Edited by Yuval Avnur (Claremont College)
|Summary||Dogmatist or Moorean responses to skepticism are most readily introduced in the context of the classic skeptical argument: (1) You don't know/have justification to believe that you are not massively deceived (2) If you don't know/have justification to believe that you are not massively deceived then you don't know/have justification to believe that you have hands--or anything else about the external world on the basis of your senses. (3) Therefore, you don't know/have justification to believe that you have hands--or anything else about the external world on the basis of your senses. Dogmatist or Moorean responses to this argument reject premise (1) in a distinctive way: you appeal to perceptual justification for, or knowledge of, some simple empirical premise, such as that you have hands, and claim to have justification to believe, or know, on that basis that you are not massively deceived. (There are many subtleties and details, some of which depend on the sort of massive deception involved in the argument.) This response to skepticism depends on a view about the conditions under which one becomes justified, or gets knowledge, on the basis of sensory experience: when one has an experience whose content is p, one gets justification to believe p so long as one lacks any evidence that one is deceived and even if one lacks independent evidence that one is not deceived.|
|Key works||This sort of response to skepticism is inspired by some remarks in Moore 1925. Much of the recent discussion on the topic is framed by the version of this response presented Pryor 2000.|
|Introductions||Pryor 2000 Pryor 2004 Wright 2002 White 2006|
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