Bookmark and Share

Discriminability

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
54 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 54
  1. Tim Black (2011). Review of John McDowell, Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  2. Bill Brewer (1995). Learning From Experience: A Commentary on Baddeley and Weiskrantz (Eds.), Attention: Selection, Awareness, and Control. Mind and Language 10 (1-2):181-193.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. John A. Burgess (1990). Phenomenal Qualities and the Nontransitivity of Matching. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):206-220.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Philippe Chuard (2010). Non-Transitive Looks & Fallibilism. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):161 - 200.
    Fallibilists about looks deny that the relation of looking the same as is non-transitive. Regarding familiar examples of coloured patches suggesting that such a relation is non-transitive, they argue that, in fact, indiscriminable adjacent patches may well look different, despite their perceptual indiscriminability: it’s just that we cannot notice the relevant differences in the chromatic appearances of such patches. In this paper, I present an argument that fallibilism about looks requires commitment to an empirically false consequence. To succeed in deflecting (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Philippe Chuard (2007). Indiscriminable Shades and Demonstrative Concepts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):277 – 306.
    Conceptualists have it that the representational content of perceptual experience is determined by the concepts a subject applies in having such an experience. Conceptualists like Bill Brewer [1999] and John McDowell [1994] have laid particular emphasis on demonstrative concepts in trying to account for the fact that subjects can perceive and discriminate very many specific shades of colour in experience. Against this, it has been objected that such demonstrative concepts have incoherent conditions of extension and/or of individuation, due to the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Philippe Chuard & Richard Corry, Looks Non-Transitive!
    Suppose you are presented with three red objects. You are then asked to take a careful look at each possible pair of objects, and to decide whether or not their members look chromatically the same. You carry out the instructions thoroughly, and the following propositions sum up the results of your empirical investigation: <blockquote> i. red object #1 looks the same in colour as red object #2. </blockquote> ii. red object #2 looks the same in colour as red object #3.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Austen Clark (1992). Sensory Qualities. Clarendon.
    Drawing on work in psychophysics, psychometrics, and sensory neurophysiology, Clark analyzes the character and defends the integrity of psychophysical explanations of qualitative facts, arguing that the structure of such explanations is sound and potentially successful.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Ariel Cohen (2008). Indiscriminability as Indiscernibility by Default. Studia Logica 90 (3):369 - 383.
    Most solutions to the sorites reject its major premise, i.e. the quantified conditional . This rejection appears to imply a discrimination between two elements that are supposed to be indiscriminable. Thus, the puzzle of the sorites involves in a fundamental way the notion of indiscriminability. This paper analyzes this relation and formalizes it, in a way that makes the rejection of the major premise more palatable. The intuitive idea is that we consider two elements indiscriminable by default, i.e. unless we (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Arthur C. Danto (1999). Indiscernibility and Perception: A Reply to Joseph Margolis. British Journal of Aesthetics 39 (4):321-329.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Rafael de Clercq & Leon Horsten (2004). Perceptual Indiscriminability: In Defence of Wright's Proof. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):439-444.
    A series of unnoticeably small changes in an observable property may add up to a noticeable change. Crispin Wright has used this fact to prove that perceptual indiscriminability is a non-transitive relation. Delia Graff has recently argued that there is a 'tension' between Wright's assumptions. But Graff has misunderstood one of these, that 'phenomenal continua' are possible; and the other, that our powers of discrimination are finite, is sound. If the first assumption is properly understood, it is not in tension (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Max Deutsch (2005). Intentionalism and Intransitivity. Synthese 144 (1):1-22.
    I argue in this paper that the existence of sorites series of color patches – series of color patches arranged so that the patches on each end look different in color though no two adjacent patches do – shows that the relation of same phenomenal charac­ter as is not a transitive relation. I then argue that the intransitivity of same phenomenal character as conflicts with certain versions of intentionalism, the view that an experiences phenomenal character is exhausted, or fully determined (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Dalia Drai (2007). The Phenomenal Sorites and Response Dependence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):619 – 631.
    Since Nelson Goodman 1951, the assumption that phenomenal indiscriminability is non-transitive is taken generally for granted. Moreover, this assumption was used (by Goodman 1951, Travis 1985, Dummett 1975 and others) to argue against the existence or coherence of subjective and/or observational properties. Recently, however, the assumption has been questioned [Fara 2001] and I agree with Fara that the assumption is much more problematic than was thought, partly because it is not clear what is meant by the relation of phenomenal indiscriminability, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Katalin Farkas (2006). Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.
    Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of indiscriminability, and for considerations (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Marina Folescu (forthcoming). Perceiving Bodies Immediately: Thomas Reid's Insight. History of Philosophy Quarterly 32 (1).
    In An Inquiry into the Human Mind and in Essays on Intellectual Powers, Thomas Reid discusses what kinds of things perceivers are related to in perception. Are these things qualities of bodies, the bodies themselves, or both? This question places him in a long tradition of philosophers concerned with understanding how human perception works in connecting us with the external world. It is still an open question in the philosophy of perception whether the human perceptual system is providing us with (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Sanford C. Goldberg (2006). Brown on Self-Knowledge and Discriminability. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):301�314.
    In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Jeremy Goodman (2013). Inexact Knowledge Without Improbable Knowing. Inquiry 56 (1):30-53.
    In a series of recent papers, Timothy Williamson has argued for the surprising conclusion that there are cases in which you know a proposition in spite of its being overwhelmingly improbable given what you know that you know it. His argument relies on certain formal models of our imprecise knowledge of the values of perceptible and measurable magnitudes. This paper suggests an alternative class of models that do not predict this sort of improbable knowing. I show that such models are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Patrick Greenough (2012). Discrimination and Self-Knowledge. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper I show that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, I offer a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by Williamson (2000) and show that this weaker conception, together with some plausible background assumptions, is not only able to undermine the claim that our core mental states are luminous (roughly: if one is in such a state then one is in a position to know that one is) but (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.) (2008). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  19. Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (2008). Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Norwood Russell Hanson (1960). On Having the Same Visual Experiences. Mind 69 (July):340-350.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Benj Hellie (2010). An Extenalist's Guide to Inner Experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. 97.
    Let's be externalists about perceptual consciousness and think the form of veridical perceptual consciousness includes /seeing this or that mind-independent particular and its colors/. Let's also take internalism seriously, granting that spectral inversion and hallucination can be "phenomenally" the same as normal seeing. Then perceptual consciousness and phenomenality are different, and so we need to say how they are related. It's complicated!<br><br>Phenomenal sameness is (against all odds) /reflective indiscriminability/. I build a "displaced perception" account of reflection on which indiscriminability stems (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Benj Hellie (2005). Noise and Perceptual Indiscriminability. Mind 114 (455):481-508.
    Perception represents colours inexactly. This inexactness results from phenomenally manifest noise, and results in apparent violations of the transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. Whether these violations are genuine depends on what is meant by 'transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability'.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Frank Jackson & R. J. Pinkerton (1973). On an Argument Against Sensory Items. Mind 82 (326):269-72.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. René Jagnow (2012). Colour Discrimination And Monitoring Theories of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):57 - 74.
    According to the monitoring theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious in virtue of being represented in the right way by a monitoring state. David Rosenthal, William Lycan, and Uriah Kriegel have developed three different influential versions of this theory. In order to explain colour experiences, each of these authors combines his version of the monitoring theory of consciousness with a specific account of colour representation. Even though Rosenthal, Lycan, and Kriegel disagree on the specifics, they all hold that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Ryota Kanai, Vincent Walsh & Chia-Huei Tseng (2010). Subjective Discriminability of Invisibility: A Framework for Distinguishing Perceptual and Attentional Failures of Awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1045-1057.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Rosanna Keefe (2011). Phenomenal Sorites Paradoxes and Looking the Same. Dialectica 65 (3):327-344.
    Taking a series of colour patches, starting with one that clearly looks red, and making each so similar in colour to the previous one that it looks the same as it, we appear to be able to show that a yellow patch looks red. I ask whether phenomenal sorites paradoxes, such as this, are subject to a unique kind of solution that is unavailable in relation to other sorites paradoxes. I argue that they do not need such a solution, nor (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Carroll Lewis (1973). On Undetectable Differences in Sensations. Analysis 33 (June):193-194.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Bernard Linsky (1984). Phenomenal Qualities and the Identity of Indistinguishables. Synthese 59 (June):363-380.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Pete Mandik (2012). Color-Consciousness Conceptualism. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
    The goal of the present paper is to defend against a certain line of attack the view that conscious experience of <span class='Hi'>color</span> is no more fine-grained that the repertoire of non- demonstrative concepts that a perceiver is able to bring to bear in perception. The line of attack in question is an alleged empirical argument - the Diachronic Indistinguishability Argument (DIA) - based on pairs of colors so similar that they can be discriminated when simultaneously presented but not when (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Pete Mandik (2012). Mental Colors, Conceptual Overlap, and Discriminating Knowledge of Particulars. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):641-643.
    I respond to the separate commentaries by Jacob Berger, Charlie Pelling, and David Pereplyotchik on my paper, “Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.” I resist Berger’s suggestion that mental colors ever enter consciousness without accompaniment by deployments of concepts of their extra-mental counterparts. I express concerns about Pelling’s proposal that a more uniform conceptualist treatment of phenomenal sorites can be gained by a simple appeal to the partial overlap of the extensions of some concepts. I question the relevance to perceptual consciousness of the arguments (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Michael G. F. Martin (2004). The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
    The disjunctive theory of perception claims that we should understand statements about how things appear to a perceiver to be equivalent to statements of a disjunction that either one is perceiving such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination); and that such statements are not to be viewed as introducing a report of a distinctive mental event or state common to these various disjoint situations. When Michael Hinton first introduced the idea, he suggested that the burden of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Eugene O. Mills (2002). Fallibility and the Phenomenal Sorites. Noûs 36 (3):384-407.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Bence Nanay (2009). Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717.
    According to the Ability Hypothesis, knowing what it is like to have experience E is just having the ability to imagine or recognize or remember having experience E. I examine various versions of the Ability Hypothesis and point out that they all face serious objections. Then I propose a new version that is not vulnerable to these objections: knowing what it is like to experience E is having the ability todiscriminate imagining or having experience E from imagining or having any (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Charles Pelling (2008). Exactness, Inexactness, and the Non-Transitivity of Perceptual Indiscriminability. Synthese 164 (2):289 - 312.
    I defend, to a certain extent, the traditional view that perceptual indiscriminability is non-transitive. The argument proceeds by considering important recent work by Benj Hellie: Hellie argues that colour perception represents ‘inexactly’, and that this results in violations of the transitivity of colour indiscriminability. I show that Hellie’s argument remains inconclusive, since he does not demonstrate conclusively that colour perception really does represent inexactly. My own argument for the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability uses inexactness instead as one horn of a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Charlie Pelling (2011). Characterizing Hallucination Epistemically. Synthese 178 (3):437 - 459.
    According to the epistemic theory of hallucination, the fundamental psychological nature of a hallucinatory experience is constituted by its being 'introspectively indiscriminable', in some sense, from a veridical experience of a corresponding type. How is the notion of introspective indiscriminability to which the epistemic theory appeals best construed? Following M. G. F. Martin, the standard assumption is that the notion should be construed in terms of negative epistemics: in particular, it is assumed that the notion should be explained in terms (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Charlie Pelling (2007). Conceptualism and the (Supposed) Non-Transitivity of Colour Indiscriminability. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):211 - 234.
    In this paper, I argue that those who accept the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception should reject the traditional view that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive. I start by outlining the general strategy that conceptualists have adopted in response to the familiar ‘fineness of grain’ objection, and I show why a commitment to what I call the indiscriminability claim seems to form a natural part of this strategy. I then show how together, the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Casey Perin (2005). Academic Arguments for the Indiscernibility Thesis. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):493-517.
    The Academics offered an argument from twins or perceptually indiscernible objects and an argument from dreams or madness in support of the indiscernibility thesis: that every true perceptual impression is such that some false impression just like it is possible. I claim that these arguments, unlike modern sceptical arguments, are supposed to establish mere counterfactual rather than epistemic possibilities. They purport to show that for any true perceptual impression j, there are a number of alternative causal histories j might have (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Ian Phillips (2011). Indiscriminability and Experience of Change. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):808 - 827.
    It is obvious both that some changes are too small for us to perceive and that we can perceive constant motion. Yet according to Fara, these two facts are in conflict, and one must be rejected. I show that conflict arises only from accepting a `zoëtrope conception' of change experience, according to which change experience is analysed in terms of a series of very short-lived sensory atoms, each lacking in dynamic content. On pain of denying the phenomenologically obvious, we must (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Duncan Pritchard (2010). Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination. Noûs 44 (2):245-268.
    This paper examines the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination in the light of the so-called ‘relevant alternatives’ intuition. It begins by outlining an intuitive relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge which incorporates the insight that there is a close connection between perceptual knowledge and the possession of relevant discriminatory abilities. It is argued, however, that in order to resolve certain problems that face this view, it is essential to recognise an important distinction between favouring and discriminating epistemic support that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. W. V. Quine (1976). Grades of Discriminability. Journal of Philosophy 73 (5):113-116.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Diana Raffman, Nontransitivity, Indiscriminability, and Looking the Same.
  42. Diana Raffman (2011). Vagueness and Observationality. In Giuseppina Ronzitti (ed.), Vagueness: A Guide. Springer Verlag. 107--121.
    Of the many families of words that are thought to be vague, so-called observational predicates may be both the most fascinating and the most confounding. Roughly, observational predicates are terms that apply to objects on the basis of how those objects appear to us perceptually speaking. ‘Red’, ‘loud’, ‘sweet’, ‘acrid’, and ‘smooth’ are good examples. Delia Graff explains that a “predicate is observational just in case its applicability to an object (given a fixed context of evaluation) depends only on the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Diana Raffman (2000). Is Perceptual Indiscriminability Nontransitive? Philosophical Topics 28 (1):153-75.
    It is widely supposed that one family of sorites paradoxes, perhaps the most perplexing versions of the puzzle, owe at least in part to the nontransitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. To a first approximation, perceptual indiscriminability is the relationship obtaining among objects (stimuli) that appear identical in some perceptual respect—for example hue, or pitch, or texture. Indiscriminable objects look the same, or sound the same, or feel the same. Received wisdom has it that there are or could be series of objects (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Diana Raffman (1995). On the Persistence of Phenomenology. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. 293–308.
    In Thomas Metzinger, Conscious Experience, Schoningh Verlag. 1995. [ online ].
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Giuseppina Ronzitti (ed.) (2011). Vagueness: A Guide. Springer Verlag.
    This volume analyzes and studies how vagueness occurs and matters as a specific problem in the context of theories that are primarily about something else.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Sydney Shoemaker (1975). Phenomenal Similarity. Critica 7 (October):3-37.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Susanna Siegel (2008). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 205--224.
    Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic treatments of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Susanna Siegel (2004). Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):91-112.
    In this paper, I describe and criticize M.G.F. Martin's version of disjunctivism, and his argument for it from premises about self-knowledge.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. A. D. Smith (2008). Disjunctivism and Discriminability. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Disjunctivism is the focus of a lively debate spanning the philosophy of perception, epistemology, and the philosophy of action. Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson present 17 specially written essays, which examine the different forms of disjunctivism and explore the connections between them.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Wilard Van Quine (1976). Grades of Discriminability. Journal of Philosophy 73:113--6.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 54