Economic institutions governing such activities as food sharing among non-kin, the accumulation and inheritance of wealth, and the division of labor and its rewards are human-constructed environments capable of imparting distinctive direction and pace to the process of biological evolution and cultural change. Where differing structures of these institutions take the form of distinct conventions sustained by (near) mutual adherence, small initial differences may support divergent evolutionary trajectories even in the absence of conformist behaviors.

A generation of social theorists have argued that if free-rider considerations show that certain collective action predicaments are unresolvable under individual, rational choice – unresolvable under an arrangement where each is free to pursue their own relative advantage – then those considerations will equally show that the predicaments cannot be resolved by recourse to norms (Buchanan, 1975, p. 132; Heath, 1976, p. 30; Sober and Wilson, 1998, 156ff; Taylor, 1987, p. 144). If free-rider considerations explain why people do not spontaneously (...) keep the streets clean, though they would each prefer unlittered streets, then those considerations will also explain why there is no effective norm against littering the streets. (shrink)

By assembling authors with a wide range of different disciplinary backgrounds, from philosophy, literature, political science, sociology to medical anthropology ...

The first part of this paper provides a general theory of moral climates, which incorporates the following three elements: first, the values and limitations of that picture of moral behaviour focused on rules, rule-following and rationality; second, that picture of moral behaviour focused on institutionally-embedded activity; and third, that picture of moral behaviour that urges us to come face to face with our own limitations, i.e., our own ways of orienting ourselves to objects of value, such that we do not (...) neglect the vigilance required in order to see and recognise the great variety and depth of suffering and vulnerability. The moral climate of any particular social environment can be evaluated from the perspective of these three elements. The second part of the paper applies this general theory of moral climates to that of international economic institutions. It is argued that, despite their importance, both human rights discourse and institutional features designed to increase participation from developing countries in decision- and policy-making, are of limited use, partly because of their inherent limitations, and partly because of the emergence of international economic institutions in the context of an already heavily de-politicised and autonomous economic sphere. The necessary transformation of international economic institutions ought not to neglect the continuing domination of the orientation of those institutions towards the value of efficiency, to which all other values tend to be made subordinate. The paper proposes not only vigilance about the limitations of current and proposed normative languages and institutional features, but also urges the consideration of a Community Forum scheme, which is designed to bring to light and thereafter communicate, via the participation of international experts and artists, some of the particularities of suffering and vulnerability within specific communities. Finally, the paper illustrates the need for greater awareness of the particularities of suffering and vulnerability by considering the continuing problem of access to public goods and services amongst the poor in Nigeria. (shrink)

The paper maps out an alternative to a behavioural (economic) approach to business ethics. Special attention is paid to the fundamental philosophical principle that any moral ‘ought’ implies a practical ‘can’, which the paper interprets with regard to the economic viability of moral agency of the firm under the conditions of the market economy, in particular competition. The paper details an economic understanding of business ethics with regard to classical and neo-classical views, on the one hand, and institutional, libertarian thought, (...) on the other hand. Implications are derived regarding unintentional and passive intentional moral agency of the firm. The paper moves on to suggest that moral agency can be economically viable in competitive ‘market’ interactions, which is conventionally disputed by classical/neo-classical and institutional, libertarian economics. The paper here conceptualises active moral agency of the firm as the utilisation of ethical capital in firm--stakeholder interactions. This yields a reinterpretation of instrumental stakeholder theory. (shrink)