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  1. Paul Anand, Prastanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.) (2009). The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press, USA.
    The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice provides an overview of issues arising in work on the foundations of decision theory and social choice over the past ...
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  2. Elizabeth Anderson (2001). Symposium on Amartya Sen's Philosophy: 2 Unstrapping the Straitjacket of ‘Preference’: A Comment on Amartya Sen's Contributions to Philosophy and Economics. Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):21-38.
    The concept of preference dominates economic theory today. It performs a triple duty for economists, grounding their theories of individual behavior, welfare, and rationality. Microeconomic theory assumes that individuals act so as to maximize their utility – that is, to maximize the degree to which their preferences are satisfied. Welfare economics defines individual welfare in terms of preference satisfaction or utility, and social welfare as a function of individual preferences. Finally, economists assume that the rational act is the act that (...)
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  3. Elizabeth Anderson (1995). Inequality Reexamined, Sen Amartya. Harvard University Press, 1992, 207 + Xiv Pages. Economics and Philosophy 11 (01):182-.
  4. N. Scott Arnold (2000). Free Markets and Social Justice, Cass Sunstein. Oxford University Press, 1997, VI + 405 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):333-378.
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  5. Jeremy Bentham & Dan Usher (1999). Why'law and Economics'is Not the Frankenstein Monster. Economics and Philosophy 15:249-267.
  6. Geoffrey Brennan (2007). Discounting the Future, yet Again. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (3):259-284.
    discounting the future' is one on which philosophers and economists have divergent professional views. There is a lot of talking at cross-purposes across the disciplinary divide here; but there is a fair bit of confusion (I think) within disciplines as well. My aim here is essentially clarificatory. I draw several distinctions that I see as significant: • between inter-temporal and intergenerational questions • between price (discount rate) and quantity (inter-temporal and intergenerational allocations) as the ethically relevant magnitude, and • between (...)
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  7. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin (1995). Constitutional Political Economy: The Political Philosophy of Homo Economicus? Journal of Political Philosophy 3 (3):280–303.
  8. Geoffrey Brennan & Loren Lomasky (1985). The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington: Toward a Smithian Theory of Electoral Behavior. Economics and Philosophy 1 (2):189-211.
  9. Geoffrey Brennan & Daniel Moseley (forthcoming). Economics and Ethics. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    We identify three points of intersection between economics and ethics: the ethics of economics, ethics in economics and ethics out of economics. These points of intersection reveal three types of conversation between economists and moral philosophers that have produced, and may continue to produce, fruitful exchange between the disciplines.
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  10. Dan W. Brock (2009). Cost-Effectiveness and Disability Discrimination. Economics and Philosophy 25 (1):27-47.
    It is widely recognized that prioritizing health care resources by their relative cost-effectiveness can result in lower priority for the treatment of disabled persons than otherwise similar non-disabled persons. I distinguish six different ways in which this discrimination against the disabled can occur. I then spell out and evaluate the following moral objections to this discrimination, most of which capture an aspect of its unethical character: it implies that disabled persons' lives are of lesser value than those of non-disabled persons; (...)
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  11. Ulrich Bröckling (2010). Human Economy, Human Capital : A Critique of Biopolitical Economy. In Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne Krasmann & Thomas Lemke (eds.), Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges. Routledge. 247.
  12. John Broome (1992). Deontology and Economics. Economics and Philosophy 8 (02):269-282.
  13. John Broome (1991). A Reply to Sen. Economics and Philosophy 7 (02):285-.
  14. Campbell Brown (2003). Giving Up Levelling Down. Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):111-134.
  15. Donald W. Bruckner (2004). Prudence and Justice. Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):35-63.
    Whereas principles of justice adjudicate interpersonal conflicts, principles of prudence adjudicate intrapersonal conflicts – i.e., conflicts between the preferences an individual has now and the preferences he will have later. On a contractarian approach, principles of justice can be theoretically grounded in a hypothetical agreement in an appropriately specified pre-moral situation in which those persons with conflicting claims have representatives pushing for their claims. Similarly, I claim, principles of prudence can be grounded in a hypothetical agreement in an appropriately specified (...)
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  16. Luigino Bruni (2010). Reciprocity: An Economics of Social Relations , Serge C. Kolm. Cambridge University Press, 2008. XI + 390 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 26 (2):241-247.
  17. Allen E. Buchanan (1985). Ethics, Efficiency, and the Market. Rowman & Allanheld.
    This is a systematic evaluation of the main arguments for and against the market as an instrument of social organization, balancing efficiency and justice .
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  18. James M. Buchanan (1988). The Economics of Rights, Co-Operation, and Welfare, Robert Sugden. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, Vii + 191 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 4 (02):341-.
  19. Ayşe Buğra & Gürol Irzik (1999). Human Needs, Consumption, and Social Policy. Economics and Philosophy 15 (02):187-.
  20. Paul Calcott (2000). New on Paternalism. Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):315-321.
    Individuals often seem to misjudge their own interests. One reason is inadequate information. Other reasons are failures of reasoning and volition. These reasons have all been construed as paternalist motives for the state to intervene. But in a recent article in this journal, New (1999), criticizes earlier accounts of paternalism. He argues that imperfect information constitutes a standard form of market failure, and consequently policies that respond to it do not require a paternalist motivation. The purpose of this note is (...)
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  21. Bryan Caplan (2005). Toward a New Consensus on the Economics of Socialism: Rejoinder to My Critics. Critical Review 17 (1-2):203-220.
    Abstract This has been an unusually productive exchange. My critics largely accept my main theoretical claims about economic calculation and socialism. They have also started to do what advocates of the Misesian view should have been doing for decades: offer empirical evidence that that the calculation problem is serious. While I continue to believe that incentive problems explain most of the failures of socialism, I am slightly less confident than I was before. Fortunately, there are many unexploited sources of information (...)
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  22. Benjamin N. Cardozo (1930). The Paradoxes of Legal Sciences. New York, Columbia University Press.
    Introduction. Rest and motion. Stability and progress.--The meaning of justice. The science of values.--The equilibration of interests. Cause and effect. The individual and society. Liberty and government.--Liberty and government. Conclusion.
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  23. Joseph H. Carens (1985). Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions. Economics and Philosophy 1 (1):39-.
  24. Paula Casal (2013). Occupational Choice and the Egalitarian Ethos. Economics and Philosophy 29 (1):3-20.
    G. A. Cohen proposes to eradicate inequality without loss of efficiency or freedom by relying on an egalitarian ethos requiring us to undertake socially useful occupations we would rather not take, and work hard at them, without requesting differential incentive payments. Since the ethos is not legally enforced, Cohen denies it threatens our occupational freedom. Drawing on the work of Joseph Raz, the paper argues that Cohen's proposal threatens our occupational autonomy even if it leaves our legal freedom intact. It (...)
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  25. David Ciepley (2004). Authority in the Firm (and the Attempt to Theorize It Away). Critical Review 16 (1):81-115.
    Abstract The classical case for market society appeals to the complementary goods of economic liberty and maximum wealth. A market society overgrown with economic firms, however, partly sacrifices liberty for the sake of wealth. This point was accepted by prewar, theorists of the economic firm, such as Frank Knight and Ronald Coase, and the attempt to moderate, or compensate for, the constriction of economic liberty was a central struggle of the Progressive Era. Since World War II, however, neoclassical economists have (...)
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  26. Flavio Comim & Miriam Teschl (2006). Introduction: Capabilities and Identity. Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (3):293-298.
  27. Robert Driskill (2012). Deconstructing the Argument for Free Trade: A Case Study of the Role of Economists in Policy Debates. Economics and Philosophy 28 (1):1-30.
    This paper argues that, in light of the apparent settled nature of economists’ judgement on the issue of trade liberalization, the profession has stopped thinking critically about the question and, as a consequence, makes poor-quality arguments justifying their consensus. To develop support for this claim, the paper first recounts what economic analysis can say about trade liberalization. Then it analyses the quality of the arguments that economists make in support of free trade. The paper argues that the standard argument made (...)
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  28. David Ellerman (1992). Property and Contract in Economics: The Case for Economic Democracy. Blackwell.
    From a pre-publication review by the late Austrian economist, Don Lavoie, of George Mason University: -/- "The book's radical re-interpretation of property and contract is, I think, among the most powerful critiques of mainstream economics ever developed. It undermines the neoclassical way of thinking about property by articulating a theory of inalienable rights, and constructs out of this perspective a "labor theory of property" which is as different from Marx's labor theory of value as it is from neoclassicism. It traces (...)
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  29. Marc Fleurbaey (2007). Social Choice and Just Institutions: New Perspectives. Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):15-43.
    It has become accepted that social choice is impossible in the absence of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. This view is challenged here. Arrow obtained an impossibility theorem only by making unreasonable demands on social choice functions. With reasonable requirements, one can get very attractive possibilities and derive social preferences on the basis of non-comparable individual preferences. This new approach makes it possible to design optimal second-best institutions inspired by principles of fairness, while traditionally the analysis of optimal second-best institutions was (...)
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  30. Philippe Fontaine (2007). Harsanyi Before Economics: An Introduction. Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):343-348.
  31. Anca Gheaus (2008). Basic Income, Gender Justice and the Costs of Gender-Symmetrical Lifestyles. Basic Income Studies 3 (3).
    I argue that, in the currently gender-unjust societies a basic income would not advance feminist goals. To assess the impact of a social policy on gender justice I propose the following criterion: a society is gender-just when the costs of engaging in a lifestyle characterized by gender-symmetry (in both the domestic and public spheres) are, for both men and women, smaller or equal to the costs of engaging in a gender-asymmetrical lifestyle. For a significant number of women, a basic income (...)
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  32. Robert E. Goodin (2001). The New Social Question: Rethinking the Welfare State, Pierre Rosanvallon. Translated by Barbara Harshav. Princeton University Press, 2000, XII + 139 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):121-145.
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  33. Reiko Gotoh & Paul Dumouchel (eds.) (2009). Against Injustice: The New Economics of Amartya Sen. Cambridge University Press.
    The rest of the book addresses a variety of theoretical and empirical issues that relate to this conception, concluding with a response from Sen to his critics.
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  34. J. J. Graafland (2005). Economics, Ethics and the Market: Introduction and Applications. Routledge.
    The primary aim of the text is to introduce the reader to the relationship between economics and ethics and to the application of economic ethics in the evaluation of the market. The reader will gain insight into: * The ethical and methodological strategy of economics and criticism of the core assumptions that underpin the economic defense of free market operation. * The characteristics of different ethical theories (utilitarianism, duty and rights ethics, justice and virtue ethics) that can be used to (...)
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  35. Ruth W. Grant (2002). The Ethics of Incentives: Historical Origins and Contemporary Understandings. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):111-139.
    Increasingly in the modern world, incentives are becoming the tool we reach for when we wish to bring about change. In government, in education, in health care, between and within institutions of all sorts, incentives are offered to steer people's choices in certain directions. But despite the increasing interest in ethics and economics, the ethics of the use of incentives has raised very little concern. From a certain point of view, this is not surprising. When incentives are viewed from the (...)
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  36. J. W. Grove (1988). Book Reviews : A Philosophy of Individual Freedom: The Political Thought of F. A. Hayek. BY CALVIN M. HOY. Westport, Connecticut and London, England: Green-Wood Press, 1984. Pp. 144. $27.95. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18 (3):422-424.
  37. Till Gruene (2004). Hansson, Sven Ove, the Structure of Values and Norms, Cambridge University Press, 2001. Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):396-403.
  38. Benedetto Gui (2009). On Mutual Benefit and Sacrifice: A Comment on Bruni and Sugden's 'Fraternity'. Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):179-185.
    This note comments on Bruni and Sugden's interesting notion of fraternity among contract partners as joint commitment to cooperate for mutual benefit. I raise two points on their paper, both concerning the role of sacrifice. First I maintain that, differently from other social preferences, guilt aversion (or warm glow) does not imply self-sacrifice. Secondly, I argue that aiming for mutual benefit does not prevent individuals from facing trade-offs between their own and their partnerssacrifices’ enhance cooperative intentions and help create feelings (...)
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  39. Martin Gustafsson (2004). On Rawls’s Distinction Between Perfect and Imperfect Procedural Justice. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2):300-305.
    s distinction between perfect and imperfect procedural justice relies on the notion of a procedure that is guaranteed to lead to a certain independently specifiable result. Clarification of this notion shows that it makes the distinction between perfect and imperfect procedural justice unreal, in the following sense: whether, in a particular case, we have an instance of perfect or imperfect procedural justice depends only on how we choose to specify the procedure that is being followed. Key Words: procedural justice • (...)
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  40. Robin Harding (2011). Freedom to Choose and Democracy: The Empirical Question. Economics and Philosophy 27 (03):221-245.
    Intuitively it would seem that choice is important for democracy. Yet the empirical question, whether people actually do value facing distinct platforms when they vote, remains open. In this paper I seek to remedy that situation by systematically addressing the question using cross-national survey data. Specifically, I investigate whether satisfaction with democracy depends on the number and/or the substance of the choices that are available to people when they vote. The analysis offers strong support for the idea that what matters (...)
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  41. John C. Harsanyi (1987). Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 297 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 3 (02):339-.
  42. LaRue Tone Hosmer & Janet Elizabeth Bordelon (2006). Is the Market Moral? A Dialogue on Religion, Economics, and Justice. Business Ethics Quarterly 16 (3):418-426.
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  43. Christine James (2004). Huntington or Halliburton? The Real Clash of Civilizations in American Life. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 8 (8):42-54.
    A wide variety of sources, including the Huntington literature and popular mass media, show that Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” idea actually has very little value in understanding the current global political context. The central assumption of Huntington’s view, that cultural kinship ties influence loyalties and agreements on a global scale, has little to do with the daily lives of American citizens and little to do with the decisions made by the current presidential administration. The mass media evidence from the United (...)
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  44. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell (2004). Reply to Ripstein: Notes on Welfarist Versus Deontological Principles. Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):209-215.
    In Fairness versus Welfare (FVW), we advance the thesis that social policies should be assessed entirely with regard to their effects on individuals' well-being. That is, no independent weight should be accorded to notions of fairness such as corrective or retributive justice or other deontological principles. Our claim is based on the demonstration that pursuit of notions of fairness has perverse effects on welfare, on other problematic aspects of the notions, and on a reconciliation of our thesis with the evident (...)
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  45. Michael Moehler & Geoffrey Brennan (2010). Neoclassical Economics. In Mark Bevir (ed.), Encyclopedia of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.
    The term neoclassical economics delineates a distinct and relatively homogenous school of thought in economic theory that became prominent in the late nineteenth century and that now dominates mainstream economics. The term was originally introduced by Thorstein Veblen to describe developments in the discipline (of which Veblen did not entirely approve) associated with the work of such figures as William Jevons, Carl Menger, and Leon Walras. The ambition of these figures, the first neoclassicists, was to formalize and mathematize the subject (...)
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  46. Fabienne Peter (2009). Rawlsian Justice. In Paul Anand, Prastanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press. 433--456.
    Rawls’ theory of justice builds on the social contract tradition to offer an alternative to utilitarianism. Rawls singles out justice – not maximum welfare or efficiency – as “the first virtue of social institutions”. Economists were quick to realize the relevance of Rawls’ theory of justice for economics. Early contributions in welfare economics and social choice theory typically attempted to incorporate Rawls’ ideas into a welfarist framework. Current research in normative economics comes closer to Rawls’ original proposal of a non-consequentialist (...)
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  47. Joshua Preiss (2012). American Inequality and the Idea of Personal Reponsibility. Public Affairs Quarterly 26 (4):337-360.
    In terms of income and wealth (and a variety of other measures), citizens of the United States are significantly less equal than their peers in Canada and Europe. In addition, American society is becoming increasingly less equal. Some theorists argue that this inequality is inefficient. Others claim that is unjust. Many Americans, however, are less concerned with the potential inefficiency and injustice of growing inequality. Distinguishing as Milton Friedman does between equality of result and equality of opportunity, many claim that (...)
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  48. Katharine Schweitzer (2013). Making Feminist Sense of the Global Justice Movement. By Catherine Eschle and Bice Maiguashca Lanham., Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010. [REVIEW] Hypatia 28 (2):388-390.
  49. Kai P. Spiekermann (2009). Sort Out Your Neighbourhood. Synthese 168 (2):273 - 294.
    Axelrod (The evolution of cooperation, 1984) and others explain how cooperation can emerge in repeated 2-person prisoner’s dilemmas. But in public good games with anonymous contributions, we expect a breakdown of cooperation because direct reciprocity fails. However, if agents are situated in a social network determining which agents interact, and if they can influence the network, then cooperation can be a viable strategy. Social networks are modelled as graphs. Agents play public good games with their neighbours. After each game, they (...)
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  50. Robert S. Taylor (2013). Market Freedom as Antipower. American Political Science Review 107 (3):593-602.
    Historically, republicans were of different minds about markets: some, such as Rousseau, reviled them, while others, like Adam Smith, praised them. The recent republican resurgence has revived this issue. Classical liberals such as Gerald Gaus contend that neo-republicanism is inherently hostile to markets, while neo-republicans like Richard Dagger and Philip Pettit reject this characterization—though with less enthusiasm than one might expect. I argue here that the right republican attitude toward competitive markets is celebratory rather than acquiescent and that republicanism demands (...)
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