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Material to categorize
- Rani Lill Anjum & Stephen Mumford (2011). What We Tend to Mean. Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 1 (46):20-33.
- Paul Audi (forthcoming). Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
- Nancy Cartwright (1989). Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford University Press.
- Sungho Choi (forthcoming). Dispositions and Bogus Counterexamples: Reply to Lee. Philosophia.
- Justin C. Fisher (forthcoming). Dispositions, Conditionals and Auspicious Circumstances. Philosophical Studies:-.
- Toby Handfield (2010). Review of A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable, by Anjan Chakravartty. [REVIEW] Mind 118 (472):1118-1121.
- Jan Hauska (2008). In Defence of Causal Bases. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):23 – 43.
- Markku Keinänen (2011). Tropes – The Basic Constituents of Powerful Particulars? Dialectica 65 (3):419-450.
- Noa Latham (forthcoming). Are Fundamental Laws Necessary or Contingent? Topics in Contemporary Philosophy 8.
- Jaeho Lee (2011). Genuine Counterexamples to the Simple Conditional Analysis of Disposition: A Reply to Choi. Philosophia 39 (2):327-334.
- Vassilios Livanios (2010). Symmetries, Dispositions and Essences. Philosophical Studies 148 (2).
- Alan C. Love (2003). Evolvability, Dispositions, and Intrinsicality. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1015-1027.
- Jennifer McKitrick (2003). The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):349 - 369.
- Harold W. Noonan (2010). Bird Against the Humeans. Ratio 23 (1):73-86.
- Elizabeth Prior, Robert Pargetter & Frank Jackson (1982). Three Theses About Dispositions. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):251-257.
- Stathis Psillos (2006). What Do Powers Do When They Are Not Manifested? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):137-156.
- Luke Robinson (forthcoming). A Dispositional Account of Conflicts of Obligation. Noûs.
- Luke Robinson (forthcoming). Obligating Reasons, Moral Laws, and Moral Dispositions. Journal of Moral Philosophy.
- Luke Robinson (2011). Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):289-309.
- N. Shackel (2010). The World as a Graph: Defending Metaphysical Graphical Structuralism. Analysis 71 (1):10-21.
- Brandon N. Towl (2010). The Individuation of Causal Powers by Events (and Consequences of the Approach). Metaphysica 11 (1):49-61.
- Ryan Wasserman (2011). Dispositions and Generics. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):425-453.
- Neil Williams, A Dispositional Theory of Possibility.
- Neil Edward Williams (2005). Static and Dynamic Dispositions. Synthese 146 (3):303 - 324.
- Fred Wilson (1969). Dispositions: Defined or Reduced? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):184 – 204.
- Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2010). Conditional and Habitual Analyses of Disposition Ascriptions. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):624-630.
Dispositional and Categorical Properties
- D. M. Armstrong (1988). Are Dispositions Ultimate? Reply to Franklin. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):84-86.
- David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):1-12.
- William A. Bauer, The Ontology of Pure Dispositions.
- Gustav Bergmann (1955). Dispositional Properties and Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 6 (5):77-80.
- Tomasz Bigaj (2010). Dispositional Monism and the Circularity Objection. Metaphysica 11 (1):39-47.
- Alexander Bird (2010). Causation and the Manifestation of Powers. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.
- Alexander Bird (2009). Structural Properties Revisited. In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Clarendon Press.
- Alexander Bird (2007). Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford University Press.
- Alexander Bird (2003). Structural Properties. In Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.), Real Metaphysics. Routledge.
- Simon W. Blackburn (1990). Filling in Space. Analysis 50 (2):62-5.
- Daniel Bonevac, Josh Dever & and David Sosa (2006). The Conditional Fallacy. Philosophical Review 115 (3):273-316.
- D. J. Bradley (2011). Functionalist Response-Dependence Avoids Missing Explanations. Analysis 71 (2):297-300.
- Anjan Chakravartty (2003). The Dispositional Essentialist View of Properties and Laws. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):393 – 413.
- Sungho Choi, Purely Dispositional Worlds.
- Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2007). Finking Frankfurt. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):363--74.
- Jonathan Cohen (2002). On an Alleged Non-Equivalence Between Dispositions and Disjunctive Properties. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (1):77-81.
- J. W. Roxbee Cox (1975). Mackie on Dispositional Properties. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):232-234.
- Troy Cross (2005). What is a Disposition? Synthese 144 (3):321-41.
- Mauro Dorato, Properties and Dispositions: Some Metaphysical Remarks on Quantum Ontology.
- Antony Eagle (2009). Causal Structuralism, Dispositional Actualism, and Counterfactual Conditionals. In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press.
- Brian Ellis (2010). Causal Powers and Categorical Properties. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.
- Brian Ellis (2005). Katzav on the Limitations of Dispositionalism. Analysis 65 (285):90–92.
- Brian Ellis (2005). Universals, the Essential Problem and Categorical Properties. Ratio 18 (4):462–472.
- Brian Ellis & Caroline Lierse (1994). Dispositional Essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):27 – 45.
- Steve Fleetwood (2010). Powers and Tendencies Revisited. Journal of Critical Realism 10 (1):80-99.
- James Franklin (1986). Are Dispositions Reducible to Categorical Properties? Philosophical Quarterly 36 (142):62-64.
- Toby Handfield (2009). Dispositions and Causes. Clarendon Press.
- Toby Handfield (2005). Armstrong and the Modal Inversion of Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):452–461.
- Toby Handfield & Alexander Bird (2008). Dispositions, Rules, and Finks. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285 - 298.
- Tobias Hansson (2006). Too Many Dispositional Properties. Sats - Northern European Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):37-42.
- John Hawthorne & David Manley (2005). Stephen Mumford. Dispositions. . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 261 Pp. Noûs 39 (1):179–195.
- John Heil (2005). Dispositions. Synthese 144 (3):343 - 356.
- Herbert Hochberg (1967). Dispositional Properties. Philosophy of Science 34 (1):10-17.
- Michael Jacovides (2003). Locke's Construction of the Idea of Power. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (2):329-350.
- Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). Lewis on Finkish Dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):703 - 710.
- Dustin Locke (forthcoming). Quidditism Without Quiddities. Philosophical Studies.
- E. J. Lowe (2008). Reply to Bird on a Posteriori Essentialism. Analysis 68 (300):345-347.
- E. J. Lowe (2007). A Problem for a Posteriori Essentialism Concerning Natural Kinds. Analysis 67 (296):286–292.
- E. J. Lowe (2004). Review: Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):817-822.
- David Manley (forthcoming). Dispositionality: Beyond The Biconditionals. Taylor and Francis: Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
- David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (2008). On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals. Mind 117 (465):59-84.
- David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (2007). A Gradable Approach to Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):68–75.
- D. H. Mellor (1974). In Defense of Dispositions. Philosophical Review 83 (2):157-181.
- DH Mellor (2000). The Semantics and Ontology of Dispositions. Mind 109 (436):757--780.
- Jon Moline (1972). Quine on Dispositions and Subvisible Structures. Mind 81 (321):131-137.
- Stephen Mumford (1994). Dispositions, Supervenience and Reduction. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):419-438.
- Bence Nanay (2011). Do We Sense Modalities with Our Sense Modalities? Ratio 24 (3):299-310.
- David S. Oderberg (2009). The Non-Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional. Analysis 69 (4):677-684.
- Elizabeth Prior (1982). The Dispositional/Categorical Distinction. Analysis 42 (2):93-6.
- Nick Reeder (1995). Are Physical Properties Dispositions? Philosophy of Science 62 (1):141-149.
- Bradley Rives (2005). Why Dispositions Are (Still) Distinct From Their Bases and Causally Impotent. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):19 - 31.
- David Robb (2007). Power Essentialism. Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):343-58.
- Alexander Rosenberg (1984). Mackie and Shoemaker on Dispositions and Properties. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 76 (1):77-91.
- Dan Ryder, Critical Notice of Stephen Mumford's Dispositions.
- Jonathan Schaffer (2005). Quiddistic Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):1-32.
- Markus Schrenk (2010). Antidotes for Dispositional Essentialism. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.
- Robert Schroer (forthcoming). Two Challenges That Categorical Properties Pose to Physicalism. Ratio.
- Robert Schroer (2010). How Far Can the Physical Sciences Reach? American Philosophical Quarterlly 47 (3):253-266.
- Robert Schroer (2010). Is There More Than One Categorical Property? Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):831-850.
- A. D. Smith (1977). Dispositional Properties. Mind 86 (343):439-445.
- Jesse R. Steinberg (2010). Dispositions and Subjunctives. Philosophical Studies 148 (3).
- Galen Strawson (2008). The Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional. Analysis 68 (300):271-282.
- Michael Tooley (1972). Armstrong's Proof of the Realist Account of Dispositional Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):283 – 287.
- Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2009). 4-D Objects and Disposition Ascriptions. Philosophical Papers 38 (1):35-72.
- Ann Whittle (2008). A Functionalist Theory of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):59-82.
- Neil E. Williams (2011). Dispositions and the Argument From Science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):71-90.
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