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  1. Judith L. Alpert (1995). Trauma, Dissociation, and Clinical Study as a Responsible Beginning. Consciousness and Cognition 4 (1):125-129.
  2. Andrew Apter (1991). The Problem of Who: Multiple Personality, Personal Identity, and the Double Brain. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):219-48.
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  3. Bernard J. Baars & Katharine McGovern (1995). Steps Toward Healing: False Memories and Traumagenic Amnesia May Coexist in Vulnerable Populations. Consciousness and Cognition 4 (1):68-74.
  4. William P. Banks & Kathy Pezdek (1994). The Recovered Memory/False Memory Debate. Consciousness and Cognition 3 (3-4):265-268.
  5. Y. Michael Barilan (2003). One or Two: An Examination of the Recent Case of the Conjoined Twins From Malta. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (1):27 – 44.
    The article questions the assumption that conjoined twins are necessarily two people or persons by employing arguments based on different points of view: non-personal vitalism, the person as a sentient being, the person as an agent, the person as a locus of narrative and valuation, and the person as an embodied mind. Analogies employed from the cases of amputation, multiple personality disorder, abortion, split-brain patients and cloning. The article further questions the assumption that a conjoined twin's natural interest and wish (...)
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  6. Michael Bavidge (1996). Commentary on "Minds, Memes, and Multiples. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):29-30.
  7. Timothy J. Bayne (2002). Moral Status and the Treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (1):87-105.
    Many contemporary bioethicists claim that the possession of certain psychological properties is sufficient for having full moral status. I will call this thepsychological approach to full moral status. In this paper, I argue that there is a significant tension between the psychological approach and a widely held model of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, formerly Multiple Personality Disorder). According to this model, the individual personalities or alters that belong to someone with DID possess those properties that proponents of the psychological approach (...)
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  8. J. O. Beahrs (1983). Co-Consciousness: A Common Denominator in Hypnosis, Multiple Personality, and Normalcy. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 26:100-13.
  9. Piers Benn (2003). The Responsibility of the Psychiatric Offender: Commentary on Ciocchetti. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):189-192.
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  10. D. G. Benner & C. Stephen Evans (1984). Unity and Multiplicity in Hypnosis, Commissurotomy, and Multiple Personality Disorder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 5:423-431.
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  11. Petr Bob & George A. Mashour (2011). Schizophrenia, Dissociation, and Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1042-1049.
  12. Margaret A. Boden (1994). Multiple Personality and Computational Models. Philosophy 37:103-114.
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  13. Stephen E. Braude, Mediumship and Multiple Personality.
    mainstream academicians. Perhaps the major common area of interest was that of dissociation — in particular, the study of hypnosis and multiple personality, The founders of the S.P.R. believed, along with many others, that dissociative phenomena promised insights into the nature of the mind generally, including..
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  14. Stephen E. Braude (2003). Counting Persons and Living with Alters: Comments on Matthews. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):153-156.
    KEYWORDS: dissociation; multiple personality, person, responsibility.
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  15. Stephen E. Braude (1996). Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 3 (1):37-54.
  16. Stephen E. Braude (1996). Multiple Personality Disorder and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):37-54.
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  17. Stephen E. Braude (1995). First-Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind. Rowman & Littlefield.
    INTRODUCTION Back in the good old days of philosophy — say, around 400 BC, philosophers played a rather prominent role in the community at large. ...
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  18. John Briere (1995). Child Abuse, Memory, and Recall: A Commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 4 (1):83-87.
  19. Mark T. Brown (2001). Multiple Personality and Personal Identity. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):435 – 447.
    If personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity, then the sharp breaks in psychological connectedness characteristic of Multiple Personality Disorder implicitly commit psychological continuity theories to a metaphysically extravagant reification of alters. Animalist theories of personal identity avoid the reification of alternate personalities by interpreting multiple personality as a failure to integrate alternative autobiographical memory schemata. In the normal case, autobiographical memory cross-classifies a human life, and in so doing provides access to a variety of interpretative frameworks with their associated (...)
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  20. Christopher Buford (2011). Review of Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality – Logi Gunnarsson. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):418-420.
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  21. Stephen R. L. Clark (1996). Minds, Memes, and Multiples. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):21-28.
  22. Stephen R. L. Clark (1996). Commentary on "Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility&Quot. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):55-57.
  23. Stephen R. L. Clark (1991). How Many Selves Make Me? Philosophy 29:213-33.
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  24. Peter Q. Deeley (2003). Social, Cognitive, and Neural Constraints on Subjectivity and Agency: Implications for Dissociative Identity Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):161-167.
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  25. X. Fargeas & E. Andreewsky (1994). Schizophrenic Troubles of Personal Identity: A Cognitive Model. World Futures 42 (1):119-124.
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  26. Owen J. Flanagan (1994). Multiple Identity, Character Transformation, and Self-Reclamation. In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
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  27. Grant Gillett (1991). Multiple Personality and Irrationality. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):103-118.
    Abstract The phenomenology of Multiple Personality (MP) syndrome is used to derive an Aristotelian explanation of the failure to achieve rational integration of mental content. An MP subject is best understood as having failed to master the techniques of integrating conative and cognitive aspects of her mental life. This suggests that in irrationality the subject may lack similar skills basic to the proper articulation and use of mental content in belief formation and control of action. The view that emerges centres (...)
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  28. Grant R. Gillett (1997). A Discursive Account of Multiple Personality Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 4 (3):213-22.
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  29. Grant R. Gillett (1986). Multiple Personality and the Concept of a Person. New Ideas in Psychology 4:173-84.
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  30. George Graham (1999). Fuzzy Fault Lines: Selves in Multiple Personality Disorder. Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):159-174.
    This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the face of multiple (...)
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  31. George Graham (1996). Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Ian Hacking. [REVIEW] Ethics 106 (4):845-.
  32. George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (1995). Book Review:First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind. Stephen F. Braude. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (3):655-.
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  33. George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (1994). Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
  34. Edward Greetis (2011). Dissociative Identity: An Objection to Baker's Constitution Theory. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 26 (4):329-341.
    One of the central problems of personal identity is to determine what we are essentially . In response to this problem, Lynne Rudder Baker espouses a psychological criterion, that is, she claims that persons are essentially psychological. Baker’s theory purports to bypass the problems of other psychological theories such as Dissociative Identity Disorder and the problem of individuating persons synchronically. I argue that the theory’s treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder leads to untenable results, is invalid, and consequently fails to individuate (...)
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  35. Logi Gunnarsson (2010). Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality. Routledge.
    Introduction -- Am I alone in my body? -- Multiple personality -- Personal identity -- Diachronic identity -- What am I fundamentally? -- Empirical discernability and fission -- My body -- The various senses of personal identity -- Multiple personality and individuation -- Morton Prince's seminal case study the dissociation of a personality -- Philosophical theories of multiple personality -- The coexistence thesis -- Sharing my body -- A criterion of individuation -- Multiple personality in therapeutic and biographic discourses -- (...)
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  36. Ian Hacking (1995). Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Princeton University Press.
    Here the distinguished philosopher Ian Hacking uses the MPD epidemic and its links with the contemporary concept of child abuse to scrutinize today's moral...
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  37. Ian Hacking (1991). Two Souls in One Body. Critical Inquiry 17 (4):838-67.
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  38. Valerie Gray Hardcastle & Owen J. Flanagan (1999). Multiplex Vs. Multiple Selves: Distinguishing Dissociative Disorders. The Monist 82 (4):645-657.
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  39. P. Henninger (1992). Conditional Handedness: Handedness Changes in Multiple Personality Disordered Subject Reflect Shift in Hemispheric Dominance. Consciousness and Cognition 1 (3):265-287.
  40. R. D. Hinshelwood (1995). The Social Relocation of Personal Identity as Shown by Psychoanalytic Observations of Splitting, Projection and Introjection. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (3):185-204.
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  41. N. Humphrey & Daniel C. Dennett (1989). Speaking for Ourselves. Raritan 9:68-98.
    _Raritan: A Quarterly Review_ , IX, 68-98, Summer 1989. Reprinted (with footnotes), _Occasional Paper #8_ , Center on Violence and Human Survival, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, The City University of New York, 1991; Daniel Kolak and R. Martin, eds., _Self & Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues_ , Macmillan, 1991.
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  42. Nicholas Humphrey & Daniel C. Dennett (1989). Speaking for Our Selves: An Assessment of Multiple Personality Disorder. Philosophical Explorations.
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  43. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2003). Delusion, Dissociation and Identity. Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.
    The condition known as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is metaphysically strange. Can there really be several distinct persons operating in a single body? Our view is that DID sufferers are single persons with a severe mental disorder. In this paper we compare the phenomenology of dissociation between personality states in DID with certain delusional disorders. We argue both that the burden of proof must lie with those who defend the metaphysically extravagant Multiple Persons view and (...)
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  44. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2002). Identity, Control and Responsibility: The Case of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):509-526.
    Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) (formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder) is a condition in which a person appears to possess more than one personality, and sometimes very many. Some recent criminal cases involving defendants with DID have resulted in "not guilty" verdicts, though the defense is not always successful in this regard. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Stephen Behnke have argued that we should excuse DID sufferers from responsibility, only if at the time of the act the person was insane (typically delusional); (...)
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  45. Daniel Kolak (1993). Finding Our Selves: Identification, Identity, and Multiple Personality. Philosophical Psychology 6 (4):363-86.
    Many of the differences between empirical/psychological and conceptual/philosophical approaches to the mind can be resolved using a more precise language that is sensitive to both. Distinguishing identification from identity and identification as from identification with, and then defining the experiential concept of the per sonat, provides a walking bridge. Applying the new terminology to increasing degrees of dissociation, from non-pathological cases to multiple personality, shows how our psychologies can profit from philosophical analysis while our philosophies can revise themselves according to (...)
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  46. John P. Lizza (2010). Review of Logi Gunnarsson, Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3).
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  47. John P. Lizza (1993). Multiple Personality and Personal Identity Revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):263-274.
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  48. Randall R. Lyle (1998). Toward a Hermeneutics of Memory and Multiple Personality. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (2/3):39-43.
    Barnhardt, in “Dissociation: An Evolutionary Interpretation,” makes a case for understanding multiple personality as a “natural”phenomenon resulting from human biological evolution. He also argues that the reason that “multiple personalities” are not encountered more frequently is a result of a social construction encouraging “single” personalities. He concludes that it is from the interaction between the two that ethics derive. In this response I offer an alternative hermeneutic, using memory as the interpretive key, and by introducing Ricoeur’s work on narrative. highlight (...)
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  49. Steve Matthews (2003). Blaming Agents and Excusing Persons: The Case of DID. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 10 (2):169-74.
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  50. Steve Matthews (2003). Establishing Personal Identity in Cases of DID. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 10 (2):143-51.
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