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  1. Keith Acheson (2000). Disciplined Stories in the Governance of the New Institutional Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 7 (3):341-371.
    The New Institutional Economics (NIE) occupies an important space in the rapidly expanding theory of organization. Traditional testing techniques have only been applied to less complex parts of the NIE. A rich body of evidence generated by the experiences of firms and other organizations lies fallow. The limited domain of traditional testing will persist because of the nature of the central concepts of the NIE, the difficulty posed for integrating transaction cost into an optimizing framework by self-reference, and the particularly (...)
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  2. Frank Ackerman (2002). Still Dead After All These Years: Interpreting the Failure of General Equilibrium Theory. Journal of Economic Methodology 9 (2):119-139.
    More than 25 years after the discovery that the equilibrium point of a general equilibrium model is not necessarily either unique or stable, there is still a need for an intuitively comprehensible explanation of the reasons for this discovery. Recent accounts identify two causes of the finding of instability: the inherent difficulties of aggregation, and the individualistic model of consumer behaviour. The mathematical dead end reached by general equilibrium analysis is not due to obscure or esoteric aspects of the model, (...)
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  3. Judith Buber Agassi (1991). The Rise of the Ideas of the Welfare State. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (4):444-457.
    It is customarily assumed that welfare-state thinking can only appear as a product of the sharpening conflict between revolutionary socialists and the defenders of the status quo; the case of Tom Paine proves otherwise. Although he defended private enterprise (to the exclusion of large landed property), he developed a forgotten early version of a comprehensive system of public welfare in the second part of his The Rights of Man and in his Agrarian Justice, where he argued that the new revolutionary (...)
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  4. Ernie Alleva (1990). Democracy and the Welfare State, Amy Gutmann (Editor). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, Ix + 290 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 6 (02):322-.
  5. Ash Amin & Joanne Roberts (eds.) (2008). Community, Economic Creativity, and Organization. OUP Oxford.
    It has long been an interest of researchers in economics, sociology, organization studies, and economic geography to understand how firms innovate. Most recently, this interest has begun to examine the micro-processes of work and organization that sustain social creativity, emphasizing the learning and knowing through action when social actors and technologies come together in 'communities of practice'; everyday interactions of common purpose and mutual obligation. These communities are said to spark both incremental and radical innovation. -/- In the book, leading (...)
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  6. Elizabeth Anderson (1997). Comment on Dawson's 'Exit, Voice and Values in Economic Institutions'. Economics and Philosophy 13 (01):101-.
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  7. Erik Angner (2006). Economists as Experts: Overconfidence in Theory and Practice. Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (1):1-24.
    Drawing on research in the psychology of judgment and decision making, I argue that individual economists acting as experts in matters of public policy are likely to be victims of significant overconfidence. The case is based on the pervasiveness of the phenomenon, the nature of the task facing economists?as?experts, and the character of the institutional constraints under which they operate. Moreover, I argue that economist overconfidence can have dramatic consequences. Finally, I explore how the negative consequences of overconfidence can be (...)
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  8. N. Scott Arnold (1988). Reply to Professor Putterman. Economics and Philosophy 4 (02):337-.
  9. N. Scott Arnold (1987). Final Reply to Professor Schweickart. Economics and Philosophy 3 (02):335-.
  10. N. Scott Arnold (1987). Further Thoughts on the Degeneration of Market Socialism: A Reply to Schweickart. Economics and Philosophy 3 (02):320-.
  11. Michelle Baddeley (2013). Herding, Social Influence and Expert Opinion. Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (1):35 - 44.
    (2013). Herding, social influence and expert opinion. Journal of Economic Methodology: Vol. 20, Methodology, Systemic Risk, and the Economics Profession, pp. 35-44. doi: 10.1080/1350178X.2013.774845.
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  12. C. Bicchieri (2010). Norms, Preferences, and Conditional Behavior. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):297-313.
    This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms . In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation of normative expectations.
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  13. C. Bicchieri, E. Xiao & R. Muldoon (2011). Trustworthiness is a Social Norm, but Trusting is Not. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (2):170-187.
    Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding (...)
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  14. Cristina Bicchieri & Azi Lev-On (2007). Computer-Mediated Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: An Experimental Analysis. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (2):139-168.
    University of Pennsylvania, USA, el322{at}nyu.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> One of the most consistent findings in experimental studies of social dilemmas is the positive influence of face-to-face communication on cooperation. The face-to-face `communication effect' has been recently explained in terms of a `focus theory of norms': successful communication focuses agents on pro-social norms, and induces preferences and expectations conducive to cooperation. 1 Many of the studies that point to a communication effect, however, do not (...)
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  15. Peter J. Boettke (1990). Individuals and Institutions. Critical Review 4 (1-2):10-26.
    ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS: A MANIFESTO FOR MODERN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS by Geoffrey Hodgson Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988. 365pp., $39.95 Traditional institutional economics argued that the methodological individualism of both classical and neoclassical economics was grounded in a false conception of human nature and a pre?scientific understanding of economic life. Geoffrey Hodgson has provided a restatement of this position and extended the institutionalist critique to modern developments within economics at both a positive and normative level. In the course of doing (...)
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  16. Samuel Bowles (2000). Economic Institutions as Ecological Niches. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1):148-149.
    Economic institutions governing such activities as food sharing among non-kin, the accumulation and inheritance of wealth, and the division of labor and its rewards are human-constructed environments capable of imparting distinctive direction and pace to the process of biological evolution and cultural change. Where differing structures of these institutions take the form of distinct conventions sustained by (near) mutual adherence, small initial differences may support divergent evolutionary trajectories even in the absence of conformist behaviors.
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  17. Geoffrey Brennan & Loren Lomasky (1985). The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington: Toward a Smithian Theory of Electoral Behavior. Economics and Philosophy 1 (2):189-211.
  18. Geoffrey Brennan & Philip Pettit (2000). The Hidden Economy of Esteem. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):77-98.
    A generation of social theorists have argued that if free-rider considerations show that certain collective action predicaments are unresolvable under individual, rational choice – unresolvable under an arrangement where each is free to pursue their own relative advantage – then those considerations will equally show that the predicaments cannot be resolved by recourse to norms (Buchanan, 1975, p. 132; Heath, 1976, p. 30; Sober and Wilson, 1998, 156ff; Taylor, 1987, p. 144). If free-rider considerations explain why people do not spontaneously (...)
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  19. Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne Krasmann & Thomas Lemke (eds.) (2010). Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges. Routledge.
    By assembling authors with a wide range of different disciplinary backgrounds, from philosophy, literature, political science, sociology to medical anthropology ...
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  20. Andrew Brown (2007). Reorienting Critical Realism: A System‐Wide Perspective on the Capitalist Economy. Journal of Economic Methodology 14 (4):499-519.
    This paper critiques the critical realist conception of social relations as ?deep? structures separate from ?surface? social activities. The alternative conception offered by ?systematic dialectics? is advocated. Systematic dialectics takes a system?wide perspective on the contemporary economic system. From this perspective, predominant social relations are inseparable from predominant social activities contra critical realism. For example, the predominance of commodity exchange relations across the economic system necessarily implies the predominance of the activities of commodity exchange. Likewise the predominance of monetary relations (...)
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  21. Vivienne Brown (1995). Reading Adam Smith's Texts on Morals and Wealth. Economics and Philosophy 11 (02):344-.
    In his Comment , Richard Arlen Kleer accepts much of the argument in my article (Brown, 1991) but insists that I have (Kleer, 1993). Kleer agrees that there is a moral hierarchy in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) where benevolence and self-command are ranked higher than justice and prudence, but he is uneasy with the conclusion that economic activity and the pursuit of gain are activities and insists that they do have a significant moral standing. In addition, although (...)
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  22. Graham A. Brownlow (2010). Structure and Change: Douglass North's Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (3):301-316.
    Douglass North is a pivotal figure in the development of the ?new? economic history as well as the ?new? institutional economics. However, the relationship between these two aspects of his thinking remains undeveloped in previous critical assessments of North's work. The relationship is clarified here. The evidence presented indicates that three distinct phases can be distinguished in his writings between the 1950s and the 2000s. The paper relates these changing views to the shifting mainstream within economics and the effects that (...)
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  23. Joseph H. Carens (1985). Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions. Economics and Philosophy 1 (1):39-.
  24. John Christman (1997). Capitalism With Morality, D. W. Haslett. Clarendon Press, 1994, Xii + 280 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 13 (01):117-.
  25. Ménard Claude (2001). Methodological Issues in New Institutional Economic. Journal of Economic Methodology 8 (1):85-92.
  26. J. Couture (1998). Review of Philippe Van Parijs's Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 14 (01):143-150.
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  27. Tyler Covven (1994). Rejoinder to David Friedman on the Economics of Anarchy. Economics and Philosophy 10:329-332.
  28. Tyler Cowen (2007). The Importance of Defining the Feasible Set. Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):1-14.
    How should we define the feasible set? Even when individuals agree on facts and values, as traditionally construed, different views on feasibility may suffice to produce very different policy conclusions. Focusing on the difficulties in the feasibility concept may help us resolve some policy disagreements, or at least identify the sources of those disagreements. Feasibility is most plausibly a matter of degree rather than of kind. Normative economic reasoning therefore faces a fuzzy social budget constraint. Iterative reasoning about feasibility and (...)
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  29. John B. Davis (2006). Social Identity Strategies in Recent Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (3):371-390.
    This paper reviews three distinct strategies in recent economics for using the concept of social identity in the explanation of individual behavior: Akerlof and Kranton's neoclassical approach, Sen's commitment approach and Kirman et al.'s complexity approach. The primary focus is the multiple selves problem and the difficulties associated with failing to explain social identity and personal identity together. The argument of the paper is that too narrow a scope for reflexivity in individual decision?making renders the problem intractable, but that enlarging (...)
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  30. John B. Davis & Matthias Klaes (2003). Reflexivity: Curse or Cure? Journal of Economic Methodology 10 (3):329-352.
    Reflexivity has been argued to be self?defeating and potentially devastating for the sociology of scientific knowledge. We first survey various meanings associated with the concept of reflexivity and then provide an interpretation of Velázquez's Las Meñinas to generate a three?part taxonomy of reflexivity, distinguishing between ?immanent?, ?epistemic? and ?transcendent? reflexivity. This provides the basis for engaging with reflexivity as a problem in the economic methodology literature, focusing on recent contributions to the topic by Hands, Sent, Mäki and Mirowski. Employment of (...)
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  31. Graham Dawson (1997). Exit, Voice and Values in Economic Institutions. Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):87-100.
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  32. Rogier de Langhe (2010). The Division of Labour in Science: The Tradeoff Between Specialisation and Diversity. Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (1):37-51.
    Economics is a typical resource for social epistemology and the division of labour is a common theme for economics. As such it should come as no surprise that the present paper turns to economics to formulate a view on the dynamics of scientific communities, with precursors such as Kitcher (1990), Goldman and Shaked (1991) and Hull (1988). But although the approach is similar to theirs, the view defended is different. Mäki (2005) points out that the lessons philosophers draw from economics (...)
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  33. Philip Faulkner (2002). The Human Agent in Behavioural Finance: A Searlean Perspective. Journal of Economic Methodology 9 (1):31-52.
    According to John Searle's theory of human ontology, intentional mental states such as beliefs and wants rely on non-intentional, Background, dispositions to produce rational behaviour. The distinction between intentional and non-intentional states is used as the basis on which to understand the various conceptions of human agency to be found in behavioural finance. The agent of behavioural finance is characterized in terms of three sets of psychological traits: prospect theory, heuristics and mental accounting. These are examined from a Searlean perspective (...)
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  34. David D. Friedman (1994). Law as a Private Good: A Response to Tyler Cowen on the Economics of Anarchy. Economics and Philosophy 10 (02):319-.
  35. Jeffrey Friedman (forthcoming). Causes of the Financial Crisis‗. Critical Review.
    The financial crisis was caused by the complex, constantly growing web of regulations designed to constrain and redirect modern capitalism. This complexity made investors, bankers, and perhaps regulators themselves ignorant of regulations previously promulgated across decades and in different “fields” of regulation. These regulations interacted with each other to foster the issuance and securitization of subprime mortgages; their rating as AA or AAA; and their concentration on the balance sheets (and off the balance sheets) of many commercial and investment banks. (...)
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  36. Daniel R. Fusfeld (1996). Rationality and Economic Behavior. Journal of Economic Methodology 3 (2):307-315.
    This paper rejects the idea that rationality can be defined as optimization, on theoretic, empirical and methodological grounds. It proposes instead a more general theory of rational action in the context of individual growth, change and development over time, in an uncertain world of social interaction, in which choices are part of a learning process. Such a theory of economic behavior is empirically testable, which is not true of either optimization or satisficing, involves conflict and tension rather than harmony, and (...)
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  37. Daniel Gay (2007). Modernism, Reflexivity and the Washington Consensus. Journal of Economic Methodology 14 (1):83-105.
    This paper develops a taxonomy of reflexive development practice, suggesting an examination of external values and norms; an assessment of the importance of local context; a recognition that policies can worsen the problems that they try to solve; and the idea that theory and policy should be revised as circumstances change. The taxonomy is developed as a way of addressing the difficulties encountered by the modernist Washington Consensus on the one hand and postmodernism on the other. The discussion draws on (...)
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  38. François Godard (2013). The Road to Serfdom's Economistic Worldview. Critical Review 25 (3-4):364-385.
    At the end of World War II, F. A. Hayek denounced the then-popular idea of central planning by arguing that, if pursued to its logical conclusion, it would entail totalitarianism. But there were at least two problems. First, judging by his example of Nazi Germany, state control over the economy appears to be a consequence, not a cause, of the monopolization of political power. Second, he conflated socialism and mere interference in the market with central planning. Therefore, history did not (...)
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  39. Martin Gustafsson (2004). On Rawls’s Distinction Between Perfect and Imperfect Procedural Justice. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2):300-305.
    s distinction between perfect and imperfect procedural justice relies on the notion of a procedure that is guaranteed to lead to a certain independently specifiable result. Clarification of this notion shows that it makes the distinction between perfect and imperfect procedural justice unreal, in the following sense: whether, in a particular case, we have an instance of perfect or imperfect procedural justice depends only on how we choose to specify the procedure that is being followed. Key Words: procedural justice • (...)
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  40. Joseph Heath (1996). Review of Viktor J. Vanberg's Rules and Choice in Economics. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 12:243-250.
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  41. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Richard McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Natalie Smith Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank W. Marlowe & John Q. Patton (2005). “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):795-815.
    Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of (...)
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  42. Carsten Herrmann-Pillath (2013). Performativity of Economic Systems: Approach and Implications for Taxonomy. Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (2):139-163.
    The paper proposes to ground the taxonomy of economic systems on the identification of strongly performative institutions as distinctive features. I analyse performativity on the basis of the Aoki model of institutions, enriched by current approaches to performativity, which I combine with Searle's notion of a status function. Performativity is conceived as resulting from the conjunction of public representations (sign systems) and behavioural dispositions which channel strategic interactions among actors such that certain sets of institutions are reproduced recurrently. I apply (...)
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  43. Carsten Herrmann-Pillath (2012). Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-Following as Performative Action. Journal of Economic Methodology 19 (1):21-42.
    Aoki recently proposed the concept of substantive institutions, a concept that relates the outcomes of strategic interaction with public representations of the equilibrium states of games. I argue that the Aoki model can be grounded in theories of distributed cognition and performativity, which I put into the context of Searle's philosophical account of institutions. Substantive institutions build on regularized causal interactions between internal neuronal mechanisms and external facts, shared in a population of agents. Following Searle's proposal of conceiving rule-following as (...)
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  44. Carsten Herrmann-Pillath (2010). A Neurolinguistic Approach to Performativity in Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (3):241-260.
    What makes institutions ?real?? One central notion has been emerging recently in sociology, which is ?performativity?, a term borrowed from the philosophy of language. I propose a neurolinguistic approach to performativity that is based on John Searle's theory of institutions, especially his concept of a ?status function? and his explanation of rule-following as a neurophysiological disposition. Positing a status function is a performative act. I proceed in two steps to establish the neurolinguistic framework. First, I apply the concept of ?conceptual (...)
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  45. Frank Hindriks (2011). Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization, John R. Searle, Oxford University Press, 2010, 224 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 27 (03):338-346.
  46. Jürgen Lange-Von Kulessa (1999). A Brief Reaction to a Brief Response. Journal of Economic Methodology 6 (3):443-444.
  47. Julian le Grand (2005). Should Citizens of a Welfare State Be Transformed Into “Queens”? A Response to Risse. Economics and Philosophy 21 (2):305-308.
  48. D. MacLean (1998). Review of Andreas Papandreou's Externality and Institutions. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 14 (01):169-176.
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  49. Maksymilian T. Madelr & Oche Onazi, The Moral Climates of International Economic Institutions and Access to Public Goods and Services in Nigeria.
    The first part of this paper provides a general theory of moral climates, which incorporates the following three elements: first, the values and limitations of that picture of moral behaviour focused on rules, rule-following and rationality; second, that picture of moral behaviour focused on institutionally-embedded activity; and third, that picture of moral behaviour that urges us to come face to face with our own limitations, i.e., our own ways of orienting ourselves to objects of value, such that we do not (...)
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  50. Bertin Martens (2011). Economic Exchange as an Evolutionary Transmission Channel in Human Societies. Biological Theory 6 (4):366-376.
    This article argues that the (epi)genetic, cultural, symbolic, and environmental transmission channels are insufficient to explain the structure of modern human societies. Economic exchange of knowledge embodied in goods and services constitutes an additional transmission channel that makes more efficient use of limited human cognitive capacity. Economic exchange results in a gradual shift in societies from task-based division of labor to cognitive specialization. This shifts scarce cognitive resources away from production and into learning. It accelerates learning and reinforces the drive (...)
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