- D. M. Armstrong (1988). Are Dispositions Ultimate? Reply to Franklin. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):84-86.
- David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):1-12.
- William A. Bauer (2010). The Ontology of Pure Dispositions. Dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
- Gustav Bergmann (1955). Dispositional Properties and Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 6 (5):77-80.
- Tomasz Bigaj (2010). Dispositional Monism and the Circularity Objection. Metaphysica 11 (1):39-47.
- Alexander Bird (2010). Causation and the Manifestation of Powers. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.
- Alexander Bird (2009). Structural Properties Revisited. In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Clarendon Press.
- Alexander Bird (2007). Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford University Press.
- Alexander Bird (2003). Structural Properties. In Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.), Real Metaphysics. Routledge.
- Alexander Bird, B. D. Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.) (2012). Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge.
- Simon W. Blackburn (1990). Filling in Space. Analysis 50 (2):62-5.
- Daniel Bonevac, Josh Dever & and David Sosa (2006). The Conditional Fallacy. Philosophical Review 115 (3):273-316.
- Anjan Chakravartty (2003). The Dispositional Essentialist View of Properties and Laws. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):393 – 413.
- Sungho Choi, Purely Dispositional Worlds.
- Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2007). Finking Frankfurt. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):363--74.
- Jonathan Cohen (2002). On an Alleged Non-Equivalence Between Dispositions and Disjunctive Properties. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (1):77-81.
- Sam Cowling (2010). Kantian Humility and Ontological Categories. Analysis 70 (4):659-665.
- J. W. Roxbee Cox (1975). Mackie on Dispositional Properties. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):232-234.
- Troy Cross (2012). Review of Marmodoro, Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
- Troy Cross (2012). Goodbye, Humean Supervenience. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:129-153.
- Troy Cross (2005). What is a Disposition? Synthese 144 (3):321-41.
- Mauro Dorato, Properties and Dispositions: Some Metaphysical Remarks on Quantum Ontology.
- Antony Eagle (2009). Causal Structuralism, Dispositional Actualism, and Counterfactual Conditionals. In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press.
- Brian Ellis (2010). Causal Powers and Categorical Properties. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.
- Brian Ellis (2005). Katzav on the Limitations of Dispositionalism. Analysis 65 (285):90–92.
- Brian Ellis & Caroline Lierse (1994). Dispositional Essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):27 – 45.
- Steve Fleetwood (2010). Powers and Tendencies Revisited. Journal of Critical Realism 10 (1):80-99.
- Sharon Ford (2012). Objects, Discreteness, and Pure Power Theories: George Molnar’s Critique of Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties. Metaphysica 13 (2):195-215.
- Sharon R. Ford (2012). Objects, Discreteness, and Pure Power Theories: George Molnar’s Critique of Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties. Metaphysica 13 (2):195-215.
- Sharon R. Ford (2012). The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction. In Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge.
- Sharon R. Ford (2010). What Fundamental Properties Suffice to Account for the Manifest World? Powerful Structure. Dissertation, University of Queensland
- Sharon R. Ford (2007). An Analysis of Properties in John Heil’s "From an Ontological Point of View". In G. Romano & Malatesti (eds.), From an Ontological Point of View, SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review, Symposium. SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review.
- James Franklin (1986). Are Dispositions Reducible to Categorical Properties? Philosophical Quarterly 36 (142):62-64.
- Philippe Gagnon (2012). Remarques Sur le Projet Essentialiste de Brian Ellis En Philosophie de la Nature. Eikasia. Revista de Filosofía 43 (March):61-94.
- Toby Handfield (ed.) (2009). Dispositions and Causes. Clarendon Press.
- Toby Handfield (2005). Armstrong and the Modal Inversion of Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):452–461.
- Toby Handfield & Alexander Bird (2008). Dispositions, Rules, and Finks. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285 - 298.
- Tobias Hansson (2006). Too Many Dispositional Properties. Sats - Northern European Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):37-42.
- John Hawthorne & David Manley, Mumford's Dispositions.
- John Hawthorne & David Manley (2005). Stephen Mumford. Dispositions. . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 261 Pp. [REVIEW] Noûs 39 (1):179–195.
- John Heil (2005). Dispositions. Synthese 144 (3):343 - 356.
- Herbert Hochberg (1967). Dispositional Properties. Philosophy of Science 34 (1):10-17.
- Michael Jacovides (2003). Locke's Construction of the Idea of Power. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (2):329-350.
- Joel Katzav (2005). Ellis on the Limitations of Dispositionalism. Analysis 65 (285):92–94.
- Meinard Kuhlmann (2010). The Ultimate Constituents of the Material World - In Search of an Ontology for Fundamental Physics. ontos.
- Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). ``Lewis on Finkish Dispositions&Quot. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:703-710.
- Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). Lewis on Finkish Dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):703 - 710.
- Vassilios Livanios (2008). Bird and the Dispositional Essentialist Account of Spatiotemporal Relations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 39 (2):383 - 394.
- Dustin Locke (2012). Quidditism Without Quiddities. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):345-363.
- E. J. Lowe (2008). Reply to Bird on a Posteriori Essentialism. Analysis 68 (300):345-347.
- E. J. Lowe (2007). A Problem for a Posteriori Essentialism Concerning Natural Kinds. Analysis 67 (296):286–292.
- E. J. Lowe (2004). Review: Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):817-822.
- D. Manley & R. Wasserman (2012). Dispositions, Conditionals, and Counterexamples. Mind 120 (480):1191-1227.
- David Manley (2012). Dispositionality: Beyond The Biconditionals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):321-334.
- David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (2008). On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals. Mind 117 (465):59-84.
- David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (2007). A Gradable Approach to Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):68–75.
- Olivier Massin (2009). The Metaphysics of Forces. Dialectica 64 (4).
- D. H. Mellor (1974). In Defense of Dispositions. Philosophical Review 83 (2):157-181.
- DH Mellor (2000). The Semantics and Ontology of Dispositions. Mind 109 (436):757--780.
- Ulrich Meyer (2012). Modal Property Comprehension. Synthese 190 (4):693-707.
- Jon Moline (1972). Quine on Dispositions and Subvisible Structures. Mind 81 (321):131-137.
- Stephen Mumford (1994). Dispositions, Supervenience and Reduction. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):419-438.
- Bence Nanay (2011). Do We Sense Modalities with Our Sense Modalities? Ratio 24 (3):299-310.
- David S. Oderberg (2009). The Non-Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional. Analysis 69 (4):677-684.
- Elizabeth Prior (1982). The Dispositional/Categorical Distinction. Analysis 42 (2):93-6.
- Nick Reeder (1995). Are Physical Properties Dispositions? Philosophy of Science 62 (1):141-149.
- Bradley Rives (2005). Why Dispositions Are (Still) Distinct From Their Bases and Causally Impotent. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):19 - 31.
- David Robb, Power for the Mental as Such.
- David Robb (2007). Power Essentialism. Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):343-58.
- Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.) (2003). Real Metaphysics. Routledge.
- Alexander Rosenberg (1984). Mackie and Shoemaker on Dispositions and Properties. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 76 (1):77-91.
- Dan Ryder, Critical Notice of Stephen Mumford's Dispositions.
- Jonathan Schaffer (2005). Quiddistic Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):1-32.
- Markus Schrenk (2010). Antidotes for Dispositional Essentialism. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.
- Robert Schroer (2013). Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered. Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.
- Robert Schroer (2012). Two Challenges That Categorical Properties Pose to Physicalism. Ratio 25 (2):195-206.
- Robert Schroer (2010). Is There More Than One Categorical Property? Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):831-850.
- Robert Schroer (2010). How Far Can the Physical Sciences Reach? American Philosophical Quarterlly 47 (3):253-266.
- Benjamin Smart, A Critique of Humean and Anti-Humean Metaphysics of Cause and Law - Final Version.
- Benjamin Smart, Categorical Properties in Background Independent Substantivalist General Relativity.
- Benjamin Smart & Stephen Barker (2013). The Ultimate Argument Against Dispositional Monist Accounts of Laws. Analysis 72 (4):714-723.
- A. D. Smith (1977). Dispositional Properties. Mind 86 (343):439-445.
- Jesse R. Steinberg (2010). Dispositions and Subjunctives. Philosophical Studies 148 (3).
- Galen Strawson (2008). The Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional. Analysis 68 (300):271-282.
- Michael Tooley (1972). Armstrong's Proof of the Realist Account of Dispositional Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):283 – 287.
- Raphael van Riel (forthcoming). Pains, Pills, and Properties. Functionalism and the First-Order/Second-Order Distinction. Dialectica.
- Agustín Vicente (2004). The Role of Dispositions in Explanations. Theoria 19 (3):301-310.
- Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2009). 4-D Objects and Disposition Ascriptions. Philosophical Papers 38 (1):35-72.
- Ann Whittle (2008). A Functionalist Theory of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):59-82.
- Neil Williams, The Problem of Dispositional Fit.
- Neil E. Williams (2011). Dispositions and the Argument From Science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):71-90.
- Alastair Wilson (2009). Disposition-Manifestations and Reference-Frames. Dialectica 63 (4):591-601.
- Jessica M. Wilson (2010). The Mind in Nature, by C. B. Martin. [REVIEW] Mind 119 (474):503-511.
- David Yates (forthcoming). The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
- David Yates (2009). Emergence, Downwards Causation and the Completeness of Physics. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):110 - 131.
- Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2010). Conditional and Habitual Analyses of Disposition Ascriptions. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):624-630.
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Email
|
RSS feed
|
|