
    Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Anil Gomes (2009). Other Minds and Perceived Identity. Dialectica 63 (2):219-230.
    Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 'conceptual problem' does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Mitchell Green (2010). Perceiving Emotions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61.
    I argue that it is possible literally to perceive the emotions of others. This account depends upon the possibility of perceiving a whole by perceiving one or more of its parts, and upon the view that emotions are complexes. After developing this account, I expound and reply to Rowland Stout's challenge to it. Stout is nevertheless sympathetic with the perceivability-of-emotions view. I thus scrutinize Stout's suggestion for a better defence of that view than I have provided, and offer a refinement (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Mitchell S. Green (2008). Expression, Indication and Showing What's Within. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (3):389 - 398.
    This essay offers a constructive criticism of Part I of Davis’ Meaning, Expression and Thought. After a brief exposition, in Sect. 2, of the main points of the theory that will concern us, I raise a challenge in Sect. 3 for the characterization of expression that is so central to his program. I argue first of all that a sincere expression of a thought, feeling, or mood shows it. Yet attention to this fact reveals that it does not go without (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Mitchell S. Green (2007). Self-Expression. Oxford University Press.
    Mitchell S. Green presents a systematic philosophical study of self-expression - a pervasive phenomenon of the everyday life of humans and other species, which has received scant attention in its own right. He explores the ways in which self-expression reveals our states of thought, feeling, and experience, and he defends striking new theses concerning a wide range of fascinating topics: our ability to perceive emotion in others, artistic expression, empathy, expressive language, meaning, facial expression, and speech acts. He draws on (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Joshua C. Gregory (1920). Do We Know Other Minds Mediately or Immediately? Mind 29 (116):446-457.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Joel Krueger & Søren Overgaard (forthcoming). Seeing Subjectivity: Defending a Perceptual Account of Other Minds. Protosociology.
    The problem of other minds has a distinguished philosophical history stretching back more than two hundred years. Taken at face value, it is an epistemological question: it concerns how we can have knowledge of, or at least justified belief in, the existence of minds other than our own. In recent decades, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and primatologists have debated a related question: how we actually go about attributing mental states to others (regardless of whether we ever achieve knowledge or rational (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Helge Malmgren (1976). Immediate Knowledge of Other Minds. Theoria 42 (1-3):189-205.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Benjamin McMyler (2011). Believing What the Man Says About His Own Feelings. In Martin Gustafsson Richard Sorli (ed.), The Philosophy of J. L. Austin. Oxford University Press.
  18. William E. S. McNeill (forthcoming). Inferentialism and Our Knowledge of Others' Minds. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Our knowledge of each others’ mental features is sometimes epistemically basic or non-inferential. The alternative to this claim is Inferentialism, the view that such knowledge is always epistemically inferential. Here, I argue that Inferentialism is not plausible. My argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. Given the nature of the task involved in recognizing what mental features others have on particular occasions, and our capacity to perform that task, we should not expect always to find good (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. William E. S. McNeill (2012). Embodiment and the Perceptual Hypothesis. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):569 - 591.
    The Perceptual Hypothesis is that we sometimes see, and thereby have non-inferential knowledge of, others' mental features. The Perceptual Hypothesis opposes Inferentialism, which is the view that our knowledge of others' mental features is always inferential. The claim that some mental features are embodied is the claim that some mental features are realised by states or processes that extend beyond the brain. The view I discuss here is that the Perceptual Hypothesis is plausible if, but only if, the mental features (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. William E. S. McNeill (2012). On Seeing That Someone is Angry. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):575-597.
    Abstract: Some propose that the question of how you know that James is angry can be adequately answered with the claim that you see that James is angry. Call this the Perceptual Hypothesis. Here, I examine that hypothesis. I argue that there are two different ways in which the Perceptual Hypothesis could be made true. You might see that James is angry by seeing his bodily features. Alternatively, you might see that James is angry by seeing his anger. If you (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Søren Overgaard (2007). Wittgenstein and Other Minds: Rethinking Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity with Wittgenstein, Levinas, and Husserl. Routledge.
    A compelling new approach to the problem that has haunted twentieth century philosophy in both its analytical and continental shapes. No other book addresses as thoroughly the parallels between Wittgenstein and leading Continental philosophers such as Levinas, Husserl, and Heidegger.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Søren Overgaard (2005). Rethinking Other Minds: Wittgenstein and Levinas on Expression. Inquiry 48 (3):249 – 274.
    One reason why the problem of other minds keeps cropping up in modern philosophy is that we seem to have conflicting intuitions about our access to the mental lives of others. On the one hand, we are inclined to think that it is wrong to claim, like Cartesian dualists must, that the minds of others are essentially inaccessible to direct experience. But on the other hand we feel that it is equally wrong to claim, like the behaviorists, that the mental (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Hanna Pickard (2003). Emotions and the Problem of Other Minds. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press. 87-103.
    The problem of other minds is a collection of problems centering upon the extent to which our belief in other minds or other's minds can be justified. Swedish psychologist, Gunnar Borg has developed a principle called "the range principle" which helps fill out our "knowledge" of other minds. Borg developed this principle partly in response to the skeptical challenge of Harvard psychophysicist S S Stevens. Stevens claimed that the intersubjective comparison of experience was scientifically impossible. Borg postulates that the range (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. H. H. Price (1938). Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds. Philosophy 13 (52):425-56.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Mark Sacks (2005). Sartre, Strawson and Others. Inquiry 48 (3):275-299.
    This paper compares the treatment of other minds in Strawson and Sartre. Both discussions are presented here as transcendental arguments, and some striking parallels between them are brought out. However the primary significance of the alignment lies in the difference that emerges between two forms of transcendental proof, with the phenomenological treatment in Sartre promising to yield a stronger conclusion than Strawson's argument. The paper goes some way towards bringing out this difference.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Charles Sayward (2005). Thompson Clarke and the Problem of Other Minds. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (1):1-14.
    The force of sceptical inquiries into out knowledge of other people is a paradigm of the force that philosophical views can have. Sceptical views arise out of philosophical inquiries that are identical in all major respects with inquiries that we employ in ordinary cases. These inquiries employ perfectly mundane methods of making and assessing claims to know. This paper tries to show that these inquiries are conducted in cases that lack certain contextual ingredients found in ordinary cases. The paper concludes (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Mark F. Sharlow, Subjective Facts and Other Minds: Readings in From Brain to Cosmos.
    This document consists primarily of an excerpt (chapter 6) from the author’s book From Brain to Cosmos. That excerpt presents an analysis of the problem of knowledge of other minds, using the concept of subjective fact that the author developed earlier in the book. (Readers unfamiliar with that concept are strongly advised to read chapters 2 and 3 of From Brain to Cosmos first. See the last page of this document for details on how to obtain those chapters.).
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Barry C. Smith (2010). Speech Sounds and the Direct Meeting of Minds. In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), New Essays on Sound and Perception. Oxford University Press.
  29. Joel Smith, Perceptual Recognition, Emotion, and Value.
    I outline an account of perceptual knowledge and assess the extent to which it can be employed in a defence of perceptual accounts of emotion and value recognition. I argue that considerations ruling out lucky knowledge give us some reason to doubt its prospects in the case of value recognition. I also discuss recent empirical work on cultural and contextual influences on emotional expression, arguing that a perceptual account value recognition is consistent with current evidence.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Joel Smith, Vision and the Ontology of Emotion and Expression.
    I offer an account of the ontology of emotions and their expressions, drawing some morals for the view that we can see others' emotions in virtue of seeing their expressions.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Joel Smith (2013). The Phenomenology of Face‐to‐Face Mindreading. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):n/a-n/a.
    I defend a perceptual account of face-to-face mindreading. I begin by proposing a phenomenological constraint on our visual awareness of others' emotional expressions. I argue that to meet this constraint we require a distinction between the basic and non-basic ways people, and other things, look. I offer and defend just such an account.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Joel Smith (2010). Seeing Other People. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):731-748.
    I present a perceptual account of other minds that combines a Husserlian insight about perceptual experience with a functionalist account of mental properties.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Shannon Spaulding (forthcoming). On Whether We Can See Intentions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others’ mental states, i.e., that we perceive others’ mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Asa Maria Wikforss (2004). Direct Knowledge and Other Minds. Theoria 70 (2-3):271-293.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Dan Zahavi (2008). Simulation, Projection and Empathy. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):514-522.
    Simulationists have recently started to employ the term "empathy" when characterizing our most basic understanding of other minds. I agree that empathy is crucial, but I think it is being misconstrued by the simulationists. Using some ideas to be found in Scheler's classical discussion of empathy, I will argue for a different understanding of the notion. More specifically, I will argue that there are basic levels of interpersonal understanding - in particular the understanding of emotional expressions - that are not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Edoardo Zamuner (2011). A Theory of Affect Perception. Mind and Language 26 (4):436-451.
    What do we see when we look at someone's expression of fear? I argue that one of the things that we see is fear itself. I support this view by developing a theory of affect perception. The theory involves two claims. One is that expressions are patterns of facial changes that carry information about affects. The other is that the visual system extracts and processes such information. In particular, I argue that the visual system functions to detect the affects of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Edoardo Zamuner, “Perception of Other People’s Emotions”. ASCS09.
    In this paper I argue that one of the functions of the perceptual system is to detect other people’s emotions when they are expressed in the face. I support this view by developing two separate but interdependent accounts. The first says that facial expressions of emotions carry information about the emotions that produced them, and about some of their properties. The second says that the visual system functions to extract the information that expressions carry about emotions.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Edoardo Zamuner (2008). “Face Value. Perception and Knowledge Others’ Happiness”. In Lisa Bortolotti (ed.), The Philosophy of Happiness. Palgrave.
    Happiness, like other basic emotions, has visual properties that create the conditions for happiness to be perceived in others. This is to say that happiness is perceivable. Its visual properties are to be identified with those facial expressions that are characteristic of happiness. Yet saying that something is perceivable does not suffice for us to conclude that it is perceived. We therefore need to show that happiness is perceived. Empirical evidence suggests that the visual system functions to perceive happiness as (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Edoardo Zamuner (ed.) (2004). Wittgenstein on the Fallacy of the Argument From Pretence. Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society.
    This paper is concerned with the answer Wittgenstein gives to a specific version of the sceptical problem of other minds. The sceptic claims that the expressions of feelings and emotions can always be pretended. Wittgenstein contrasts this idea with two arguments. The first argument shows that other-ascriptions of psychological states are justified by experience of the satisfaction of criteria. The second argument shows that if one accepts the conclusion of the first argument, then one is compelled to accept the idea (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation