This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Subcategories:
193 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 193
Material to categorize
  1. John E. Abbruzzese (1997). The Coherence of Omniscience: A Defense. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 41 (1):25-34.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Robert Merrihew Adams (1991). An Anti-Molinist Argument. Philosophical Perspectives 5:343-353.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Robert Merrihew Adams (1973). Middle Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):552-554.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Torin Alter (2002). On Two Alleged Conflicts Between Divine Attributes. Faith and Philosophy 19 (1):47-57.
    Some argue that God’s omnipotence and moral perfection prevent God from being afraid and having evil desires and thus from understanding such states—which contradicts God’s omniscience. But, I argue, God could acquire such understanding indirectly, either by (i) perceiving the mental states of imperfect creatures, (ii) imaginatively combining the components of mental states with which God could be acquainted, or (iii) having false memory traces of such states. (i)–(iii) are consistent with the principal divine attributes.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. D. Basinger (2000). Divine Providence: The Molinist Account. Philosophical Review 109 (2):274-276.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. David Basinger (1991). Middle Knowledge and Divine Control: Some Clarifications. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (3):129 - 139.
    What then have we discovered? The general issue under discussion, remember, is whether it is advantageous or disadvantageous for the theist to affirm MK, especially as this form of knowledge relates to God's control over earthly affairs. As we have seen, both proponents and opponents of MK have claimed that this form of knowledge gives God significant power over earthly affairs, including control over the (indeterministically) free choices of humans.We have seen, though, that such a contention is dubious. There are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. David Basinger (1986). Omniscience and Deliberation: A Response to Reichenbach. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (2/3):169 - 172.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. David Basinger (1982). Divine Omniscience and the Best of All Possible Worlds. Journal of Value Inquiry 16 (2):143-148.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Robert Bass (2007). Omniscience and the Identification Problem. Florida Philosophical Review 7 (1):78-91.
    I once came across a Mark Twain story in which a character said something to the effect that the one thing God didn’t know was that he was not all-knowing. As an argument against omniscience, Twain’s one-liner doesn’t amount to much. Thinking about it, however, led to the kind of puzzles I explore here. Some puzzles about omniscience are connected to other issues, such as whether all claims about the future presently have truth-values. Those in turn are connected to deep (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Robert W. Beard (1986). Professor Lucas on Omniscience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (1):37 - 43.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Tully Boreland, Omniscience and Divine Foreknowledge. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Robert F. Brown (1991). Divine Omniscience, Immutability, Aseity and Human Free Will. Religious Studies 27 (3):285-295.
  13. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1967). Omniscience and Indexical Reference. Journal of Philosophy 64 (7):203-210.
  14. David M. Ciocchi (2002). The Religious Adequacy of Free-Will Theism. Religious Studies 38 (1):45-61.
    In this paper I question the claim that the increasingly popular position known as ‘free-will theism’ or ‘the open view of God’ supports a rich religious life. To do this I advance a notion of ‘religious adequacy’, and then argue that free-will theism fails to be religiously adequate with respect to one of the principal practices of the religious life – petitionary prayer. Drawing on current work in libertarian free-will theory, I consider what are likely the only two lines of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Steven B. Cowan (2003). The Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge Revisited. Religious Studies 39 (1):93-102.
    The Molinist doctrine that God has middle knowledge requires that God knows the truth-values of counterfactuals of freedom, propositions about what free agents would do in hypothetical circumstances. A well-known objection to middle knowledge, the grounding objection, contends that counterfactuals of freedom have no truth-value because there is no fact to the matter as to what an agent with libertarian freedom would do in counterfactual circumstances. Molinists, however, have offered responses to the grounding objection that they believe are adequate for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. William Lane Craig (1992). Hasker on Divine Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 67 (2):89 - 110.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. William Lane Craig (1988). Tachyons, Time Travel, and Divine Omniscience. Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):135-150.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Andrew Cullison (2006). Omniscience as a Dispositional State. Philosophia Christi 8 (1):151-160.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Scott A. Davison (1991). Foreknowledge, Middle Knowledge and “Nearby” Worlds. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (1):29 - 44.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. R. Lance Factor (1978). Newcomb's Paradox and Omniscience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1):30 - 40.
  21. Alicia Finch & Michael Rea (2008). Presentism and Ockham's Way Out. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 1:1-17.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Thomas P. Flint (1999). A New Anti-Anti-Molinist Argument. Religious Studies 35 (3):299-305.
    This paper argues that William Hasker's 'A new anti-Molinist argument' offers a fascinating but ultimately unsuccessful new instalment in his continuing campaign to discredit the picture of providence based on the theory of middle knowledge. It is first shown that Hasker's argument, though suffering from a seemingly irreparable logical gap, does nicely highlight a significant (and hitherto unduly underemphasized) point of contention between Molinists and anti-Molinists -- the question whether or not Molinists are committed to viewing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Thomas P. Flint (1991). Middle Knowledge and the Doctrine of Infallibility. Philosophical Perspectives 5:373-393.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Alfred Freddoso, Molinism.
    Molinism, named after Luis de Molina, is a theological system for reconciling human freedom with God's grace and providence. Presupposing a strongly libertarian account of freedom, Molinists assert against their rivals that the grace whereby God cooperates with supernaturally salvific acts is not intrinsically efficacious. To preserve divine providence and foreknowledge, they then posit "middle knowledge", through which God knows, prior to his own free decrees, how any possible rational agent would freely act in any possible situation. Beyond this, they (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Alfred Freddoso, The "Openness" of God: A Reply to William Hasker.
    Emulating Bill Hasker, I will begin with a few autobiographical remarks. Numbered among the half-dozen or so writers whom I have been most influenced by spiritually as well as intellectually are St. Augustine of Hippo and St. Thomas Aquinas. Having pondered at length the philosophical doctrines of God fashioned by these two brilliant and holy men, I find it difficult to entertain the idea that we moderns will be better positioned philosophically to make progress in our understanding of the divine (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Richard M. Gale (2002). Divine Omniscience, Human Freedom, and Backwards Causation. Faith and Philosophy 19 (1):85-88.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Gregory Ganssle (1993). Atemporality and the Mode of Divine Knowledge. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 34 (3):171 - 180.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Michael V. Griffin (1999). Leibniz on God's Knowledge of Counterfactuals. Philosophical Review 108 (3):317-343.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. William Hasker (2000). Are Alternative Pasts Plausible? A Reply to Thomas Flint. Religious Studies 36 (1):103-105.
    Thomas Flint has claimed that my argument against Molinism suffers from a 'seemingly irreparable logical gap'. He also contests a key assumption of that argument, namely that 'something which has had causal consequences in the past is ipso facto a hard, fixed, settled fact about the past'. In reply, I show that there is no logical gap at all in the argument. And I argue that, even though Molinists have reasons, based on Molinist principles, for rejecting the assumption in question, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. William Hasker (1989). God, Time and Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    ... or engenders a tradition of philosophical reflection, questions will arise about the relation between divine knowledge and power and human freedom. ...
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Jill Graper Hernandez (2005). Divine Omniscience and Human Evil: Interpreting Leibniz Without Middle Knowledge. Philosophy and Theology 17 (1/2):107-120.
    The ‘middle knowledge’ doctrine salvages free will and divine omniscience by contending that God knows what agents will freely choose under any possible circumstances. I argue, however, that the Leibnizian problem of divine knowledge of human evil is best resolved by applying a Theodicy II distinction between determined, foreseen, and resolved action. This move eliminates deference to middle knowledge. Contingent action is indeed free, but not all action is contingent, and so not all action is free. For Leibniz, then, God’s (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Noreen E. Johnson (2007). Divine Omnipotence and Divine Omniscience: A Reply to Michael Martin. Sophia 46 (1):69-73.
    In Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, Michael Martin argues that to posit a God that is both omnipotent and omniscient is philosophically incoherent. I challenge this argument by proposing that a God who is necessarily omniscient is more powerful than a God who is contingently omniscient. I then argue that being omnipotent entails being omniscient by showing that for an all-powerful being to be all-powerful in any meaningful way, it must possess complete knowledge about all states of affairs and thus must (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Gordon Knight (2005). The Theological Significance of Subjectivity. Heythrop Journal 46 (1):1–10.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Eric Russert Kraemer (1984). Divine Omniscience and Criteria of Intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1):131-135.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Norman Kretzmann (1966). Omniscience and Immutability. Journal of Philosophy 63 (14):409-421.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Jonathan Kvanvig, Omniscience and Eternity: A Reply to Craig Jonathan L. Kvanvig.
    Craig claims that my treatment of temporal indexicals such as ‘now’ is inadequate, and that my theory gives no general account of tense. Craig’s argument misunderstands the theory of indexicals I give, and I show how to extend the theory to give a general account of tense.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Jonathan Kvanvig, Response to Flint.
    In defending his rejection of Maverick Molinism (Faith and Philosophy 20.1, (January 2003), pp. 91-100) from my criticisms (Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002), pp. 348-357), Tom Flint attributes three central claims to my argument, and disagrees with two of them. He also notes my request for a defense of the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle, which his argument employs. He portrays that discussion as taking “potshots” at his argument, in part because I denied that concerns about the Law are compelling, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Jonathan Kvanvig (2002). On Behalf of Maverick Molinism. Faith and Philosophy 19 (3):348-357.
    In clarifying and defending Molinism, Thomas Flint argues against a position he terms Maverick Molinism. This version of Molinism maintains that, though counterfactuals of freedom have their truth-value logically prior to God’s acts of will, God could have so acted that these counterfactuals would have had a different truth value from that which they actually have. Flint believes this position is flawed, and presents an argument for rejecting it. I argue that Flint’s argument against Maverick Molinism is flawed, and suggest (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Jonathan Kvanvig (1989). The Analogy Argument for a Limited Acccount of Omniscience. International Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):129-138.
    IN COMPARISON with other doctrines Cthe doctrine of omnipotence, for example Cthe proper formulation of the doctrine of omniscience has not seemed especially problematic. Once we accept the contemporary wisdom that knowledge is knowledge of truths, the formulation of the traditional doctrine seems straightforward: to be omniscient is just to know all truths. What has seemed problematic, rather, is whether the doctrine is itself true. In particular, many have wondered whether anyone can know the parts of the future not necessitated (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Traditional and Limited Doctrines of Omniscience.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2000). Divine Omniscience. In Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason & Hugh Pyper (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 498-499.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). He Who Lapse Last Lapse Best: Plantinga on Leibniz'Lapse. Southwest Philosophy Review 10:137-146.
  43. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). Unknowable Truths and the Doctrine of Omniscience. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 57:485-507.
    THE DOCTRINE OF omniscience has been understood in two ways. Roughly, it has been taken either as the claim that God knows all that is true (Geach, Kvanvig 1986) or as the claim that God knows all that can be known (Swinbume; Mavrodes). The first construal I shall call the traditional construal, and the second I shall call a limited construal. Though the traditional construal would seem to be the natural one to hold, considerations of the analogy between the best (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1986). The Possibility of an All-Knowing God. London: Macmillan Press.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Michael Martin (2007). Divine Incoherence. Sophia 46 (1):75-77.
    In this note I show that Noreen Johnson misunderstands my argument and consequently fails to refute my thesis that God’s omnipotence conflicts with his omniscience.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. T. J. Mawson (2008). Divine Eternity. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 64 (1):35 - 50.
    I argue that Open Theism leads to a retreat from ascribing to God ‘complete omniscience’. Having surrendered this ground, the Open Theist cannot but retreat from ascribing to God complete omnipotence; the Open Theist must admit that God might perform actions which He reasonably expected would meet certain descriptions but which nevertheless do not do so. This then makes whatever goodness (in the sense of beneficence, not just benevolence) God has a matter of luck. Open Theism is committed to a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Thomas Metcalf (2004). Omniscience and Maximal Power. Religious Studies 40 (3):289-306.
    This essay examines a conflict between God's omnipotence and His omniscience. I discuss our intuitions regarding omnipotence and omniscience and describe a method by which we can decide whether a being is omnipotent. I consider the most promising versions of omnipotence and argue that they produce a genuine conflict with omniscience. Finally, I suggest that we can take the example of omniscience and generalize it to several of God's essential properties and thereby reveal incompatibilities that result even from sophisticated conceptions (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Yujin Nagasawa (2007). A Further Reply to Beyer on Omniscience. Sophia 46 (1):65-67.
    I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His other attributes.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Divine Omniscience and Knowledge de Se. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53 (2):73-82.
    Patrick Grim argues that God cannot beomniscient because no one other than me canacquire knowledge de se of myself. Inparticular, according to Grim, God cannot knowwhat I know in knowing that I am making amess. I argue, however, that given twoplausible principles regarding divineattributes there is no reason to accept Grim'sconclusion that God cannot be omniscient. Inthis paper I focus on the relationship betweendivine omniscience and necessaryimpossibilities, in contrast to the generaltrend of research since Aquinas, which hasconcentrated on the relationship (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Divine Omniscience and Experience: A Reply to Alter. Ars Disputandi 3.
    According to one antitheist argument, the necessarily omniscient, necessarily omnipotent, and necessarily omnibenevolent Anselmian God does not exist, because if God is necessarily omnipotent it is impossible for Him to comprehend fully certain concepts, such as fear, frustration and despair, that an omniscient being needs to possess. Torin Alter examines this argument and provides three elaborate objections to it. I argue that theists would not accept any of them because they con ict with traditional Judaeo-Christian doctrines concerning divine attributes.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 193