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  1. Istvan A. Aranyosi (2005). Type-A Dualism: A Novel Theory of the Mental-Physical Nexus. Dissertation, Central European University
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  2. R. Banerjee, A. Bhattacharya, A. Genc & B. M. Arora (2006). Structure of Twins in Gaas Nanowires Grown by the Vapour-Liquid-Solid Process. Philosophical Magazine Letters 86 (12):807-816.
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  3. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) (2006). Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness. Ontos.
    By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavors to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favor of new and more differentiated positions.
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  4. Karen Bennett, Why I Am Not a Dualist.
    Dualists think that not all the facts are physical facts. They think that there are facts about phenomenal consciousness that cannot be explained in purely physical terms—facts about what it’s like to see red, what it’s like to feel sandpaper, what it’s like to run 10 miles when it’s 15° F out, and so on. These phenomenal facts are genuine ‘extras’, not fixed by the physical facts and the physical laws. To use the standard metaphor: even after God settled the (...)
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  5. Kirsten Birkett (2006). Conscious Objections: God and the Consciousness Debates. Zygon 41 (2):249-266.
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  6. Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (1987). Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and Consciousness. Blackwell.
  7. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Undefeated Dualism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.
    In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...)
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  8. John Bricke (1973). The Attribute Theory of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (December):226-237.
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  9. Chhanda Chakraborti (2002). Metaphysics of Consciousness, and David Chalmers's Property Dualism. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19 (2):59-84.
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  10. Jason Costanzo (forthcoming). Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content (...)
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  11. John M. DePoe (2013). RoboMary, Blue Banana Tricks, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness: A Critique of Daniel Dennett's Apology for Physicalism. Philosophia Christi 15 (1):119-132.
    Daniel Dennett has argued that consciousness can be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of physical entities and processes. In some of his most recent publications, he has made this case by casting doubts on purely conceptual thought experiments and proposing his own thought experiments to "pump" the intuition that consciousness can be physical. In this paper, I will summarize Dennett's recent defenses of physicalism, followed by a careful critique of his position. The critique presses two flaws in Dennett's defense of (...)
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  12. Eric Dietrich (1999). Fodor's Gloom, or What Does It Mean That Dualism Seems True? Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 11 (2):145-152.
    Any time you have philosophers working on a problem, you know you’ve got troubles. If a question has attracted the attention of the philosophers that means that either it is intractably difficult with convolutions and labyrinthine difficulties that would make other researchers blanch, or that it is just flat out impossible to solve. Impossible problems masquerade as intractable problems until someone either proves the problem is impossible (which can only happen in mathematics), or someone shows all solutions to the problem (...)
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  13. Eric Dietrich (1998). Review of David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (3):441-461.
    When Charles Darwin died in April, 1882, he left behind a world changed forever. Because of his writings, most notably, of course, The Origin of Species, by 1882, evolution was an almost universally acknowledged fact. What remained in dispute, however, was how evolution occurred. So because of Darwin’s work, everyone accepted that new species emerge over time, yet few agreed with him that it was natural selection that powered the change, as Darwin hypothesized. Chalmers’ book, The Conscious Mind , reminds (...)
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  14. Frank B. Dilley (2004). Taking Consciousness Seriously: A Defense of Cartesian Dualism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (3):135-153.
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  15. John C. Eccles (1987). Brain and Mind: Two or One? In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.
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  16. Christina E. Erneling (ed.) (2004). The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press.
    Clearly the Cartesian ontological commitments that have dominated the scientific study of the mind up to the present have not been helpful. ...
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  17. John A. Foster (1989). A Defense of Dualism. In J. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press.
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  18. Martina Fürst (2014). A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts. In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense. 112-135. Routledge. 112-135.
    The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions. In this paper I first argue that physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts fail to explain their cognitive role. Second, I develop an encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that best explains their particularities. Finally, I argue that the encapsulation account, which features self-representing experiences, implies non-physical referents. Therefore, the account of (...)
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  19. Martina Fürst, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Hiebaum (eds.) (2009). Gehirne Und Personen. ontos.
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  20. Igor Gasparov (2013). Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 18 (1).
    n this paper I would like to defend the three interconnected claims. The first one is based on that fact that the definition of substance dualism proposed recently by Dean Zimmerman needs some essential adjustments in order to capture the genuine spirit of this doctrine. In this paper I will formulate the conditions for the genuine substance dualism in contrast to quasi-dualisms and provide the definition for the genuine substance dualism which I consider to be more appropriate than the Zimmerman's (...)
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  21. Benedikt Paul Göcke (2009). From Physicalism to Theological Idealism. In Martina Fürst, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Hiebaum (eds.), Gehirne und Personen. ontos.
    In the first part elements and entailments of an adequate thesis of physicalism are presented. In the second part an argument against these is elaborated. Based on this argument a thesis of theological idealism is sketched.
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  22. Irwin Goldstein (1996). Ontology, Epistemology, and Private Ostensive Definition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.
    People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
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  23. Ted Honderich (1981). Nomological Dualism: Reply to Four Critics. Inquiry 24 (December):419-438.
    Three theses about the mind, when conjoined with a certain understanding of lawlike connection, escape the objection that they constitute an epiphenomenalism and so conflict with our conviction of the efficacy of the mental. Certain alternatives to the given picture of the mind, one of them an Identity Theory, are in various respects less defensible. The given picture can be defended against considerations deriving from a contextual conception of the mental, and from an elaborated objection having to do with the (...)
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  24. Ted Honderich (1981). Psychophysical Law-Like Connections and Their Problems. Inquiry 24 (October):277-303.
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  25. Amy Kind (2005). The Irreducibility of Consciousness. Disputatio 1 (19):1 - 18.
    In this paper, by analyzing the Chalmers-Searle debate about Chalmers� zombie thought experiment, I attempt to determine the implications that the irreducibility of consciousness has for the truth of materialism. While Chalmers claims that the irreducibility of consciousness forces us to embrace dualism, Searle claims that it has no deep metaphysical import and, in particular, that it is fully consistent with his materialist theory of mind. I argue that this disagreement hinges on the notion of physical identity in play in (...)
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  26. Ran Lahav & N. Shanks (1992). How to Be a Scientifically Respectable 'Property Dualist'. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):211-32.
  27. Eric LaRock (2013). From Biological Naturalism to Emergent Subject Dualism. Philosophia Christi 15 (1):97-118.
    I argue (1) that Searle's reductive stance about mental causation is unwarranted on evolutionary, logical, and neuroscientific grounds; and (2) that his theory of weak emergence, called biological naturalism, fails to provide a satisfactory account of objectual unity and subject unity. Finally I propose a stronger variety of emergence called emergent subject dualism (ESD) to fill the gaps in Searle's account, and support ESD on grounds of recent evidence in neuroscience. Hence I show how it is possible, if not also (...)
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  28. Noa Latham (1998). Chalmers on the Addition of Consciousness to the Physical World. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):71-97.
  29. E. J. Lowe (2005). Uwe Meixner, the Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism, Paderborn, Mentis, 2004, 486 Pp. ISBN: 3-89785-376-. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 62 (2):290-294.
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  30. David Ludwig (2011). Beyond Physicalism and Dualism? Putnam’s Pragmatic Pluralism and the Philosophy of Mind. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (1).
  31. William G. Lycan (2007). Recent Naturalistic Dualisms. In E. Meyers, R. Styers & A. Lange (eds.), Light Against Darkness: Dualism in Ancient Mediterranean Religion and the Contemporary World. Brill Academic Publishers.
    This paper is about a certain family of philosophical positions on the mind-body problem. The positions are dualist, but only in a minimal sense of that term employed by philosophers: according to the positions in question, mental entities are immaterial and distinct from all physical things.
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  32. Fiona Macpherson (2006). Property Dualism and the Merits of Solutions to the Mind-Body Problem: A Reply to Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 10-11):72-89.
    This paper is divided into two main sections. The first articulates what I believe Strawson's position to be. I contrast Strawson's usage of 'physicalism' with the mainstream use. I then explain why I think that Strawson's position is one of property dualism and substance monism. In doing this, I outline his view and Locke's view on the nature of substance. I argue that they are similar in many respects and thus it is no surprise that Strawson actually holds a view (...)
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  33. Nicholas Maxwell (2011). Three Philosophical Problems About Consciousness and Their Possible Resolution. Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-10.
    Three big philosophical problems about consciousness are: Why does it exist? How do we explain and understand it? How can we explain brain-consciousness correlations? If functionalism were true, all three problems would be solved. But it is false, which means all three problems remain unsolved. Here, it is argued that the first problem cannot have a solution; this is inherent in the nature of explanation. The second problem is solved by recognizing that (a) there is an explanation as to why (...)
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  34. Nicholas Maxwell (1968). Understanding Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (August):127-146.
    My aim in this paper is to defend a version of the brain process theory, or identity thesis, which differs in one important respect from the theory put forward by J.J.C. Smart. I shall argue that although the sensations which a person experiences are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations which cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory. These 'mental' facts cannot be described by physics for the simple (...)
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  35. Colin McGinn (1993). Consciousness and Cosmology: Hyperdualism Ventilated. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.
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  36. Uwe Meixner (2004). The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psychophysical Dualism. Mentis.
    This book is intended as a comprehensive defense of psycho-physical dualism. It gives answers to the question of what dualism may consist in, and inquires into the broadly cultural motivation behind accepting dualism or its opponent physicalism. Arguments for dualism, among them strengthened versions of the famous classical arguments, are presented and defended against objections. Moreover, the various general objections to dualism are criticized in detail, for example, the allegation that dualism is of an anti-scientific nature. The book issues into (...)
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  37. E. Meyers, R. Styers & A. Lange (eds.) (2007). Light Against Darkness: Dualism in Ancient Mediterranean Religion and the Contemporary World. Brill Academic Publishers.
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  38. Peter C. M. Molenaar (2006). Psychophysical Dualism From the Point of View of a Working Psychologist. Erkenntnis 65 (1):47-69.
    Cognitive neuroscience constitutes the third phase of development of the field of cognitive psychophysiology since it was established about half a century ago. A critical historical overview is given of this development, focusing on recurring problems that keep frustrating great expectations. It is argued that psychology has to regain its independent status with respect to cognitive neuroscience and should take psychophysical dualism seriously. A constructive quantum physical model for psychophysical interaction is presented, based on a new stochastic interpretation of the (...)
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  39. Jörg Neunhäuserer (2007). Wider Die Materialistische Metaphysik. Marburger Forum 8 (4).
    Wir geben einen kurzen Überblick über klassische und moderne antimaterialistische Argumente und entwickeln pluralistische Perspektiven.
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  40. Gregory Nixon (2000). Max Velmans' *Understanding Consciousness*. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):96-99.
    This is a fine book. In what has become a crowded field, it stands out as direct, deep, and daring. It should place Max Velmans amongst the stars in the field like Chalmers, Dennett, Searle, and Churchland who are most commonly referenced in consciousness studies books and articles. It is direct in that the de rigueur history and review of the body-mind problem is illuminating and concise. It is deep in that Velmans deconstructs the usual idea of an objective world (...)
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  41. Michael Pauen (2000). Painless Pain: Property Dualism and the Causal Role of Phenomenal Consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):51-64.
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  42. Howard Robinson (2011). Substance Dualism and its Rationale. In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy.
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  43. Jay F. Rosenberg (1988). On Not Knowing What or Who One Is: Reflections on the Intelligibility of Dualism. Topoi 7 (March):57-63.
    Beginning with Descartes' caution not “imprudently” to “take some other object in place of myself”, I consider first the problems of self-identification confronted by various amnesiacs , both ordinary and Cartesian. Noting that cogitationes as such do not individuate, I proceed to examine conclusions drawn from certain sorts of “body-switching” thought experiments. This, in turn, gives rise to a general critique of “psychological connectedness” or “unity of consciousness” as a candidate criterion of personal identity. I conclude that our ability to (...)
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  44. Don Ross (2005). Chalmers's Naturalistic Dualism: The Irrelevance of the Mind-Body Problem to the Scientific Study of Consciousness. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press. 165-175.
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  45. Susan Schneider (2012). Why Property Dualists Must Reject Substance Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):61-76.
    I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality.
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  46. Roger Smook (1988). Egoicity and Twins. Dialogue 27 (02):277-86.
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  47. J. R. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.) (1989). The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press.
  48. Timothy L. S. Sprigge (1994). Consciousness. Synthese 98 (1):73-93.
    Various reflections on the nature of consciousness, partly inspired by Alastair Hannay's views on the subject, are presented. In particular, its reality as a distinct non-physical existence is defended against such alternatives as have dominated philosophy for many years. The main difficulty in such a defense concerns the contingency it seems to imply as to the relations between consciousness and its expression in behaviour. But it only implies such contingency if some version of the Humean principle that there cannot be (...)
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  49. Jesse R. Steinberg & Alan M. Steinberg (2007). Disembodied Minds and the Problem of Identification and Individuation. Philosophia 35 (1):75-93.
    We consider and reject a variety of attempts to provide a ground for identifying and differentiating disembodied minds. Until such a ground is provided, we must withhold inclusion of disembodied minds from our picture of the world.
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  50. Charles A. Strong (1934). A Plea for Substantialism in Psychology. Journal of Philosophy 31 (12):309-328.
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