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The Concept of Disease in Philosophy of Science, Misc

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Mental disorders in entangled brains.Awais Aftab - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):583-595.

In this commentary on Anneli Jefferson’s book “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?,” I offer an overview of her central thesis, and then propose my own modified account of when we are justified in calling mental disorders as “brain disorders.” In doing so, I draw on recent work in neuroscience that understands the relationship between brain and behavior in complex, dynamic, and computational terms. In particular, I disagree with Jefferson’s criterion of sufficiency, that a particular brain process should always realize a (...)

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Disease: An Ill-Founded Concept at Odds with the Principle of Patient-Centred Medicine.Arandjelovic Ognjen - forthcoming - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice.

Background: Despite the at least decades long record of philosophical recognition and interest, the intricacy of the deceptively familiar appearing concepts of ‘disease’, ‘disorder’, ‘disability’, etc., has only recently begun showing itself with clarity in the popular discourse wherein its newly emerging prominence stems from the liberties and restrictions contingent upon it. Whether a person is deemed to be afflicted by a disease or a disorder governs their ability to access health care, be it free at the point of use (...)

Disability in Applied Ethics

Health in Philosophy of Science, Misc

Health Care Rights in Applied Ethics

The Concept of Disease in Philosophy of Science, Misc

Natural Sciences

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An account of medical treatment, with a preliminary account of medical conditions.Steven Tresker - 2023 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 44 (6):607-633.

In this article, I present a philosophical account of medical treatment. In support of this account, I offer a suggestive account of medical conditions. The account of medical treatment uses three desiderata to demarcate treatment from non-treatment. Namely, a treatment should: (1) be describable by features that enable it to be standardized and characterized as a discrete intervention, (2) target a specific medical condition, and (3) have the possibility of being effective. The account of medical conditions underlies the second desideratum (...)

Disease, Misc in Philosophy of Science, Misc

The Concept of Disease in Philosophy of Science, Misc

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The biopsychosocial model: Its use and abuse.Alex Roberts - 2023 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 26 (3):367-384.

The biopsychosocial model (BPSM) is increasingly influential in medical research and practice. Several philosophers and scholars of health have criticized the BPSM for lacking meaningful scientific content. This article extends those critiques by showing how the BPSM’s epistemic weaknesses have led to certain problems in medical discourse. Despite its lack of content, many researchers have mistaken the BPSM for a scientific model with explanatory power. This misapprehension has placed researchers in an implicit bind. There is an expectation that applications of (...)

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A remarkable American work upon evolution and the germ theory of disease.Edward Bagnall Poulton - 1913 - London,: Printed by Taylor and Francis.

Evolutionary Biology in Philosophy of Biology

The Concept of Disease in Philosophy of Science, Misc

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Medical Disorder Is Not a Black Box Essentialist Concept.Harriet Fagerberg - 2023 - Philosophy of Medicine 4 (1).

Defining Mental Disorder: Jerome Wakefield and His Critics, edited by Denis Forest and Luc Faucher, is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of medicine whose work is informed by that of Jerome Wakefield, or the disease debate in general. If you are anything like me, this book will open the door to a new depth of understanding of the harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) and its methodical underpinnings, and an enriched appreciation of what is at stake in defining medical (...)

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What Is Psychiatry About?Dominic Murphy - 2023 - Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 30 (1):41-43.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What Is Psychiatry About?Dominic Murphy, PhD (bio)There are no such things as minds, but there are animate objects who behave differently from other types of natural entity. They move around under their own power, and some of their activity seems to be very different from that of other natural objects. Furthermore, some of our predictions about these objects are disproved in interesting ways; if we make a false prediction (...) we do not revise our best theory about how such things generally behave, but we instead conclude that there is something wrong with the object of the prediction. These intelligent unpredictable things need a special vocabulary, and mental talk has arisen to serve as that vocabulary. But since a mind is not a thing in nature we face the problem of saying what the sciences of the mind are actually about.There are, then, intelligent systems that can be judged pathological, and some of them are our conspecifics. It is fair to say that there is no agreement about how such judgments are made or should be made. The question of what a mental illness is part of this larger picture, and it raises several different issues.First, how should we think about our practices of judging deviance? It would be contrary to accepted practice to wear a swimsuit to a state funeral, but what sort of norms would it violate and what state of mind would we ascribe to somebody who did it? Second, what is the difference between a judgment of deviance and a judgment of pathology? We have many ways of distinguishing between types of deviance, and the lines between criminality, immorality and pathology, to take three examples, are not always easy to discern. Third, what makes an illness a mental illness? This is Gough's topic, and I will get to it in a moment, but it worth situating it within this broader framework which asks what we are doing when we make these judgments of norm-violation.Gough begins by quite correctly pointing out that if we look at the domain of psychiatry as currently understood, we would have a hard time seeing what it is supposed to be the science of. It is customary to see psychiatry as dealing with the mental but, as Gough notes, there are some mental processes that psychiatry does not deal with, and some processes that psychiatry deals with that are not mental. Gough's response to this problem is a very interesting one, which starts from the idea that the point of psychiatry is to help those who need it; how different do things look if we start from this position? Conley and Glackin (2021) argues that the practical and therapeutic aspirations of psychiatry should constrain our understanding of mental illness. Glackin argues that we should [End Page 41] see this 'norms-first' view, as I will call it, as part of a broader liberal-democratic conversation about the ways in which we should live togetherA view that starts with norms is typically opposed to the 'naturalist' position. A naturalist begins with positive facts as the basis for diagnostic concepts, on the grounds that our concepts of disease and health are supposed to answer to facts about the physical and mental constitution of human beings. Gough's view is neither a norms-first view or a naturalist's view. We could call it an institutionalist view, or, if we were being a bit less kind, an ostensive one—"these things here, that's mental illness."David Hull (1988) taught us that every science (indeed, every intellectual formation or tradition) needs to be understood in two ways. First, we have the theoretical commitments that are taken to define it. Second, there are the practices and institutions that separate its practitioners off from others. Contemporary evolutionary biology, for instance, is built on the twin foundations of the modern synthesis—Darwinian natural selection and Mendelian genetics. These two theoretical commitments have been transformed and adapted and supplemented in diverse ways so that their modern forms no longer resemble their originals very closely. Still, they continue as the central undertakings about the nature of the living world that modern... (shrink)

Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

The Concept of Disease in Philosophy of Science, Misc

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Minding Psychiatric Practice.Paul B. Lieberman - 2023 - Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 30 (1):37-39.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Minding Psychiatric PracticePaul B. Lieberman, MD (bio)In recent discussions of what makes or should make something 'a psychiatric disorder' (if anything does; Lange, 2007), attention and contention have mostly involved problems distinguishing disorder from normal life, expectable suffering, neurological disease, criminality, prejudice, error, religious experience and effects of injustice, but the question of what makes or should make something psychiatric is also important and difficult to answer. It's important (...) because general conceptions of what kinds of things we treat (e.g., disorders of the heart, brain, or mind) guide practice by specifying what constitutes, nurtures or poisons them, ways they may break apart or be repaired and processes that produce change, as well as by helping to draw appropriate boundaries between psychiatry and other fields. It's difficult because psychiatry comprises many kinds of objects, theories and forms of practice (primarily biomedical, psychodynamic and cognitive behavioral), and we don't know which, if any, are 'natural' or valid. It's also not established whether or why all or any should be called, 'psychiatric,' what explains their being so-called (if it is correct to do so), or which may be fundamental or constitutive and which derivative and potentially eliminable.One appealing answer (the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM] an swer; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) to the question of what makes something psychiatric is that it is mental in some essential way. But few psychiatrists could explain what that might mean, nor would many be able to say what a mental disorder is or defend the idea that the conditions they work with are (always?) such things (though many probably wouldn't deny it either; they wouldn't know what to say and most wouldn't think it mattered). But if the idea that 'psychiatric disorders are essentially mental' seems obvious yet unclear to psychiatrists, what's the alternative? And if no alternative leaps to mind, then are psychiatrists practicing without knowing what they're treating?In "What makes a disorder 'mental'? A practical treatment of psychiatric disorder," Joseph Gough (2023) addresses these problems with two bold proposals: first, that we abandon altogether using 'mental' (assuming we understand its meaning) in the definition of 'psychiatric disorder,' and, second, that we, instead, define psychiatric disorders as those conditions best treated by psychiatrists (including psychologists, social workers, nurses and other practitioners).To a psychiatrist, these proposals seem, both, a welcome validation of our work ("At last, someone appreciates us!"), but also a troubling destabilization of how we understand that work ("That can't be right: it's backwards!") In Gough's [End Page 37] wide-ranging and carefully reasoned defense of his two proposals, he offers many novel and provocative insights relevant to problems defining psychiatric disorders. I will consider only a few of the issues he raises, which I think are especially worth emphasis and further thought.Gough initially rejects mentality in the definition of psychiatric disorder by reminding us that it is neither sufficient nor necessary for inclusion in the DSM. Vision is mental but blindness is not in the manual; caffeinism and erectile dysfunction are not mental but are included. Later, he offers two additional reasons for abandoning mentality: it promotes stigma and encourages dualism. I think all these arguments are correct. (Although blindness is not the best example because DSM defines mental disorders as disturbances of "thought, feeling and behavior" and blindness is none of these. But many other examples (e.g., encephalopathies) could make the point.)But Gough passes over this issue too quickly: we should pause and consider more carefully possible reasons to keep or even privilege the mental in psychiatry as well as the losses we might suffer if we gave it up. The examples and arguments he offers for abandoning the mental could be contested if one were motivated to do so. For example, one could argue, as Gough does elsewhere, that the DSM is just wrong sometimes and should be revised. Perhaps, as Gough briefly considers, there is a subset of 'mental' disorders that are properly psychiatric (where, e.g., certain favored features such as meaning, agency, narrative, or connection of 'self and world' are preserved, and... (shrink)

Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

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Narcissism A Focal Point for Examining the Interrelatedness of Psychology and Philosophy.Lydia Amir - 2023 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 30 (2):169-172.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Narcissism A Focal Point for Examining the Interrelatedness of Psychology and PhilosophyLydia Amir, PhD (bio)In a groundbreaking article, Aleksandar Fatic challenges the view that mental health is to be dissociated from morality or ethics. His argument targets cluster B personality disorders, such as Borderline and Narcissistic Personality Disorders, but focuses mainly on narcissistic disorders, whether diagnosed or not. Although these persons are not exempt of moral and legal responsibility, (...) they are diagnosed by and relegated to the mental health system, which is often ineffective in treating them. Fatic suggests that addressing their faulty morality is the best policy. In my commentary of his article, I further probe the viability and desirability of doing so. I point to narcissism as a focal point for examining the necessary impact of psychology and philosophy insofar as psychologists may be considered experts in emotions and philosophers in normative ethics. I question the interest in any ethics that does not also supply the means of its implementation and suggest that narcissists may have a morality of their own, ethical egoism.As psychiatrist Bennett Simon notes, Socrates did not inquire into the mental health field; his presence is missed as the questions, “what is mental illness?” and “what are psychiatry and psychiatrists?” are not addressed. It follows that it is up to us, as Simon attempts to do in the first chapter of Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece: The Classical Roots of Modern Psychiatry (1978), to define the psychiatrist’s proper area of professional competence (p. 28). That which makes matters even more confusing, he notes, is that psychiatrists are only one group of professionals who deal with the “mentally ill” and that they are “far from unanimous” about which problems “pertain to their particular sphere” (Simon, 1978, p. 29). He thus lists a variety of problems which “a glance at both popular and professional literature…reveals that at one time or another, psychiatrists have claimed [End Page 169] (sometimes by public demand) for their proper sphere” (Simon, 1978, p. 29). Among them is the issue that Fatic’s break grounding article tackles: “Psychiatrists at times consider it their proper task to deal with people who are excessively selfish and self-centered (narcissistic personality disorder)” (Simon, 1978, p. 29).Thus, Simon sees as a matter of controversy whether narcissism is a psychiatric issue, and defines the disorder in moral terms (“selfish,” “self-centered”). Fatic broadens the argument: he questions the validity of the psychological approach not only to narcissism as a personality disorder, but also to narcissistic traits, and the effectivity of this approach given that this is an area in which therapists usually do not have much success even if the patients look for help, which is rare. Fatic suggests that these personalities, either those with narcissistic traits or those with full-fledged narcissistic personality disorder, should be better understood (and maybe also addressed, although this point is not explicitly made) when viewed through moral lenses. In doing so, Fatic not only questions the validity of one form of personality disorder––still a controversial category––but re-kindles the view that correlates aspects of mental health with virtue, a view that was valid up until the nineteenth century and that made of philosophers (and priests) doctors of the soul.1That which made of philosophers’ teachings an important part of one’s life before the advent of scientific psychology has been often associated with this view, that the virtuous are also the healthy. Without going as far as to suggest that philosophers should teach virtue to narcissists, which could be a further argument in favor of the new field of philosophical practice and a broadening of its legitimate concerns, Fatic notes that moral categories are better suited to approach those who are plagued by narcissism.One way to explain the historical role that psychology played in relation to the traditional one upheld by morality is that psychology stepped in to explain the origins of failures in morality. If the narcissist is to be judged according to moral categories (a judgment that he necessarily fails in so far as right emotions as relevant to morality), what might be the consequences?Ascribing... (shrink)

Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

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A REVIEW ON AYURVEDIC PRACTICE THROUGH SADAPADARTHA THEORY.Devanand Upadhyay & B. K. Dwibedy - 2017 - Int. J. Res. Ayurveda Pharm 8 (3):31-35.

Padartha is a concept which has been clinically and academically described in Ayurveda. Health and disease are prime focus of Ayurveda and the principle causes behind both of these are Padatha. Ayurveda and Vaisheshika darshan considers similar padartha but with different views. How this view is different has been explained? Disease is a state of disequilibrium of physiological functions causing vriddhi or kshaya of structural entity (Dhatus). Vriddhi or Kshaya is based on samanya and vishesha and its treatment is also (...)

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Are All Mental Disorders Affective Disorders?Michelle Maiese - 2023 - Passion: Journal of the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotion 1 (1):31-49.

A growing number of theorists have looked to the enactivist approach in philosophy of mind or the affordance-based approach from ecological psychology to make sense of a wide variety of phenomena; some theorists believe that these theoretical accounts can offer rich insights about the nature of mental disorders, their etiology, and their characteristic symptoms. I argue that theorists who adopt such approaches also should embrace the further claim that all mental disorders are affective disorders. First, enactivist accounts of mental disorder (...)

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Preclinical Disease or Risk Factor? Alzheimer’s Disease as a Case Study of Changing Conceptualizations of Disease.Maartje H. N. Schermer - 2023 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 48 (4):322-334.

Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) provides an excellent case study to investigate emerging conceptions of health, disease, pre-disease, and risk. Two scientific working groups have recently reconceptualized AD and created a new category of asymptomatic biomarker positive persons, who are either said to have preclinical AD, or to be at risk for AD. This article examines how prominent theories of health and disease would classify this condition: healthy or diseased? Next, the notion of being “at risk”—a state somewhere in-between health and disease—is (...)

Alzheimer's Disease in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

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Nosology in Philosophy of Science, Misc

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Brain dysfunction without function.Harriet Fagerberg - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):570-582.

In an important and timely book, Anneli Jefferson outlines a view according to which a given mental disorder is a brain disorder if it is a (harmful) mental dysfunction realised by a brain dysfunction. Prima facie, Jefferson’s book is a study in the metaphysics of dysfunction: how does mental dysfunction relate to brain dysfunction, and what does this imply for the status of mental disorders and brain disorders? In what follows, I shall argue that Jefferson’s contribution to this debate is (...)

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Infinity, Technology, Degeneracy: A Note on Werkhoven’s Dispositional Theory of Health.Shane N. Glackin - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (3):797-807.

Werkhoven’s ‘A Dispositional Theory of Health’ is an important and original contribution to debates about the disease concept, which persuasively demonstrates that dispositions must play some role in a full account of what it is to be healthy or ill. Unfortunately, as a theory, it cannot as it stands be correct.I first demonstrate what appears to be a significant, and possibly fatal, flaw; the proliferation of dispositions which Werkhoven’s theory requires makes impossible, at least in the absence of significant further (...)

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Une théorie en germe ? Les « intuitions » des Grecs sur les maladies contagieuses.Hebrard Jeremie - 2021 - Volumen 22:31-60.

This contribution gives an overview of the few passages of Ancient Greek literature dealing with the causes of epidemics and contagions (i.e. in Hippocrates, Thucydides, Isocrates, ps-Aristotle’s Problems, Plutarch, and Galen). With the help of the distinction between an ontological and a physiological conception of what a disease is, I suggest that the latter was an obstacle to better understand the process through which epidemics spread. I nonetheless show that the ontological conception of these diseases was not entirely absent from (...)

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The Medical Model of “Obesity” and the Values Behind the Guise of Health.Kayla R. Mehl - forthcoming - Synthese 201 (6):1-28.

Assumptions about obesity—e.g., its connection to ill health, its causes, etc.—are still prevalent today, and they make up what I call the medical model of fatness. In this paper, I argue that the medical model was established on the basis of insufficient evidence and has nevertheless continued to be relied upon to justify methodological choices that further entrench the assumptions of the medical model. These choices are illegitimate in so far as they conflict with both the epistemic and social aims (...)

Chronic Diseases, Misc in Philosophy of Science, Misc

Feminist Epistemology in Epistemology

Health and Illness in Philosophy of Science, Misc

Medical Research Ethics in Applied Ethics

Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science

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Does Schizophrenia Exist?Georg Repnikov - 2023 - Philosophy of Medicine 4 (1).

This paper develops and defends a deflationary analysis of existence claims involving psychiatric disorders. According to this analysis, a given psychiatric disorder exists if, and only if, there are people who have the disorder. The implications of this analysis are spelled out for our views of nosological decision making, and for the relationship between claims about the existence of psychiatric disorders and claims about their reality. A pragmatic view of psychiatric nosology is defended and it is argued that worries about (...)

Mental Disorders in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Nosology in Philosophy of Science, Misc

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Is Autism a Mental Disorder According to the Harmful Dysfunction View?Mladen Bošnjak - 2023 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 23 (67):89-111.

The supporters of the neurodiversity movement contend that autism is not a mental disorder, but rather a natural human variation. In a recent paper Jerome Wakefi eld, David Wasserman and Jordan Conrad (2020) argued against this view relying on Wakefi eld’s harmful dysfunction theory of mental disorder (the HD theory). Although I argue that the HD theory is problematic, I contend that arguments offered by Wakefi eld et al. (2020) against those of the neurodiversity movement are plausible, except in one (...)

Mental Disorders in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

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Knowledge, Life, and Error. Nietzschean Themes in the Work of Georges Canguilhem.Henning Schmidgen - 2023 - In Giuseppe Bianco, Charles T. Wolfe & Gertrudis Van de Vijver (eds.), Canguilhem and Continental Philosophy of Biology. Springer. pp. 147-157.

It is well known that authors such as Emile Chartier, i.e. Alain, Henri Bergson and Kurt Goldstein impacted importantly on the work of Georges Canguilhem. This paper argues, however, that it is the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche which gave Canguilhem’s work its most distinctive traits. Themes such as the relationship between health and disease, the influence of language on perception and knowledge, or the conception of philosophy as a philosophy of values, are obviously Nietzschean. The paper shows that in Nietzsche (...)

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Severity as a moral qualifier of malady.Carl Tollef Solberg, Mathias Barra, Lars Sandman & Bjorn Hoffmann - 2023 - BMC Medical Ethics 24 (1):1-7.

The overarching aim of this article is to scrutinize how severity can work as a qualifier for the moral impetus of malady. While there is agreement that malady is of negative value, there is disagreement about precisely how this is so. Nevertheless, alleviating disease, injury, and associated suffering is almost universally considered good. Furthermore, the strength of a diseased person’s moral claims for our attention and efforts will inevitably vary. This article starts by reflecting on what kind of moral impetus (...)

Disease, Misc in Philosophy of Science, Misc

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What Makes a Disorder 'Mental'? A Practical Treatment of Psychiatric Disorder.Joseph Gough - 2023 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 30 (1):15-35.

Abstract:The titular question, of what makes a disorder 'mental,' has an obvious answer: mental disorders are disorders of the mind. I argue that this is not so, before proposing a positive theory of what makes a disorder 'mental,' that what makes a disorder 'mental' is its relationship to psychiatry. The overall thrust of my argument is that mental disorder is mental in name only—to have a mental disorder is not to have a disorder of the mind. Instead, mental disorder is (...)

Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

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Correction to: Experimental philosophy of medicine and the concepts of health and disease.Walter Veit - 2023 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 44 (1):99-100.

Experimental Philosophy of Science in Metaphilosophy

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Mental disorder: An ability-based view.Sanja Dembic - 2023 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 4.

What is it to have a mental disorder? The paper proposes an ability-based view of mental disorder. It argues that such a view is preferable to biological dysfunction views such as Wakefield’s Harmful Dysfunction Analysis and Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory. According to the proposed view, having a mental disorder is basically a matter of having a certain type of inability (or: an ability that is not sufficiently high): the inability to respond adequately to some of one’s available reasons in some of (...)

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The skill of mental health: Towards a new theory of mental health and disorder.Garson Leder & Tadeusz Zawidzki - 2023 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 4.

This paper presents a naturalist skill-based alternative to traditional function-based naturalist theories of mental health and disorder. According to the novel skill view outlined here, mental health is a skilled action of individuals, rather than a question of the functioning of mental mechanisms. Mental disorder is the failure or breakdown of this skill. This skill view of mental health is motivated by focusing on the process of mental healing. This paper argues that, when we start with a focus on how (...)

Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Psychiatry and Psychotherapy in Cognitive Sciences

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Pathologizing Ugliness: A Conceptual Analysis of the Naturalist and Normativist Claims in “Aesthetic Pathology”.Yves Saint James Aquino - 2022 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 47 (6):735-748.

Pathologizing ugliness refers to the use of disease language and medical processes to foster and support the claim that undesirable features are pathological conditions requiring medical or surgical intervention. Primarily situated in cosmetic surgery, the practice appeals to the concept of “aesthetic pathology”, which is a medical designation for features that deviate from some designated aesthetic norms. This article offers a two-pronged conceptual analysis of aesthetic pathology. First, I argue that three sets of claims, derived from normativist and naturalistic accounts (...)

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Is Aging a Disease? The Theoretical Definition of Aging in the Light of the Philosophy of Medicine.Cristian Saborido & Pablo García-Barranquero - 2022 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 47 (6):770-783.

In the philosophical debate on aging, it is common to raise the question of the theoretical definition of aging in terms of its possible characterization as a disease. Understanding aging as a disease seems to imply its medicalization, which has important practical consequences. In this paper, we analyze the question of whether aging is a disease by appealing to the concept of disease in the philosophy of medicine. As a result of this analysis, we argue that a pragmatist approach to (...)

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Osteoporosis and risk of fracture: reference class problems are real.Nicholas Binney - 2022 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 43 (5):375-400.

Elselijn Kingma argues that Christopher Boorse’s biostatistical theory does not show how the reference classes it uses—namely, age groups of a sex of a species—are objective and naturalistic. Boorse has replied that this objection is of no concern, because there are no examples of clinicians’ choosing to use reference classes other than the ones he suggests. Boorse argues that clinicians use the reference classes they do because these reflect the natural classes of organisms to which their patients belong. Drawing on (...)

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Prolonged grief as a disease?Ronja Lutz, Cornelia Eibauer & Andreas Frewer - 2022 - Ethik in der Medizin 34 (4):609-626.

Definition of the problem The eleventh version of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11), which became effective in 2022, has raised a number of issues associated with medical ethics. Arguments In this context the paper explores the normative view of grief as a disease. ICD-11 contains the new diagnosis of “prolonged grief disorder” with a definition that fails to aid its clear distinction from the normal course of grief. The article discusses the philosophical and ethical implications of this diagnosis and (...)

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Representation and Pathology in Philosophy and Psychotherapy.Aleksandar Fatić - 2019 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 39 (1):33-47.

The paper discusses the conceptualisation of mental disorder as a representation, rather than an illness, and relates this perspective to the modern understanding of mental health as a healthy »narrative« or life story. The author proceeds to briefly consider the evolution of concepts of illness in psychiatry and a gradual reappearance of Lacanian psychoanalysis and psychiatry. The key concepts of Lacanian psychotherapy pave the way to a growing together of standard psychotherapy and modern philosophical practice within the novel concept of (...)

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A Critical Review of the Definition of Mental Disorders in DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). 김광영 & 정우진 - 2022 - Cheolhak-Korean Journal of Philosophy 150:309-331.

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The Concept of Mental Disease in Plato. 장미성 - 2018 - Journal of the Society of Philosophical Studies 121:1-24.

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Critique and Refinement of the Wakefieldian Concept of Disorder: An Improvement of the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis.Emmanuel Smith - 2022 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 47 (4):530-539.

One way in which bioethicists can benefit the medical community is by clarifying the concept of disorder. Since insurance companies refer to the DSM for whether a patient should receive assistance, one must consider the consequences of one’s concept of disorder for who should be provided with care. I offer a refinement of Jerome Wakefield’s hybrid concept of disorder, the harmful dysfunction analysis. I criticize both the factual component and the value component of Wakefield’s account and suggest how they might (...)

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Mental Disorder, Meaning-making, and Religious Engagement.Kate Finley - 2023 - Theologica 7 (1).

Meaning-making plays a central role in how we deal with experiences of suffering, including those due to mental disorder. And for many, religious beliefs, experiences, and practices (hereafter, religious engagement) play a central role in informing this meaning-making. However, a crucial facet of the relationship between experiences of mental disorder and religious engagement remains underexplored—namely the potentially positive effects of mental disorder on religious engagement (e.g. experiences of bipolar disorder increasing sense of God’s presence). In what follows, I will present (...)

Experimental Philosophy of Mind in Metaphilosophy

Experimental Philosophy of Religion in Metaphilosophy

Mental Disorders in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Philosophy of Mind

Philosophy of Religion

The Concept of Disease in Philosophy of Science, Misc

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The concept of genetic disease.Jonathan Michael Kaplan - 2016 - In Miriam Solomon, Jeremy R. Simon & Harold Kincaid (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine. Routledge.

The Concept of Disease in Philosophy of Science, Misc

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The concept of disease.Dominic Sisti & Arthur L. Caplan - 2016 - In Miriam Solomon, Jeremy R. Simon & Harold Kincaid (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine. Routledge.

The Concept of Disease in Philosophy of Science, Misc

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Losing our minds: the challenge of defining mental illness.Lucy Foulkes - 2022 - New York: St. Martin's Press.

A compelling and incisive book that questions the overuse of mental health terms to describe universal human emotions Public awareness of mental illness has been transformed in recent years, but our understanding of how to define it has yet to catch up. Too often, psychiatric disorders are confused with the inherent stresses and challenges of human experience. A narrative has taken hold that a mental health crisis has been building among young people. In this profoundly sensitive and constructive book, psychologist (...)

Mental Illness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

The Concept of Disease in Philosophy of Science, Misc

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Own-world and Common World in Schizophrenia: Towards a Theory of Anthropological Proportions.Kasper Møller Nielsen - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.

The conceptual pair of own-world and common world constitutes an archaic pair, originally introduced by Heraclitus. More than two millennia after its introduction, Binswanger picked up this conceptual pair in the attempt to understand existence and mental disorder. Ever since, this conceptual pair has been part of the conceptualization of schizophrenia in phenomenological psychopathology. However, the concepts of ídios kósmos and koinós kósmos have seldomly been elaborated and expanded upon, and certain unclarities rest within the literature. This paper resolves some (...)

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Psychiatric Disorders Are Soft Natural Kinds.Dan J. Stein - 2022 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 29 (3):183-185.

Tilmes concludes his interesting and informative piece with the sentence that “analysis of psychiatric vagueness merits further consideration.” I agree with this point, as well as with his earlier assertion that how one understands psychiatric vagueness may implicate the diagnostic model that one adopts, and the research that one pursues. Fortunately, there has been recent attention to vagueness in psychiatry, addressing both degree-vagueness and combinatorial vagueness. Vagueness in psychiatry is related to a range of nosological debates, including about the...

Mental Disorders in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

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The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: A pluralogue part 2: Issues of conservatism and pragmatism in psychiatric diagnosis.Phillips James, Frances Allen, A. Cerullo Michael, Chardavoyne John, S. Decker Hannah, B. First Michael, Ghaemi Nassir, Greenberg Gary, C. Hinderliter Andrew, A. Kinghorn Warren, G. LoBello Steven, B. Martin Elliott, L. Mishara Aaron, Paris Joel, M. Pierre Joseph, W. Pies Ronald, A. Pincus Harold, Porter Douglas, Pouncey Claire, A. Schwartz Michael, Szasz Thomas, C. Wakefield Jerome, G. Waterman, Whooley Owen & Zachar Peter - 2012 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):8.

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...)

The Concept of Disease in Philosophy of Science, Misc

Nosology in Philosophy of Science, Misc

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What Counts as a Disease, and Why Does It Matter?Quill R. Kukla - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy of Disability 2:130-156.

I argue that the concept of disease serves such radically different strategic purposes for different kinds of stakeholders that coming up with a unified philosophical definition of disease is hopeless. Instead, I defend a radically pluralist, pragmatist account of when it is appropriate to mobilize the concept of disease. I argue that it is appropriate to categorize a condition as a disease when it serves legitimate strategic goals to at least partially medicalize that condition, and when the condition is pathological (...)

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From psychiatric kinds to harmful symptoms.Christophe Gauld - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-25.

Much research in the philosophy of psychiatry has been devoted to the characterization of the normal and the pathological. In this article, we identify and deconstruct two postulates that have held sway in the philosophy of psychiatry. The first postulate concerns the belief that clinicians would benefit from conceiving of psychiatric disorders as stable entities with clear boundaries. By relying on a symptom-based approach, we support a conception of psychiatric disorders whose symptoms are the products of many activated mechanisms in (...)

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Causation and Causal Selection in the Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease.Hane Htut Maung - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (2):5-27.

In The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease, Derek Bolton and Grant Gillett argue that a defensible updated version of the biopsychosocial model requires a metaphysically adequate account of disease causation that can accommodate biological, psychological, and social factors. This present paper offers a philosophical critique of their account of biopsychosocial causation. I argue that their account relies on claims about the normativity and the semantic content of biological information that are metaphysically contentious. Moreover, I suggest that these claims are (...)

Biological Information in Philosophy of Biology

Causation in Biology in Philosophy of Biology

Disease, Misc in Philosophy of Science, Misc

Genetic Information in Philosophy of Biology

Manipulability Theories of Causation in Metaphysics

Medical Epistemology in Philosophy of Science, Misc

The Concept of Disease in Philosophy of Science, Misc

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Health and disease are dynamic complex-adaptive states implications for practice and research.Joachim P. Sturmberg - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychiatry 12 (29).

Interoception, the ability to convey one's overall physiological state, allows people to describe their health along an experiential continuum, from excellent, very good, good, fair to poor. Each health state reflects a distinct pattern of one's overall function. This assay provides a new frame of understanding health and disease as complex-adaptive system states of the person as-a-whole. It firstly describes how complex patterns can emerge from simple equations. It then discusses how clinical medicine in certain domains has started to explore (...)

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Naturalism, Disease, and Levels of Functional Description.Somogy Varga & David Miguel Gray - 2022 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 47 (3):482-493.

The paper engages Christopher Boorse’s Bio-Statistical Theory. In its current form, BST runs into a significant challenge. For BST to account for its central tenet—that lower-level part-dysfunction is sufficient for higher-level pathology—it must provide criteria for how to decide which lower-level parts are the ones to be analyzed for health or pathology. As BST is a naturalistic theory, such choices must be based solely on naturalistic considerations. An argument is provided to show that, if BST is to be preserved, such (...)

Philosophy of Biology, General Works in Philosophy of Biology

Illness in Philosophy of Science, Misc

The Concept of Disease in Philosophy of Science, Misc

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New Approach to Disease, Risk, and Boundaries Based on Emergent Probability.Patrick Daly - 2022 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 47 (3):457-481.

The status of risk factors and disease remains a disputed question in the theory and practice of medicine and healthcare, and so does the related question of delineating disease boundaries. I present a framework based on Bernard Lonergan’s account of emergent probability for differentiating (1) generically distinct levels of systematic function within organisms and between organisms and their environments and (2) the methods of functional, genetic, and statistical investigation. I then argue on this basis that it is possible to understand (...)

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Mental Disorder and Suicide: What’s the Connection?Hane Htut Maung - 2022 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 47 (3):345-367.

This paper offers a philosophical analysis of the connection between mental disorder and suicide risk. In contemporary psychiatry, it is commonly suggested that this connection is a causal connection that has been established through empirical discovery. Herein, I examine the extent to which this claim can be sustained. I argue that the connection between mental disorder and increased suicide risk is not wholly causal but is partly conceptual. This in part relates to the way suicidality is built into the definitions (...)