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  1. Jose Luis Bermudez (1999). Categorizing Qualitative States: Some Problems. Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (2).
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  2. Stephen Biggs, Mohan Matthen & Dustin Stokes (2014). Sorting the Senses. In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and its Modalities. Oxford University Press. 1-19.
    We perceive in many ways. But several dubious presuppositions about the senses mask this diversity of perception. Philosophers, scientists, and engineers alike too often presuppose that the senses (vision, audition, etc.) are independent sources of information, perception being a sum of these independent contributions. We too often presuppose that we can generalize from vision to other senses. We too often presuppose that vision itself is best understood as a passive receptacle for an image thrown by a lens. In this essay (...)
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  3. Robert Briscoe (forthcoming). Bodily Action and Distal Attribution in Sensory Substitution. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Proceedings of the British Academy.
    According to proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory of perception (Hurley & Noë 2003, Noë 2004, O’Regan 2011), active control of camera movement is necessary for the emergence of distal attribution in tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS) because it enables the subject to acquire knowledge of the way stimulation in the substituting modality varies as a function of self-initiated, bodily action. This chapter, by contrast, approaches distal attribution as a solution to a causal inference problem faced by the subject’s perceptual systems. (...)
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  4. C. A. J. Coady (1974). The Senses of Martians. Philosophical Review 83 (1):107-125.
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  5. Kevin Connolly (forthcoming). Sensory Substitution and Perceptual Learning. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Oxford University Press.
    When a user integrates a sensory substitution device into her life, the process involves perceptual learning, that is, ‘relatively long-lasting changes to an organism’s perceptual system that improve its ability to respond to its environment’ (Goldstone 1998: 585). In this paper, I explore ways in which the extensive literature on perceptual learning can be applied to help improve sensory substitution devices. I then use these findings to answer a philosophical question. Much of the philosophical debate surrounding sensory substitution devices concerns (...)
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  6. Kevin Connolly, Diana Acosta Navas, Umut Baysan, Janiv Paulsberg & David Suarez, Sensory Substitution Conference Question Three.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Conference at the British Academy in March of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: How does sensory substitution interact with the brain’s architecture?
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  7. D. E. Cooper (1970). Materialism and Perception. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (October):334-346.
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  8. J. W. Roxbee Cox (1970). Distinguishing the Senses. Mind 79 (October):530-550.
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  9. Louw Feenstra & Johannes Borgstein (2003). The Senses in Perspective. Ludus Vitalis 11 (20):135-157.
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  10. Richard Gray (2014). Pain, Perception and the Sensory Modalities: Revisiting the Intensive Theory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):87-101.
    Pain is commonly explained in terms of the perceptual activity of a distinct sensory modality, the function of which is to enable us to perceive actual or potential damage to the body. However, the characterization of pain experience in terms of a distinct sensory modality with such content is problematic. I argue that pain is better explained as occupying a different role in relation to perception: to indicate when the stimuli that are sensed in perceiving anything by means of a (...)
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  11. Richard Gray (2013). Is There a Space of Sensory Modalities? Erkenntnis 78 (6):1259-1273.
    Two proposals have recently, and independently, been made about a space of possible sensory modalities. In this paper I examine these different proposals, and offer one of my own. I suggest that there are several spaces associated with distinct kinds of sensory modality.
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  12. Richard Gray (2011). On the Nature of the Senses. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
    The failure to resolve satisfactorily epistemological issues surrounding the identification of different senses has led to questions being asked of the nature of the senses. This issue has been thrown into sharp focus by two starkly contrasting positions. The first is a realist position that draws on science and is based on the application of criteria. The second is an anti-realist position that adheres to commonsense conceptions and is partly motivated by the apparent failure of criterial approaches. In this paper (...)
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  13. Richard Gray (2005). On the Concept of a Sense. Synthese 147 (3):461-475.
    Keeley has recently argued that the philosophical issue of how to analyse the concept of a sense can usefully be addressed by considering how scientists, and more specifically neuroethologists, classify the senses. After briefly outlining his proposal, which is based on the application of an ordered set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for modality differentiation, I argue, by way of two complementary counterexamples, that it fails to account fully for the way the senses are in fact individuated in (...)
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  14. H. P. Grice (1962). Some Remarks About the Senses. In R. J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, First Series. Oxford University Press.
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  15. Robert Hopkins (2011). Re-Imagining, Re-Viewing and Re-Touching. In Fiona McPherson (ed.), The senses: classic and contemporary philosophical perspectives. Oxford University Press, Usa. 261.
    One strategy for working out how to individuate the senses is to pursue that task in tandem with that of individuating the sensory imaginings. We can tackle both, at least for the spatial senses of sight and touch, if we appeal to the idea that, while both modes represent their objects perspectivally, different forms of perspective are involved in each. This cannot, however, exhaust the differences between tactual and visual. Tactual experience is tied to bodily awareness as visual is not. (...)
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  16. Brian L. Keeley (2002). Making Sense of the Senses: Individuating Modalities in Humans and Other Animals. Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):5-28.
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  17. Julian Kiverstein, Mirko Farina & Andy Clark (forthcoming). Substituting the Senses. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Sensory substitution devices are a type of sensory prosthesis that (typically) convert visual stimuli transduced by a camera into tactile or auditory stimulation. They are designed to be used by people with impaired vision so that they can recover some of the functions normally subserved by vision. In this chapter we will consider what philosophers might learn about the nature of the senses from the neuroscience of sensory substitution. We will show how sensory substitution devices work by exploiting the cross-modal (...)
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  18. Mark Leon (1988). Characterising the Senses. Mind and Language 3 (4):243-70.
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  19. Fiona Macpherson (forthcoming). The Space of Sensory Modalities. In D. Stokes S. Biggs & M. Matthen (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities.
    Is there a space of the sensory modalities? Such a space would be one in which we can represent all the actual, and at least some of the possible, sensory modalities. The relative position of the senses in this space would indicate how similar and how different the senses were from each other. The construction of such a space might reveal unconsidered features of the actual and possible senses, help us to define what a sense is, and provide grounds that (...)
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  20. Fiona Macpherson (ed.) (2011). The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    The senses, or sensory modalities, constitute the different ways we have of perceiving the world, such as seeing, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling. But how many senses are there? How many could there be? What makes the senses different? What interaction takes place between the senses? This book is a guide to thinking about these questions. Together with an extensive introduction to the topic, the book contains the key classic papers on this subject together with nine newly commissioned essays. -/- (...)
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  21. Fiona Macpherson (2011). Individuating the Senses. In , The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
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  22. Fiona Macpherson (ed.) (2011). The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    This volume is the first on the philosophy of the non-visual senses. It includes in equal measure both "classic" articles (from Aristotle to Paul Grice) which are unavailable or otherwise difficult to access, as well as new essays by well-known philosophers. It also includes an introduction by Macpherson, which draws together the centuries of philosophical thought on the senses and points to likely new directions.
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  23. Fiona Macpherson (2011). Taxonomising the Senses. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):123-142.
    I argue that we should reject the sparse view that there are or could be only a small number of rather distinct senses. When one appreciates this then one can see that there is no need to choose between the standard criteria that have been proposed as ways of individuating the senses—representation, phenomenal character, proximal stimulus and sense organ—or any other criteria that one may deem important. Rather, one can use these criteria in conjunction to form a fine-grained taxonomy of (...)
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  24. Olivier Massin (2010). L'objectivité du toucher [The Objectivity of the Sense of Touch]. Dissertation, Aix-Marseille
    This thesis vindicates the common-sense intuition that touch is more objective than the other senses. The reason why it is so, it is argued, is that touch is the only sense essential of the experience of physical effort, and that this experience constitutes our only acquaintance with the mind-independence of the physical world. The thesis is divided in tree parts. Part I argues that sensory modalities are individuated by they proper objects, realistically construed. Part II argues that the proper objects (...)
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  25. Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). The Individuation of the Senses. In , Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    How many senses do humans possess? Five external senses, as most cultures have it—sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste? Should proprioception, kinaesthesia, thirst, and pain be included, under the rubric bodily sense? What about the perception of time and the sense of number? Such questions reduce to two. 1. How do we distinguish a sense from other sorts of information-receiving faculties? 2. By what principle do we distinguish the senses? Aristotle discussed these questions in the De Anima. H. P. Grice (...)
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  26. Norton Nelkin (1990). Categorizing the Senses. Mind and Language 5 (2):149-165.
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  27. Matthew Nudds, Is Seeing Just Like Feeling? Kinds of Experiences and the Five Senses.
    In this paper I am going to argue that two commonly held views about perceptual experience are incompatible and that one must be given up. The first is the view that the five senses are to be distinguished by appeal to the kind of experiences involved in perception; the second is the view.
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  28. Matthew Nudds (2011). The Senses as Psychological Kinds. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford.
    The distinction we make between five different senses is a universal one.<sup>1</sup> Rather than speaking of generically perceiving something, we talk of perceiving in one of five determinate ways: we see, hear, touch, smell, and taste things. In distinguishing determinate ways of perceiving things what are we distinguishing between? What, in other words, is a sense modality?<sup>2</sup> An answer to this question must tell us what constitutes a sense modality and so needs to do more than simply describe differences in (...)
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  29. Matthew Nudds (2009). Discriminating Senses. The Philosophers' Magazine 45 (45):92-98.
    The character of our perceptual experience is such that it appears to be integrated or unified across different senses. If introspection were all we had to go on, we wouldn’t distinguish different senses at all, but would take ourselves to have a single sense and to simply perceive, but not see, or feel, or taste, etc.
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  30. Matthew Nudds (2004). The Significance of the Senses. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):31-51.
    Standard accounts of the senses attempt to answer the question how and why we count five senses (the counting question); none of the standard accounts is satisfactory. Any adequate account of the senses must explain the significance of the senses, that is, why distinguishing different senses matters. I provide such an explanation, and then use it as the basis for providing an account of the senses and answering the counting question.
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  31. Matthew Nudds (2000). Modes of Perceiving and Imagining. Acta Analytica 15 (24):139-150.
    We enjoy modes of sensory imagining corresponding to our five modes of perception - seeing, touching, hearing, smelling and tasting. An account of what constitutes these different modes of perseption needs also to explain what constitutes the corresponding modes of sensory perception. In this paper I argue that we can explain what distinguishes the different modes of sensory imagination in terms of their characteristic experiences without supposing that we must distinguish the senses in terms of the kinds of experience involved. (...)
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  32. John O'Dea (2011). A Proprioceptive Account of the Senses. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Representationalist theories of sensory experience are often thought to be vulnerable to the existence of apparently non-representational differences between experiences in different sensory modalities. Seeing and hearing seem to differ in their qualia, quite apart from what they represent. The origin of this idea is perhaps Grice’s argument, in “Some Remarks on the Senses,” that the senses are distinguished by “introspectible character.” In this chapter I take the Representationalist side by putting forward an account of sense modalities which is consistent (...)
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  33. Catherine Osborne (1998). Perceiving White and Sweet (Again): Aristotle, De Anima 3.7, 431a20-B1. Classical Quarterly 48 (02):433-446.
    In chapter 7 of the third book of De anima Aristotle is concerned with the activity of the intellect (nous), which, here as elsewhere in the work, he explores by developing parallels with his account of sense-perception. In this chapter his principal interest appears to be the notion of judgement, and in particular intellectual judgements about the value of some item on a scale of good and bad. In this paper I shall argue, firstly that there is in fact a (...)
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  34. Catherine Osborne (1983). Aristotle, De Anima 3. 2: How Do We Perceive That We See and Hear? Classical Quarterly 33 (02):401-411.
    The second chapter of book three of the De anima marks the end of Aristotle's discussion of sense-perception. The chapter is a long one and apparently rambling in subject matter. It begins with a passage that is usually taken as a discussion of some sort of self-awareness, particularly awareness that one is perceiving, although such an interpretation raises some difficulties. This paper reconsiders the problems raised by supposing that the question discussed in the first paragraph is ‘how do we perceive (...)
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  35. Vincent Picciuto & Peter Carruthers (forthcoming). Inner-Sense. In Biggs S., Matthen M. & Stokes D. (eds.), Perception and its Modalites. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter considers whether any of the inner sense mechanisms that have been postulated to detect and represent some of our own mental states should qualify as sensory modalities. We first review and reject the four standard views of the senses, and then propose a set of properties that would be possessed by a prototypical sensory system. Thereafter we consider how closely the existing models of inner sense match the prototype. Some resemble a prototypical sense to a high degree, some (...)
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  36. Louise Richardson, Fiona Macpherson, Mohan Matthen & Matthew Nudds, Symposium on Louise Richardson’s “Flavour, Taste and Smell”. Mind and Language Symposia at Brains.
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  37. P. Ross (2001). Qualia and the Senses. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.
    In his classic paper, "Some Remarks about the Senses," H. P. Grice argues that our intuitive distinction among perceptual modalities requires that the modalities be characterized in terms of the introspectible character of experience. I first show that Grice's argument provides support for the claim that perceptual experiences have qualia, namely, mental qualitative properties of experience which are what it's like to be conscious of perceived properties such as color. I then defend intentionalism about experience, which rejects qualia, by showing (...)
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  38. Peter W. Ross (2008). Common Sense About Qualities and Senses. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):299 - 316.
    There has been some recent optimism that addressing the question of how we distinguish sensory modalities will help us consider whether there are limits on a scientific understanding of perceptual states. For example, Block has suggested that the way we distinguish sensory modalities indicates that perceptual states have qualia which at least resist scientific characterization. At another extreme, Keeley argues that our common-sense way of distinguishing the senses in terms of qualitative properties is misguided, and offers a scientific eliminativism about (...)
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  39. Peter W. Ross (2001). Qualia and the Senses. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.
    How should we characterize the nature of perceptual experience? Some theorists claim that colour experiences, to take an example of perceptual experiences, have both intentional properties and properties called 'colour qualia', namely, mental qualitative properties which are what it is like to be conscious of colour. Since proponents of colour qualia hold that these mental properties cannot be explained in terms of causal relations, this position is in opposition to a functionalist characterization of colour experience.
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  40. Michael Scott (2007). Distinguishing the Senses. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):257 – 262.
    Seeing, hearing and touching are phenomenally different, even if we are detecting the same spatial properties with each sense. This presents a prima facie problem for intentionalism, the theory that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. The paper reviews some attempts to resolve this problem, and then looks in detail at Peter Carruthers' recent proposal that the senses can be individuated by the way in which they represent spatial properties and incorporate time. This proposal is shown to be ineffective in (...)
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  41. Michel Serres (2009). The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies (I). Continuum.
    Veils -- Boxes -- Tables -- Visit -- Joy.
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  42. D. Stokes, M. Matthen & S. Biggs (eds.) (2014). Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press.
    This volume is about the many ways we perceive. Contributors explore the nature of the individual senses, how and what they tell us about the world, and how they interrelate. They consider how the senses extract perceptual content from receptoral information. They consider what kinds of objects we perceive and whether multiple senses ever perceive a single event. They consider how many senses we have, what makes one sense distinct from another, and whether and why distinguishing senses may be useful. (...)
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  43. David Vender (2010). Reid's Discovery of the Sense of Balance. Journal of Scottish Thought 3:23 - 40.
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