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  1. Kristoffer Ahlstrom (2011). Dream Skepticism and the Conditionality Problem. Erkenntnis 75 (1):45-60.
    Recently, Ernest Sosa (2007) has proposed two novel solutions to the problem of dream skepticism. In the present paper, I argue that Sosa’s first solution falls prey to what I will refer to as the conditionality problem, i.e., the problem of only establishing a conditional—in this case, if x, then I am awake, x being a placeholder for a condition incompatible with dreaming—in a context where it also needs to be established that we can know that the antecedent holds, and (...)
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  2. Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans (2010). Sosa's Dream. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):249 - 252.
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  3. M. W. Beal (1976). Skepticism and Knowing One Is Awake. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):33-36.
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  4. William S. Boardman (1979). Dreams, Dramas, and Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 29 (116):220-228.
    Malcolm;[1] but the sharp attacks in the last decade on Malcolm's assumptions have led some philosophers to suppose that Descartes' dreaming problem is a cogent support for scepticism. [2] In this paper, I hope to dispose of the problem without using controversial assumptions of the sort used by Malcolm.
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  5. Jessica Brown (2009). Review: Sosa on Scepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 143 (3):397 - 405.
    In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
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  6. Jessica Brown (2009). Sosa on Scepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 143 (3):397--405.
    In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
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  7. Robert Brown (1957). Sound Sleep and Sound Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (May):47-53.
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  8. Anthony Brueckner (1992). Problems with the Wright Route to Skepticism. Mind 101 (402):309-317.
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  9. Reid Buchanan (2002). Natural Doubts: Williams's Diagnosis of Scepticism. Synthese 131 (1):57 - 80.
    Michael Williams believes that scepticism about the externalworld seems compelling only because the considerations that underpin it are thoughtto be ``mere platitudes'''' about e.g., the nature and source of human knowledge, and hence,that if it shown through a ``theoretical diagnosis'''' that it does not rest upon suchplatitudes, but contentious theoretical considerations that we are no means bound toaccept, we can simply dismiss the absurd sceptical conclusion. Williams argues thatscepticism does presuppose two extremely contentious doctrines, however, he admits thatif (...)
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  10. Otávio Bueno (2009). Sosa on Skepticism. Metaphilosophy 40 (2):195-202.
    Abstract: Ernest Sosa has recently articulated an insightful response to skepticism and, in particular, to the dream argument. The response relies on two independent moves. First, Sosa offers the imagination model of dreaming according to which no assertions are ever made in dreams and no beliefs are involved there. As a result, it is possible to distinguish dreaming from being awake, and the dream argument is blocked. Second, Sosa develops a virtue epistemology according to which in appropriately normal conditions our (...)
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  11. Brad Chynoweth (2010). Descartes' Resolution of the Dreaming Doubt. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):153-179.
    After resolving the dreaming doubt at the end of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes concedes to Hobbes that one could apply the criterion for waking experience in a dream and thus be deceived, but he no longer considers this possibility to have skeptical force. I argue that this is a legitimate response by Descartes since 1) the dreaming doubt in the Sixth Meditation is no longer a global skeptical hypothesis as it is in the First, and 2) the level of certainty (...)
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  12. Charles E. M. Dunlop (1978). Dreams, Skepticism, and Scientific Research. Philosophia 8 (2-3):355-65.
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  13. Charles E. M. Dunlop (1974). Performatives and Dream Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 25 (4):295 - 297.
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  14. Paul Faulkner (2005). On Dreaming and Being Lied To. Episteme 2 (3):149-159.
    As sources of knowledge, perception and testimony are both vulnerable to sceptical arguments. To both arguments a Moorean response is possible: both can be refuted by reference to particular things known by perception and testimony. However, lies and dreams are different possibilities and they are different in a way that undercuts the plausibility of a Moorean response to a scepticism of testimony. The condition placed on testimonial knowledge cannot be trivially satisfi ed in the way the Moorean would suggest. This (...)
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  15. T. Grundmann (2002). Die Struktur Des Skeptischen Traumarguments. Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):57-81.
    Skeptical dream-arguments are intended as general challenges to our epistemic claims concerning the world. They argue that we can never rule out the possibility of merely dreaming what we believe to perceive. In my paper I will scrutinize whether any kind of such argument is sound. On my view, many versions of this argument are defective. They are either too weak to challenge all kinds of our epistemic claims or they rely on implausibly strong epistemic principles. More plausible versions of (...)
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  16. Robert Hanna (1992). Descartes and Dream Skepticism Revisited. Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (3):377-398.
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  17. Stephen Hetherington (2011). The Cartesian Dreaming Argument for External-World Skepticism. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  18. M. Huemer (2002). Fumerton's Principle of Inferential Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:329--340.
    Richard Fumerton’s “Principle of Inferential Justification” holds that, in order to be justified in believing P on the basis of E, one must be justified in believing that E makes P probable. I argue that the plausibility of this principle rests upon two kinds of mistakes: first, a level confusion; and second, a fallacy of misconditionalisation. Furthermore, Fumerton’s principle leads to skepticism about inferential justification, for which reason it should be rejected. Instead, the examples Fumerton uses to motivate his principle (...)
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  19. Jonathan Ichikawa (2008). Skepticism and the Imagination Model of Dreaming. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):519–527.
    Penultimate draft; please refer to published version -- especially important in this case, as the official version has been Britishized; even the title's second letter is not the same. Abstract. Ernest Sosa has argued that the solution to dream skepticism lies in an understanding of dreams as imaginative experiences – when we dream, on this suggestion, we do not believe the contents of our dreams, but rather imagine them. Sosa rebuts skepticism thus: dreams don’t cause false beliefs, so my beliefs (...)
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  20. Alan Charles Kors (1998). The Birth of the Modern Mind. Teaching Co..
    lecture 1. Introduction : intellectual history and conceptual change -- lecture 2. The dawn of the 17th century : Aristotelian scholasticism -- lecture 3. The new vision of Francis Bacon -- lecture 4. The new astronomy and cosmology -- lecture 5. Descartes's dream of perfect knowledge -- lecture 6. The specter of Thomas Hobbes -- lecture 7. Skepticism and Jansenism : Blaise Pascal -- lecture 8. Newton's discovery -- lecture 9. The Newtonian revolution -- lecture 10. John Locke, the revolution (...)
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  21. Adam Leite, Austin, Dreams, and Skepticism.
    J. L. Austin’s attitude towards traditional epistemological problems was largely negative. They arise and are maintained, he charged, by “sleight of hand,” “wile,” “concealed motives,” “seductive fallacies,” fixation on a handful of “jejune examples” and a host of small errors, misinterpretations, and mistakes about matters of fact (1962: 3- 6, 1979: 87). As these charges indicate, he did not offer a general critical theory of traditional epistemological theorizing or of the intellectual motivations that lead to it. Instead, he subjected individual (...)
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  22. Morris Lipson (1989). Dreams, Scepticism, and Features of the World. Philosophical Studies 55 (2):223 - 228.
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  23. Norman Malcolm (1957). Dreaming and Scepticism: A Rejoinder. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (December):207-211.
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  24. Norman Malcolm (1956). Dreaming and Skepticism. Philosophical Review 65 (January):14-37.
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  25. Halvor Nordby (2009). Skepticism and Internalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):pp. 35-54.
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  26. Douglas Odegard (1981). Berkeleian Idealism and the Dream Argument. Idealistic Studies 11 (2):93-99.
  27. Duncan Pritchard (2001). Scepticism and Dreaming. Philosophia 28 (1-4):373-390.
    In a recent, and influential, article, Crispin Wright maintains that a familiar form of scepticismwhich finds its core expression in Descartes’ dreaming argumentcan be defused (or, to use Wright’s own parlance, “imploded”), by showing how it employs self-defeating reasoning. I offer two fundamental reasons for rejecting Wright’s ‘implosion’ of scepticism. On the one hand, I argue that, even by Wright’s own lights, it is unclear whether there is a sceptical argument to implode in the first place. On the other, I (...)
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  28. Andrew Rein (1990). Stroud and Williams on Dreaming and Scepticism. Ratio 3 (1):40-47.
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  29. Paul F. Snowdon (2009). McDowell on Skepticism, Disjunctivism, and Transcendental Arguments. Philosophical Topics 37 (1):133-152.
  30. Roy Sorensen, Do Butterflies Dream?
    If people never dreamed, would it make a difference to how they picture reality? Or themselves? Philosophers would certainly lose the most natural way of introducing skepticism. The Chinese Taoist, Chuang Tzu (369 B. C. - ?), dreamt he was a butterfly. When he awoke he wondered whether he was a man who dreamt he was butterfly or a butterfly now dreaming he is a man. Any experience can be explained as either a faithful representation of the world or as (...)
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  31. Ernest Sosa (2005). Dreams and Philosophy. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2):7 - 18.
    That conception is orthodox in today’s common sense and also historically. Presupposed by Plato, Augustine, and Descartes, it underlies familiar skeptical paradoxes. Similar orthodoxy is also found in our developing science of sleep and dreaming.[2] Despite such confluence.
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  32. Ernest Sosa (1988). Beyond Scepticism, to the Best of Our Knowledge. Mind 97 (386):153-188.
    Epistemology is too far-flung and diverse for a survey in a single essay. I have settled for a snapshot which, though perforce superficial and partial, might yet provide an overview. My perspective is determined by the books and articles prominent in the recent literature and in my own recent courses and seminars. Seeing that the boundaries of our field have shifted through the ages and are even now very ill-marked, I have chosen two central issues, each under vigorous and many-sided (...)
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  33. Ernest Sosa & Jonathan Ichikawa (2009). Dreaming, Philosophical Issues. In Tim Bayne, Patrick Wilken & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Having fascinated some of the greatest philosophers from the earliest times, dreaming figures importantly in the history of philosophy, as in Plato’s Theaetetus, Augustine’s Confessions, and, perhaps most famously, Descartes’s Mediations. By far the greatest philosophical focus on dreaming has been epistemic: Socrates suggests to Theaetetus that since he cannot tell whether he is dreaming, he cannot trust his senses to know contingent facts about the world around him. And a similar worry drives Descartes’s radical doubt in the First Meditation. (...)
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  34. Avrum Stroll (2009). Wittgenstein and the Dream Hypothesis. Philosophia 37 (4):681-690.
    The paper deals with Wittgenstein’s treatment of radical skepticism. He holds from his earliest work to his last that skepticism is senseless and therefore no rebuttal, such as G.E. Moore offered, is necessary.
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  35. Robert Wachbrit (1987). Dreams and Representations: A New Perspective on Dreaming and Cartesian Skepticism. American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (2):171 - 180.
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  36. Russell Wahl & Jonathan Westphal (1992). Descartes, Leibniz and Berkeley on Whether We Can Dream Marks of the Waking State. Studia Leibnitiana 24 (2):177-181.
  37. Jan Westerhoff (2011). Reality: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
    Is matter real? Are persons real? Is time real? This Very Short Introduction discusses what, if anything, is "real" by looking at a variety of arguments from philosophy, physics, and cognitive science. The book shows that the question "what is real?" is not some esoteric puzzle that only philosophers ponder. Scientists also ask this question when they investigate whether candidates for the fundamental constituents of matter are actually "out there" or just a mere abstraction from a successful theory and cognitive (...)
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  38. Jessica M. Wilson (2012). The Regress Argument Against Cartesian Skepticism. Analysis 72 (4):668-673.
    I argue that Cartesian skepticism about the external world leads to a vicious regress of skeptical attitudes, the only principled and unproblematic response to which requires refraining from taking the very first skeptical step.
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  39. Julian Wolfe (1971). Dreaming and Scepticism. Mind 80 (320):605-606.
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  40. Crispin Wright (1991). Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon. Noûs 25 (2):205.
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  41. R. M. Yost Jr (1959). Professor Malcolm on Dreaming and Scepticism--I. Philosophical Quarterly 9 (April):142-151.
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  42. R. M. Yost Jr (1959). Professor Malcolm on Dreaming and Scepticism--I. Philosophical Quarterly 9 (35):142-151.
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  43. R. M. Yost Jr (1959). Professor Malcolm on Dreaming and Scepticism--II. Philosophical Quarterly 9 (36):231-243.
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