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  1. J. Almog (2001). What Am I?: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford University Press.
    In his Meditations, Rene Descartes asks, "what am I?" His initial answer is "a man." But he soon discards it: "But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? No: for then I should inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead down the slope to harder ones." Instead of understanding what a man is, Descartes shifts to two new questions: "What is Mind?" and "What is Body?" These questions develop (...)
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  2. Mitchell G. Ash, Horst Gundlach & Thomas Sturm (2010). Irreducible Mind? On E. Kelly Et Al., Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century. [REVIEW] American Journal of Psychology 123:246-250.
    This is a review of a book that tries to re-establish mind-body dualism by using (a) empirical research on near-death experiences, placebo effects, creativity, claiming even that parapsychology should become a respected part of science, and (b) Frederic W. H. Myers' (1843-1901) metaphor of the brain as a kind of receiving device that records what the irreducible mind sends as messages. Among other things, we criticize the lack of philosophical clarity about mind-body relation, and question the book's tendency to refer (...)
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  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (2004). Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
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  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (2004). Reply to Zimmerman's 'Should a Christian Be a Mind/Body Dualist?' - Yes. In Michael L. Peterson & Raymond Vanarragon (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
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  5. Lynne Rudder Baker (2004). Should a Christian Be a Mind-Body Dualist? - No. In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
    Through the ages, Christians have almost automatically been Mind-Body dualists. The Bible portrays us as spiritual beings, and one obvious way to be a spiritual being is to be (or to have) an immaterial soul. Since it is also evident that we have bodies, Christians naturally have thought of themselves as composite beings, made of two substances—a material body and a nonmaterial soul. Despite the historical weight of this position, I do not think that it is required either by Scripture (...)
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  6. Mark C. Baker & Stewart Goetz (eds.) (2011). The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations Into the Existence of the Soul. Continuum Press.
    Presents views from an interdisciplinary team of scholars addressing questions about the existence and nature of the soul.
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  7. Gordon Barnes (2001). Should Property-Dualists Be Substance-Hylomorphists? Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:285-299.
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in property dualism—the view that some mental properties are neither identical with, nor strongly supervenient on, physical properties. One of the principal objections to this view is that, according to natural science, the physical world is a causally closed system. So if mental properties are really distinct from physical properties, then it would seem that mental properties never really cause anything that happens in the physical world. Thus, dualism threatens to (...)
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  8. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom Elitzur (eds.) (2009). Irreducibly Conscious. Winter.
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  9. William P. Bechtel (1982). Taking Vitalism and Dualism Seriously: Towards a More Adequate Materialism. Nature and System 4 (March-June):23-44.
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  10. John Beloff, The Mind-Brain Problem.
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  11. John Beloff, What Are Minds For?
    _Two positions on the mind-body problem are here_ _compared:__Materialism__, which is here taken to mean the thesis_ _that mind plays no part in the determination of behaviour so that,_ _for all the good it does us, we might just as well have evolved as_ _insentient automata, and_ _Ineractionism_ _which is here taken as its_ _contradictory._.
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  12. Jose Luis Bermudez (1996). Locke, Property Dualism and Metaphysical Dualism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4:223-245.
  13. Thomas W. Bestor (1976). Dualism and Bodily Movements. Inquiry 19 (1-4):1-26.
    Philosophers.all too often think that statements about human bodily movements are basic and unproblematic. It is argued here that just the opposite is the case: with human beings action descriptions are the basic ones and bodily movement descriptions are the problematic ones. They are problematic because they are the offspring of the Cartesian dualist's notion of a human body as something ?conceptually separable? from anything mental, a notion which in fact is wholly empty. This claim is supported by examining three (...)
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  14. Will Bynoe & Nicholas K. Jones (2013). Solitude Without Souls: Why Peter Unger Hasn't Established Substance Dualism. [REVIEW] Philosophia 41 (1):109-125.
    Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to Unger’s opponents. (...)
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  15. Keith Campbell (1993). Swimming Against the Tide. Inquiry 36 (1-2):161-177.
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  16. Gregg Caruso (2001). Review of Nicholas Humphrey’s How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem. [REVIEW] Metapsychology 5 (46).
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  17. Hugh Chandler, -≫Fuzzy Minds.
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  18. Kevin Corcoran (ed.) (2001). Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Cornell University Press.
    This collection brings together cutting-edge research on the metaphysics of human nature and soul-body dualism.Kevin Corcoran's collection, Soul, Body, and ...
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  19. Tim Crane (2003). Mental Substances. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. 229-250.
    Philosophers of mind typically conduct their discussions in terms of mental events, mental processes, mental properties, mental states – but rarely in terms of minds themselves. Sometimes this neglect is explicitly acknowledged. Donald Davidson, for example, writes that ‘there are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties, which is to say that certain psychological predicates are true of them. These properties are constantly changing, and such changes are mental events’.2 Hilary Putnam agrees, though for somewhat different reasons: (...)
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  20. K. Crone, R. Schnepf & J. Stolzenberg (eds.) (2010). Über Die Seele. Suhrkamp.
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  21. Giuseppina D'Oro (2005). Collingwood's Solution to the Problem of Mind-Body Dualism. Philosophia 32 (1-4):349-368.
    This paper contrasts two approaches to the mind-body problem and the possibility of mental causation: the conceptual approach advocated by Collingwood/Dray and the metaphysical approach advocated by Davidson. On the conceptual approach to show that mental causation is possible is equivalent to demonstrating that mentalistic explanations possess a different logical structure from naturalistic explanations. On the metaphysical approach to show that mental causation is possible entails explaining how the mind can intelligibly be accommodated within a physicalist universe. I argue that (...)
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  22. Rene Descartes (2004/2002). Meditations on First Philosophy. Caravan Books.
    I have always considered that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be demonstrated by philosophical rather than ...
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  23. John Dewey (1917). Duality and Dualism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (18):491-493.
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  24. Frank B. Dilley (2003). A Critique of Emergent Dualism. Faith and Philosophy 20 (1):37-49.
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  25. Arthur Efron (1992). Residual Asymmetric Dualism: A Theory of Mind-Body Relations. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (2):113-36.
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  26. Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (eds.) (2005). Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
  27. Suzette M. Evans (1981). Separable Souls: A Defense of Minimal Dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):313-332.
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  28. Peter Forrest (1996). Difficulties with Physicalism, and a Programme for Dualists. In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
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  29. John Foster (1989). A Defense of Dualism. In The Case for Dualism. Univ Pr of Virginia.
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  30. John A. Foster (2000). Theos, Anthropos, Christos: A Compendium of Modern Philosophical Theology. New York: Lang.
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  31. John A. Foster (2000). The Case for Dualism. In Theos, Anthropos, Christos: A Compendium of Modern Philosophical Theology. New York: Lang.
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  32. Robert Francescotti (2001). Property Dualism Without Substance Dualism? Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.
    Abstract Substance dualism is widely rejected by philosophers of mind, but many continue to accept some form of property dualism. The assumption here is that one can consistently believe that (1) mental properties are not physical properties, while denying that (2) mental particulars are not physical particulars. But is this assumption true? This paper considers several analyses of what makes something a physical particular (as opposed to a non-physical particular), and it is argued that on any plausible analysis, accepting (1) (...)
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  33. Stewart C. Goetz (1994). Dualism, Causation, and Supervenience. Faith and Philosophy 11 (1):92-108.
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  34. Herbert Granger (1994). Supervenient Dualism. Ratio 7 (1):1-13.
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  35. John J. Haldane (1992). An Embarrassing Question About Reproduction. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):427-431.
    Standard objections to dualism focus on problems of individuation: what, in the absence of matter, serves to diversify immaterial items? and interaction: how can material and immaterial elements causally affect one another? Given certain ways of conceiving mental phenomena and causation, it is not obvious that one cannot reply to these objections. However, a different kind of difficulty comes into view when one considers the question of the origin of the mental. Here attention is directed upon the case of intentionality. (...)
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  36. Jonathan Harrison (1985). A Philosopher's Nightmare: And Other Stories. Nottingham: University Of Nottingham.
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  37. William D. Hart (1988). The Engines of the Soul. Cambridge University Press.
    Dr Hart sets out to answer this question by showing that the issue is as much about the nature of causation as it is about the natures of mind and matter.
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  38. John Hawthorne (2007). Cartesian Dualism. In Peter van Inwagen & D. Zimmerman (eds.), Persons Human and Divine. Oxford University Press.
    In this short paper, I shall examine some key structural features of Descartes’s metaphysics, as it relates to mind–body dualism. The style of presentation will partly be one of rational reconstruction, designed to present the Cartesian system in a way that will be of maximal interest to contemporary metaphysicians. Section 1 focuses on five key Cartesian theses about principal attributes. Sections 2 and 3 examine how those theses play themselves out in Descartes’s discussion of mind–body dualism.
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  39. Robert T. Herbert (1998). Dualism/Materialism. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):159-75.
    I argue that in rejecting Cartesian ‘mind’ and retaining Cartesian ‘body’, materialism/physicalism falls to the allure of three charming but deadly ‘eliminative’ identities: perceivable properties become particles in motion; perception, by being ‘sensationized’, turns into neuronal activity; and a perceiver becomes a brain in a body. In rebuttal I argue that ‘particles in motion’ does not nullify but instead preserves the perceivable properties it seeks to explain; ‘neuronal activity’ is not a reduction of, but is doubtlessly necessary to, perception; and (...)
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  40. Kenneth E. Himma (2005). When a Problem for All is a Problem for None: Substance Dualism, Physicalism, and the Mind-Body Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):81-92.
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  41. Wolfram Hinzen (2006). Dualism and the Atoms of Thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (9):25-55.
    Contemporary arguments for forms of psycho-physical dualism standardly depart from phenomenal aspects of consciousness ('what it is like' to have some particular conscious experience). Conceptual aspects of conscious experience, as opposed to phenomenal or visual/perceptual ones, are often taken to be within the scope of functionalist, reductionist, or physicalist theories. I argue that the particular conceptual structure of human consciousness makes this asymmetry unmotivated. The argument for a form of dualism defended here proceeds from the empirical premise that (...)
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  42. K. Mitch Hodge (2008). Descartes Mistake: How Afterlife Beliefs Challenge the Assumption That Humans Are Intuitive Cartesian Dualists. Journal of Cognition and Culture 8 (3-4):387-415.
    This article presents arguments and evidence that run counter to the widespread assumption among scholars that humans are intuitive Cartesian substance dualists. With regard to afterlife beliefs, the hypothesis of Cartesian substance dualism as the intuitive folk position fails to have the explanatory power with which its proponents endow it. It is argued that the embedded corollary assumptions of the intuitive Cartesian substance dualist position (that the mind and body are different substances, that the mind and soul are intensionally identical, (...)
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  43. Michael P. Hodges (1974). Criteria and Dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):191-199.
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  44. Jennifer Hornsby (1998). Dualism in Action. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:377-401.
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  45. Edward W. James (1991). Mind-Body Continuism: Dualities Without Dualism. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 233 (4):233-255.
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  46. D. Jehle (2006). Kim Against Dualism. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):565-78.
    This paper presents and evaluates Jaegwon Kim’s recent argument against substance dualism. The argument runs as follows. Causal interaction between two entities requires pairing relations. Pairing relations are spatial relations, such as distance and orientation. Souls are supposedly nonspatial, immaterial substances. So it is hard to see how souls could enter into paired causal relations with material substances. I show that Kim’s argument against dualism fails. I conclude by sketching a way the substance dualist could meet Kim’s central (...)
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  47. Jaegwon Kim (2001). Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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  48. Max Kistler (2005). Lowe's Argument for Dualism From Mental Causation. Philosophia 33 (1-4):319-329.
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  49. Martin Knutzen (2009). System of Efficient Causes (1735) ; Philosophical Treatise on the Immaterial Nature of the Soul (1744). In Eric Watkins (ed.), Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials. Cambridge University Press.
  50. Eric Russert Kraemer & Charles Sayward (1980). Dualism and the Argument From Continuity. Philosophical Studies 37 (January):55-59.
    One of the things C. D Broad argued many years ago is that certain 'scientific' arguments against dualist interactionism come back in the end to a metaphysical bias in favor of materialism. Here the authors pursue this basic strategy against another 'scientific' argument against dualism itself. The argument is called 'the argument from continuity'. According to this argument the fact that organisms and species develop by insensible gradations renders dualism implausible. The authors try to demonstrate that this argument fails to (...)
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