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  1. Robert Merrihew Adams (1991). An Anti-Molinist Argument. Philosophical Perspectives 5:343-353.
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  2. David J. Bartholomew (2008). God, Chance, and Purpose: Can God Have It Both Ways? Cambridge University Press.
    The thesis of this book is that chance is neither unreal nor non-existent but an integral part of God's creation.
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  3. D. Basinger (2000). Divine Providence: The Molinist Account. Philosophical Review 109 (2):274-276.
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  4. David Basinger (1991). Middle Knowledge and Divine Control: Some Clarifications. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (3):129 - 139.
    What then have we discovered? The general issue under discussion, remember, is whether it is advantageous or disadvantageous for the theist to affirm MK, especially as this form of knowledge relates to God's control over earthly affairs. As we have seen, both proponents and opponents of MK have claimed that this form of knowledge gives God significant power over earthly affairs, including control over the (indeterministically) free choices of humans.We have seen, though, that such a contention is dubious. There are (...)
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  5. Lawrence C. Becker (1972). Foreknowledge and Predestination. Mind 81 (321):138-141.
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  6. Marc E. Bobro (2008). Leibniz on Concurrence and Efficient Causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):317-338.
    Leibniz defends concurrentism, the view that both God and created substances are causally responsible for changes in the states of created substances. Interpretive problems, however, arise in determining just what causal role each plays. Some recent work has been revisionist, greatly downplaying the causal role played by created substances—arguing instead that according to Leibniz only God has productive causal power. Though bearing some causal responsibility for changes in their perceptual states, created substances are not efficient causes of such changes. This (...)
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  7. Caleb Cohoe (2014). God, Causality, and Petitionary Prayer. Faith and Philosophy 31 (1):24-45.
    Many maintain that petitionary prayer is pointless. I argue that the theist can defend petitionary prayer by giving a general account of how divine and creaturely causation can be compatible and complementary, based on the claim that the goodness of something depends on its cause. I use Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical framework to give an account that explains why a world with creaturely causation better reflects God’s goodness than a world in which God brought all things about immediately. In such a (...)
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  8. Jason Colwell (2000). Chaos and Providence. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48 (3):131-138.
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  9. Benjamin S. Cordry (2009). Divine Hiddenness and Belief de Re. Religious Studies 45 (1):1-19.
    In this paper I argue that Poston and Dougherty's attempt to undermine the problem of divine hiddenness by using the notion of belief de re is problematic at best. They hold that individuals who appear to be unbelievers (because they are de dicto unbelievers) may actually be de re believers. I construct a set of conditions on ascribing belief de re to show that it is prima facie implausible to claim that seemingly inculpable and apparent unbelievers are really de re (...)
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  10. Steven B. Cowan (2003). The Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge Revisited. Religious Studies 39 (1):93-102.
    The Molinist doctrine that God has middle knowledge requires that God knows the truth-values of counterfactuals of freedom, propositions about what free agents would do in hypothetical circumstances. A well-known objection to middle knowledge, the grounding objection, contends that counterfactuals of freedom have no truth-value because there is no fact to the matter as to what an agent with libertarian freedom would do in counterfactual circumstances. Molinists, however, have offered responses to the grounding objection that they believe are adequate for (...)
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  11. Brian Davies (1999). Divine Providence. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):646-650.
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  12. S. F. (2000). Peter Frick Divine Providence in Philo of Alexandria. (Texts and Studies in Ancient Judaism, 77). (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999). Pp. XIII+220. DM 85 Hbk. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 36 (1):123-125.
  13. Thomas Flint (1988). Two Accounts of Providence. In Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Divine and Human Action: Essays on the Metaphysics of Theism. Cornell University Press. 147-181.
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  14. Thomas P. Flint (2008). Divine Providence. In Thomas P. Flint & Michael C. Rea (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press.
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  15. Thomas P. Flint (1999). A New Anti-Anti-Molinist Argument. Religious Studies 35 (3):299-305.
    This paper argues that William Hasker's 'A new anti-Molinist argument' offers a fascinating but ultimately unsuccessful new instalment in his continuing campaign to discredit the picture of providence based on the theory of middle knowledge. It is first shown that Hasker's argument, though suffering from a seemingly irreparable logical gap, does nicely highlight a significant (and hitherto unduly underemphasized) point of contention between Molinists and anti-Molinists -- the question whether or not Molinists are committed to viewing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (...)
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  16. Alfred J. Freddoso (1991). God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is Not Enough. Philosophical Perspectives 5:553-585.
    After an exposition of some key concepts in scholastic ontology, this paper examines four arguments presented by Francisco Suarez for the thesis, commonly held by Christian Aristotelians, that God's causal contribution to effects occurring in the ordinary course of nature goes beyond His merely conserving created substances along with their active and passive causal powers. The postulation of a further causal contribution, known as God's general concurrence (or general concourse), can be viewed as an attempt to accommodate an element of (...)
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  17. Joseph S. Fulda, Remarks on the Argument From Design.
    Gives two pared-down versions of the argument from design, which may prove more persuasive as to a Creator, discusses briefly the mathematics underpinning disbelief and nonbelief and its misuse and some proper uses, moves to why the full argument is needed anyway, viz., to demonstrate Providence, offers a theory as to how miracles (open and hidden) occur, viz. the replacement of any particular mathematics underlying a natural law (save logic) by its most appropriate nonstandard variant. -/- Note: This is an (...)
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  18. Richard M. Gale (2000). Swinburne on Providence. Religious Studies 36 (2):209-219.
    My review of Swinburne's elaborate and ingenious higher-good type theodicy will begin with an examination of his argument for why the theist needs a theodicy in the first place. After a preliminary sketch of his theodicy and its crucial free-will plank, its rational-choice theoretic arguments will be critically scrutinized.
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  19. Shawn Graves (forthcoming). God and Moral Perfection. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
    One will be hard-pressed to find a morally perfect agent in this world. It’s not that there aren’t any morally good people. It just takes a lot to be morally perfect. However, theists claim that God is morally perfect. (Atheists claim that if God exists, God is morally perfect.) Perhaps they are mistaken. This chapter presents an argument for the conclusion that God is not morally perfect. The argument depends upon two things: (1) the nature of the concept of moral (...)
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  20. Charles A. Hart (1943). Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil. New Scholasticism 17 (1):68-69.
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  21. William Hasker (1999). Divine Providence. Faith and Philosophy 16 (2):248-253.
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  22. William Hasker (1999). A New Anti-Molinist Argument. Religious Studies 35 (3):291-297.
    An argument is given showing that, on the assumptions of Molinism, human beings must bring about the truth of the counterfactuals of freedom that govern their actions. But, it is claimed, it is impossible for humans to do this, and so Molinism is involved in a contradiction. The Molinist must maintain, on the contrary, that we can indeed bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us. This question turns out to depend on whether the counterfactuals of freedom are, (...)
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  23. William Hasker (1993). How Good/Bad is Middle Knowledge? A Reply to Basinger. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33 (2):111 - 118.
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  24. Paul Helm (1999). Thomas P. Flint Divine Providence. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998). Pp. XI+258. £35.00 Hbk. Religious Studies 35 (1):99-111.
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  25. Paul Helm (1993). The Providence of God. Intervarsity Press.
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  26. John Hick (2000). Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (1):57-61.
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  27. Dewey J. Hoitenga Jr (1988). Predestination and Free Will. Faith and Philosophy 5 (4):463-466.
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  28. Arthur F. Holmes (1998). Reflections of Divine Providence. Faith and Philosophy 15 (2):147-150.
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  29. David P. Hunt (2004). Providence, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Loops: A Reply to Robinson. Religious Studies 40 (4):485-491.
    In a number of earlier papers I have attempted to defend the providential utility of simple foreknowledge as a via media between the accounts of divine providence offered by Molinists, on the one hand, and ‘open theists’, on the other. In the current issue of this journal, Michael Robinson argues that my response to one of the standard difficulties for simple foreknowledge – that its providential employment would generate explanatory loops – is inadequate. In the following paper I answer Robinson's (...)
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  30. David P. Hunt (2000). Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (1):62-64.
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  31. David P. Hunt (1993). Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge. Faith and Philosophy 10 (3):394-414.
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  32. Christopher C. Knight (2009). Theistic Naturalism and "Special" Divine Providence. Zygon 44 (3):533-542.
    Although naturalistic perspectives are an important component of their accounts of divine action, most participants in the current dialogue between science and theology eschew a purely naturalistic model. They believe that certain events of divine providence require a special mode of divine action, over and above that inherent in naturalistic processes. The analogy of human providential action suggests, however, that a strong theistic naturalism can account for these events. This model does not depend on a particular notion of God's relationship (...)
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  33. Hylarie Kochiras (2012). By Ye Divine Arm: God and Substance in De Gravitatione. Religious Studies 2012 (September):1-30.
    This article interprets Newton’s De gravitatione as presenting a reductive account of substance, on which divine and created substances are identified with their characteristic attributes, which are present in space. God is identical to the divine power to create, and mind to its characteristic power. Even bodies lack parts outside parts, for they are not constructed from regions of actual space, as some commentators suppose, but rather consist in powers alone, maintained in certain configurations by the divine will. This interpretation (...)
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  34. Jonathan Kvanvig, Response to Flint.
    In defending his rejection of Maverick Molinism (Faith and Philosophy 20.1, (January 2003), pp. 91-100) from my criticisms (Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002), pp. 348-357), Tom Flint attributes three central claims to my argument, and disagrees with two of them. He also notes my request for a defense of the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle, which his argument employs. He portrays that discussion as taking “potshots” at his argument, in part because I denied that concerns about the Law are compelling, (...)
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  35. Jonathan Kvanvig (2002). On Behalf of Maverick Molinism. Faith and Philosophy 19 (3):348-357.
    In clarifying and defending Molinism, Thomas Flint argues against a position he terms Maverick Molinism. This version of Molinism maintains that, though counterfactuals of freedom have their truth-value logically prior to God’s acts of will, God could have so acted that these counterfactuals would have had a different truth value from that which they actually have. Flint believes this position is flawed, and presents an argument for rejecting it. I argue that Flint’s argument against Maverick Molinism is flawed, and suggest (...)
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  36. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (forthcoming). , An Epistemic Theory of Creation. In Destiny and Decision: Essays in Philosophical Theology. 233-297 ms..
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  37. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). He Who Lapse Last Lapse Best: Plantinga on Leibniz'Lapse. Southwest Philosophy Review 10:137-146.
  38. Bruce Langtry (2008). God, the Best, and Evil. OUP Oxford.
    God, the Best, and Evil is an original treatment of some longstanding problems about God and his actions towards human beings. First, Bruce Langtry explores some implications of divine omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness for God's providence. In particular, he investigates whether God is in some sense a maximizer. Second, he assesses the strength of objections to the existence of God that are based on the apparent fact that God could have created a better world than this one. Finally, he (...)
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  39. Sandra Rudnick Luft (1982). A Genetic Interpretation of Divine Providence in Vico's New Science. Journal of the History of Philosophy 20 (2):151-169.
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  40. Hugh J. McCann, Divine Providence. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  41. John T. Mullen (2007). Can Evolutionary Psychology Confirm Original Sin? Faith and Philosophy 24 (3):268-283.
    Christian responses to the developing field of evolutionary psychology tend to be defensive, focusing on the task of showing that Christians have not beenpresented with any reason to abandon any central beliefs of the Christian faith. A more positive response would seek to show that evolutionary psychologycan provide some sort of epistemic support for one or more distinctively Christian doctrines. This paper is an attempt to supply such a response by focusing on the distinctively Christian doctrine of original sin, which (...)
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  42. Timothy O'Connor (2008). Theism and the Scope of Contingency. Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 1:134-149.
  43. Paul Oslington (2011). Divine Action, Providence, and Adam Smith's Invisible Hand. In , Adam Smith as Theologian. Routledge.
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  44. Rik Peels (2006). Divine Foreknowledge and Eternal Damnation: The Theory of Middle Knowledge as Solution to the Soteriological Problem of Evil. Neue Zeitschrift Für Systematische Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 48 (2):160-75.
    Traditionally, Christians have hold the two following beliefs: the belief that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good on the one hand and the belief that God has actualized a possible world in which some people freely reject Christ and are damned eternally, while others freely accept Him and are saved on the other. The combination of these two beliefs seems to result in a contradiction. This serious and well-known problem is called the soteriological problem of evil. In this article (...)
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  45. Derk Pereboom (2011). Theological Determinism and Divine Providence. In Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford University Press.
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  46. Derk Pereboom (2005). Free Will, Evil, and Divine Providence. In Andrew Dole & Andrew Chignell (eds.), God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge University Press.
  47. C. P. Ragland (2005). Descartes on Divine Providence and Human Freedom. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 87 (2):159-188.
    God’s providence appears to threaten the existence of human freedom. This paper examines why Descartes considered this threat merelyapparent. Section one argues that Descartes did not reconcile providence and freedom by adopting a compatibilist conception of freedom. Sections two and three argue that for Descartes, God’s superior knowledge allows God to providentially arrange free choices without causally determining them. Descartes’ position thus strongly resembles the “middle knowledge” solution of the Jesuits. Section four examines the problematic relationship between this solution and (...)
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  48. Alan R. Rhoda (2010). Gratuitous Evil and Divine Providence. Religious Studies 46 (3):281-302.
    Discussions of the evidential argument from evil generally pay little attention to how different models of divine providence constrain the theist's options for response. After describing four models of providence and general theistic strategies for engaging the evidential argument, I articulate and defend a definition of 'gratuitous evil' that renders the theological premise of the argument uncontroversial for theists. This forces theists to focus their fire on the evidential premise, enabling us to compare models of providence with respect to how (...)
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  49. Michael D. Robinson (2004). Divine Providence, Simple Foreknowledge, and the ‘Metaphysical Principle’. Religious Studies 40 (4):471-483.
    In this essay, I challenge David P. Hunt's defence of the utility of simple foreknowledge for divine providence against the ‘Metaphysical Principle’. This principle asserts that circular causal loops are impossible. Hunt agrees with this principle but maintains that so long as the deity does not use simple foreknowledge in such a way that causal loops unfold, the Metaphysical Principle in not violated. I argue that Hunt's position still allows for the possibility of such causal loops and this itself is (...)
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  50. John P. Rock (1966). Divine Providence in St. Thomas Aquinas. In Frederick J. Adelmann (ed.), The Quest for the Absolute. Boston College. 67--103.
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