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  1. Russ Abbott, Abstractions and Implementations.
    Fundamental to Computer Science is the distinction between abstractions and implementations. When that distinction is applied to various philosophical questions it yields the following conclusions. -/- • EMERGENCE. It isn’t as mysterious as it’s made out to be; the possibility of strong emergence is not a threat to science. -/- • INTERACTIONS BETWEEN HIGHER-LEVEL ENTITIES. Physical interaction among higher-level entities is illusory. Abstract interactions are the source of emergence, new domains of knowledge, and complex systems. -/- • PHYSICS and the (...)
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  2. P. B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N. O. Finnemann & P. V. Christiansen (eds.) (2000). Downward Causation. University of Aarhus Press.
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  3. Michael Baumgartner (2009). Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-Reductive Physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):161-178.
    The first part of this paper presents an argument showing that the currently most highly acclaimed interventionist theory of causation, i.e. the one advanced by Woodward, excludes supervening macro properties from having a causal influence on effects of their micro supervenience bases. Moreover, this interventionist exclusion argument is demonstrated to rest on weaker premises than classical exclusion arguments. The second part then discusses a weakening of interventionism that Woodward suggests. This weakened version of interventionism turns out either to be inapplicable (...)
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  4. William Bechtel (2007). Top-Down Causation Without Top-Down Causes. Biology and Philosophy 22 (4):547-563.
  5. Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (1992). Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
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  6. Mark A. Bedau (2002). Downward Causation and the Autonomy of Weak Emergence. Principia 6 (1):5-50.
    Weak emergence has been offered as an explication of the ubiquitous notion of emergence used in complexity science (Bedau 1997). After outlining the problem of emergence and comparing weak emergence with the two other main objectivist approaches to emergence, this paper explains a version of weak emergence and illustrates it with cellular automata. Then it explains the sort of downward causation and explanatory autonomy involved in weak emergence.
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  7. Guy Bennett-Hunter (forthcoming). Emergence, Emergentism and Pragmatism. Theology and Science.
    In this paper, I argue for the usefulness of pragmatism as a framework within which to develop the theological application of emergentist theory. I consider some philosophical issues relevant to the recent revival of interest, across various disciplines, in the concept of emergence and clarify some of the conceptual issues at stake in the attempts to formulate the philosophical position of emergentism and to apply it theologically. After highlighting some major problems arising from the main existing ways of formulating emergentism, (...)
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  8. Sara Bernstein (forthcoming). Overdetermination Underdetermined. Erkenntnis:1-24.
    Widespread causal overdetermination is often levied as an objection to nonreductive theories of minds and objects. In response, nonreductive physicalists have argued that the type of overdetermination generated by their theories is different from the sorts of coincidental cases involving multiple rock-throwers, and thus not problematic. This paper pushes back. I argue that attention to differences between types of overdetermination discharges very few explanatory burdens, and that overdetermination is a bigger problem for the nonreductive metaphysician than previously thought.
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  9. Robert C. Bishop (2005). Downward Causation in Fluid Convection. Synthese 160 (2):229 - 248.
    Recent developments in nonlinear dynamics have found wide application in many areas of science from physics to neuroscience. Nonlinear phenomena such as feedback loops, inter-level relations, wholes constraining and modifying the behavior of their parts, and memory effects are interesting candidates for emergence and downward causation. Rayleigh–Bénard convection is an example of a nonlinear system that, I suggest, yields important insights for metaphysics and philosophy of science. In this paper I propose convection as a model for downward causation in classical (...)
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  10. Michel Bitbol (2012). Downward Causation Without Foundations. Synthese 185 (2):233-255.
    Emergence is interpreted in a non-dualist framework of thought. No metaphysical distinction between the higher and basic levels of organization is supposed, but only a duality of modes of access. Moreover, these modes of access are not construed as mere ways of revealing intrinsic patterns of organization: They are supposed to be constitutive of them, in Kant’s sense. The emergent levels of organization, and the inter-level causations as well, are therefore neither illusory nor ontologically real: They are objective in the (...)
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  11. Donald T. Campbell (1974). Downward Causation. In F. Ayala & T. Dobzhansky (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology. University of California Press. 179--186.
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  12. Donald T. Campbell (1974). 11.'Downward Causation'in Hierarchically Organised Biological Systems. In Francisco Jose Ayala & Theodosius Grigorievich Dobzhansky (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems. University of California Press. 179.
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  13. Richard Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard (2011). Physicalism, Emergence and Downward Causation. Axiomathes 21 (1):33-56.
    The development of a defensible and fecund notion of emergence has been dogged by a number of threshold issues neatly highlighted in a recent paper by Jaegwon Kim. We argue that physicalist assumptions confuse and vitiate the whole project. In particular, his contention that emergence entails supervenience is contradicted by his own argument that the ‘microstructure’ of an object belongs to the whole object, not to its constituents. And his argument against the possibility of downward causation is question-begging and makes (...)
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  14. Justin A. Capes (2010). Can 'Downward Causation' Save Free Will? Philosophia 38 (1):131-142.
    Recently, Trenton Merricks has defended a libertarian view of human freedom. He claims that human persons have downward causal control of their constituent parts, and that downward causal control of this sort is sufficient for free will. In this paper I examine Merricks’s defense of free will, and argue that it is unsuccessful. I show that having downward causal control is not sufficient for for free will. In an Appendix I also argue that Merricks’s defense of free will, together with (...)
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  15. Xiaoping Chen (2010). How Does Downward Causation Exist?—A Comment on Kim's Elimination of Downward Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (4):652-665.
    The importance of downward causation lies in showing that it shows that functional properties such as mental properties are real, although they cannot be reduced to physical properties. Kim rejects nonreductive physicalism, which includes leading functionalism, by eliminating downward causation, and thereby returns to reductionism. In this paper, I make a distinction between two aspects of function—functional meaning and functional structure and argue that functional meaning cannot be reduced to the physical level whereas functional structure can. On this basis, I (...)
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  16. Philip Clayton & P. C. W. Davies (eds.) (2006). The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis From Science to Religion. Oxford University Press.
    This volume introduces readers to emergence theory, outlines the major arguments in its defence, and summarizes the most powerful objections against it. It provides the clearest explication yet of this exciting new theory of science, which challenges the reductionist approach by proposing the continuous emergence of novel phenomena.
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  17. Richard Corry (2013). Emerging From the Causal Drain. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):29-47.
    For over 20 years, Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument has stood as the major hurdle for non-reductive physicalism. If successful, Kim’s argument would show that the high-level properties posited by non-reductive physicalists must either be identical with lower-level physical properties, or else must be causally inert. The most prominent objection to the Causal Exclusion Argument—the so-called Overdetermination Objection—points out that there are some notions of causation that are left untouched by the argument. If causation is simply counterfactual dependence, for example, (...)
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  18. J. D'Ewart (1917). Downward Paths. An Inquiry Into the Causes Which Contribute to the Making of the Prostitute. The Eugenics Review 9 (3):253.
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  19. Paul Cw Davies (2006). The Physics of Downward Causation. In P. Davies & P. Clayton (eds.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford University Press.
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  20. Paul Sheldon Davies (2006). The Physics of Downward Causation. In Philip Clayton & Paul Sheldon Davies (eds.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford University Press.
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  21. Charbel Niño Ei-Hani & Antonio Augusto Passos Videira (2001). Causação Descendente, Emergência de Propriedades E Modos Causais Aristotélicos (Downward Causation, Property Emergence, and Aristotelian Causal Modes). Theoria 16 (2):301-329.
    O problema da causação descendente é um ponto central na formulação do fisicalismo não-redutivo e na compreensão da emergência de propriedades. Duas interpretações possíveis da causação descendente, nas quais a contribuição do pensamento aristotélico é importante, são examinadas. Os requisitos do programa de matematização da natureza na mecanica clássica, que levaram ao abandono de três dos modos causais aristotélicos, nao parecem igualmente importantes nas ciencias especiais. Isto sugere que a contribuição de Aristóteles pode ser, de certa maneira, retomada. Uma definição (...)
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  22. Charbel Niño El-Hani (2010). Emergence and Downward Causation. Principia 6 (1):1-4.
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  23. Charbel Niño El-Hani (2005). Downward Determination. Abstracta 1 (2):162-192.
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  24. Claus Emmeche, Simo Koppe & Frederick Stjernfelt (2000). Levels, Emergence, and Three Versions of Downward Causation. In P.B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann & P.V. Christiansen (eds.), Downward Causation. Aarhus, Denmark: University of Aarhus Press. 322-348.
    The idea of a higher level phenomenon having a downward causal influence on a lower level process or entity has taken a variety of forms. In order to discuss the relation between emergence and downward causation, the specific variety of the thesis of downward causation (DC) must be identified. Based on some ontological theses about inter-level relations, types of causation and the possibility of reduction, three versions of DC are distinguished. Of these, the `Strong' form of DC is held to (...)
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  25. Markus I. Eronen (2015). Levels of Organization: A Deflationary Account. Biology and Philosophy 30 (1):39-58.
    The idea of levels of organization plays a central role in the philosophy of the life sciences. In this article, I first examine the explanatory goals that have motivated accounts of levels of organization. I then show that the most state-of-the-art and scientifically plausible account of levels of organization, the account of levels of mechanism proposed by Bechtel and Craver, is fundamentally problematic. Finally, I argue that the explanatory goals can be reached by adopting a deflationary approach, where levels of (...)
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  26. Markus I. Eronen (2013). No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1042-1052.
    I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is unsatisfactory since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is incompatible with Craver and Bechtel’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as composition and scale. One outcome of this is that (...)
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  27. Markus I. Eronen & Daniel S. Brooks (2014). Interventionism and Supervenience: A New Problem and Provisional Solution. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):185-202.
    The causal exclusion argument suggests that mental causes are excluded in favour of the underlying physical causes that do all the causal work. Recently, a debate has emerged concerning the possibility of avoiding this conclusion by adopting Woodward's interventionist theory of causation. Both proponents and opponents of the interventionist solution crucially rely on the notion of supervenience when formulating their positions. In this article, we consider the relation between interventionism and supervenience in detail and argue that importing supervenience relations into (...)
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  28. Steve Fleetwood (2006). Themes and Issues: Rejoinder to Sheila Dow and Paul Downward. Journal of Critical Realism 5 (1):169-182.
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  29. Steve Fleetwood (2006). Themes and Issues: Reply to Shelia Dow and Paul Downward. Journal of Critical Realism 5 (1):158-165.
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  30. M. Füllsack (2012). Author's Response: Systems as Realities Sui Generis with Eigenbehavior? Constructivist Foundations 8 (1):114-116.
    Upshot: The differentiation between society being emergent or sui generis seems to correspond to the question of whether the development of interaction, in particular communication, should better be considered bottom-up, top-down or as a sort of circular concurrency of bottom-up and top-down causes. This is reminiscent of the philosophical debate about the implications of the terms emergence and downward causation.
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  31. Øistein Schmidt Galaaen, The Disturbing Matter of Downward Causation: A Study of the Exclusion Argument and its Causal-Explanatory Presuppositions.
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  32. Øistein Schmidt Galaaen (2006). The Disturbing Matter of Downward Causation. Dissertation, University of Oslo
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  33. John Gibbons (2006). Mental Causation Without Downward Causation. Philosophical Review 115 (1):79-103.
    to counterintuitive results. Suppose a mental event, m1, causes another mental event, m2. Unless the mental and the physical are completely independent, there will be a physical event in your brain or your body or the physical world as a whole that underlies this event. The mental event occurs at least partly in virtue of the physical event’s occurring. And the same goes for m2 [2] and p2. Let’s not worry about what exactly “underlying” or “in virtue of” means here. (...)
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  34. Charbel El Hani & João Queiroz (2005). Downward Determination. Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente E Ação 1 (2):162-192.
    The problem of downward causation – i.e., the problem of the nature of the influence of a system or whole over its components – is highly debated in the literature on property emergence. Nevertheless, most treatments of downward causation do not really refer to causation at all, but rather to explanation and/or determination, as Menno Hulswit recently argued. In this context, it is quite important to search for an understanding of how the roles usually ascribed to systems relatively to their (...)
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  35. Matthew C. Haug (2011). Emergence in Mind * Edited by Cynthia MacDonald and Graham MacDonald. Analysis 71 (4):783-785.
  36. John Heil & Alfred Mele (eds.) (1993). Mental Causation. Clarendon Press.
    I argue that the two standard models of mental causation fail to capture the crucial causal relevance of the reason-giving relations involved. Their common error is an exclusively mechanical conception of causation, on which any justification is bound to be independent of the causal process involved, based upon a general rule from which the correctness of the particular case follows only by subsumption. I establish possibility of an alternative model, by sketching an account of the causal dependence of perceptual knowledge (...)
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  37. Menno Hulswit (2005). How Causal is Downward Causation? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):261 - 287.
    The purpose of this paper is to lay bare the major problems underlying the concept of downward causation as discussed within the perspective of the present interest for phenomena that are characterized by self-organization. In our Discussion of the literature, we have focussed on two questions: (1) What sorts of things are said to be, respectively, causing and caused within the context of downward causation? And (2) What is the meaning of 'causing' in downward causation? We have concluded that the (...)
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  38. Andrew J. Jaeger (2011). Mental Causation as Teleological Causation. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 85:161-171.
    I argue that the Causal Closure Argument (CCA) and the Explanatory Exclusion Argument (EEA) fail to show that mental causes must either be reduced/ identical to physical causes or that mental causes are epiphenomenal. I begin by granting the soundness of CCA and EEA and go on to argue that they only rule out irreducible mental efficient causes/explanations. A proponent of irreducible mental causation can, therefore, grant the soundness of CCA and EEA, provided she holds mental causation/explanation to be teleological. (...)
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  39. Alicia Juarrero (2013). Downward Causation: Polanyi and Prigogine. Tradition and Discovery 40 (3):4-15.
    Michael Polanyi argues that in the case of both organisms and machines the functionality of the higher level imposes boundary conditions that harness the operations of lower level components in the service of the higher level, systemic whole. Given the science of his day, however, Polanyi understands this shaping of boundary conditions in terms of the operation of an external agency. The essay argues that the science of nonlinear, far from equilibrium thermodynamics in general, and the phenomenon of autocatalysis in (...)
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  40. Jaegwon Kim (2000). Making Sense of Downward Causation. In P. B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N. O. Finnemann & P. V. Christiansen (eds.), Downward Causation. University of Aarhus Press. 305--321.
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  41. Jaegwon Kim (1999). Making Sense of Emergence. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
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  42. Jaegwon Kim (1992). "Downward Causation" in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism. In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. 119--138.
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  43. Max Kistler (2010). Causation Across Levels, Constitution, and Constraint. In Mauricio Suarez, Mauro Dorato & Miklos Redei (eds.), Epsa Philosophical Issues in the Sciences. Springer. 141--151.
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  44. Max Kistler (2010). Mechanisms and Downward Causation. Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):595-609.
    Experimental investigation of mechanisms seems to make use of causal relations that cut across levels of composition. In bottom-up experiments, one intervenes on parts of a mechanism to observe the whole; in top-down experiments, one intervenes on the whole mechanism to observe certain parts of it. It is controversial whether such experiments really make use of interlevel causation, and indeed whether the idea of causation across levels is even conceptually coherent. Craver and Bechtel have suggested that interlevel causal claims can (...)
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  45. Robert C. Koons (1998). Teleology as Higher-Order Causation: A Situation-Theoretic Account. Minds and Machines 8 (4):559-585.
    Situation theory, as developed by Barwise and his collaborators, is used to demonstrate the possibility of defining teleology (and related notions, like that of proper or biological function) in terms of higher order causation, along the lines suggested by Taylor and Wright. This definition avoids the excessive narrowness that results from trying to define teleology in terms of evolutionary history or the effects of natural selection. By legitimating the concept of teleology, this definition also provides promising new avenues for solving (...)
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  46. Thomas Kroedel (2015). A Simple Argument for Downward Causation. Synthese 192 (3):841-858.
    Instances of many supervenient properties have physical effects. In particular, instances of mental properties have physical effects if non-reductive physicalism is true. This follows by a straightforward argument that assumes a counterfactual criterion for causation. The paper presents that argument and discusses several issues that arise from it. In particular, the paper addresses the worry that the argument shows too many supervenient property-instances to have physical effects. The argument is also compared to a similar argument that has been suggested by (...)
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  47. I. Kvart (1996). Cause and Some Positive Causal Impact: Causation and Emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 11:401-432.
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  48. Eric LaRock (2013). Aristotle and Agent-Directed Neuroplasticity. International Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):385-408.
    I propose an Aristotelian approach to agent causation that is consistent with the hypothesis of strong emergence. This approach motivates a wider ontology than materialism by maintaining (1) that the agent is generated by the brain without being reducible to it on grounds of the unity of experience and (2) that the agent possesses (formal) causal power to affect (i.e., mold, sculpt, or organize) the brain on grounds of agent-directed neuroplasticity. After providing recent empirical evidence for the strong emergence of (...)
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  49. Eric LaRock (2008). Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process? International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):201-229.
    I argue on the basis of recent findings in neuroscience that consciousness is not a brain process, and then explore some alternative, non-reductive options concerning the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and the brain, such as weak and strong accounts of the emergence of consciousness and the constitution view of consciousness. I propose an Aristotelian account of the strong emergence of consciousness. This account motivates a wider ontology than reductive physicalism and makes reference to formal causation as a way explaining the (...)
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  50. Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (2010). Emergence and Downward Causation. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press.
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