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Summary Dogmatism about perceptual justification is named after the response to external-world skepticism that it recommends. When the skeptic claims that perception cannot justify beliefs about the external world, the dogmatist thinks it is reasonable to reply that simply having a visual experience can give one reason to believe one's eyes, even without having independent justification to think there is an external world.  And analogous replies for auditory, gustatory, olfactory and other perceptual experiences (including multimodal ones) are supposed to be equally reasonable. In the hands of dogmatists, G.E. Moore was basically right when he purported to refute the skeptic by holding up a hand (which presumably he could see) and telling the skeptic that he was sure he had a hand.  Dogmatist theses are often formulated in terms of two notions:defeater and immediate justification. To a first approximation, defeaters are reasons to believe that the experience is not a good guide to the way things are. One dogmatist thesis is that a perceptual experience with the content P (such as "here is a hand") provides justification for believing P, absent defeaters for the experience.  A different dogmatist thesis is that a perceptual experience with content P provides immediate justification for believing P, absent defeaters. To a first approximation, justification from experience for believing P is immediate, if there are no other proposition Q such that one needs to rely on one's justification for Q to have justification from experience to believe P. The thesis that perceptual experiences provide immediate justification is compatible both with reliabilism about justification and with non-reliablist theories of justification.  Dogmatism is appealing for its simplicity, and for preserving the intuitive idea that the external-world skeptic cannot be right. But in assigning so much rational power to perceptual experiences, it raises several questions. What gives perceptual experiences those rational powers? Is it the phenomenal character of the experience, its content, the status of the experience as reliable,  some combination, or other factors? Can there be immediate justification? 
Key works Moore 1925 introduced the example of holding up one's hands and claiming to answer the skeptic by invoking one's visual experience of one's hands. Pryor 2000 recently reinvigorated discussion of dogmatism, which was defended earlier by Pollock 1970 and has received continued defense by Huemer 2007Goldman 2008 defends a reliabilist version of the view that perceptual experiences can be provide immediate justification.Two influential objections to dogmatism are Siegel 2012, who poses a problem for dogmatism from the cognitive penetrability of experience, and White 2006, who raises an objection using Bayesian considerations. 
Introductions Moore 1925 is a good place to begin. Pryor 2005 makes a case of immediate justification and Pryor 2000 is a straightforward positive defense of the view. Siegel & Silins forthcoming provides an overview of versions of dogmatism, problems for it, and locates dogmatism in the more general topic of perceptual justification.
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  1. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings. Inquiry.
    In Philosophy Without Intuitions Herman Cappelen argues that unlike what is commonly thought, contemporary analytic philosophers do not typically rely on intuitions as evidence. If they do indeed rely on intuitions, that should be evident from their written works, either explicitly in the form of ‘intuition’ talk or by means of other indicators. However, Cappelen argues, while philosophers do engage in ‘intuition’ talk, that is not a good indicator that they rely on intuitions, as ‘intuition’ and its cognates have many (...)
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  2. Berit Brogaard (2013). Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification. Oup Usa. 270.
  3. Elijah Chudnoff (2011). The Nature of Intuitive Justification. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.
    In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology—and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, (...)
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  4. Harmen Ghijsen (2014). Phenomenalist Dogmatist Experientialism and the Distinctiveness Problem. Synthese 191 (7):1549-1566.
    Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism (PDE) holds the following thesis: if $S$ has a perceptual experience that $p$ , then $S$ has immediate prima facie evidential justification for the belief that $p$ in virtue of the experience’s phenomenology. The benefits of PDE are that it (a) provides an undemanding view of perceptual justification that allows most of our ordinary perceptual beliefs to be justified, and (b) accommodates two important internalist intuitions, viz. the New Evil Demon Intuition and the Blindsight Intuition. However, in (...)
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  5. Paweł Grabarczyk (2013). Do Animals See Objects? In Marcin Miłkowski Konrad Talmont-Kamiński (ed.), Regarding Mind, Naturally.
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  6. Kenneth Hobson (2008). Foundational Beliefs and the Structure of Justification. Synthese 164 (1):117 - 139.
    I argue that our justification for beliefs about the external physical world need not be constituted by any justified beliefs about perceptual experiences. In this way our justification for beliefs about the physical world may be nondoxastic and this differentiates my proposal from traditional foundationalist theories such as those defended by Laurence BonJour, Richard Fumerton, and Timothy McGrew. On the other hand, it differs from certain non-traditional foundationalist theories such as that defended by James Pryor according to which perceptual experience (...)
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  7. Michael Huemer (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.
    This book develops and defends a version of direct realism: the thesis that perception gives us direct awareness, and non-inferential knowledge, of the external...
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  8. Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism. Symposion.
    According to the explanationist, we can rely on inference to best explanation to justifiably believe familiar skeptical hypotheses are false. On this view, commonsense beliefs about the existence and character of familiar, medium-sized dry goods provides the best explanation of our evidence and so justifies our belief that we're not brains-in-vats. This explanationist approach seems prima facie plausible until we press the explanationist to tell us what the data is that we're trying to explain by appeal to our beliefs about (...)
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  9. Jack Lyons (forthcoming). Critical Notice: Seemings and Justification, Ed. Chris Tucker. [REVIEW] Analysis.
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  10. Jack Lyons (2011). Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
    Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.
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  11. Jack Lyons (2010). Precis of Perception and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):443 - 446.
  12. Jack Lyons (2010). Response to Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):477 - 488.
    Part of book symposium on _Perception and Basic Beliefs_. Responses to Terry Horgan, Alvin Goldman, and Peter Graham.
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  13. Jack Lyons (2009). Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World. Oxford University Press.
    Perception and Basic Beliefs brings together an important treatment of these major epistemological topics and provides a positive solution to the traditional problem of the external world.
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  14. Mohan Matthen (2014). How to Be Sure: Sensory Exploration and Empirical Certainty. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):38-69.
  15. Luca Moretti (forthcoming). Phenomenal Conservatism. Analysis.
    I review recent work on Phenomenal Conservatism, the position introduced by Michael Huemer according to which if it seems that P to a subject S, in absence of defeaters S has thereby some degree of justification for believing P.
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  16. Luca Moretti (forthcoming). In Defence of Dogmatism. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, when you have an experience with content p, you often have prima facie justification to believe p that does not rest on your independent justification to believe any proposition. Although dogmatism has an intuitive appeal and seems to have an antisceptical bite, it has been targeted by different objections. This paper principally aims to answer the objections by Roger White according to which dogmatism is inconsistent with the Bayesian account of how evidence affects our credences. (...)
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  17. Luca Moretti (2014). The Dogmatist, Moore's Proof and Transmission Failure. Analysis 74 (3):382-389.
    According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, if you have an experience as if P, you acquire immediate prima facie justification for believing P. Pryor contends that dogmatism validates Moore’s infamous proof of a material world. Against Pryor, I argue that if dogmatism is true, Moore’s proof turns out to be non-transmissive of justification according to one of the senses of non-transmissivity defined by Crispin Wright. This type of non-transmissivity doesn’t deprive dogmatism of its apparent antisceptical bite.
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  18. Luca Moretti (2014). Chris Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, NY: OUP (2013). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):364-366.
  19. Ram Neta (2004). Perceptual Evidence and the New Dogmatism. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):199-214.
    What is the epistemological value of perceptual experience? In his recently influential paper, “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”1, James Pryor develops a seemingly plausible answer to this question. Pryor’s answer comprises the following three theses: (F) “Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible – there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs.” (517) (PK) “This justification that you get merely by having an experience as of p can sometimes (...)
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  20. Michael Pace (2010). Foundationally Justified Perceptual Beliefs and the Problem of the Speckled Hen. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):401-441.
    Many epistemologists accept some version of the following foundationalist epistemic principle: if one has an experience as if p then one has prima facie justification that p. I argue that this principle faces a challenge that it inherits from classical foundationalism: the problem of the speckled hen. The crux of the problem is that some properties are presented in experience at a level of determinacy that outstrips our recognitional capacities. I argue for an amendment to the principle that adds to (...)
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  21. James Pryor, Uncertainty and Undermining.
    Dogmatism is a claim about a possible epistemic position, not about the metaphysics of what puts us in that position. So, for example, it leaves it open whether the intrinsic nature of a perceiving subject’s state is the same as that of a hallucinating subject’s state.
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  22. James Pryor (2013). Problems for Credulism. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism.
    We have several intuitive paradigms of defeating evidence. For example, let E be the fact that Ernie tells me that the notorious pet Precious is a bird. This supports the premise F, that Precious can fly. However, Orna gives me *opposing* evidence. She says that Precious (the same Precious) is a dog. Alternatively, defeating evidence might not oppose Ernie's testimony in that direct way. There might be other ways for it to weaken the support that Ernie's testimony gives me for (...)
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  23. James Pryor (2000). The Skeptic and the Dogmatist. Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
    Consider the skeptic about the external world. Let’s straightaway concede to such a skeptic that perception gives us no conclusive or certain knowledge about our surroundings. Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible—there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs. Let’s also concede to the skeptic that it’s metaphysically possible for us to have all the experiences we’re now having while all those experiences are false. Some philosophers dispute (...)
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  24. Susanna Siegel (forthcoming). Epistemic Evaluability and Perceptual Farce. In A. Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Effects on Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford.
  25. Susanna Siegel (2013). Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):749-757.
    Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath each contributed to a symposium on "The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience" in Philosophical Studies. These are my replies their contributions.
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  26. Susanna Siegel (2013). The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
    In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
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  27. Susanna Siegel (2012). Congnitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification. Noûs 46 (2):201 - 222.
    In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
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  28. Nicholas Silins (forthcoming). Experience and Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  29. Nicholas Silins (2013). The Significance of High-Level Content. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.
    This paper is an essay in counterfactual epistemology. What if experience have high-level contents, to the effect that something is a lemon or that someone is sad? I survey the consequences for epistemology of such a scenario, and conclude that many of the striking consequences could be reached even if our experiences don't have high-level contents.
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  30. Nicholas Silins (2011). Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'. Mind 120 (478):329-367.
    Suppose our visual experiences immediately justify some of our beliefs about the external world — that is, justify them in a way that does not rely on our having independent reason to hold any background belief. A key question now arises: Which of our beliefs about the external world can be immediately justified by experiences? I address this question in epistemology by doing some philosophy of mind. In particular, I evaluate the following proposal: if your experience e immediately justifies you (...)
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  31. Nicholas Silins (2008). Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic. In Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 2. OUP.
    My focus will be on two questions about Moore’s justification to believe the premises and the conclusion of the argument above. At stake is what makes it possible for our experiences to justify our beliefs, and what makes it possible for us to be justified in disbelieving skeptical..
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  32. Paul Silva Jr (2013). How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
    Conservatism about perceptual justification tells us that we cannot have perceptual justification to believe p unless we also have justification to believe that perceptual experiences are reliable. There are many ways to maintain this thesis, ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. Most of these ways lead to at least one of two problems. The first is an over-intellectualization problem, whereas the second problem concerns the satisfaction of the epistemic basing requirement on justified belief. I argue that there is at (...)
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  33. Chris Tucker (forthcoming). Seemings and Justification: An Introduction. In , Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press.
    It is natural to think that many of our beliefs are rational because they are based on seemings, or on the way things seem. This is especially clear in the case of perception. Many of our mathematical, moral, and memory beliefs also appear to be based on seemings. In each of these cases, it is natural to think that our beliefs are not only based on a seeming, but also that they are rationally based on these seemings—at least assuming there (...)
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  34. Chris Tucker (2014). If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too. Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.
    Perceptual dogmatism holds that if it perceptually seems to S that P, then S thereby has prima facie perceptual justification for P. But suppose Wishful Willy's desire for gold cognitively penetrates his perceptual experience and makes it seem to him that the yellow object is a gold nugget. Intuitively, his desire-penetrated seeming can't provide him with prima facie justification for thinking that the object is gold. If this intuitive response is correct, dogmatists have a problem. But if dogmatists have a (...)
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  35. Chris Tucker (ed.) (2013). Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. OUP USA.
    The primary aim of this book is to understand how seemings relate to justification and whether some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism can be sustained. It also addresses a number of other issues, including the nature of seemings, cognitive penetration, Bayesianism, and the epistemology of morality and disagreement.
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  36. Jona Vance (2014). Emotion and the New Epistemic Challenge From Cognitive Penetrability. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):257-283.
    Experiences—visual, emotional, or otherwise—play a role in providing us with justification to believe claims about the world. Some accounts of how experiences provide justification emphasize the role of the experiences’ distinctive phenomenology, i.e. ‘what it is like’ to have the experience. Other accounts emphasize the justificatory role to the experiences’ etiology. A number of authors have used cases of cognitively penetrated visual experience to raise an epistemic challenge for theories of perceptual justification that emphasize the justificatory role of phenomenology rather (...)
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  37. Roger White (2006). Problems for Dogmatism. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525--57.
    I argue that its appearing to you that P does not provide justification for believing that P unless you have independent justification for the denial of skeptical alternatives – hypotheses incompatible with P but such that if they were true, it would still appear to you that P. Thus I challenge the popular view of ‘dogmatism,’ according to which for some contents P, you need only lack reason to suspect that skeptical alternatives are true, in order for an experience as (...)
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