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  1. 77 88 (2002). Why God's Beliefs Are Not Hard-Type Soft Facts. Religious Studies 38 (1):77-88.
    John Fischer has attacked the Ockhamistic solution to the freedom–foreknowledge dilemma by arguing that: God's prior beliefs about the future, though being soft facts about the past, are soft facts of a special sort, what he calls ‘hard-type soft facts’, i.e. soft facts, the constitutive properties of which are ‘hard’, or ‘temporally non-relational properties’; in this respect, such facts are like regular past facts which are subject to the fixity of the past. In this paper, I take issue with this (...)
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  2. Mohammed Abouzahr (2013). Future Contingents, Freedom, and Foreknowledge. Dissertation, Wayne State University
    This essay is a contribution to the new trend and old tradition of analyzing theological fatalism in light of its relationship to logical fatalism. All results pertain to branching temporal systems that use the A-theory and assume presentism. The project focuses on two kinds of views about branching time. One position is true futurism, which designates what will occur regardless of contingency. The opposing view is open futurism, by which no possible course of events is privileged over others; that is, (...)
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  3. Robert Merrihew Adams (1973). Middle Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):552-554.
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  4. Dennis M. Ahern (1979). Foreknowledge: Nelson Pike and Newcomb's Problem. Religious Studies 15 (4):475 - 490.
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  5. Dennis M. Ahern (1979). Foreknowledge: Nelson Pike and Newcomb's Problem: DENNIS M. AHERN. Religious Studies 15 (4):475-490.
    The problem of foreknowledge and freedom presents a challenge to the defender of traditional Western theism. Nelson Pike has argued that the existence of an essentially omniscient God who possesses foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. Pike's opponents in this matter, among whom is Alvin Plantinga, argue that no incompatibility has yet been shown. I shall develop the view that neither Pike nor his opponents have conclusively settled the question whether foreknowledge and freedom are compatible. Furthermore there is a reason (...)
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  6. William P. Alston (1985). Divine Foreknowledge and Alternative Conceptions of Human Freedom. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (1-2):19-32.
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  7. David J. Anderson & Joshua L. Watson (2010). The Mystery of Foreknowledge. Philo 13 (2):136-150.
    Many have attempted to respond to arguments for the incompatibility of freedom with divine foreknowledge by claiming that God’s beliefs about the future are explained by what the world is like at that future time. We argue that this response adequately advances the discussion only if the theist is able to articulate a model of foreknowledge that is both clearly possible and compatible with freedom. We investigate various models the theist might articulate and argue that all of these models fail.
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  8. Benjamin H. Arbour (2013). Future Freedom and the Fixity of Truth: Closing the Road to Limited Foreknowledge Open Theism. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):189-207.
    Unlike versions of open theism that appeal to the alethic openness of the future, defenders of limited foreknowledge open theism (hereafter LFOT) affirm that some propositions concerning future contingents are presently true. Thus, there exist truths that are unknown to God, so God is not omniscient simpliciter. LFOT requires modal definitions of divine omniscience such that God knows all truths that are logically knowable. Defenders of LFOT have yet to provide an adequate response to Richard Purtill’s argument that fatalism logically (...)
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  9. Deane-Peter Baker (2005). Divine Foreknowledge – so What? Heythrop Journal 46 (1):60–65.
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  10. David Basinger (1993). The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. Review of Metaphysics 47 (1):171-172.
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  11. David Basinger (1986). Omniscience and Deliberation: A Response to Reichenbach. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (2/3):169 - 172.
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  12. Robert W. Beard (1986). Professor Lucas on Omniscience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (1):37 - 43.
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  13. Lawrence C. Becker (1972). Foreknowledge and Predestination. Mind 81 (321):138-141.
  14. Endre Begby (2005). Leibniz on Determinism and Divine Foreknowledge. Studia Leibnitiana 37 (1):83-98.
    Nach Michael J. Murrays Aufsatz „Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom" ist Leibniz nicht als Kompatibilist zu verstehen. Die göttliche Vorhersehung beruhe nicht darauf, dass menschliche Handlungen mechanischen Gesetzen von Ursache und Wirkung (causa efficiens) gehorchen, sondern auf den für diese Handlungen spezifischen geistigen Gesetzen (causa finalis, moralische Gesetze, etc.). In diesem Aufsatz argumentiere ich, dass Murray die Tragweite des Grundsatzes vom hinreichenden Grund in Leibniz' Philosophie nicht richtig versteht. Des Weiteren zeige ich, dass die Unterscheidung (...)
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  15. Tully Boreland, Omniscience and Divine Foreknowledge. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  16. Stephen Brown (1986). The Works of Richard Campsall. Review of Metaphysics 40 (2):403-406.
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  17. Anthony Brueckner (2000). On an Attempt to Demonstrate the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 17 (1):132-134.
    Ted A. Warfield seeks to establish the compatibility in question by getting the incompatibilist to reject an unpersuasive argument from fatalism to the conclusion that a given action is not freely done. He maintains that such a rejection requires the the incompatibilist to hold that there is a possible world in which the fatalist’s premise is true and in which the conclusion is false (and so the given action is freely done). If a foreknowing God exists in that world, then (...)
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  18. Michael J. Cholbi (2003). Contingency and Divine Knowledge in Ockham. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1):81-91.
    Ockham appeared to maintain that God necessarily knows all true propositions, including future contingent propositions, despite the fact that such propositions have determinate truth values. While some commentators believe that Ockham’s attempt to reconcile divine omniscience with the contingency of true future propositions amounts to little more than a simple-minded assertion of Ockham’s Christian faith, I argue that Ockham’s position is more sophisticated than this and rests on attributing to God a dual knowledge property: God not only knows every true (...)
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  19. Joseph Corabi & Rebecca Germino (2013). Prophecy, Foreknowledge, and Middle Knowledge. Faith and Philosophy 30 (1):72-92.
    Largely following on the heels of Thomas Flint’s book-length defense of Molinism a number of years ago, a debate has emerged about the ability of Molinism to explain God’s purported ability to successfully prophesy the occurrence of human free choices, as well as about the merits of other theories of divine providence and foreknowledge in this respect. After introducing the relevant issues, we criticize Alexander Pruss’s recent attempt to show that non-Molinist views which countenance only simple foreknowledge fare as well (...)
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  20. William Lane Craig (1990). Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. London: E. J. Brill.
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  21. William Lane Craig (1987). Divine Foreknowledge and Newcomb's Paradox. Philosophia 17 (3):331-350.
    Newcomb's Paradox thus serves as an illustrative vindication of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. A proper understanding of the counterfactual conditionals involved enables us to see that the pastness of God's knowledge serves neither to make God's beliefs counterfactually closed nor to rob us of genuine freedom. It is evident that our decisions determine God's past beliefs about those decisions and do so without invoking an objectionable backward causation. It is also clear that in the context of (...)
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  22. William Lane Craig (1986). Temporal Necessity; Hard Facts/Soft Facts. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (2/3):65 - 91.
    In conclusion, then, the notion of temporal necessity is certainly queer and perhaps a misnomer. It really has little to do with temporality per se and everything to do with counterfactual openness or closedness. We have seen that the future is as unalterable as the past, but that this purely logical truth is not antithetical to freedom or contingency. Moreover, we have found certain past facts are counterfactually open in that were future events or actualities to be other than they (...)
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  23. Barry A. David (2001). Divine Foreknowledge in De Civitate Dei 5.9. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 75 (4):479-495.
    It is commonly agreed that Augustine's discussion of divine foreknowledge in DcD 5.9 is distinguished by its anti-Ciceronian polemic, but no one has analyzed the philosophical structure of this polemic to determine if it is compelling. I argue that Augustine's presentation has significant philosophical merit for two reasons. First, Augustine's rigorous application of the principle, shared with Cicero, that "nothing occurs unless it is preceded by an efficient cause" is capable of answeringforcefully one of the chief difficulties that Cicero poses (...)
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  24. Scott Davis (1994). The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents From Aristotle to Suarez. Ancient Philosophy 14 (1):234-241.
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  25. Scott A. Davison (1991). Foreknowledge, Middle Knowledge and “Nearby” Worlds. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (1):29 - 44.
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  26. Joseph Diekemper (2013). Eternity, Knowledge, and Freedom. Religious Studies 49 (1):45-64.
    This article addresses the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom by developing a modified version of Boethius' solution to the problem – one that is meant to cohere with a dynamic theory of time and a conception of God as temporal. I begin the article by discussing the traditional Boethian solution, and a defence of it due to Kretzmann and Stump. After canvassing a few of the objections to this view, I then go on to offer my own modified (...)
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  27. R. Lance Factor (1978). Newcomb's Paradox and Omniscience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1):30 - 40.
  28. John Martin Fischer (1983). Freedom and Foreknowledge. Philosophical Review 92 (1):67-79.
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  29. John Martin Fischer & Patrick Todd (eds.) (2015). Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge. Oxford University Press.
    We typically think we have free will. But how could we have free will, if for anything we do, it was already true in the distant past that we would do that thing? Or how could we have free will, if God already knows in advance all the details of our lives? Such issues raise the specter of "fatalism". This book collects sixteen previously published articles on fatalism, truths about the future, and the relationship between divine foreknowledge and human freedom, (...)
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  30. John Martin Fischer, Patrick Todd & Neal A. Tognazzini (2009). Engaging with Pike: God, Freedom, and Time. Philosophical Papers 38 (2):247-270.
    Nelson Pike’s article, “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action,” is one of the most influential pieces in contemporary Philosophy of Religion. Published over forty years ago, it has elicited many different kinds of replies. We shall set forth some of the main lines of reply to Pike’s article, starting with some of the “early” replies. We then explore some issues that arise from relatively recent work in the philosophy of time; it is fascinating to note that views suggested by recent work (...)
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  31. John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini (2014). Omniscience, Freedom, and Dependence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):346-367.
    Several theorists (Merricks, Westphal, and McCall) have recently claimed to offer a novel way to respond to the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge, rooted in Molina's insight that God's beliefs depend on what we do, rather than the other way around. In this paper we argue that these responses either beg the question, or else are dressed-up versions of Ockhamism.
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  32. Thomas P. Flint (1999). A New Anti-Anti-Molinist Argument. Religious Studies 35 (3):299-305.
    This paper argues that William Hasker's 'A new anti-Molinist argument' offers a fascinating but ultimately unsuccessful new instalment in his continuing campaign to discredit the picture of providence based on the theory of middle knowledge. It is first shown that Hasker's argument, though suffering from a seemingly irreparable logical gap, does nicely highlight a significant (and hitherto unduly underemphasized) point of contention between Molinists and anti-Molinists -- the question whether or not Molinists are committed to viewing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (...)
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  33. Thomas P. Flint (1990). Hasker's God, Time, and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 60 (1-2):103 - 115.
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  34. Alfred Freddoso, Molinism.
    Molinism, named after Luis de Molina, is a theological system for reconciling human freedom with God's grace and providence. Presupposing a strongly libertarian account of freedom, Molinists assert against their rivals that the grace whereby God cooperates with supernaturally salvific acts is not intrinsically efficacious. To preserve divine providence and foreknowledge, they then posit "middle knowledge", through which God knows, prior to his own free decrees, how any possible rational agent would freely act in any possible situation. Beyond this, they (...)
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  35. Alfred Freddoso, Molina, Luis De.
    A leading figure in sixteenth-century Iberian scholasticism, Molina was one of the most controversial thinkers in the history of Catholic thought. In keeping with the strongly libertarian account of human free choice that marked the early Jesuit theologians, Molina held that God's causal influence on free human acts does not by its intrinsic nature uniquely determine what those acts will be or whether they will be good or evil. Because of this, Molina asserted against his Dominican rivals that God's comprehensive (...)
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  36. Alfred Freddoso, The "Openness" of God: A Reply to William Hasker.
    Emulating Bill Hasker, I will begin with a few autobiographical remarks. Numbered among the half-dozen or so writers whom I have been most influenced by spiritually as well as intellectually are St. Augustine of Hippo and St. Thomas Aquinas. Having pondered at length the philosophical doctrines of God fashioned by these two brilliant and holy men, I find it difficult to entertain the idea that we moderns will be better positioned philosophically to make progress in our understanding of the divine (...)
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  37. Alfred J. Freddoso (ed.) (1988). On Divine Foreknowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    Luis de Molina was a leading figure in the remarkable sixteenth-century revival of Scholasticism on the Iberian peninsula.
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  38. Richard Gaskin (1994). Molina on Divine Foreknowledge and the Principle of Bivalence. Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (4):551-571.
  39. Richard Gaskin (1993). Conditionals of Freedom and Middle Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (173):412-430.
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  40. Benedikt Paul Göcke (2012). Panentheism and Classical Theism. Sophia 52 (1):61-75.
    Panentheism seems to be an attractive alternative to classical theism. It is not clear, though, what exactly panentheism asserts and how it relates to classical theism. By way of clarifying the thesis of panentheism, I argue that panentheism and classical theism differ only as regards the modal status of the world. According to panentheism, the world is an intrinsic property of God – necessarily there is a world – and according to classical theism the world is an extrinsic property of (...)
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  41. Peter A. Graham (2008). Warfield on Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 25 (1):75-78.
    Warfield (1997, 2000) argues that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible. He assumes for conditional proof that there is a necessarilyexistent omniscient being. He also assumes that it is possible for there to be a person who both does something and could have avoided doing it. As supportfor this latter premise he points to the fact that nearly every participant to the debate accepts the falsity of logical fatalism. Appealing to this consensus, however, renders the argument question-begging, for that (...)
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  42. Susan Haack (1974). On a Theological Argument for Fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (95):156-159.
    It is the aim of this paper to show that [the theological argument from Divine omniscience] is not more than a needlessly (and confusingly) elaborate version of the argument for fatalism discussed by Aristotle in de Interpretatione 9, which, since its sole premise is the Principle of Bivalence, may conveniently be called the logical argument for fatalism. If this is right, if the theological premisses of the theological argument can be shown to be strictly irrelevant to the fatalist conclusion, then (...)
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  43. William Hasker (2001). The Foreknowledge Conundrum. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 50 (1/3):97-114.
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  44. William Hasker (2000). Are Alternative Pasts Plausible? A Reply to Thomas Flint. Religious Studies 36 (1):103-105.
    Thomas Flint has claimed that my argument against Molinism suffers from a 'seemingly irreparable logical gap'. He also contests a key assumption of that argument, namely that 'something which has had causal consequences in the past is ipso facto a hard, fixed, settled fact about the past'. In reply, I show that there is no logical gap at all in the argument. And I argue that, even though Molinists have reasons, based on Molinist principles, for rejecting the assumption in question, (...)
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  45. William Hasker (1999). A New Anti-Molinist Argument. Religious Studies 35 (3):291-297.
    An argument is given showing that, on the assumptions of Molinism, human beings must bring about the truth of the counterfactuals of freedom that govern their actions. But, it is claimed, it is impossible for humans to do this, and so Molinism is involved in a contradiction. The Molinist must maintain, on the contrary, that we can indeed bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us. This question turns out to depend on whether the counterfactuals of freedom are, (...)
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  46. William Hasker (1993). How Good/Bad is Middle Knowledge? A Reply to Basinger. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33 (2):111 - 118.
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  47. William Hasker (1990). On Divine Foreknowledge. Faith and Philosophy 7 (3):356-361.
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  48. William Hasker (1988). Hard Facts and Theological Fatalism. Noûs 22 (3):419-436.
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  49. Paul Helm (1975). Timelessness and Foreknowledge. Mind 84 (336):516-527.
  50. Daniel Hill (2003). Review of James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Eds) Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views. (Downers Grove IL: Intervarsity Press, 2001), (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2001). [REVIEW] Religious Studies 39 (2):241-246.
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