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  1. Scott Althaus, David Barash, Jeffrey Friedman, George E. Marcus & Charles S. Taber (2008). Roundtable 4: Political Dogmatism. Critical Review 20 (4):481-498.
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  2. Eunjin Lee (2008). Pryor's Dogmatism Against The Skeptic. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:155-161.
    My aim in this paper is to show the difficulty James Pryor faces in attempting to overcome the skeptic’s challenge. According to the skeptic, we can never know anything about the external world, because of our cognitive limitation that cannot distinguish real perceptions from false ones in the skeptical scenarios. Thus, the skeptic requires us having antecedent justification to rule out all possible hypotheses. In opposition to the skeptic, Pryor argues that as long as we remain dogmatic about perception, we (...)
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Dogmatism, Misc
  1. John M. DePoe (2011). Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):347-359.
    Michael Huemer has argued for the justification principle known as phenomenal conservativism by employing a transcendental argument that claims all attempts to reject phenomenal conservativism ultimately are doomed to self-defeat. My contribution presents two independent arguments against the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism after briefly presenting Huemer’s account of phenomenal conservativism and the justification for the self-defeat argument. My first argument suggests some ways that philosophers may reject Huemer’s premise that all justified beliefs are formed on the basis of seemings. (...)
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  2. Nathan Hanna (2011). Against Phenomenal Conservatism. Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.
    Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially far-reaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that PC is false. If PC is true, beliefs can yield justification for believing their contents in cases (...)
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  3. Ali Hasan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.
    In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” (2007), “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition” (2006), and Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (2001), Michael Huemer endorses the principle of phenomenal conservatism, according to which appearances or seemings constitute a fundamental source of (defeasible) justification for belief. He claims that those who deny phenomenal conservatism, including classical foundationalists, are in a self-defeating position, for their views cannot be both true and justified; that classical foundationalists have difficulty accommodating false introspective beliefs; and that phenomenal conservatism (...)
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  4. Michael Huemer (2011). Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to DePoe. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):1-13.
    John DePoe has criticized the self-defeat argument for Phenomenal Conservatism. He argues that acquaintance, rather than appearance, may form the basis for non-inferentially justified beliefs, and that Phenomenal Conservatism conflicts with a central motivation for internalism. I explain how Phenomenal Conservatism and the self-defeat argument may survive these challenges.
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  5. Michael Huemer (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
    I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair (...)
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  6. Michael Huemer (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30-55.
    I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair (...)
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  7. Michael Huemer (2006). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):147-158.
    Externalist theories of justification create the possibility of cases in which everything appears to one relevantly similar with respect to two propositions, yet one proposition is justified while the other is not. Internalists find this difficult to accept, because it seems irrational in such a case to affirm one proposition and not the other. The underlying internalist intuition supports a specific internalist theory, Phenomenal Conservatism, on which epistemic justification is conferred by appearances.
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  8. Peter Kung (2010). On Having No Reason: Dogmatism and Bayesian Confirmation. Synthese 177 (1):1 - 17.
    Recently in epistemology a number of authors have mounted Bayesian objections to dogmatism. These objections depend on a Bayesian principle of evidential confirmation: Evidence E confirms hypothesis H just in case Pr(H|E) > Pr(H). I argue using Keynes' and Knight's distinction between risk and uncertainty that the Bayesian principle fails to accommodate the intuitive notion of having no reason to believe. Consider as an example an unfamiliar card game: at first, since you're unfamiliar with the game, you assign credences based (...)
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  9. Rodrigo Laera (2014). Epistemic conservatism. Filosofia Unisinos 14 (3):176-188.
    The present paper aims to revisit the virtues and disadvantages of epistemic conservatism, which claims that it is rational to adhere to a belief until there is evidence to the contrary. Two main theses are put forward: first, while conservatism presents several epistemological flaws, from a contextualist point of view it is not only desirable but also is essential to knowledge accumulation in everyday life; second, conservatism provides a solution to sceptical challenges and to the problem of easy knowledge.
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  10. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism. Analytic Philosophy 52 (1):35-48.
    According to the phenomenal conservatives, beliefs are justified by non-doxastic states we might speak of as ‘appearances’ or ‘seemings’. Those who defend the view say that there is something self-defeating about believing that phenomenal conservatism is mistaken. They also claim that the view captures an important internalist insight about justification. I shall argue that phenomenal conservatism is indefensible. The considerations that seem to support the view commit the phenomenal conservatives to condoning morally abhorrent behavior. They can deny that their view (...)
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  11. Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). Phenomenal Conservatism, Justification, and Self-Defeat. Logos and Episteme.
    In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advanced in support of alternatives to (...)
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  12. Moti Mizrahi (2014). Against Phenomenal Conservatism: A Reply to Moretti. The Reasoner 8 (3):26.
    In this paper, I reply to Moretti's objection to my reductio against Phenomenal Conservatism.
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  13. Moti Mizrahi (2013). Against Phenomenal Conservatism. The Reasoner 7 (10):117-118.
    In this paper, I outline a reductio against Phenomenal Conservatism. If sound, this reductio shows that the phenomenal conservative is committed to the claim that appealing to appearances is not a trustworthy method of fixing belief.
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  14. Luca Moretti (forthcoming). In Defence of Dogmatism. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, when you have an experience with content p, you often have prima facie justification to believe p that does not rest on your independent justification to believe any proposition. Although dogmatism has an intuitive appeal and seems to have an antisceptical bite, it has been targeted by different objections. This paper principally aims to answer the objections by Roger White according to which dogmatism is inconsistent with the Bayesian account of how evidence affects our credences. (...)
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  15. Luca Moretti (2014). Chris Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, NY: OUP (2013). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):364-366.
  16. Luca Moretti (2013). Mizrahi’s Argument Against Phenomenal Conservatism. The Reasoner 7 (12):137-139.
    I show that Mizrahi’s argument against Phenomenal Conservatism is fallacious.
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  17. Matthew Skene (2013). Seemings and the Possibility of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):539-559.
    Abstract I provide an account of the nature of seemings that explains why they are necessary for justification. The account grows out of a picture of cognition that explains what is required for epistemic agency. According to this account, epistemic agency requires (1) possessing the epistemic aims of forming true beliefs and avoiding errors, and (2) having some means of forming beliefs in order to satisfy those aims. I then argue that seeming are motives for belief characterized by their role (...)
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  18. Chris Tucker (forthcoming). Seemings and Justification: An Introduction. In , Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press.
    It is natural to think that many of our beliefs are rational because they are based on seemings, or on the way things seem. This is especially clear in the case of perception. Many of our mathematical, moral, and memory beliefs also appear to be based on seemings. In each of these cases, it is natural to think that our beliefs are not only based on a seeming, but also that they are rationally based on these seemings—at least assuming there (...)
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  19. Chris Tucker (ed.) (2013). Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. OUP USA.
    The primary aim of this book is to understand how seemings relate to justification and whether some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism can be sustained. It also addresses a number of other issues, including the nature of seemings, cognitive penetration, Bayesianism, and the epistemology of morality and disagreement.
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  20. Chris Tucker (2012). Movin' on Up: Higher-Level Requirements and Inferential Justification. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):323-340.
    Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against many internalists, (...)
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  21. Chris Tucker (2011). Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology. In Kelly James Clark & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford University Press. 52--73.
    Phenomenal conservatism holds, roughly, that if it seems to S that P, then S has evidence for P. I argue for two main conclusions. The first is that phenomenal conservatism is better suited than is proper functionalism to explain how a particular type of religious belief formation can lead to non-inferentially justified religious beliefs. The second is that phenomenal conservatism makes evidence so easy to obtain that the truth of evidentialism would not be a significant obstacle to justified religious belief. (...)
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  22. Chris Tucker (2010). Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
    Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. Dogmatism holds that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P necessarily provides non-inferential justification for P. I show that dogmatism provides an intuitive explanation of four issues concerning non-inferential justification. It is particularly impressive that dogmatism can explain these issues because prominent epistemologists have argued that it can’t address at least two of them. Prominent epistemologists also object that dogmatism is absurdly permissive because it allows a seeming to (...)
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  23. Brian Weatherson (2007). The Bayesian and the Dogmatist. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169 - 185.
    There is a lot of philosophically interesting work being done in the borderlands between traditional and formal epistemology. It is easy to think that this would all be one-way traffic. When we try to formalise a traditional theory, we see that its hidden assumptions are inconsistent or otherwise untenable. Or we see that the proponents of the theory had been conflating two concepts that careful formal work lets us distinguish. Either way, the formalist teaches the traditionalist a lesson about what (...)
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Dogmatist and Moorean Replies to Skepticism
  1. William P. Alston (1986). Epistemic Circularity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):1-30.
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  2. Jonathan Barnes (1988). Scepticism and Relativity. Philosophical Studies 32:1-31.
  3. Peter Baumann (2009). Was Moore a Moorean? On Moore and Scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):181-200.
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  4. T. Black (2002). A Moorean Response to Brain-in-a-Vat Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):148 – 163.
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  5. Tim Black (2008). A Warranted-Assertability Defense of a Moorean Response to Skepticism. Acta Analytica 23 (3):187-205.
    According to a Moorean response to skepticism, the standards for knowledge are invariantly comparatively low, and we can know across contexts all that we ordinarily take ourselves to know. It is incumbent upon the Moorean to defend his position by explaining how, in contexts in which S seems to lack knowledge, S can nevertheless have knowledge. The explanation proposed here relies on a warranted-assertability maneuver: Because we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p, it can seem that (...)
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  6. Nick Bostrom, What We Should Say to the Skeptic.
    Since it is conceivable that the sun won't rise tomorrow although it has always done so in the past, we cannot hope for justification for the belief that it is strictly speaking absolutely certain that the sun will rise tomorrow. What we are looking for is an explanation of why it is reasonable even to believe with a high degree of confidence that the sun will rise.
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  7. Bryson Brown (2006). Skepticism About the Past and the Problem of the Criterion. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):291-306.
    An argument for skepticism about the past exploits a circularity in the arguments connecting present observations to claims about past events. Arguments supporting claims about the past depend on current observations together with processes linking current observations to those claims. But knowledge of processes requires knowledge of the past: Knowledge of the present alone cannot provide evidence for claims about the past. A practical, coherentist response to this challenge rejects the assumption that we come to the problem with no information (...)
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  8. Jessica Brown, Proof.
    Davies and Wright have recently diagnosed the felt inadequacy of Moore’s response to the sceptic in terms of a failure of transmission of warrant. They argue that warrant fails to transmit across the following key inference: I have hands, if I have hands then I am not a BIV, so I am not a BIV, on the grounds that this inference cannot be used to rationally overcome doubt about its conclusion, and cannot strengthen one’s epistemic position with respect to the (...)
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  9. Jessica Brown (2005). Doubt, Circularity and the Moorean Response to the Sceptic. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):1–14.
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  10. Jessica Brown (2004). Wright on Transmission Failure. Analysis 64 (1):57–67.
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  11. Anthony Brueckner (2007). Hinge Propositions and Epistemic Justification. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):285–287.
    Michael Williams and Crispin Wright have claimed that we are epistemically justified in believing hinge propositions, such as there is an external world. In a recent paper Allan Hazlett puts forward an argument that purports to elucidate the source of such justification. This paper reconstructs Hazlett's argument and offers a criticism of it.
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  12. Toni Vogel Carey (2002). Taming the Skeptical Dragon. Philosophy Now 35:7-9.
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  13. L. S. Carrier (1987). Out-Gunning Skepticism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):655 - 657.
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  14. J. Adam Carter (2012). Recent Work on Moores Proof. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):115-144.
    Recently, much work has been done on G.E. Moore's proof of an external world with the aim of diagnosing just where the Proof `goes wrong'. In the mainstream literature, the most widely discussed debate on this score stands between those who defend competing accounts of perceptual warrant known as dogmatism (i.e. Pryor and Davies) and conservativism (i.e. Wright). Each account implies a different verdict on Moore's Proof, though both share a commitment to supposing that an examination of premise-conclusion dependence relations (...)
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  15. J. Adam Carter (2011). Radical Skepticism, Closure, and Robust Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:115-133.
    The Neo-Moorean response to the radical skeptical challenge boldly maintains that we can know we’re not the victims of radical skeptical hypotheses; accordingly, our everyday knowledge that would otherwise be threatened by our inability to rule out such hypotheses stands unthreatened. Given the leverage such an approach has against the skeptic from the very start, the Neo-Moorean line is an especially popular one; as we shall see, though, it faces several commonly overlooked problems. An initial problem is that this particular (...)
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  16. J. Adam Carter (2011). Radical Skepticism, Closure, and Robust Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:115-133.
    The Neo-Moorean response to the radical skeptical challenge boldly maintains that we can know we’re not the victims of radical skeptical hypotheses; accordingly, our everyday knowledge that would otherwise be threatened by our inability to rule out such hypotheses stands unthreatened. Given the leverage such an approach has against the skeptic from the very start, the Neo-Moorean line is an especially popular one; as we shall see, though, it faces several commonly overlooked problems. An initial problem is that this particular (...)
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  17. Roderick M. Chisholm (1973). Empirical Knowledge; Readings From Contemporary Sources. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
    Nelson, L. The impossibility of the "Theory of knowledge."--Moore, G. E. Four forms of skepticism.--Lehrer, K. Skepticism & conceptual change.--Quine, W. V. Epistemology naturalized.--Rozeboom, W. W. Why I know so much more than you do.--Price, H. H. Belief and evidence.--Lewis, C. I. The bases of empirical knowledge.--Malcolm, N. The verification argument.--Firth, R. The anatomy of certainty.--Chisholm, R. M. On the nature of empirical evidence.--Meinong, A. Toward an epistemological assessment of memory.--Brandt, R. The epistemological status of memory beliefs.--Malcolm, N. A definition (...)
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  18. Noam Chomsky, Force and Opinion.
    We can trace such ideas to 17th century thinkers who reacted to the skeptical crisis of the times by recognizing that there are no absolutely certain grounds for knowledge, but that we do, nevertheless, have ways to gain a reliable understanding of the world and to improve that understanding and apply it -- essentially the standpoint of the working scientist today. Similarly, in normal life a reasonable person relies on the natural beliefs of common sense while recognizing that they may (...)
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  19. Thompson Clarke (1972). The Legacy of Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 64 (20):754-769.
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  20. Annalisa Coliva, The Paradox of Moore's Proof Of.
    Moore’s proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright’s nor Pryor’s readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for (...)
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  21. Annalisa Coliva (2013). Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. Philosophia 41 (1):1-12.
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  22. Annalisa Coliva (2012). Varieties of Failure (of Warrant Transmission: What Else?!). Synthese 189 (2):235-254.
    In the contemporary expanding literature on transmission failure and its connections with issues such as the Closure principle, the nature of perceptual warrant, Moore’s proof of an external world and the effectiveness of Humean scepticism, it has often been assumed that there is just one kind of it: the one made familiar by the writings of Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. Although it might be thought that one kind of failure is more than enough, Davies has recently challenged this view: (...)
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  23. Annalisa Coliva (2010). Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense. Palgrave Macmillan.
  24. Annalisa Coliva (2008). The Paradox of Moore's Proof of an External World. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):234–243.
    Moore's proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright's nor Pryor's readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for (...)
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  25. Earl Conee (2001). Comments on Bill Lycan's Moore Against the New Skeptics. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):55 - 59.
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