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Material to categorize
- John E. Abbruzzese (1997). The Coherence of Omniscience: A Defense. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 41 (1):25-34.
- Robert Merrihew Adams (1991). An Anti-Molinist Argument. Philosophical Perspectives 5:343-353.
- Robert Merrihew Adams (1973). Middle Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):552-554.
- Torin Alter (2002). On Two Alleged Conflicts Between Divine Attributes. Faith and Philosophy 19 (1):47-57.
- D. Basinger (2000). Divine Providence: The Molinist Account. Philosophical Review 109 (2):274-276.
- David Basinger (1991). Middle Knowledge and Divine Control: Some Clarifications. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (3):129 - 139.
- David Basinger (1986). Omniscience and Deliberation: A Response to Reichenbach. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (2/3):169 - 172.
- David Basinger (1982). Divine Omniscience and the Best of All Possible Worlds. Journal of Value Inquiry 16 (2):143-148.
- Robert Bass (2007). Omniscience and the Identification Problem. Florida Philosophical Review 7 (1):78-91.
- Robert W. Beard (1986). Professor Lucas on Omniscience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (1):37 - 43.
- Tully Boreland, Omniscience and Divine Foreknowledge. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Robert F. Brown (1991). Divine Omniscience, Immutability, Aseity and Human Free Will. Religious Studies 27 (3):285-295.
- Hector-Neri Castañeda (1967). Omniscience and Indexical Reference. Journal of Philosophy 64 (7):203-210.
- David M. Ciocchi (2002). The Religious Adequacy of Free-Will Theism. Religious Studies 38 (1):45-61.
- Steven B. Cowan (2003). The Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge Revisited. Religious Studies 39 (1):93-102.
- William Lane Craig (1992). Hasker on Divine Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 67 (2):89 - 110.
- William Lane Craig (1988). Tachyons, Time Travel, and Divine Omniscience. Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):135-150.
- Andrew Cullison (2006). Omniscience as a Dispositional State. Philosophia Christi 8 (1):151-160.
- Scott A. Davison (1991). Foreknowledge, Middle Knowledge and “Nearby” Worlds. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (1):29 - 44.
- R. Lance Factor (1978). Newcomb's Paradox and Omniscience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1):30 - 40.
- Alicia Finch & Michael Rea (2008). Presentism and Ockham's Way Out. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 1:1-17.
- Thomas P. Flint (1999). A New Anti-Anti-Molinist Argument. Religious Studies 35 (3):299-305.
- Thomas P. Flint (1991). Middle Knowledge and the Doctrine of Infallibility. Philosophical Perspectives 5:373-393.
- Alfred Freddoso, Molinism.
- Alfred Freddoso, The "Openness" of God: A Reply to William Hasker.
- Richard M. Gale (2002). Divine Omniscience, Human Freedom, and Backwards Causation. Faith and Philosophy 19 (1):85-88.
- Gregory Ganssle (1993). Atemporality and the Mode of Divine Knowledge. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 34 (3):171 - 180.
- Michael V. Griffin (1999). Leibniz on God's Knowledge of Counterfactuals. Philosophical Review 108 (3):317-343.
- William Hasker (2000). Are Alternative Pasts Plausible? A Reply to Thomas Flint. Religious Studies 36 (1):103-105.
- William Hasker (1989). God, Time and Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Jill Graper Hernandez (2005). Divine Omniscience and Human Evil: Interpreting Leibniz Without Middle Knowledge. Philosophy and Theology 17 (1/2):107-120.
- Noreen E. Johnson (2007). Divine Omnipotence and Divine Omniscience: A Reply to Michael Martin. Sophia 46 (1).
- Gordon Knight (2005). The Theological Significance of Subjectivity. Heythrop Journal 46 (1):1–10.
- Eric Russert Kraemer (1984). Divine Omniscience and Criteria of Intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1):131-135.
- Norman Kretzmann (1966). Omniscience and Immutability. Journal of Philosophy 63 (14):409-421.
- Jonathan Kvanvig, Omniscience and Eternity: A Reply to Craig Jonathan L. Kvanvig.
- Jonathan Kvanvig, Response to Flint.
- Jonathan Kvanvig (2002). On Behalf of Maverick Molinism. Faith and Philosophy 19 (3):348-357.
- Jonathan Kvanvig (1989). The Analogy Argument for a Limited Acccount of Omniscience. International Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):129-138.
- Jonathan Kvanvig, He Who Lapse Last Lapse Best : Plantinga on Lelbnlz's Lapse.
- Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Traditional and Limited Doctrines of Omniscience.
- Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2000). Divine Omniscience. In Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason & Hugh Pyper (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). Unknowable Truths and the Doctrine of Omniscience. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 57:485-507.
- Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1986). The Possibility of an All-Knowing God. London: Macmillan Press.
- Michael Martin (2007). Divine Incoherence. Sophia 46 (1).
- T. J. Mawson (2008). Divine Eternity. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 64 (1):35 - 50.
- Thomas Metcalf (2004). Omniscience and Maximal Power. Religious Studies 40 (3):289-306.
- Yujin Nagasawa (2007). A Further Reply to Beyer on Omniscience. Sophia 46 (1).
- Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Divine Omniscience and Knowledge de Se. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53 (2):73-82.
- Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Divine Omniscience and Experience: A Reply to Alter. Ars Disputandi 3.
- Rik Peels (2006). Divine Foreknowledge and Eternal Damnation: The Theory of Middle Knowledge as Solution to the Soteriological Problem of Evil. Neue Zeitschrift Für Systematische Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 48 (2):160-75.
- Nelson Pike (1965). Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action. Philosophical Review 74 (1):27-46.
- Alexander R. Pruss (2003). Post's Critiques of Omniscience and of Talk of All True Propositions. Philo 6 (1):49-58.
- Hugh Rice (2006). Divine Omniscience, Timelessness, and the Power to Do Otherwise. Religious Studies 42 (2):123-139.
- Mark Roberts (1999). Eternal Truths and Divine Omniscience in Maritain. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):227-232.
- Robert Segal (1982). Pike on Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action. The New Scholasticism 56 (3):329-339.
- Joseph Shieber (2009). Personal Responsibility and Middle Knowledge: A Challenge for the Molinist. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2):61 - 70.
- Joshua T. Spencer (2006). Two Mereological Arguments Against the Possibility of an Omniscient Being. Philo 9 (1):62-72.
- Alfred J. Stenner (1989). A Paradox of Omniscience and Some Attempts at a Solution. Faith and Philosophy 6 (3):303-319.
- Neil A. Stubbens (1988). Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence In Medieval Philosophy. Idealistic Studies 18 (2):185-186.
- Eleonore Stump (1983). Knowledge, Freedom and the Problem of Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1):49 - 58.
- Roland J. Teske (1979). Omniscience, Omnipotence, and Divine Transcendence. The New Scholasticism 53 (3):277-294.
- Patrick Todd (2011). Geachianism. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3:222-251.
- Neal Tognazzini, Patrick Todd & John Martin Fischer (2011). Engaging with Pike: God, Freedom, and Time. Philosophical Papers 38 (2):247-270.
- R. T. Wallis (1981). Divine Omniscience in Plotinus, Proclus and Aquinas. In A. H. Armstrong, H. J. Blumenthal & R. A. Markus (eds.), Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought: Essays in Honour of A.H. Armstrong. Variorum Publications.
- Dennis Whitcomb (forthcoming). Grounding and Omniscience. In Jon Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Vol. 4. OUP.
- Edward Wierenga (2008). Omniscience. In Thomas P. Flint & Michael C. Rea (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press.
- Linda Zagzebski (2004). Omniscience, Time, and Freedom. In William Mann (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell Pub..
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