This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
25 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. A. Allport (1988). What Concept of Consciousness? In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Glenn Braddock (2002). Eliminativism and Indeterminate Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):37-54.
    One of Daniel Dennett's most sophisticated arguments for his eliminativism about phenomenological properties centers around the color phi phenomenon. He attempts to show that there is no phenomenological fact of the matter concerning the phenomenon of apparent motion because it is impossible to decide between two competing explanations. I argue that the two explanations considered by Dennett are both based on the assumption that a realist account of the phenomenon must include a neat mapping between phenomenological time and objective time. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Patricia S. Churchland (1983). Consciousness: The Transmutation of a Concept. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):80-95.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Paul M. Churchland (1992). Activation Vectors Versus Propositional Attitudes: How the Brain Represents Reality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):419-424.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Richard J. Davidson, Sophie Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.) (1982). Consciousness and Self-Regulation, Vol. 3. New York: Plenum.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Daniel C. Dennett (1979). The Onus Re Experiences: A Reply to Emmett. Philosophical Studies 35 (April):315-318.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Daniel C. Dennett (1976). Are Dreams Experiences? Philosophical Review 73 (April):151-71.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Drakon Nikolinakos (1994). General Anesthesia, Consciousness, and the Skeptical Challenge. Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):88-104.
  9. Herbert R. Otto (ed.) (1988). Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    INTRODUCTION Phenomenology and analytic philosophy have skirmished often, but seldom in ways conducive to dialectical progress. ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Eliott Park Frost (1913). The Belief in Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (26):716-719.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Georges Rey (1995). Toward a Projectivist Account of Conscious Experience. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. 123--42.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Georges Rey (1986). A Question About Consciousness. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Georges Rey (1982). A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness. In Richard J. Davidson, Sophie Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation, Vol. 3. New York: Plenum.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Titus Rivas & Hein van Dongen (2001). Exit Epiphenomenalism: The Demolition of a Refuge. Revista de Filosofia 57.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. William S. Robinson, Epiphenomenalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process. Huxley (1874), who held the view, compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Alf Ross (1941). On the Illusion of Consciousness. Theoria 7 (3):171-202.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Susan Schneider (2007). Daniel Dennett on the Nature of Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 313--24.
    One of the most influential philosophical voices in the consciousness studies community is that of Daniel Dennett. Outside of consciousness studies, Dennett is well-known for his work on numerous topics, such as intentionality, artificial intelligence, free will, evolutionary theory, and the basis of religious experience. (Dennett, 1984, 1987, 1995c, 2005) In 1991, just as researchers and philosophers were beginning to turn more attention to the nature of consciousness, Dennett authored his Consciousness Explained. Consciousness Explained aimed to develop both a theory (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. David Woodruff Smith (1987). Rey Cogitans: The Unquestionability of Consciousness. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Pär Sundström (2008). A Somewhat Eliminativist Proposal About Phenomenal Consciousness. In Hieke and Leitgeb (ed.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. John L. Tienson (1987). Brains Are Not Conscious. Philosophical Papers 16 (November):187-93.
  21. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1995). Losing Consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1988). Yishi, Duh, Um and Consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1984). Is Consciousness Important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (September):223-43.
    The paper discusses the utility of the notion of consciousness for the behavioural and brain sciences. It describes four distinctively different senses of 'conscious', and argues that to cope with the heterogeneous phenomena loosely indicated thereby, these sciences not only do not but should not discuss them in terms of 'consciousness'. It is thus suggested that 'the problem' allegedly posed to scientists by consciousness is unreal; one need neither adopt a realist stance with respect to it, nor include the term (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Donald C. Williams (1959). Mind as a Matter of Fact. Review of Metaphysics 13 (December):205-25.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Donald C. Williams (1934). Scientific Method and the Existence of Consciousness. Psychological Review 41:461-79.