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  1. William P. Alston (1971). Dispositions and Occurrences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):125 - 154.
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  2. William P. Alston (1971). Dispositions, Occurrences, and Ontology. In R. Tuomela (ed.), Dispositions. Reidel. 359-88.
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  3. Rani Lill Anjum & Stephen Mumford (2011). What We Tend to Mean. Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 1 (46):20-33.
    In this paper a dispositional account of meaning is offered. Words might dispose towards a particular or ‘literal’ meaning, but whether this meaning is actually conveyed when expressed will depend on a number of factors, such as speaker’s intentions, the context of the utterance and the background knowledge of the hearer. It is thus argued that no meaning is guaranteed or necessitated by the words used.
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  4. D. M. Armstrong (2001). Dispositions by Stephen Mumford. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):246-248.
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  5. D. Armstrong, C. B. Martin & U. T. Place (1996). In T. Crane. In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge.
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  6. David M. Armstrong (1996). Dispositions as Categorical States. In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge. 15--18.
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  7. David Malet Armstrong (1969). Dispositions Are Causes. Analysis 30 (1):23-26.
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  8. Dm Armstrong, Ut Place & Cb Martin (1992). A Debate on Dispositions Their Nature and Their Role in Causation. Conceptus 26 (68-69):3-58.
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  9. Robert Arp, Function, Role and Disposition in Basic Formal Ontology. Nature Precedings.
    Numerous research groups are now utilizing Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) as an upper-level framework to assist in the organization and integration of biomedical information. This paper provides elucidation of the three existing BFO subcategories of realizable entity, namely function, role, and disposition. It proposes one further sub-category of tendency, and considers the merits of recognizing two sub-categories of function for domain ontologies, namely, artifactual and biological function. The motivation is to help advance the coherent ontological treatment of functions, roles, and (...)
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  10. Lauren Ashwell (2014). The Metaphysics of Desire and Dispositions. Philosophy Compass 9 (7):469-477.
    There seems to be some kind of close relationship between desires and behavioral dispositions. While a popular view about the nature of desire is that it essentially involves dispositions towards action, there do seem to be pressing objections to this view. However, recent work on dispositional properties potentially undermines some of the metaphysical assumptions that lie beneath these objections.
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  11. Paul Audi (2012). Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):654-674.
    According to the subset account of realization, a property, F, is realized by another property, G, whenever F is individuated by a non-empty proper subset of the causal powers by which G is individuated (and F is not a conjunctive property of which G is a conjunct). This account is especially attractive because it seems both to explain the way in which realized properties are nothing over and above their realizers, and to provide for the causal efficacy of realized properties. (...)
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  12. Anouk Barberousse (2007). Are Specific Heats Dispositions? In Gnassounou Bruno & Kistler Max (eds.), Dispositions and Causal Powers. Ashgate. 271--282.
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  13. Stephen Barker (2009). Dispositional Monism, Relational Constitution and Quiddities. Analysis 69 (2):242-250.
    Let us call dispositional monism the view that all natural properties have their identities fixed purely by their dispositional features, that is, by the patterns of stimulus and response in which they participate. DM implies that natural properties are pure powers: things whose natures are fully identified by their roles in determining the potentialities of events to cause or be caused. As pure powers, properties are meant to lack quiddities in Black's sense. A property possesses a quiddity just in case (...)
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  14. Alexander Bird (2001). David Armstrong, Charlie Martin, and Ullin Place, Edited by Tim Crane Dispositions: A Debate; Stephen Mumford Dispositions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):137-149.
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  15. T. Bittner (2001). MUMFORD, S.-Dispositions. Philosophical Books 42 (1):61-62.
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  16. Andrea Borghini, Dispositions and Their Intentions.
    – Dispositional Realism is the view according to which some denizens of reality – i.e., dispositions – are properties, that may exist in the natural world and have an irreducible modal character. Among Dispositional Realists, Charlie Martin, Ullin Place and George Molnar most notably argued that the modal character of dispositions should be understood in terms of their intentionality. Other Dispositional Realists, most notably Stephen <span class='Hi'>Mumford</span>, challenged this understanding of the modal character of dispositions. In this paper, I defend (...)
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  17. Andrea Borghini & Neil E. Williams (2008). A Dispositional Theory of Possibility. Dialectica 62 (1):21–41.
    – The paper defends a naturalistic version of modal actualism according to which what is metaphysically possible is determined by dispositions found in the actual world. We argue that there is just one world—this one—and that all genuine possibilities are anchored by the dispositions exemplified in this world. This is the case regardless of whether or not those dispositions are manifested. As long as the possibility is one that would obtain were the relevant disposition manifested, it is a genuine possibility. (...)
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  18. Simon Bostock (2008). In Defence of Pan-Dispositionalism. Metaphysica 9 (2):139-157.
    Pan-Dispositionalism – the view that all properties (and relations) are irreducibly dispositional – currently appears to have no takers amongst major analytic metaphysicians. There are those, such as Mumford, who are open to the idea but remain uncommitted. And there are those, such as Ellis and Molnar, who accept that some properties are irreducibly dispositional but argue that not all are. In this paper, I defend Pan-Dispositionalism against this ‘Moderate’ Dispositionalism.
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  19. Denny Bradshaw (2003). Dispositions and Ontology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):169-182.
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  20. José Sebastián Briceño (2012). Mumford, Stephen and Rani Lill Anjum. Getting Causes From Powers. Review of Metaphysics 65 (4):887-888.
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  21. José Sebastián Briceño (2012). Mumford, Stephen and Rani Lill Anjum. Getting Causes From Powers. Review of Metaphysics 65 (4):887-888.
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  22. José Sebastián Briceño (2012). Mumford, Stephen and Rani Lill Anjum. Getting Causes From Powers. Review of Metaphysics 65 (4):887-888.
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  23. Rachael Briggs & Daniel Nolan (2012). Epistemic Dispositions. Logos and Episteme 3 (4):629-636.
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  24. Robert Brown (1952). Dispositional and Teleological Statements. Philosophical Studies 3 (5):73 - 80.
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  25. Arthur W. Burks (1955). Dispositional Statements. Philosophy of Science 22 (3):175-193.
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  26. R. Carnap (1963). Arthur Pap on Dispositions'. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, Ill.,Open Court. 947--52.
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  27. Spencer Carr (1976). The Explication of Dispositions. Journal of Critical Analysis 6 (2):47-54.
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  28. J. W. Carroll (2001). Dispositions. Philosophical Review 110 (1):82-84.
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  29. John Carroll (2001). Review of S. Mumford, Dispositions. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 100:82-4.
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  30. Nancy Cartwright (1989). Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford University Press.
    Ever since David Hume, empiricists have barred powers and capacities from nature. In this book Cartwright argues that capacities are essential in our scientific world, and, contrary to empiricist orthodoxy, that they can meet sufficiently strict demands for testability. Econometrics is one discipline where probabilities are used to measure causal capacities, and the technology of modern physics provides several examples of testing capacities (such as lasers). Cartwright concludes by applying the lessons of the book about capacities and probabilities to the (...)
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  31. Kai-Yuan Cheng (2010). Intrinsic Finks and Attributions of Rule-Following Dispositions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):209-220.
    Handfield and Bird claim that dispositionalists such as Martin and Heil appeal to antidotes and finks to explain why and how a conditional analysis of dispositions falls to Kripke's criticisms, but fail. The main reason is that some antidotes and finks are unavoidably intrinsic and relatively permanent in an agent, in which case the ascription of a rule-following disposition to the agent is false. In this paper, I contend that the presence of intrinsic and relatively permanent finks or antidotes does (...)
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  32. Sungho Choi (forthcoming). Dispositions. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  33. Sungho Choi (2013). Can Opposing Dispositions Be Co-Instantiated? Erkenntnis 78 (1):161 - 182.
    Is it possible that one and the same object x has opposing dispositions at the same time? One's first reaction might be that it is evidently impossible. On the assumption that x is incombustible, it seems to follow that it is not combustible. Surprisingly enough, however, it is claimed that there are a number of examples in support of the possibility of simultaneous co-instantiation of opposing dispositions. In this paper, I will bring under scrutiny some of the examples and come (...)
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  34. Sungho Choi (2011). Finkish Dispositions and Contextualism. The Monist 94 (1):103-120.
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  35. Sungho Choi (2010). Dispositions and Bogus Counterexamples: Reply to Lee. [REVIEW] Philosophia 38 (3):579-588.
    This paper discusses Lee’s argument that Lewis’s reformed conditional analysis of dispositions is preferable to the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. Lee’s argument is basically that there are some examples that can be adequately handled by Lewis’s analysis but cannot by the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. But I will reveal that, when carefully understood, they spell no trouble for the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, failing to serve a motivating role for Lewis’s analysis.
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  36. Sungho Choi (2008). The Incompleteness of Dispositional Predicates. Synthese 163 (2):157 - 174.
    Elizabeth Prior claims that dispositional predicates are incomplete in the sense that they have more than one argument place. To back up this claim, she offers a number of arguments that involve such ordinary dispositional predicates as ‘fragile’, ‘soluble’, and so on. In this paper, I will first demonstrate that one of Prior’s arguments that ‘is fragile’ is an incomplete predicate is mistaken. This, however, does not immediately mean that Prior is wrong that ‘fragile’ is an incomplete predicate. On the (...)
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  37. Sungho Choi (2003). The Simple Conditional Analysis of Dispositions. Unpublished Article.
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  38. D. S. Clarke (1968). The Dispositional Theory of Signs. Southern Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):108-114.
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  39. Randolph Clarke (2008). Intrinsic Finks. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):512–518.
    Dispositions can be finkish, prone to disappear in circumstances that would commonly trigger their characteristic manifestations. Can a disposition be finkish because of something intrinsic to the object possessing that disposition? Sungho Choi has argued that this is not possible, and many agree. Here it is argued that no good case has been made for ruling out the possibility of intrinsic finks; on the contrary, there is good reason to accept it.
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  40. David Coder (1969). Some Misconceptions About Dispositions. Analysis 29 (6):200 - 202.
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  41. J. W. Roxbee Cox (1964). Are There Non-Dispositional Properties? Analysis 24 (5):161 - 164.
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  42. Edward Craig (1987). E. Prior, "Dispositions". [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 37 (46):109.
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  43. Robert C. Cummins (1974). Dispositions, States and Causes. Analysis 34 (6):194 - 204.
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  44. J. C. D'Alessio (1967). Dispositions, Reduction Sentences and Causal Conditionals. Critica 1 (3):65 - 81.
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  45. Neil Degrasse Tyson (2005). 2 Powers of Ten. In Alan F. Blackwell & David MacKay (eds.), Power. Cambridge University Press. 21.
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  46. M. Dummett (1988). Are Dispositions Ultimate-Reply. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):87-103.
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  47. Travis Dumsday (2013). Using Natural-Kind Essentialism to Defend Dispositionalism. Erkenntnis 78 (4):869-880.
    Marc Lange and Ann Whittle have independently developed an important challenge to dispositionalism, arguing that dispositions are reducible to primitive subjunctive facts. I argue in reply that by pairing dispositionalism with a certain version of natural-kind essentialism, their objection can be overcome. Moreover, such a marriage carries further advantages for the dispositionalist. My aim is therefore two-fold: to defend dispositionalism, and to give the dispositionalist some new motivation to adopt natural-kind essentialism.
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  48. Travis Dumsday (2012). Dispositions, Primitive Activities, and Essentially Active Objects. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):43-64.
    The question of whether there could be a physical object that is necessarily constantly active has a long history, and it has recently arisen again in the literature on dispositions. I examine and critique two proposals for affirming the possibility of such an object. I then advocate a third option, one which is workable if paired with natural-kind essentialism. Finally I briefly outline three possible implications of this view for wider debates concerning the ontology of dispositions and natural kinds.
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  49. Andy Egan (2012). Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):557-582.
    Adopting a dispositional theory of value promises to deliver a lot of theoretical goodies. One recurring problem for dispositional theories of value, though, is a problem about nonconvergence. If being a value is being disposed to elicit response R in us, what should we say if it turns out that not everybody is disposed to have R to the same things? One horn of the problem here is a danger of the view collapsing into an error theory—of it turning out, (...)
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  50. W. K. Essler (1985). On Determining Dispositions. Erkenntnis 22 (1-3):365 - 368.
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