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  1. David Basinger (1992). Divine Omniscience and the Soteriological Problem of Evil Is the Type of Knowledge God Possesses Relevant? Religious Studies 28 (1):1 - 18.
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  2. Jason A. Beyer (2004). A Physicalist Rejoinder to Some Problems with Omniscience; or, How God Could Know What We Know. Sophia 43 (2):5-13.
    A certain objection to belief in God is based on the intrinsic incoherence of the concept of Divine Being or God. In particular, it questions the major traditional characteristic, notably omniscience, and its relation to omnipotence, moral unassailability, and absence of embodiment on the part of the Divine Being. In this paper, an attempt is made to counter this objection by an appeal, not to natural theology, but rather to physicalism in its application to human beings, and by extension to (...)
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  3. John Bishop & Ken Perszyk (2011). The Normatively Relativised Logical Argument From Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2):109-126.
    It is widely agreed that the ‘Logical’ Argument from Evil (LAFE) is bankrupt. We aim to rehabilitate the LAFE, in the form of what we call the Normatively Relativised Logical Argument from Evil (NRLAFE). There are many different versions of a NRLAFE. We aim to show that one version, what we call the ‘right relationship’ NRLAFE, poses a significant threat to personal-omniGod-theism—understood as requiring the belief that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good person who has created our world—because it (...)
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  4. Martin Cooke, The Jump Theodicies.
    Mawson recently argued that since a temporal God can’t know what we’ll freely choose, so he’s not completely omniscient and hence not omnipotent, whence his beneficence is a matter of luck. However, even (transfinite) arithmetic is inde-finitely extensible and only an everlasting, changeable God could learn forever. Furthermore an epistemically perfect being would hardly, I argue, be completely certain that there were no other perfect beings, because such negative empirical be-liefs could hardly be fully justified. So if God could learn, (...)
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  5. William Lane Craig (2000). Omniscience, Tensed Facts and Divine Eternity. Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):227--228.
    A difficulty for a view of divine eternity as timelessness is that if time is tensed, then God, in virtue of His omniscience, must know tensed facts. But tensed facts, such as It is now t, can only be known by a temporally located being.Defenders of divine atemporality may attempt to escape the force of this argument by contending either that a timeless being can know tensed facts or else that ignorance of tensed facts is compatible with divine omniscience. Kvanvig, (...)
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  6. Wesley D. Cray (2011). Omniscience and Worthiness of Worship. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2):147-153.
    At first glance, the properties being omniscient and being worthy of worship might appear to be perfectly co-instantiable. (To say that some properties are co-instantiable is just to say that it is possible that some object instantiate all of them simultaneously. Being entirely red and being a ball are co-instantiable; being entirely red and being entirely blue are not). But there are reasons to be worried about this co-instantiability, as it turns out that, depending on our commitments with respect to (...)
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  7. Scott A. Davison (1997). Privacy and Control. Faith and Philosophy 14 (2):137-151.
    In this paper, I explore several privacy issues as they arise with respect to the divine/human relationship. First, in section 1, I discuss the notion of privacy in a general way. Section 2 is devoted to the claim that privacy involves control over information about oneself. In section 3, I summarize the arguments offered recently by Margaret Falls-Corbitt and F. Michael McLain for the conclusion that God respects the privacy of human persons by refraining from knowing certain things about them. (...)
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  8. Nicholas Everitt (1997). Quasi-Berkeleyan Idealism as Perspicuous Theism. Faith and Philosophy 14 (3):353-377.
    In this paper, I argue that the kind of idealism defended by Berkeley is a natural and almost unavoidable expression of his theism. Two main arguments are deployed, both starting from a theistic premise and having an idealist conclusion. The first likens the dependence of the physical world on the will of God to the dependence of mental states on a mind. The second likens divine omniscience to the kind of knowledge which it has often been supposed we have of (...)
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  9. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Joshua Rasmussen & Andrew Cullison (2013). On Whitcomb's Grounding Argument for Atheism. Faith and Philosophy 30 (2):198-204.
    Dennis Whitcomb argues that there is no God on the grounds that (i) God is supposed to be omniscient, yet (ii) nothing could be omniscient due to the nature of grounding. We give a formally identical argument that concludes that one of the present co-authors does not exist. Since he does exist, Whitcomb’s argument is unsound. But why is it unsound? That is a difficult question. We venture two answers. First, one of the grounding principles that the argument relies on (...)
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  10. Douglas P. Lackey (1984). Divine Omniscience and Human Privacy. Philosophy Research Archives 10:383-391.
    This paper argues that there is a conflict between divine omniscience and the human right to privacy. The right to privacy derives from the right to moral autonomy, which human persons possess even against a divine being. It follows that if God exists and persists in knowing all things, his knowledge is a non-justifiable violation of a human right. On the other hand, if God exists and restricts his knowing in deference to human privacy, it follows that he cannot fulfill (...)
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  11. Rob Lovering (2013). Does God know what it's like not to know? Religious Studies 49 (1):85-99.
    The topic of divine omniscience is well-trodden ground, with philosophers and theologians having asked virtually every question there is to ask about it. The questions regarding God's omniscience to be addressed here are as follows. First, is omniscience best understood as maximal propositional knowledge along with maximal experiential knowledge (both to be defined shortly)? I argue that it is. Second, is it possible for God to be essentially omniscient? I argue that it is not.
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  12. William E. Mann (1985). Epistemology Supernaturalized. Faith and Philosophy 2 (4):436-456.
    If God is omniscient then he knows contingent facts. If he exists a se, then his knowledge of facts must not depend on them. How then does he know them? I take seriously Aquinas’ view that God’s knowledge is the cause of things. I argue that “things” includes both entities and situations, that God’s knowledge of them is his knowledge of his unimpedable will, and that the view does not threaten human freedom. God’s knowledge is thus like my knowledge of (...)
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  13. William E. Mann (1985). Keeping Epistemology Supernaturalized. Faith and Philosophy 2 (4):464-468.
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  14. Moti Mizrahi (2013). New Puzzles About Divine Attributes. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2):147-157.
    According to traditional Western theism, God is maximally great (or perfect). More explicitly, God is said to have the following divine attributes: omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. In this paper, I present three puzzles about this conception of a maximally great (or perfect) being. The first puzzle about omniscience shows that this divine attribute is incoherent. The second puzzle about omnibenevolence and omnipotence shows that these divine attributes are logically incompatible. The third puzzle about perfect rationality and omnipotence shows that these (...)
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  15. Christine Overall (2003). Miracles and Larmer. Dialogue 42 (01):123-.
    This paper, a reply to Robert Larmer’s "Miracles, Evidence, and God," is the sixth in an exchange between us that began in 1985 on the epistemic status of miracles. Here I argue against Larmer’s definition of "miracle" because it is based upon an anthropomorphic understanding of laws of nature. But even granting his definition, I demonstrate that his method of showing that miracles are evidence for God is circular. I contend that if a miracle (in Larmer’s sense) were to occur, (...)
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  16. Rik Peels (2013). Is Omniscience Impossible? Religious Studies 49 (4):481-490.
    In a recent paper, Dennis Whitcomb argues that omniscience is impossible. But if there cannot be any omniscient beings, then God, at least as traditionally conceived, does not exist. The objection is, roughly, that the thesis that there is an omniscient being, in conjunction with some principles about grounding, such as its transitivity and irreflexivity, entails a contradiction. Since each of these principles is highly plausible, divine omniscience has to go. In this article, I argue that Whitcomb's argument, if sound, (...)
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  17. Benjamin G. Purzycki, Daniel N. Finkel, John Shaver, Nathan Wales, Adam B. Cohen & Richard Sosis (2012). What Does God Know? Supernatural Agents' Access to Socially Strategic and Non-Strategic Information. Cognitive Science 36 (5):846-869.
    Current evolutionary and cognitive theories of religion posit that supernatural agent concepts emerge from cognitive systems such as theory of mind and social cognition. Some argue that these concepts evolved to maintain social order by minimizing antisocial behavior. If these theories are correct, then people should process information about supernatural agents’ socially strategic knowledge more quickly than non-strategic knowledge. Furthermore, agents’ knowledge of immoral and uncooperative social behaviors should be especially accessible to people. To examine these hypotheses, we measured response-times (...)
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  18. Paul Sheehy (2006). Theism and Modal Realism. Religious Studies 42 (3):315-328.
    This paper examines the relationship between the classical theistic conception of God and modal realism. I suggest that realism about possible worlds has unwelcome consequences for that conception. First, that modal realism entails the necessity of divine existence eludes explanation in a way congenial to a commitment to both modal realism and classical theism. Second, divine knowledge is dependent on worlds independent of the creative role and action of God, thereby suggesting a limitation on the nature of divine knowledge and (...)
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  19. Brice R. Wachterhauser (1985). The Problem of Evil and Moral Scepticism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 17 (3):167 - 174.
    This paper argues that the logical coherence of classical theism can be defended through the traditional free-will defense and argument from divine omniscience and human finitude, but only at the cost of moral scepticism. The above two-pronged defense entails moral scepticism because it demands that we construe clear and undeniable cases of morally unjustifiable evil as merely apparently unjustifiable evils which can be morally justified from some moral point of view. The paper argues that justification is impossible because such basic (...)
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